For easier reading and comprehension, this research by the KHAR Center will be presented in multiple parts.
For the first part of the research
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Ilham Aliyev not only maintains authoritarian governance domestically but also pursues a foreign policy aimed at promoting and supporting authoritarian political models at the international level. The core characteristic of this policy is a departure from the liberal-democratic world and the establishment of deep cooperation with authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes. At the regional level, Aliyev acts as both a founder and a member of alliances that unite non-democratic regimes. As one of the new-generation authoritarian leaders of the 21st century, Aliyev is now recognized as an active participant and initiator of international authoritarian networks. He has especially forged strategic partnerships with authoritarian regimes in Russia, China, Turkey, and Central Asia, promoting regional authoritarian integration and strengthening mutual support mechanisms among these regimes. Simultaneously, he has crafted a façade of cooperation with Western countries in areas such as energy security, migration, and geopolitical balance, thus managing to avoid harsh international pressure on his authoritarian policies. The West’s selective and tolerant stance towards his regime has created fertile ground for Aliyev to entrench authoritarianism both regionally and globally while ensuring his own political impunity.
Strategic Alliances with Authoritarian Regimes: Russia, China, and Central Asia
Anti-democratic synchronization: The Azerbaijani leadership prioritizes political and economic relations with authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes such as Russia, China, Turkey, Belarus, Central Asian countries, and Iran (President.az 2025a). These relationships encompass not only energy and trade but also the exchange of governance practices, information control, suppression of opposition, and large-scale assaults on human rights under the pretext of state sovereignty (OCCRP 2021).
Aliyev has particularly pursued close political ties with Vladimir Putin’s Russia, aiming to solidify an authoritarian cooperation platform in the post-Soviet space. The 2022 “Declaration on Allied Interaction” with Russia sent a clear signal of Azerbaijan’s strategic pivot away from the West.
At the same time, economic and infrastructure cooperation with China has deepened under the Belt and Road Initiative. Democracy, human rights, and civil society are entirely absent from the agenda of these partnerships (President.az 2025b).
Aliyev’s cooperation model with such regimes serves to build a regional authoritarian resistance network to weaken Western normative influence (Kendall-Taylor & Frantz, 2014).
An Authoritarian Barrier Against the Wave of Democracy
Aliyev’s regime has, in recent years, not only preserved the internal political status quo in the South Caucasus but also actively sought to preempt democratic transformations at the regional level. This demonstrates that the regime does not merely defend authoritarianism but also actively attempts to propagate it. In this process, Azerbaijan has assumed the role of an “anti-democratic outpost.” This strategy manifests in three primary dimensions: controlling the regional environment, neutralizing Western normative influence, and constructing a discursive hegemony.
Neutralization of regional democracy initiatives: Aliyev’s regime has consistently approached democratic awakenings in Georgia, Armenia, and the broader post-Soviet space with skepticism and caution. Georgia’s 2003 Rose Revolution and its subsequent democratic reforms, as well as Armenia’s 2018 “Velvet Revolution,” posed a risk of “contamination” of authoritarianism in the region. Consequently, the Azerbaijani leadership began portraying these transformations as “Western scripts,” “externally orchestrated chaos,” and “domestically destabilizing uprisings.”
The regime’s aggressive rhetoric toward Armenia’s democratic transition and its diplomatic and military pressure on the Pashinyan government are not solely explained by the Karabakh conflict; rather, they can be interpreted as a strategic maneuver to prevent the emergence of a “model democratic government” in the region. For the Aliyev regime, a successful democratic neighbor could deepen its own internal legitimacy crisis and potentially inspire demands for alternative governance models among Azerbaijani citizens.
A realpolitik support system against Western normative influence: Despite criticisms from Western institutions—particularly the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and the U.S. Department of State—regarding human rights abuses, election fraud, and media suppression in Azerbaijan, Aliyev has employed a dual strategy to neutralize such pressure: energy diplomacy and authoritarian diversification.
