For easier reading and comprehension, this research by the KHAR Center will be presented in multiple parts.
For the first part of the research
For the third part of the research paper
In the autumn of 2020, the Azerbaijani army’s military victory in Karabakh temporarily increased domestic support for the Aliyev regime. As a result, this period was accompanied by the further consolidation of authoritarianism and the use of “victory capital” for legitimacy (Freedom House, 2023). After the 44-day war, the government placed the Karabakh victory at the center of the political agenda and began presenting all criticism as “anti-patriotic rhetoric.” New “anti-national” frameworks were formed to counter dissent. This created a foundation for continuing repression under the veil of national ideology, and the victory was transformed into a symbol of political hegemony.
The Collapse of the “Reform After Victory” Rhetoric:
Immediately after the war, the regime launched slogans such as “reforms,” “a new social contract,” “open governance,” and “transparency in the reconstruction of Karabakh.” However, in a short time, these calls were replaced by the old corruption practices and non-transparent tender processes (Transparency International, 2022). Reconstruction works in Karabakh were mainly entrusted to companies connected to the ruling family or to foreign allies (e.g., companies close to Erdoğan).
In the post-Karabakh period, the regime strengthened not only traditional repressive methods but also digital surveillance and disinformation. Critics on social media were monitored and targeted. Through troll networks and cyber-surveillance tools, the information environment was brought under total control (Reporters Without Borders, 2023).
Increase in Geopolitical Capital and Domestic Authoritarianism:
The strengthening of relations with Turkey and the increased regional influence following the Karabakh victory gave the Aliyev regime additional maneuvering power in the international arena (Shusha Declaration, 2021). This, in turn, created an environment for harsher and more impunity-driven governance at home: the number of political prisoners increased, and new waves of repression occurred. The post-Karabakh period was not one of weakening of the authoritarian regime but rather one where it was reinforced with new sources of legitimacy and control techniques. Victory became not an opportunity for civic liberties, but a tool for consolidating the existing political transformation—a rule of a single man or a family.
However, the success of all these processes is, in fact, rooted in the developments of the 30 years prior to the post-Karabakh period.
The Contribution of Weak Political Culture to the Consolidation of Authoritarianism
The deepening of authoritarianism in Azerbaijan is not solely due to political elites and institutional factors, but also significantly shaped by a weak political culture. Politics is not only about knowledge, belief, and experience—it is also a matter of culture (Arqument.az, 2019). The absence of democratic values as a common social experience across wide layers of society has strengthened public indifference to the threat of authoritarian governance and fostered a passive, obedient citizen identity.
The political passivity inherited from the Soviet era has led to fear and obedience dominating citizens’ attitudes toward the state. Rather than engaging in political processes, people have preferred to accept the regime’s narrative of “stability” and “order.” This, in turn, has prevented the strengthening of civil society. Repeatedly rigged elections, dysfunctional opposition parties, and ineffective political appeals have created a sense of “nothing will ever change” among the public. This distrust has reduced interest in political alternatives and led to authoritarian rule being seen as a “forced choice.”
Traditional family values and leader-centered relationship models prevalent in Azerbaijani society are reflected in the political domain as well. The mythologization of Heydar Aliyev as a “national leader,” and framing criticism of his successor as treason, has provided a foundation for government-led smear campaigns even against rational political critique (Azerbaijan-news-az, 2021).
The education system lacks mechanisms that foster political awareness and critical thinking. Curricula in civic subjects do not include instruction on political participation or citizens’ rights. This has conditioned citizens to accept lawlessness and live without connecting their personal interests to the broader political fate of the country, pushing society further into political apathy.
Generational Change and the Continuity of Authoritarian Governance
One of the main mechanisms ensuring the continuity of authoritarianism in Azerbaijan is the managed and planned implementation of generational change within the ruling elite. These changes are not only biological or age-based rotations but also serve as mechanisms for transmitting political loyalty, family allegiance, and governance experience.
From Heydar Aliyev to Ilham Aliyev: Institutionalization of Political Succession:
After Heydar Aliyev’s death, the rise of his son Ilham Aliyev to power marked the beginning of familial rule in Azerbaijan. This transition was not merely a power change but a new form of continuing authoritarianism through dynastic succession. The succession process was pre-planned, with legal and administrative arrangements in place (Hale, H. E., 2005). The 2017 appointment of Mehriban Aliyeva as Vice President formalized the division of power within the family. This move aimed to both protect Ilham Aliyev’s personal power and create a mechanism for transferring power to another family member in the future. Consequently, internal family coordination was established in state governance to maintain system stability.
