(This article was prepared as part of the KHAR Center’s research on Azerbaijani authoritarianism)
Introduction
The phenomenon of authoritarian stability in the post-Soviet region—that is, the long-term functionality of systems governed by force—has become one of the most important research topics in political science. Various scholars have referred to this continuity using terms such as “regime durability,” “resilient authoritarianism,” or “hegemonic authoritarianism.” The main paradox of authoritarian systems lies in their ability to function without genuine competition or legitimacy while still creating the illusion of both.
Azerbaijan is one of the most vivid examples of this phenomenon. Since 1993, the regime's stability has been maintained not only through repression and co-optation but also through strategic efforts to build legitimacy. To understand this continuity, it is not enough to examine only political pressure. This stability is shaped by a complex interplay of factors ranging from how economic resources are distributed, how the informational environment is constructed, how collective memory is manipulated, and how the state presents itself through various symbolic tools.
To understand Azerbaijani authoritarianism, one must examine the inner workings of a multilayered system: total control of resources, and the interplay between fear and security. These mechanisms operate in tandem, giving the appearance of a stable system. Although different political theories describe these mechanisms differently, Azerbaijan presents a unique case of a “hybrid authoritarian model.”
According to Jason Brownlee’s research, modern autocrats do not maintain power solely through coercion or imprisonment. They also create tools that unify different segments of society: job opportunities for some, debt forgiveness for others, and for yet others, simply a “don’t bother me, I won’t bother you” principle (Brownlee, 2007). Azerbaijani authoritarianism is built on precisely these invisible pillars, which are constantly shifting and replacing each other. When the social contract begins to collapse, the “security” discourse is amplified. When security fatigues, the “victory narrative” is pushed forward. The system is flexible: whichever narrative works best at a given moment becomes the focal point.
At one time, Azerbaijan was described as a “hybrid regime” or “competitive authoritarianism.” However, particularly after 2013, the system became so monolithic that these terms no longer suffice. The regime no longer engages in genuine competition, nor does it rely on democratic institutions. Instead, it operates through a triad: a social contract, a discourse of security and fear, and legitimacy derived from national victories.
These three pillars function like interlocking cogs in a mechanical clock. If one stops, the others turn faster. In this way, modern Azerbaijani authoritarianism constitutes a uniquely adaptable model that political science has yet to fully explain.
Methodology
This study employs a mixed-method approach to analyze the stability and legitimacy mechanisms of Azerbaijani authoritarianism through three foundational pillars: the social contract/welfare, the discourse of security and fear, and “victory legitimacy.” The approach combines normative and theoretical frameworks with empirical indicators and explores how the discourse is constructed through textual and event analysis. Thus, the research is built on a combination of conceptual and discourse analysis.
The methodology investigates the conceptual arguments presented in the article through measurable indicators and discourse chronologies. The goal is not to provide “definitive proof” of causality, but to present high-level explanatory frameworks that highlight the specificity of the Azerbaijani case in comparative context.
Time frame: 1993–2025
Sub-periods: 1993–2003; 2004–2014; 2015–2019; post-2020
Research question: What are the primary legitimacy mechanisms that have sustained authoritarian stability in Azerbaijan since 1993, and how do they interact?
The Social Contract and the Authoritarian Welfare Paradigm
The early years of independence were marked by economic hardship, armed conflict, and institutional collapse, leading to social chaos in Azerbaijan. This chaos triggered deep psychological trauma in the public psyche, creating fertile ground for an authoritarian social contract. The state came to be perceived as the sole guarantor of order and security, and as a result, political stability became more valuable than freedom for many citizens.
Thus, Azerbaijan’s fledgling democracy began drifting toward authoritarian stability following Heydar Aliyev’s return to power in 1993. During this period, the regime’s power fit squarely into the “social contract” concept found in classical political theory. As Thomas Hobbes noted in Leviathan (1651), “people trade their liberty to become part of a power structure in order to escape danger.” This principle re-emerged in post-Soviet Azerbaijan.
Heydar Aliyev’s speeches reflected this psychological shift. He frequently emphasized that “stability is more important than anything else,” linking the very existence of the state to the concept of security. This mirrored Hobbes’ ideological claim: where there is no order, there is no state. Consequently, the state’s existence and the continuity of power were framed as something the public must “digest” and accept.
During this phase, state–citizen relations were rebuilt on the principle of “political obedience in exchange for social provision.” The regime did not offer democratic participation; instead, it provided basic material needs through normative rules. Scholars Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef describe such systems as “authoritarian social contracts,” where citizen consent is not derived through elections, but through the state’s performance in social welfare and security (Desai, Olofsgard, Yousef, 2009).
In Azerbaijan, this model encompassed not only economic exchange but also emotional and cultural dimensions. The chaos of the early 1990s was encoded in collective memory with the formula: “democracy = chaos.” The state positioned itself as the alternative to this chaos. The regime and its media relentlessly reinforced this association. The instability of the early years was depicted as the “failure of democracy,” while the Heydar Aliyev era was mythologized as the “restoration of stability and statehood” (KHAR Center, Sep 2025).