Through energy policy, the Aliyev regime pushes the West toward interest-based cooperation rather than idealistic principles. For example, while the EU elite presented Azerbaijan as a “reliable gas supplier” in the 2022 energy agreement with the European Commission, the number of political prisoners in Azerbaijan continued to rise (European Commission 2024). Concurrently, the regime deepened military, technological, and diplomatic ties with undemocratic states such as Russia and China, thereby establishing a kind of “anti-Western buffer” in the region.
In this process, Aliyev has aligned strategically with leaders such as Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to construct a conservative-authoritarian counter-wave against Western-promoted democratization efforts. This wave is not merely defensive; it also carries an ideological and discursive offensive character.
Export of Authoritarian Discourse and Manipulation of Public Consciousness
The Aliyev regime actively seeks to delegitimize Western democracy in the eyes of the domestic audience. In both official and proxy media, Western societies are depicted as symbols of “chaos, depravity, and weakness.” Political crises in the U.S. and EU—such as the Capitol attack in the U.S. or controversies surrounding migration policies in France and Germany—are presented to the Azerbaijani public as evidence of “democracy’s collapse.”
This discourse aims not only to erode public trust in the West but also to normalize authoritarian governance as a “national model” and a “guarantee of stability and development.” The regime’s propaganda machinery consistently promotes themes such as “Western double standards,” “interference with national sovereignty,” and “attacks on traditional values.” These narratives closely align with Russia’s “sovereign democracy” and China’s “development without democracy” concepts.
Authoritarian resistance architecture in the Caucasus: As a result of these policies, the Aliyev regime functions as a coordinated barrier to Western democracy initiatives in the Caucasus. This barrier is not merely passive resistance—it is a strategic structure that actively seeks to block Western ideological influence through foreign policy. Examples include involvement in weakening opposition forces in Georgia, ongoing pressure on Pashinyan’s government in Armenia, and intensified cooperation with Russia and Iran. These represent the main pillars of the authoritarian geopolitical barrier that Aliyev has constructed.
Aliyev’s political strategy is thus not simply a matter of “national self-defense” but part of a broader ideological counteroffensive as a member of international authoritarian blocs. This model aims to redesign the South Caucasus as a post-democratic space. In this context, Azerbaijan is no longer just an authoritarian state—it is a regional hub of resistance against democracy promotion.
Authoritarian Integration Initiatives
Especially since 2020, Ilham Aliyev has played an active role in platforms such as the Organization of Turkic States and the Non-Aligned Movement, promoting ideologies centered not on democratic criteria but on sovereignty, stability, and “neutrality against the West.” These structures are used to launch counterattacks against human rights criticisms and to legitimize authoritarian regimes.
In recent decades, Azerbaijan has not only consolidated internal authoritarianism but also established close international collaborations with other authoritarian regimes. These collaborations are not solely driven by economic and security interests; they are part of broader ideological and strategic integration efforts to create an alternative to the liberal-democratic international order. Under Aliyev, Azerbaijan has become both a participant and a driver of authoritarian integration.
Thus, the Aliyev regime is not merely preserving authoritarianism—it is transforming into a strategic partner for regional actors seeking to disseminate authoritarian governance. This places Azerbaijan as a crucial link in the international authoritarian coalition led by Vladimir Putin.
Intensification of Anti-Western Rhetoric
In recent years, the Aliyev regime has adopted an increasingly confrontational tone against Western political centers such as the United States and the European Union, as well as democratic institutions like the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), accusing them of “interference in internal affairs” and “double standards.” This rhetoric mirrors the lexicon of Russia and other authoritarian regimes, forming part of the coordinated information strategies of the international authoritarian coalition (Freedom House 2023a). In recent years, anti-Western rhetoric has become central to Aliyev’s political vocabulary. It reflects not only the tensions in Azerbaijan’s relations with the West but also constitutes the regime’s primary narrative for legitimizing domestic authoritarianism.
Western states and institutions—especially the EU, the Council of Europe, and the U.S.—are portrayed as having “neo-colonial” and “imperial” intentions. This rhetoric is structured around three pillars: domestic legitimation, international positioning, and the promotion of regional alternatives.
Domestically, anti-Western rhetoric is presented through propaganda emphasizing “national security,” “degradation of Western values,” and “resistance to external enemies.” Aliyev and his administration frequently claim that Western demands for human rights and free elections are, in fact, aimed at weakening Azerbaijan’s sovereignty and dragging the country into chaos.