Controlled Promotion of Young Cadres: Technocratic Appearance, Political Control:
In recent years, some young and educated individuals have been appointed to official positions. However, these changes are not intended to alter the system's essence but to update it within the framework of “modernized authoritarianism.” These individuals are either selected for their loyalty to the family or operate under strict supervision. Thus, the regime is being “renewed”—for the sake of ensuring authoritarian continuity (Levitsky & Way, 2010).
On the other hand, generational transitions are presented by the regime as “continuity of stability and development.” The government uses this argument to neutralize public demands for change. In reality, this serves to suppress political alternatives and prevent the formation of a new elite. As a result, generational change in Azerbaijan does not weaken the regime but strengthens it. These transitions are carried out through planned, controlled mechanisms based on intra-family loyalty, ensuring the shift to a family-based authoritarian model. Although the political system appears to be renewing, in essence it becomes even more reactionary.
The Aliyev Regime’s Slide from Cosmopolitanism to Militarism
The political discourse and ideological orientation of the Ilham Aliyev regime have undergone significant transformation over time. In the 2000s, a cosmopolitan rhetoric prioritizing Western integration and economic liberalization was replaced—starting in 2020—with nationalist, militarist, and post-war dominance rhetoric. This shift was not merely ideological but also a political tool in response to a crisis of authoritarian legitimacy (Modern Diplomacy, 2024).
From 2003–2013, the Aliyev government portrayed Azerbaijan to international investors and Western political institutions as a “modernizing, stable, open, and multiculturalist” country. Reform rhetoric targeting the World Bank, EU, OSCE, and UN, and active participation in international forums, maintained the regime’s cosmopolitan mask. During this phase, focus was placed on energy contracts and strategic partnerships with Europe. Starting in the mid-2010s, amid escalating tensions with Western institutions and deepening authoritarian policies domestically, terms like “foreign interference,” “national sovereignty,” and “double standards” entered official discourse. This shift led Aliyev to adopt a more defensive and critical stance. After 2020, this defensive tone evolved into open attacks against Western institutions and even specific political centers.
The 2020 Karabakh War became an ideological turning point for the Aliyev regime. The post-victory official rhetoric centered entirely around military success, patriotism, the enemy image, and a cult of victory. State media, education, and political debates were saturated with militarist rhetoric. Military strength, the cult of martyrs, and the “reconstruction” of Karabakh became central pillars of political hegemony.
The Functional Role of Militarism for Authoritarianism:
Militarism is not merely a rhetoric of national pride—it also serves as an ideological shield to suppress internal dissent. Through post-war rhetoric, the regime:
- Labels free media and dissenting opinions as “traitorous” or “anti-national”;
- Uses the cult of victory to suppress searches for alternatives to authoritarian rule;
- Projects the army’s prestige onto police power, turning it into the leading repressive apparatus, and metaphorically turns the “iron fist” idolized in the war against the enemy onto its own people.
Etatism as a Source of Authoritarian Strength
One of the main structural reasons for the deepening of authoritarianism in Azerbaijan is etatism—the state’s total dominance in the economy, public life, and distribution of social resources. While this model is formally presented as a promise of economic prosperity and stability, in reality, it becomes a tool that weakens civil society, stifles individual initiative, and legitimizes the regime’s total control. The Aliyev regime has created broad social groups dependent on the state budget, ensuring their political passivity. Teachers, doctors, public sector employees, and farmers reliant on subsidies are effectively forced into loyalty to the regime. In this model, economic reward and punishment are tools of political control.
The traditional private sector has failed to develop in Azerbaijan’s economy. Instead, oligarchic companies tied to the state and reliant on state contracts have come to the forefront. This not only illustrates the absence of a market economy but also blocks the formation of political alternatives.
The state’s monopoly over all spheres leads to independent NGOs, media, and civic initiatives being labeled as “anti-state activities.” Thus, etatism transforms not only into an economic model but also an ideological control mechanism.
When the state is presented as the sole source of welfare, citizens begin to view it not just as a ruler but as a “savior” and “protector.” This facilitates the societal acceptance of leader cults and undemocratic governance. Therefore, etatism becomes not only a protective force for authoritarianism but also its ideological feeder. By ensuring economic dependence, it blocks political alternatives, stifles independent initiatives, and nourishes authoritarianism at both structural and ideological levels.
To summarize: while the Aliyev regime previously used cosmopolitan rhetoric to preserve its international image, it now reinforces its authoritarian rule with etatist-militarist ideological pillars. This shift is not merely rhetorical—it carries strategic significance for governance and societal control.