In this context, the social contract became not only a mechanism of economic provision but also a symbolic act of identification based on ideological loyalty. The image of the state and its leader was constructed as a “savior.” As a result, criticism of the regime or the emergence of alternative political initiatives came to be seen not only as threats to stability but also as acts of moral ingratitude. One of the regime’s greatest successes during this period was institutionalizing political apathy.
Simultaneously, the regime constantly renewed its symbolic connection with the people. During every crisis or threat (e.g., terrorist attacks, regional conflicts), the government presented itself as the guardian of “national unity” and demanded more mobilization and less criticism from citizens. This aligns with Henry E. Hale’s “patronal politics” model, which posits that personal authority structures create individualized systems of stability (Hale, 2014).
As a result, the social contract formed between 1993 and 2003 became the foundation of the regime’s legitimacy in psychological, economic, and cultural spheres. This arrangement did not build a relationship of growth between society and the state, but rather one of fear and dependency. The state’s core function was no longer to offer freedom, but to manage chaos. This distinctive feature of Azerbaijani authoritarianism was preserved in the following years and further reinforced under Ilham Aliyev through the themes of economic welfare and security.
Oil Prosperity and the Economic Engineering of Political Loyalty
In the early 2000s, significant structural changes occurred in Azerbaijan’s political economy. Following the signing of the “Contract of the Century” in 1994, the rise in oil production and the launch of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline in 2005 brought substantial financial inflows into the country. Over 70% of state budget revenues began to depend on the energy sector, providing strong economic backing to the regime’s social contract. While the 1990s contract had been based on the principle of “obedience in exchange for stability,” in the 2000s it evolved into one centered around economic welfare.
According to Farid Guliyev’s analysis, Azerbaijan reflects the traditional model of a rentier state. The state’s main function is not to earn income from productive economic activity, but to appropriate revenues—often through corruption—and redistribute them to ensure political loyalty (Guliyev, 2005a). In rentier economies, citizens’ welfare depends not on their productivity but on the state’s redistributive policies. Welfare is granted not in exchange for labor, but for obedience.
Institutionalizing the Rentier Model
As oil revenues surged, government spending also rapidly expanded. Between 2003 and 2014, the number of jobs in the public sector increased, and civil servant salaries rose. These changes were driven not by economic logic, but by political engineering. The resources distributed through the state budget served not only social purposes but also functioned as tools of control. With state intervention in the labor market and the private sector’s weakness, a broad segment of the population became economically dependent on the regime (Gubad Ibadoglu, Kamil Aleskerov, Galib Bayramov, 2013).
Guliyev terms this mechanism “institutional dependency”: by ensuring the population’s everyday social stability, the state fosters political passivity (Guliyev, 2005b). For instance, in the early 2010s, the state tripled its social spending (IMF Country Report, 2014). While investments in education, healthcare, and infrastructure were promoted under the banner of “public welfare,” in reality they often enabled mega-corruption schemes and further strengthened the state’s control over society.
Embedding Welfare into an Ideological Framework
Oil revenues were used not only as economic resources but also as vital components of the regime’s legitimacy narrative. The slogan “strong state – prosperous people” became a central tenet of state policy. This ideology framed the government as a benevolent provider, while citizens were seen not as creators of wealth, but as its “consumers.” This narrative was amplified through mass media and propaganda during both Heydar and Ilham Aliyev’s leadership. Salary increases for state employees, the inauguration of infrastructure projects—all were deployed as instruments of ideological reinforcement.
This process fits with David Easton’s model of “political system support”: citizen support for the system is cultivated through ideology and ritualized political practices (Easton, 1965). In Azerbaijan, these practices—salary hikes, new schools, bridges, roads—are not only material outputs but also displays of loyalty.
Oil Revenues as “Political Insurance”
One of the most critical functions of energy revenues for the regime was to serve as political insurance. Funds allocated from the Oil Fund were officially used for economic development but, in reality, they helped mitigate social discontent. During periods of crisis or elections, measures such as benefit increases, salary indexation, and loan amnesties became tools for restoring loyalty (Presidential Decree of the Republic of Azerbaijan, 2018).
This strategy aligns perfectly with Beatriz Magaloni’s model of “authoritarian durability through distribution”: authoritarian regimes do not distribute welfare equally but selectively, in line with political objectives (Magaloni, 2008).
State Domination of the Labor Market and the Passive Middle Class
The strong influence of the state over key sectors of the economy—particularly education, healthcare, oil services, state enterprises, and the construction sector—led to the emergence of a passive middle class in society. Although this class was economically stable, it remained politically inactive. Its success was linked to its association with the state, and the belief that a change in the current system could lead to the loss of personal welfare remained deeply rooted. This situation laid the economic foundation for a "culture of secure obedience."
Thus, the prosperity mechanism that emerged during the oil boom years was not merely the result of economic achievements but also formed the financial basis of a system of political dependency. The centralized distribution of welfare weakened society's independence and eroded the sense of public responsibility.