In state media, the West is portrayed as the mastermind behind disastrous events like the “Arab Spring,” “color revolutions,” and the crises in Libya, Syria, and Ukraine—used to stoke fear and anxiety.
Opposition activists, NGOs, and journalists are routinely labeled “grant recipients of Western foundations,” “fifth columns,” or “servants of foreign interests.” This approach stigmatizes critics as traitors.
Since 2020, Aliyev’s speeches have increasingly included harsh and explicit condemnations of reports by the European Parliament and U.S. State Department. For example, in a 2022 speech, he declared: “The Azerbaijani people will never again be accountable to any international organization—those days are over!” (Report 2019).
Anti-Western rhetoric is also used to justify a geopolitical reorientation and closer ties with authoritarian regimes. Aliyev presents the West as an unreliable partner due to its political pressure and “democracy demands,” while relations with Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran are described as “cooperation based on mutual respect.”
- Azerbaijan’s relations with the Council of Europe are effectively frozen, and non-compliance with European Court of Human Rights judgments has become routine.
- Instead, pragmatic energy and security cooperation with Russia and “development without democracy” cooperation with China are promoted. In economic and media narratives, the Chinese model of “authoritarian capitalism” is compared favorably against the “chaotic and destructive democracy” of the West and is offered as an alternative path.
- At the ideological level, anti-Western rhetoric targets core Western values such as human rights, gender equality, open society, LGBTQ rights, and liberal legal systems, portraying them as “immoral,” “alien to national culture,” and “contrary to traditional family structures.”
- This discourse seeks to mobilize broader segments of society—especially conservative and religious groups—against Western-oriented policies.
- Experts and media outlets close to the Presidential Administration frame opposition to Western “ideological hegemony” as a struggle for “cultural independence.”
- Thus, the goal is not merely the political survival of the regime, but also the ideological consolidation of authoritarianism.
Anti-Western rhetoric has become not just a communication tool but a core ideological pillar for the survival and continuity of Aliyev’s political regime. Through this rhetoric, the regime positions itself domestically as a “shield against foreign influence” and internationally as an active member of the “authoritarian coalition.”
Exchange of Repressive Technologies and Practices
Azerbaijan has shown significant interest in digital surveillance technologies developed by states such as Iran, China, and Russia. Moreover, it has actively utilized regional experiences in internet censorship, social media control, and surveillance of civic activists. This indicates a localized implementation of international authoritarian practices aimed at ensuring long-term political stability and control.
Thus, Ilham Aliyev is not only a domestic practitioner of authoritarianism but also an international promoter and defender of such governance models. Under his leadership, Azerbaijan has become an active participant in the “authoritarian bloc,” seeking to strengthen solidarity among non-democratic regimes and to institutionalize mechanisms of cooperation and mutual support at both regional and global levels.
The Role of Political Corruption in the West’s Tolerant Attitude Towards the Aliyev Regime
The Western political elite’s “dangerous tolerance” towards Azerbaijan’s authoritarian regime is rooted not only in geopolitical interests but also in transnational political corruption. The Aliyev government has established corrupt ties with political and economic circles in Western countries to minimize international pressure concerning human rights violations and democratic backsliding.
The regime’s influence over institutions such as the Council of Europe and the European Parliament through lobbying and bribery became widely known in the 2010s as “caviar diplomacy.” Azerbaijani officials offered expensive gifts, cash payments, and various services to European parliamentarians and Western diplomats in exchange for their silence on human rights violations and their abstention from supporting harsh resolutions against the authoritarian regime (European Stability Initiative, 2012).
The fusion of energy interests and corruption: Azerbaijan’s oil and gas resources have not only been a source of economic prosperity but have also served as strategic tools for strengthening internal political control and gaining international legitimacy. This fusion of energy dominance and political corruption has been used to establish domestic social control and neutralize democratic pressure from the international community. The resulting model—energy kleptocracy—represents a new, duplicitous form of classical authoritarian governance.
