Karl Polanyi noted in The Great Transformation that when the market becomes a self-regulating system, it fundamentally reshapes society (Karl Polanyi, 1944).
In Azerbaijan’s context, we are now witnessing a different kind of “great transformation.” Politics is being abolished. The system is turning solely into a mechanism of governance, security, and resource distribution. Opposition activity is now treated as an “abnormality” or a “threat.” Just as the severing of ties between the market and society constituted a “great transformation,” the elimination of politics in Azerbaijan represents a transformation of the same magnitude.
Western academia still tries to explain regimes like Azerbaijan using terms such as “competitive authoritarianism,” “hard authoritarian turn,” “shrinking civic space,” and “democratic backsliding” (Petra Guasti and Zdenka Mansfeldová, 2018).
The problem is that these terms refer to systems where politics still exists: fraud occurs, but elections also take place; there is pressure, but independent voices can still occasionally be heard; media is restricted, but not completely silenced.
Azerbaijan, however, has entered a new stage:
Elections carry only a ritual function.
Opposition activity has been criminalized.
The concept of “authoritarian consolidation” can no longer fully describe this system (Kharcenter, Nov 2025).
Political science literature still attempts to evaluate such regimes through the “democracy spectrum.” Yet when discussing Azerbaijan, we must instead use terms such as post-democratic, post-opposition, and post-political regime.
Where does Ali Karimli’s arrest stand in this transformation?
What is being removed together with him is a 30-year political experience — the sentiment that “politics may still be possible.” The regime is now effectively declaring:
“I no longer want to coexist with an opposition. I want a system without opposition, without politics, without alternatives.”
Even the period of classical authoritarianism is now behind us in Azerbaijan:
There is a ruling elite, an apparatus, and resources, but the alphabet of political discussion and competition simply does not exist.
Yes — Ali Karimli’s arrest marks the end of the political calendar of Azerbaijan’s post-Soviet era.
On 29 November 2025, the detention of opposition leader Ali Karimli, the large-scale operation carried out against his team, and the paralysis of the Popular Front Party (AXCP) structure were initially described as “the next wave of repression” (AP, Nov 2025). But this explanation does not fully reflect the essence of the event.
Azerbaijan has entered a stage in which politics itself is being abolished.
For three decades, a strange duality existed in the country: the ruling power had long shifted to full authoritarianism, yet the political energy of 1988–1993 was still alive — principled political parties, alternative leaders, memories of political competition, and at least faint hopes for political debate (Kharcenter, Nov 2025).
Ali Karimli was the final symbol of this resilience.
His power did not come from resources or institutions. He had no parliamentary representation; rallies were banned. His strength emerged from a completely different function: he was the last glimmer of the idea that politics was still possible.
Trying to explain what is happening in Azerbaijan using classical terms — “authoritarian consolidation,” “shrinking civic space,” “pressure on the opposition” — diminishes the magnitude of the transformation. All these terms rely on one assumption: that politics still exists. But Azerbaijan has already passed that stage. What is happening now is the elimination of politics itself.
Classical authoritarianism builds control over politics; the post-political regime considers politics itself an anomaly.
The Azerbaijani regime no longer sees the opposition as a rival but as an “abnormal element.”
It does not simply suppress the media — it declares it has no need for media.
It does not merely falsify elections — it destroys the election as a political institution.
It does not treat the politician as a threat — it defines him as a category outside the system.
Ali Karimli’s arrest is the formalization of this transition — the closure of the political era that emerged after the Soviet collapse.
That era had the following characteristics:
– there was opposition, but suffocated;
– there were elections, but outcomes were predetermined;
– there were intellectual and civic discussions, but they were ineffective;
– political parties existed, but they were powerless (Kharcenter, May 2025).
That era is now over.
Azerbaijan is transforming into a post-opposition state.
– there are no actors of politics,
– there are no spaces of politics,
– there is no function of politics.
The system does not want competition because competition no longer has meaning.
The system does not need dialogue because there is no counterpart.
The system rejects debate because it views any alternative narrative as undesirable.