Consequently, between 2000 and 2014, the Azerbaijani government fused the "authoritarian social contract" with economic foundations. A direct correlation emerged between the level of citizens' welfare and their political attitudes: guaranteed provision without competition served as the price for loyalty to the regime. This period was also characterized by the strengthening of economic populism and state paternalism (Farid Guliyev, 2013).
All these factors contributed to the formation of the core psychological foundation of Azerbaijani authoritarianism. It can be assumed that the majority of citizens evaluate "regime change" less in political terms and more as an economic risk.
The Ideology of Stability and Mass Consent
The second phase of Azerbaijani authoritarianism—the oil boom era—was characterized not only by the deepening of economic dependence but also by the standardization of the ideology of stability. Whereas the central condition of the earlier social contract was "obedience in exchange for stability," starting from the mid-2000s this concept transformed into an ideological value. During this period, stability was no longer presented merely as a means, but as an end in itself.
In official state rhetoric, the concept of "stability" is consistently equated with such positive terms as "development," "national progress," and "a predictable future."
Ilham Aliyev: "Over the past 15 years, we have followed this path and achieved great success. The Azerbaijani people have lived in conditions of security and stability. Over these 15 years, very dangerous processes have occurred in different parts of the world, in our region, and in Europe: bloody clashes, wars, civil wars, coups. In terms of security, these past 15 years were very tense. In Azerbaijan, however, our people lived in safety. We eliminated all internal risks and managed to protect ourselves from external threats. Today, we continue to do so, and I am confident that we will continue to do so in the future." (Ilham Aliyev, 2018)
This is not just a speech; it is also a key component of the regime's ideological legitimacy strategy. For instance, in state television, official newspapers, and school textbooks, stability is cited as the fundamental precondition for development. At the same time, the notion of stability is automatically associated with the "wisdom of the leader."
This ideology aligns with Steven Heydemann's concept of "resilient authoritarianism." He categorizes such systems as "ideologically flexible authoritarianism" (Steven Heydemann, 2007). In the case of Azerbaijan, this flexibility reveals itself during periods of declining oil revenues, increasing external pressure, or rising social discontent. By presenting stability as the "core principle of development," the regime responds to each new crisis with a new ideological form. Therefore, stability reflects not only the behavioral standard of the government but also the expectations of the people.
The Psychology of "Stability" and the Normalization of Political Disengagement
The concept of stability has shaped public consciousness in such a way that political disengagement is perceived as "normal" and "safe" behavior. The expression "we don’t interfere in politics; we are just trying to build our lives" has become a commonly internalized social norm. This situation can be explained through Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of "habitus." In this context, stability becomes part of society’s shared behavioral norms. People view political involvement as risky and silence as a form of social capital. The regime encourages such behavior: criticism is labeled as ingratitude, while silence is framed as "patriotism" (Pierre Bourdieu, 1990).
What is striking is that the main cause of this behavior is not ideological loyalty, but the emotional and social need for security. According to Lisa Wedeen’s writings on the Syrian regime, in authoritarian systems people sometimes appear compliant not because they believe, but because they fear the chaos they have experienced before. Wedeen illustrates how authoritarian systems are constructed through obedience, loyalty, and submission (Lisa Wedeen, 1999). In Azerbaijani society, this "consent" typically stems not from trust in the regime but from a perceived absence of alternatives. In this landscape, the ideology of stability encompasses both "negative legitimacy" (legitimacy based on fear of change) and "positive legitimacy" (an understanding that stability must be preserved).
The ideology of stability also functions as a mechanism of "ideological hegemony" in Antonio Gramsci’s terms (Gramsci, 1971). Power is exercised not only through coercion but also through a system of "mutual consent." Due to stability propaganda, the relationship between citizens and the state turns into a model of passive agreement. The state does not merely carry out administrative functions—it also behaves like a parent providing moral support. This paternalistic state model reduces the agency of individuals, as the majority feel dependent on the state for social care and security. Consequently, the notion of individual rights is sacrificed to the principle of collective stability, and in Azerbaijani society, the desire for political change is equated with "threat."
This ideological system rests on three core concepts: stability, fear, and loyalty. Stability is desirable. Fear is the painful memory of losing it. Loyalty is presented as a civic obligation to preserve this "successful" status quo. The interaction of these three elements has created a broad effect of public consent in Azerbaijani society: people comply not out of trust in the regime, but because they retreat into the "illusion of security" that it has constructed.
Heydemann’s concept of "resilient authoritarianism" is precisely this kind of model—a regime that maintains itself not only through violence but also by drawing upon the fear and dependency dynamics within society (Mats Radeck, 2022). In the Azerbaijani context, this model continues to operate effectively both in terms of political governance and in the continuation of the social contract.