The growing dependence of Western countries, especially the European Union, the Balkan states, and certain Eastern European countries, on Azerbaijani gas and oil has led to a softer and more concessionary approach toward the Aliyev regime. This economic dependency has deepened through energy contracts and corruption-linked dealings, with some Western politicians and lobbyists acting as intermediaries to derive personal financial benefit from such arrangements.
Portraying the regime as a “stability partner”: Certain Western political circles portray the Aliyev regime as a “guarantor of regional stability” and “a partner against radicalism,” even though it is fundamentally non-democratic. This rhetoric helps justify corrupt relationships and weakens the principled defense of democracy, indirectly legitimizing the autocratic system on international platforms.
Selective operation of anti-corruption institutions: While numerous Western anti-corruption bodies have investigated the foreign corruption activities of the Aliyev regime, such investigations rarely result in concrete political consequences. For instance, although the "Azerbaijani Laundromat" investigation proved that large sums of money were funneled from Azerbaijan into European corruption networks, political actors largely failed to respond with substantive measures (OCCRP, 2017).
In sum, Western tolerance towards the Aliyev regime cannot be explained solely through geopolitical rationality. It is also tied to transnational political corruption networks that protect the regime's international legitimacy, sideline the importance of human rights and democratic institutions, and reinforce authoritarianism on a global scale.
The Resources Aliyev Relies on in Confrontation with the West
Ilham Aliyev’s ability to confront the West is underpinned by a combination of strategic energy leverage, regional geopolitical positioning, a façade of authoritarian stability, and robust internal control mechanisms. These resources not only enable him to resist international pressure but also serve to defend his regime’s legitimacy both domestically and internationally. Below, these resources are discussed in detail:
Energy and transit leverage: The most powerful resource is Azerbaijan’s strategic position in global energy geopolitics. With projects like the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, TAP, and TANAP, Azerbaijan has become a critical alternative energy route for Europe to reduce dependence on Russian supplies. This position allows Aliyev to deliver the message: “Leave us alone, and your energy security will be ensured.”
Azerbaijan’s geographic location—at the crossroads of the South Caucasus energy, transportation, and security corridors—further strengthens its importance. The West’s access to Central Asia, alternative transit routes to China, and the balancing of relations between Russia and Iran all elevate Azerbaijan’s geostrategic value.
This enables Aliyev to position himself as a “regional stability actor,” forcing the West to engage with him rather than isolate him.
In comparison to Georgia and Armenia, Azerbaijan projects an image of “manageable and authoritarian stability,” making Aliyev appear indispensable to Western geopolitical calculations.
A migration and stability buffer for Europe: Azerbaijan is also portrayed as an island of relative stability in the Caucasus. The regime plays this card by claiming, “without us, the region would radicalize, and migration flows would increase.” This narrative is used to exploit Europe’s anxieties about migration and security.
Internal political monolith and repressive system: Aliyev has built a powerful apparatus of domestic political control and repression, which shields him from public pressure and strengthens his resilience against external demands. The absence of a strong domestic opposition enables him to adopt uncompromising positions vis-à-vis the West.
Aliyev’s confrontation strategy relies not only on energy and geography but also on regional authoritarian support networks, transnational lobbying structures, and a highly consolidated domestic repression system. These factors allow the regime to portray itself as a durable and defiant political system capable of withstanding Western pressure.
What Is the Likely Trajectory of Azerbaijani Authoritarianism?
In exploring the question, “What is the appropriate methodology for transitioning from autocracy to democratization?”, the historical experience of the three waves of democratization provides crucial lessons. The concept of democratic waves remains a central topic in political science.
The first wave of democratization began with the U.S. Declaration of Independence in 1776 and the French Revolution in 1789. This wave, which lasted over a century, led to the collapse of empires such as the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires, and the emergence of new states in the Balkans, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus. Many of these states implemented democratic forms of governance. The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic was one such example, as the first independent and democratic state in the region (Elman Fattah, The Reconstruction of the Berlin Wall, 2019).
However, the ascent of Mussolini in 1922 and Hitler in 1933 marked the retreat of the first wave, which failed to consolidate democratic institutions across many newly formed states. By 1940, only Switzerland and Sweden remained as functioning democracies in continental Europe.