Preparation for the Post-Oil Period
This harsh transformation taking place now is tied to economic and geopolitical realities. Between 2027 and 2035, Azerbaijan will enter the post-oil period. This stage will involve shrinking easy oil revenues, rising social tension, budget contractions, drastic shifts in regional power dynamics, and new technological and economic adaptation costs (Elman Fattah, Nov 2025).
Democratic systems respond to such conditions by renewing political competition.
Classical authoritarian regimes introduce some degree of softening.
Petro-authoritarian regimes, however, choose political sterilization: they eliminate not just today’s opponents but also the potential political groupings of tomorrow in advance.
Thus, the sequence observed over the past decade — destruction of independent media, collapse of the NGO sector, transnational pressure on exiles, criminalization of bloggers and online activists, dismantling of political party structures, and finally the imprisonment of an opposition leader — is no coincidence.
This sequence is the path toward creating a post-political state.
What did Ali Karimli represent?
Karimli was not a threat to the regime in the classical sense. He did not possess the power to change the existing order. His threat was different: he preserved an alternative political memory.
He was the last bearer of:
– the political energy of the 1988–1993 national awakening,
– the experience of the first democratic parliament,
– the memory of competitive elections,
– the belief in the “possibility of politics.”
In a post-political system, this is precisely what the regime cannot tolerate.
The post-political system views the politician as a historical anomaly. Therefore, Karimli needed to be eliminated not as a figure, but as a function.
Risks of the Post-Political State
Management without politics may create an impression of stability in the short term. But in the long term, this is the most dangerous scenario for any political system. Democratic institutions are essential safety cushions for managing tensions, absorbing public dissatisfaction within the system, and turning crises into political transformation.
Yet Azerbaijan will enter the post-oil era deprived of these instruments:
– there will be no experienced politicians,
– no channels of dialogue,
– no culture of debate,
– no intermediary mechanisms between society and the state.
Under such conditions, a crisis will emerge not as a controlled challenge but as uncontrollable chaos. By abolishing politics today, the regime is leaving itself completely defenseless against the crises of tomorrow.
REFERENCES
Karl Polyani, 1944. The Great Transformation. p 1. https://la.utexas.edu/users/hcleaver/368/368Polanyitable.pdf
Petra Guasti and Zdenka Mansfeldová, 2018. DEMOCRACY UNDER STRESS. https://www.soc.cas.cz/images/drupal/publikace/mansfeldova_guasti_-democracy_under_stress._changing_perspectives_on_democracy_governance_and_their_measurement.pdf
Kharcenter, Nov 2025. MIRAS: Azerbaijan’s Digital Repression Architecture. https://kharcenter.com/en/researches/miras-azerbaijans-digital-repression-architecture
AP, Nov 2025. Opposition leader detained in Azerbaijan’s continuing crackdown on dissent. https://apnews.com/article/azerbaijan-aliyev-dissent-crackdown-opposition-89765279ed1f97f2ca3ab69b580aeaa1
Kharcenter, Nov 2025.The Stability and Legitimacy Mechanism of Azerbaijani Authoritarianism. https://kharcenter.com/en/publications/the-stability-and-legitimacy-mechanism-of-azerbaijani-authoritarianism
(Kharcenter, May 2025. The Evolution of Azerbaijani Authoritarianism (III PART): Ilham Aliyev’s Role in International Authoritarian Coalitions and Western Strategic Tolerance in the Context of Regional Integration Initiatives. https://kharcenter.com/en/publications/the-evolution-of-azerbaijani-authoritarianism-iii-part-ilham-aliyevs-role-in-international-authoritarian-coalitions-and-western-strategic-tolerance-in-the-context-of-regional-integration-initiatives
Elman Fattah, Nov 2025. The Prospects of Weakening in the Aliyev Regime: A Seven-Stage Mechanism of Decline. https://kharcenter.com/en/expert-commentaries/the-prospects-of-weakening-in-the-aliyev-regime-a-seven-stage-mechanism-of-decline