The Rise of the Security Discourse
With Ilham Aliyev’s accession to power in 2003, Azerbaijani authoritarianism entered a new phase. In addition to the "obedience-for-stability" contract, the concept of national security began to form the ideological foundation of the regime. At this stage, the state’s priority was not limited to governance and social provision; it also sought legitimacy through security.
From the mid-2000s, the term "security" gradually became one of the central elements of official political discourse. The frequency of words like "stability," "security," "protection of national interests," and "external threats" in presidential speeches increased steadily (International Crisis Group, 2010a). This discourse follows Carl Schmitt’s "friend–enemy" concept: an authoritarian political order can justify its existence only in the presence of threats (Carl Schmitt, 1932). In this context, the state’s role was no longer limited to administration; its protective and defensive functions were emphasized. The state began to act as a "protective father figure," symbolizing both defense against external enemies and an internal center that ensures "national unity."
Thus, the paternalistic model manifested not only in the economic sphere but also in the national-psychological realm. The leader was expected to be supported by all as the guardian of national existence. Everyone had to unite closely around him (Report, 2023).
In the following period, the argument of security became a primary mechanism for justifying decisions across various sectors of the bureaucratic apparatus. This aligns with the theory of securitization proposed by Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan. According to this theory, once an issue is portrayed as a "threat," it is automatically removed from political debate and placed at the center of special attention (Ole Wæver & Barry Buzan, 1998). The securitization theory clearly describes the process observed in Azerbaijan’s political environment, particularly from the late 2000s onward. Based on this approach, an issue becomes a security problem not because it objectively threatens the state’s existence, but because the ruling elite frames it as an "existential threat."
The frequent usage of terms such as "stability," "security," "external threats," "fifth column," and "anti-Azerbaijani forces" in official discourse indicates that internal political processes are increasingly removed from the normal political realm. These expressions emphasize the elevated level of threat. Accordingly, the government frames activities that reduce public competition as "emergency measures," while opposition views are categorized not as political alternatives but as threats to national interests.
As emphasized in the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework, securitizing speech acts become a crucial tool for internal authoritarian consolidation. In this process, the government’s legitimacy is derived not from actual threats, but from the creation of a security discourse.
In Azerbaijan, this resulted in human rights, political opposition, NGOs, and independent media being targeted under the umbrella of "national security." The government, through proxy media outlets, now even labels political parties as threats to national security and promotes their prohibition (APA, November 2025).
Manipulative Use of Security in Domestic Politics
The rhetoric of security has also been directed toward criminalizing domestic political competition. Political opposition figures, journalists, civic activists, and groups working jointly with international non-governmental organizations are presented as “foreign agents” and “anti-state forces” (Leila Aliyeva, 2021). This grants the regime both legal and moral legitimacy: repression and restrictions are no longer political acts but “measures of national defense.”
The regime’s intensified repression against the media and the NGO sector in 2023 and 2024 is justified under the pretext of “protection from foreign influence.” Amendments made to legislation concerning NGOs, political parties, and the media are based on the same principle: “preventing security risks.” In this regard, security rhetoric forms the background for legal restrictions, expanding the method of repression through lawmaking, which is characteristic of classical authoritarian systems (Human Rights Watch, 2024).
The Psychological Function of the Security Discourse: Managing Fear
The impact of security-centered discussions also manifests itself in the engineering of fear — a psychological mechanism. Traumas associated with the war and anarchy of the 1990s have left deep traces in the collective memory of society. The regime continuously invokes this trauma, carrying out a process of “legitimizing fear.” State media frequently bring “the chaos of the past” to the forefront, presenting alternative paths of political action as a “new threat” (International Crisis Group, 2010b).
This corresponds to Martha Cottam and Brenton Faber’s model of “fear and legitimacy”: in authoritarian systems, fear does not remain merely a consequence of repression — it becomes the very foundation of legitimacy. In Azerbaijan’s case, this operates through the concept of “trust in the state-leader for security”; here repression, fear, and trust function as interdependent factors that mutually reinforce one another in the government’s governance doctrine (Martha Cottam & Brenton Faber, 1986).
As a result, the security discourse has brought Azerbaijani statehood closer to a “militaristic” model. In this model, law and politics become subordinate to security mechanisms, and individual freedoms are presented as external factors threatening “national stability.” Because the state interprets all spheres through a security prism, even in the absence of danger the simulation of danger is constantly reproduced.
Thus, the regime foregrounds not “secure democracy” but “security without democracy.” This is one of the characteristic features of post-Soviet authoritarian systems: when security is accepted as the central element of the political regime, regime change is presented as a “threat” to national stability. In the Azerbaijani context, this “security-legitimacy” principle has become one of the main factors enabling the long-term continuation of Ilham Aliyev’s rule.
The Social Function of the Security Discourse
The main purpose of the national security discourse is to manage public behavior and shape both individual and collective thinking. In other words, this discourse does not serve to “protect the state from external threats,” but to publicly justify total internal control.