The end of World War II and the collapse of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy marked the beginning of the second wave. Although victors like Britain and France emerged with weakened economies and lost their colonies, these decolonized nations began declaring independence, and new international institutions like the United Nations were established to promote and guarantee human rights and democratic institutions. Regional European organizations such as the Council of Europe, the European Economic Community, and NATO became democratic centers of integration and political cooperation.
However, the Cold War hindered the global spread of democracy. Many young democracies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America failed to align with either the USSR or the USA, which in turn supported authoritarian coups in their respective spheres of influence.
Despite this, a new wave of democratization emerged in the mid-1970s, beginning in Southern Europe. Portugal, Spain, and Greece transitioned away from dictatorship. By the late 1980s, a surge of democratic change across Eastern Europe, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the collapse of the USSR signaled the rise of the third wave.
Outcomes of the Third Wave
The third wave had varied effects across different countries. Czechoslovakia transitioned peacefully to a multiparty system and later split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia without violence. Yugoslavia disintegrated through ethnic cleansing, mass killings, and NATO bombings over the course of a decade. Some Soviet republics (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) joined the EU, while others (Russia, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia) reverted to authoritarianism.
In 1985, there were only 44 democratic countries; by 2005, the number had risen to 93. Despite optimism about the irreversibility of this wave, it began to recede around the 2000s, giving way to a third global authoritarian resurgence.
Events in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan in the early 21st century did not signify a continuation of the third wave, but rather revolutionary shifts resembling the first wave. Today, many anti-authoritarian movements in various countries are less aligned with the liberal consolidation of the third wave and more with the revolutionary spirit of the first.
The Azerbaijani Context
The failure of democratic forces in Azerbaijan to succeed against the Aliyev regime over the past decades stems in part from a misreading of the nature of democratization waves. The final wave emphasized elite-led reform and consolidation, whereas the first wave relied on revolutionary change. Azerbaijani opposition strategies mirrored the third wave—hoping international pressure and exposure of human rights abuses would force regime change through dialogue. This was similar to the end of apartheid in South Africa.
However, the Aliyev regime signaled a shift towards hard authoritarianism as early as 2002. By 2003, the regime had moved beyond soft authoritarianism, rendering traditional strategies ineffective.
Post-2003, democratic opposition began to weaken not simply because of internal demoralization, but because the global democratic wave was in retreat, and Putin’s consolidation of authoritarianism in Russia marked the beginning of a new phase. Unlike Georgia and Ukraine, the Aliyev regime made a clear decision to side with the emerging international authoritarian coalition rather than flirt with democratization.
Although activists did not retreat, they failed to develop new strategies suited to the new authoritarian context. The dissonance between outdated methods and a transformed political landscape led to the erosion of democratic forces and the consolidation of authoritarian power.
Emerging Questions
Several questions arise from this analysis:
— Is revolutionary change desirable?
— Not necessarily. But the current conditions may necessitate it.
— Are there revolutionary-oriented political organizations in Azerbaijan?
— No.
Thus, the Azerbaijani political system is caught in a labyrinth. Unless new political strategies are developed to address authoritarianism at its core, the opposition will remain ineffective. Ultimately, finding a formula for the collapse of authoritarianism may prove more realistic than expecting reforms to be initiated from within.
The current political structure in Azerbaijan has long been entrenched in an authoritarian model. Presidential power is centralized, opposition is marginalized, and media is tightly controlled. This hegemonic structure has eliminated avenues for free expression. Understanding the future trajectory of this system requires examining internal and external dynamics, social trends, and global pressures.
Possible Trajectories of Azerbaijani Authoritarianism
- Scenario of Deepening Authoritarianism: Continuation of existing practices and further entrenchment of authoritarian methods. Recent institutional changes—strengthening presidential powers, introduction of a vice presidency, centralized election control, regressive media and party laws—are indicators of this trend.
Key features include:- Enhanced surveillance technologies (e.g., AI-based monitoring).
- Suppression of emerging opposition and civic movements.
- Ideological homogenization through state propaganda.