The Opposition’s Mistakes and Their Impact on the Strengthening of Authoritarianism
There is no doubt that the persistence of Azerbaijan’s authoritarian regime is primarily due to the uncompromising repression by the ruling government. However, the weakness and strategic missteps of the opposition have also contributed to this trajectory.
The ineffectiveness of the opposition has manifested in several ways:
Fragmentation and Leadership Conflicts:
The opposition camp has long suffered from a lack of effective unity. Personal ambitions among party leaders have often taken precedence over shared political goals, resulting in fragmentation and a decline in public trust. The decision to boycott the 1998 presidential elections, the failure to organize resistance after elections, and especially the inability to present a unified front during the 2003 presidential elections deepened public disappointment.
Inability to Adapt to the Information Age:
While the ruling regime widely utilized social media and digital technology for control and propaganda, the opposition failed to coordinate its presence in these spaces for a long time. Due to the lack of effective communication, their messages did not reach a broad public audience and had limited impact.
Misplaced Expectations from Foreign Powers:
Some opposition groups placed their hopes for change on pressure from foreign powers and heavily promoted this narrative. However, this approach neither aligned with international actors' interests nor the domestic context. It resulted in a passive waiting stance among opposition elites and, with unmet expectations, left protest-minded citizens disillusioned.
Although systematically subjected to pressure, the Azerbaijani opposition has failed to expand public support and present a viable alternative due to its internal weaknesses, organizational problems, and inconsistent strategies. This has become a significant factor in the durability of authoritarianism.
The Opposition’s Defeat by Ilham Aliyev’s “Ura-Patriotism”
Since 1993, the opposition has accused the Aliyev regime of being unpatriotic and pursuing anti-national policies, building its core discourse on this narrative. However, this incomplete discourse collapsed in the face of Ilham Aliyev's victorious commander image following the 2020 Karabakh war. As a result, the idea of patriotism was monopolized in Azerbaijani political space. The Aliyev regime presented the war victory not just as a diplomatic or military achievement, but as a foundation for ideological hegemony. In this context, traditional opposition parties either adopted the same “ura-patriotic” rhetoric as the regime or failed to construct an alternative and credible political framework.
In the post-victory official rhetoric, patriotism became meaningful only in association with the state and its leader. Ilham Aliyev used expressions like “iron fist,” “political triumph,” and “nation-army unity” to frame his personal leadership and family rule as the symbols of victory. The opposition failed to respond to this rhetoric—either remaining silent or merely repeating it.
The Opposition’s Identity Crisis:
Rather than criticizing the patriotic discourse, most opposition parties joined it visually and rhetorically, thus aligning themselves with the regime. This erased ideological differences with the regime and led the public to view the opposition as unoriginal and secondary actors. As long as ura-patriotism dominates, the spread of alternative ideas among the younger electorate becomes limited. Since the opposition could not engage this audience with a new language, new tools, or different perspectives, the regime’s propaganda gained dominance here as well.
The opposition failed to present either an intellectual alternative to the “ura-patriotism” discourse or a new political vision that could generate broad public resonance. This situation not only ideologically reinforced Ilham Aliyev’s authoritarian legitimacy but also practically eliminated political competition.
The Third Republic Platform’s Attempt to Create a New Discourse
Against the backdrop of long-standing ideological stagnation and repetitive rhetoric in Azerbaijan’s political scene, the Third Republic Platform (ResPlatforma), announced in December 2023, emerged as one of the few initiatives attempting to construct a new and forward-looking discourse while also criticizing the current authoritarianism on both political and intellectual grounds. With the slogan “We obey not a man, but the law!”, the platform not only directly targeted the Aliyev regime but also stood out with its critique of the ideological deadlock of the opposition.
The Thesis of “No to the Old System, Yes to a New Republic”:
Identifying a total collapse of republicanism in the country, the Third Republic Platform emphasized the necessity of a new constitution and a new political system. This is not merely a call for regime change but implies deeply transformed institutions, democratic governance, and the rule of law. This approach portrays the Aliyev regime as “beyond reform” and thus proposes a different logic of struggle—promoting a model of critical and responsible citizenship against ura-patriotism. In its founding statement titled “Post-Karabakh Agenda,” the platform highlights a rejection of ultra-etatist political thinking that feeds authoritarianism and introduces decentralization as an alternative to highly centralized government. Their rhetoric is not populist, but principled, analytical, and discussion-oriented. This positions the platform as innovative in terms of both political and intellectual discourse.
However, the platform’s activities were severely weakened immediately after its launch when its founding member and spokesperson were arrested under harsh repression.