In Azerbaijan, the concept of security has long been shaped more through symbolic constructs than through real events. Terms such as “war,” “Armenian provocation,” “Western double standards,” “foreign NGO influence,” “religious radicalism,” and “attempts at a coup d’état” create a constant sense of threat in society. This “production of threat” demonstrates the perpetual existence of danger, thereby making the regime’s continuation appear even more “necessary.”
Through the uninterrupted rhetoric of threat, a sacred atmosphere of fear is created within society. In this environment, the state is not only an administrator but is interpreted as a “sacred power protecting from danger.” This corresponds to Zygmunt Bauman’s notion of the “security syndrome.” In such a state of psychological dependency, people are willing to hand over all of their rights to the state/power blindly for the sake of their own security (Zygmunt Bauman, 2006).
The goal of this mechanism is clear: to portray public criticism as a dangerous activity and label critics as enemies. Thus, the regime not only delegitimizes opposition forces but also presents civic participation itself as a “risky behavior.” As a result, the absence of public activism becomes normalized, and passivity becomes the safest way to avoid repression and imprisonment. In Azerbaijan, this process ensures the covert regulation of social behavior. People associate silence toward public affairs with safety, and activity with existential risk.
All of this aligns with Anthony Giddens’ concept of “ontological security”: because individuals are attached to the predictability of everyday life, authoritarian regimes exploit this need by placing the concept of “security” at the center of citizens’ sense of identity (Anthony Giddens, 1991). This process is also a modern manifestation of Charles Tilly’s maxim “war makes states, and states make wars”: the regime strengthens its legitimacy through war discourse, and society perceives this legitimacy as a form of “security guarantee” (Charles Tilly, 1985).
Consequently, the security discourse eliminates the citizen’s sense of identity on political, psychological, and social levels. Through this formula, people — reduced to a state in which they are ready to surrender all their rights — try to secure themselves by adapting to the system, repeating its rhetoric, and protecting themselves through passivity. The regime, in turn, achieves the apolitical behavior of the population and insures itself against electoral risk.
Victory Legitimacy
For a long time, in the reports of Western institutions, the Aliyev figure was associated with terms such as “corrupt elite” and “family-clan system.” Yet after the victory, this image was systematically reconstructed. Notably, the occupation of seven districts had taken place under the Aliyevs. Without the victory, there would not have been a single positive point to include in the regime’s record. The war changed everything fundamentally. A leader previously known as a symbol of kleptocratic authoritarianism was transformed — through the efforts of pro-government media — into the image of a “strong-willed commander” and a “triumphant military leader.” Thus, the corruption scandals surrounding the leader were relegated to the background as a result of the victory, and Aliyev’s image was elevated to a new ideological peak.
The 44-day war that took place in the autumn of 2020, apart from its military results, also played an important ideological role in Azerbaijani political life. It created a new form of legitimacy: victory legitimacy. This new ideological narrative helped the government explain its existence and political authority through the idea of “restoring historical justice.” From this stage onward, the regime merged classical authoritarian stability mechanisms — which ensured social welfare and stability — with narratives of national pride, military heroism, and victory. Whereas previously legitimacy relied on the image of “the guardian of stability,” after 2020 it transformed into the image of “the leader who restored historical justice.”
This transformation corresponds to what Moshe Gammer emphasized: in former imperial peripheries, ethno-national achievements function as the most powerful ideological resource for the continuity of authoritarian regimes (Moshe Gammer, 2008). The victory was not limited to the restoration of territorial integrity; it was also presented as the healing of a national trauma. In Azerbaijani political discourse, this appears in expressions such as “our lands were liberated,” “the nation’s pride was returned,” and “national dignity was restored.”
Thus, the military outcome of the war was transformed into a national myth: the state not only achieved victory but also restored historical justice and national dignity. As a result, an organic link was created between the tone of the victory narrative and the leader’s persona. In government and proxy media outlets, in official ceremonies, and in public presentations, Ilham Aliyev is portrayed not merely as a political leader but also as “the person behind the victory” (Report, 2021). This is a modernized form of traditional authoritarian leadership, where legitimacy derives not from elections but from the execution of a historic mission.
For example, the frequently repeated phrase in official speeches — “we achieved this victory thanks to the President’s wise policy” — forms an ideological link between individual leadership and collective achievements. This ideological construction aligns with the concept of performative legitimacy. Society’s trust in the leader functions less as genuine belief and more as a publicly performed act. In this way, all institutional propaganda reconstructs the “leader–people–state” triangle through victory ceremonies (Azerbaijan National Academy of Sciences, 2021).
The foundations of victory legitimacy are solidified not only discursively but also institutionally. Newly established official initiatives such as “Victory Day,” the “Karabakh Revival Fund,” “The Year of Shusha,” and commemorative days for each liberated city have integrated the ideological meaning of victory into everyday life. These official-public rituals systematize and reinforce the myth.
This process corresponds to Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger’s concept of “invented traditions”: the state creates new ceremonies, holidays, and narratives to transform victory into a source of lasting political legitimacy. Through these rituals, society annually “re-enacts” the victory and thereby reaffirms the regime’s existence (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983).