- This scenario may provide short- to mid-term stability but is unsustainable in the long term. Discontent may grow, and the regime could collapse in a manner reminiscent of Ceaușescu’s Romania, Saddam’s Iraq, or Qaddafi’s Libya.
- Scenario of Reform and Softening: A partial reform strategy within authoritarian boundaries aimed at reducing domestic dissatisfaction, improving international image, and sustaining the system.
Possible developments:- Promotion of technocratic governance (e.g., e-government, social services).
- Limited political opening (e.g., semi-competitive elections).
- Partial media liberalization.
- This path may restore some legitimacy but won't establish real pluralism. History shows that such transitional periods must evolve into either full democratization or return to authoritarianism.
- Scenario of Social Conflict and Change: If economic instability increases, youth discontent deepens, and external pressure grows, radical transformation may become possible.
Contributing factors:- Decline in oil revenues and rising unemployment.
- Politically engaged youth demanding democratic change.
- Shifts in regional and international power dynamics.
- This trajectory could lead to either positive democratic transition or negative outcomes such as conflict and instability.
- Hybrid Model: Authoritarianism + Modernization: The most probable path—preserving authoritarian foundations while implementing selective modernization to ensure resilience.
Characteristics:- State-controlled innovation and economic growth.
- Continued suppression of political pluralism.
- Governance centered on internal security.
- This model aims to absorb social dissatisfaction within the system and ensure regime continuity.
In conclusion, the future of Azerbaijan’s authoritarian political system depends on various factors: economic stability, civic development, youth mobilization, strategic innovation, external pressure, and regional dynamics.
Conclusion
Between 1993 and 2025, a gradual and systematic deepening of authoritarian governance has been observed in the Republic of Azerbaijan. This process of evolution has been analyzed in the research through successive phases of consultative, imitative, soft, hard, and ultimately familial authoritarianism. The consultative and soft authoritarian model formed during Heydar Aliyev’s rule was initially aimed at ensuring political stability. However, this model was soon replaced by a simulation of democracy, and during Ilham Aliyev’s presidency, it transitioned into a new phase dominated by hard and familial authoritarianism (Freedom House, 2023b).
These processes, while increasing the formality of political institutions, simultaneously limited the opportunities for genuine political competition. In particular, the falsification of electoral mechanisms (OSCE/ODIHR, 2015), the paralysis of independent media, and the weakening of civil society through legal instruments contributed to the transformation of authoritarianism into a structured and sustained mode of governance in Azerbaijan. The appointment of Ilham Aliyev’s wife, Mehriban Aliyeva, as Vice President and the centralization of political power within the family confirm this development as a clear example of dynastic authoritarianism.
The research demonstrates that this evolution has not been confined to domestic politics alone but has also been supported by an economy based on energy resources and the inconsistent and weak positions of international actors—particularly the European Union and the United States. Despite the regime’s “anti-Western rhetoric,” factors such as geopolitical necessity, political corruption, and the prioritization of “security concerns” have neutralized democratizing pressures that could have been applied to the country.
The evolution of Azerbaijani authoritarianism has led to the elimination of political competition, the restriction of individual rights and freedoms, and the destruction of civil society. The continuation of this model may result not only in political deadlock but also in social fragmentation and economic instability.
Ultimately, the deepening of authoritarianism in the Azerbaijani case is no longer merely a form of political rule, but has begun to take shape as an institutional and ideological model. The future trajectory of Azerbaijani authoritarianism may follow one of two paths: further consolidation toward a stricter model resembling those of China and Russia, or a simulation of controlled liberalization in pursuit of external legitimacy. A common feature of both trajectories, however, is the persistent absence of political freedoms and genuinely competitive elections in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, institutional fragility within the system, fragmentation among the elite, and latent public discontent may eventually lead this trajectory toward more overt confrontation or a phase of necessary reform. From this perspective, although the authoritarian future of Azerbaijan appears sustainable in the short term, the medium- and long-term outlook remains marked by uncertainty and a high risk of potential turmoil.
Under these circumstances, the prerequisites for democratic transformation include the emancipation of domestic institutions, the revitalization of civil society, and a consistent democratic stance from the international community.
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