General State of Opposition Political Parties in Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan Popular Front Party (APFP) and National Council:
In the public’s eyes, these two entities are seen as one and the same. APFP continues to be the most consistent and principled political organization opposing authoritarianism. In the current political landscape, especially against the backdrop of the unified patriotism rhetoric following the 2020 Karabakh war, APFP’s consistent critique of authoritarianism (without updating its rhetoric), its maintenance of an independent political stance, and its refusal to compromise with the regime underscore its principled position.
Despite enduring long-standing legal, administrative, and physical repression—including arrests, fines, protest bans, and propaganda attacks—APFP leaders and members have consistently maintained their political positions. This is rare in Azerbaijani politics and one of the party’s defining features. However, the severe repression it faces deprives the party of effective operational capacity and, due to the “rhetorical deadlock” it is a victim of, leaves it experiencing a lack of vision.
Musavat Party:
Once a symbolically and historically significant actor in the Azerbaijani opposition, the Musavat Party’s recent activity, influence, and strategic positioning have raised questions both among political circles and the public. Once a guiding force ideologically and organizationally for the opposition, the party now appears more passive and observant. In recent years, Musavat has shifted from an open and confrontational tone in its criticism to a softer, more balanced, and investigative style. While this is presented as a civil political manner, it has generated distrust and indifference among public groups expecting principled resistance against the regime.
By avoiding open confrontation and opting for “struggle within the system,” Musavat distinguishes itself from more hardline opposition forces. This aligns it closer with observational politics rather than protest politics and weakens its emotional connection with the socially active segment of the public demanding change.
Nevertheless, Musavat retains symbolic significance and fidelity to Mammad Amin Rasulzade’s ideological legacy. Its main principles remain sovereignty, the rule of law, and parliamentary republicanism. However, without an active political strategy, this ideological foundation lacks real influence and remains symbolic.
Musavat’s weakening in recent years and its hesitation between principled resistance and passivity render it more of a traditional, but weakened, political organization than a real alternative to the authoritarian system.
REAL Party (Republican Alternative):
REAL Party initially emerged as one of the few actors aiming to create a modern, institutional, and technocratic model of opposition in Azerbaijani politics. However, in recent years, the party has entered a phase of decline and ambiguity, both in terms of its public image and political stance. Initially notable for its intellectual potential and structured criticism articulated through the language of the new generation, REAL now faces a dilemma between loyalty and principle.
Staying Within the System – Tactic or Assimilation?
Since 2020, REAL’s presence in the parliament has been presented as a way of conducting democratic struggle “from within the system.” Although the party leadership justified this as a tactical and strategic move, broad public opinion interpreted it as a sign that REAL had lost its oppositional spirit and was leaning toward compromise with the regime.
Despite once advocating for liberalism and institutional republican values, the party has suffered from ideological ambiguity and shifting rhetoric. Especially after the Karabakh war, its adaptation to the government’s “ura-patriotic” discourse distanced it from a position of principled opposition.
While REAL Party initially brought dynamism to the political scene as an intellectual and youth-oriented actor, today it finds itself trapped between remaining within the system and creating an alternative. The absence of a clear ideological line, principled stance, and broad public support has led to the perception of the party as an unsuccessful project.
The party’s relationship with the Aliyev government is an example of a strange ambivalence and uncertainty in Azerbaijani politics. These relations do not occur within a classic opposition-versus-government confrontation, nor within full-scale cooperation. Instead, a model of relations based on silent agreements, loyal criticism, and cautious distancing has been formed.
Although REAL presents itself officially as an opposition party, it does not issue systematic and consistent criticism of the regime’s main structures, governance logic, or political essence. Criticism is mostly technical and administrative in nature, while fundamental issues such as political legitimacy, the roots of authoritarianism, and family rule are avoided—sometimes even supported. In short, REAL has turned into a model of managed opposition based on political conformism in its relations with the ruling regime.
Conclusion
The post-Karabakh period marked a new phase for Azerbaijan’s political regime: authoritarian governance was further reinforced and transformed under the banner of victory rhetoric and national emotions. The government used military success not to enhance national unity but to neutralize domestic political opposition and legitimize authoritarian control. During this period, authoritarianism was increasingly justified through populist narratives such as “protecting national interests” and “ensuring stability.” At the same time, cosmetic changes were introduced to the political system, allowing the authoritarian regime to renew itself with a more flexible and adaptive governance model.
This modification was aimed at enhancing the regime’s resilience in the face of both international pressure and domestic social demands. As a result, in the post-Karabakh period, authoritarianism in Azerbaijan not only preserved its existence but was also strengthened through more refined and strategic forms.
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