Simultaneously, in the post-victory discourse, the notion of the “domestic enemy” has resurfaced. Dissenting views are labeled as “casting a shadow on the victory,” while civil society is accused of “undermining national unity.” In other words, victory has been molded in a way that serves the interests of the regime, rather than the state.
To summarize, the war triggered significant changes in Azerbaijan’s national identity. It eliminated the trauma of defeat that had dominated the previous identity narrative and replaced it with the idea of a victorious nation. The regime took full control of this sphere, turning the concept of “victory” into a mechanism of identity formation. Now, national identity is based not on citizenship or linguistic unity, but on achievements obtained under the leader’s guidance. Society, enveloped in the model of a “nation united around the victory,” has sunk into ideological silence. This creates a new period of authoritarian stability in Azerbaijan and strengthens the regime’s sources of legitimacy on emotional and symbolic grounds.
However, this form of legitimacy is temporary in nature. Although the emotional excitement generated by the victory initially created broad solidarity, over time society’s everyday socio-economic grievances began to diminish that energy and motivation. While the discussion of “historical justice” served as an important political tool in the first stage, only five years later the appeal of the victory narrative has markedly decreased. Issues such as living standards, social justice, ongoing severe repression, and the quality of governance significantly overshadow the ideology of victory. As a result, the initial surge of collective enthusiasm is gradually giving way to colder and more rational questions, such as: “What happens now?” and “Did the victory bring real and everyday prosperity to us?” This dynamic shows that legitimacy based on victory, over time, becomes an ordinary event in people’s memory.
In addition, the “victory legitimacy” has a paradoxical aspect. Although the victory narrative increases the regime’s legitimacy, it also normalizes a permanent state of tension and military mobilization. The peace process does not contribute to this narrative. The regime is compelled to raise the level of perceived security at any moment to create ideological obstacles to political change. Consequently, the regime is doomed to become a prisoner of the narrative it created.
Thus, Azerbaijani authoritarianism stands out in the post-Soviet space not only through the centralization of power but also through the simultaneous operation of three distinct channels of legitimacy. In many post-Soviet countries, these mechanisms appear sequentially, replacing one another over time. In Azerbaijan, however, they operate as an “overlapping three-layered system.” This system includes the social contract and welfare expectations, narratives of security and fear, and — since 2020 — the “victory legitimacy” discourse, which not only reshaped the 30-year political configuration but also aimed to prevent the emergence of any “new alternatives” within society.
In other post-Soviet regimes, legitimacy is usually based either on economic prosperity or on the concept of security. In the Azerbaijani model, these mechanisms do not replace one another; instead, they complement each other and, when necessary, fill each other’s gaps to produce a flexible structure.
Azerbaijan is also considered one of the most central nomenklatura-reproduction models in the post-Soviet authoritarian landscape. Elite turnover is shaped not only by formal rules but also by family ties, economic dependency, and generational transmission. This is the key feature distinguishing Azerbaijan from classical rentier states: oil revenue does not merely ensure economic balance — it also functions as the “currency of political loyalty.”
In conclusion, the Azerbaijani model cannot be placed into either the “hybrid” or “competitive authoritarianism” category. This system is a resource-based, security-woven, and victory-myth-shaped hegemonic authoritarianism. Its uniqueness lies precisely in the synchronized functioning of these three elements.
Conclusion
This analysis shows that Azerbaijan’s authoritarian stability is built on a synthesis of fear, welfare, and security discourses.
Fear:
The chaotic independence period of the 1990s created a deep trauma in Azerbaijani society, forming the perception that “democracy = anarchy.” This label became so entrenched among the public that the democratic government of the early independence years saw the need to popularize the slogan “democracy is not anarchy; it is disciplined understanding.”
This situation not only conditioned the transformation of the state into strong hands but also enabled the state to be perceived as “the sole guarantor of order and stability.” Beginning with the Heydar Aliyev era, the regime built its legitimacy precisely on this collective memory: relinquishing freedoms for the sake of security. The citizen handed over his freedom to the state in exchange for protection from fear.
Social Contract:
Since the early 2000s, oil revenues strengthened the economic foundations of the regime. The rent-distribution mechanism created through the State Oil Fund became an instrument not only for social welfare but also for ensuring political loyalty. The state bureaucracy was expanded, salaries were increased, and numerous infrastructure projects were carried out in the regions. The real purpose of this policy was not to raise citizens’ well-being but to keep a significant part of society in a state of economic dependency. In other words, welfare was presented not as the result of labor and productivity but as the result of obedience. As citizens obtained stability under state patronage, they began to evaluate political change as a personal economic risk. Thus, the authoritarian social contract turned into a mechanism that secured citizens’ economic comfort in exchange for political silence.
Security:
Under Ilham Aliyev, the ideological center of legitimacy shifted toward the concept of security. Terms such as “Armenian threat,” “foreign intervention attempts,” and “religious radicalism” became central topics of security discussions. Issues of human rights and free press also began to be framed within the national security context. It is clear that once an issue is presented as a “threat,” democratic debate about it becomes impossible. The security discourse functions not only ideologically but also psychologically — as a mechanism of fear management. By repeatedly invoking memories of war and chaos, critical thinking becomes equated with “threat.” As a result, public passivity turns into “patriotic behavior,” while criticism becomes “internal hostility.”
The 44-day war of 2020 marked the beginning of a new ideological period for the regime. The victory was highlighted as “the restoration of historical justice.” This became an ideological tool that enhanced state legitimacy through the concepts of “national pride” and “restored dignity.” Victory now constitutes the cornerstone of national identity.
The security discourse has transformed into a form of social engineering that shapes public behavior. Citizens interpret political participation as a risk and silence as “wisdom and responsibility.”
All these mechanisms create a balance between security, welfare, and fear. With this balance, the regime is able to portray itself as both stable domestically and a “reliable partner” internationally.
However, this stability is risky because it is based on emotional and symbolic foundations. The economic pillars, ideological forms, and psychological supports of the social contract are tightly interconnected. Oil revenues form the economic base; victory and security play a central role in ideology; while fear and the desire for stability constitute the psychological foundation. If one of these components weakens, the balance of the entire system may collapse.
Ultimately, the power of Azerbaijani authoritarianism lies in its ability to simultaneously manage society’s traumas, welfare expectations, and security needs. For this reason, the regime has become a prisoner of its own stability ideology: to preserve stability, it is compelled to constantly generate new threats, new narratives of victory, and new forms of public compliance.
References
Brownlee Jason, 2007. Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. https://la.utexas.edu/users/jmciver/Honors/NonFiction%202013/Brownlee_Authoritarianism%20in%20an%20Age%20of%20Democratization--Introduction_2007.pdf?utm_source=chatgpt.com
Desai, Olofsgard and Yousef, 2009. The Logic of Authoritarian Bargains. 93-125p. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/46540277_The_Logic_of_Authoritarian_Bargains
Kharcenter, Sep 2025. Control of Collective Memory in Authoritarian Regimes. https://kharcenter.com/en/researches/control-of-collective-memory-in-authoritarian-regimes?utm_source
Thomas Hobbes, 1651. LEVIATHAN. https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm?utm#link2HCH0003
Henry E. Hale, 2014. Patronal Politics. Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/patronal-politics/4C1B4D49A7F17739E75A5AB7B66E2115
Farid Guliyev, 2005a. Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semiauthoritarianism? An Attempt at Conceptualization. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228159868_Post-Soviet_Azerbaijan_Transition_to_Sultanistic_Semiauthoritarianism_An_Attempt_at_Conceptualization
Gubad Ibadoglu,Kamil Aleskerov, Galib Bayramov, 2013. Oil and Gas Revenue Management in Azerbaijan. https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/documents/rwi_erc_20140315.pdf?utm
Farid Guliyev, 2005b. Post-Soviet Azerbaijan: Transition to Sultanistic Semiauthoritarianism? An Attempt at Conceptualization. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228159868_Post-Soviet_Azerbaijan_Transition_to_Sultanistic_Semiauthoritarianism_An_Attempt_at_Conceptualization
IMF Country Report 14/159 (2014). REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN. https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14159.pdf
David Easton, 1965. A Systems Analysis of Political Life ğhttps://www.researchgate.net/publication/251138328_David_Easton_A_Systems_Analysis_of_Political_Life_ChicagoLondon_1965
Azərbaycan Respublikası Prezidentinin Fərmanı, 2019. Azərbaycan Respublikasında fiziki şəxslərin problemli kreditlərinin həlli ilə bağlı əlavə tədbirlər haqqında. https://pk.cbar.az/az/ferman
Magaloni, Beatriz, 2008. “Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule.” Comparative Political Studies 41, no. 4–5 (2008): 715–741. https://bmagaloni.com/storage/uploads/publications/crediblepowersharing.pdf.pdf
Farid Guliyev, 2013. Oil and regime stability in Azerbaijan. https://go.gale.com/ps/i.do?id=GALE%7CA319228490&issn=10746846&it=r&linkaccess=abs&p=AONE&sid=googleScholar&sw=w&v=2.1&utm_source=chatgpt.com&userGroupName=anon%7Ef5831918&aty=open-web-entry
Steven Heydemann, 2007. UpgradingaUthoritarianism in thearab World. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/10arabworld.pdf
İlham Əliyev, 2018. İlham Əliyevin andiçmə mərasimində nitqi. https://president.az/az/articles/view/28071?utm_source
Pierre Bourdieu, 1990. The Logic of Practice. 27-32p https://monoskop.org/images/8/88/Bourdieu_Pierre_The_Logic_of_Practice_1990.pdf
Lisa Wedeen, 1999. Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria. 137-141p. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/ambiguities-of-domination-politics-rhetoric-and-symbols-in-contemporary-syria-by-lisa-wedeen-chicago-university-of-chicago-press-1999-230p-4800/AD5DA7961429426CC1725C9EFD751D95
Antonio Gramsci, 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. 320-342p. https://ia600506.us.archive.org/19/items/AntonioGramsciSelectionsFromThePrisonNotebooks/Antonio-Gramsci-Selections-from-the-Prison-Notebooks.pdf
Mats Radeck, 2022. Tunisia’s Deadlocked Situation: President Saied Takes the Authoritarian Exit. https://behorizon.org/tunisias-deadlocked-situation-president-saied-takes-the-authoritarian-exit/
International Crisis Group, 2010a. AZERBAIJAN: VULNERABLE STABILITYEurope Report N°207 – 3 September 2010. https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/207-azerbaijan-vulnerable-stability.pdf
Carl Schmitt, 1932. The Concept of the Political. 28p. https://archive.org/stream/schmitt-carl-concept-of-the-political.pdf-pdfdrive-1/Schmitt%2C%20Carl-%20Concept%20of%20the%20Political.pdf%20%28%20PDFDrive%20%29%20%281%29_djvu.txt
Report, 2023."Xalqımız Prezident İlham Əliyevin ətrafında sıx birləşərək ardınca irəliyə doğru addımlayır". https://report.az/daxili-siyaset/pa-rehberi-xalqimiz-prezident-ilham-eliyevin-etrafinda-six-birleserek-ardinca-ireliye-dogru-addimlayir
Ole Wæver və Barry Buzan, 1998. A New Framework for Analysis. 29-36p https://www.rienner.com/title/Security_A_New_Framework_for_Analysis
APA, noyabr 2025. AXCP və Müsavat xarici təsir dairələrinin maraqlarına xidmət edir. https://apa.az/siyasi/axcp-ve-musavat-xarici-tesir-dairelerinin-maraqlarina-xidmet-edir-tehlil-924696
Leila Aliyeva, 2021. “Securitization/De-Securitization” and Attitudes in Azerbaijan in Reaction to the Karabagh Conflict. https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/87104/ssoar-caucasusad-2021-121-alieva-SecuritizationDe-Securitization_and_Attitudes_in_Azerbaijan.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y
Human Rights Watch, 2024. “We Try to Stay Invisible” Azerbaijan's Escalating Crackdown on Critics and Civil Society. https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/10/08/we-try-stay-invisible/azerbaijans-escalating-crackdown-critics-and-civil-society
International Crisis Group, 2010b. AZERBAIJAN: VULNERABLE STABILITYEurope Report N°207 – 3 September 2010. https://www.crisisgroup.org/sites/default/files/207-azerbaijan-vulnerable-stability.pdf
Martha Cottam və Brenton Faber, 1986. Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Influence of Cognition. 186p. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/foreign-policy-decision-making-the-influence-of-cognition-by-martha-l-cottam-boulder-westview-press-1986-xiii-262p-2650/89763A4AD3A8E49C3DD5E43589F29C0B
Zygmunt Bauman, 2006. Liquid Fear. “Modern individuals live under a security syndrome, constantly seeking protection from threats that are vague, shifting and often imagined.”. https://pocketbook.de/de_de/downloadable/download/sample/sample_id/8086587/?srsltid=AfmBOopmUpqxzLNg4UaXHhUZU39HjGlKn-vPsAaOxWeYi7HY7_9v465L
Anthony Giddens, 1991. Modernity and Self-Identity. 92p. https://www.sup.org/books/sociology/modernity-and-self-identity
Charles Tilly, 1985. War Making and State Making as Organized Crime. 170p. https://books.google.cz/books/about/War_Making_and_State_Making_as_Organized.html?id=JwAcNAAACAAJ&redir_esc=y
Moshe Gammer, 2008. Ethno-Nationalism, Islam and the State in the Caucasus Post-Soviet Disorder. “Leaders who present themselves as restorers of historical justice often secure strong legitimacy, especially where imperial legacies still shape collective memory.” 16p. https://www.routledge.com/Ethno-Nationalism-Islam-and-the-State-in-the-Caucasus-Post-Soviet-Disorder/Gammer/p/book/9780415596183
Report, 2021. Azərbaycan Prezidenti adını tarixə ərazi bütövlüyümüzü bərpa edən lider kimi yazdırdı. https://report.az/milli-meclis/fatma-yildirim-azerbaycan-prezidenti-adini-tarixe-erazi-butovluyumuzu-berpa-eden-lider-kimi-yazdirdi
Azərbaycan Elmləır Akademiyası, 2021. Prezident İlham Əliyev – alternativsiz lider, qüdrətli sərkərdə. https://science.gov.az/az/news/open/18702
Hobsbawm Eric & Ranger, 1983. The Invention of Tradition. “The invention of tradition implies a process of formalization and ritualization, often in response to novel situations, by attempting to establish continuity with a suitable historic past.” (Introduction). https://psi424.cankaya.edu.tr/uploads/files/Hobsbawm_and_Ranger_eds_The_Invention_of_Trad
