(This article was prepared within the framework of the "Khar Center" studies on Azerbaijani authoritarianism)
Author: Akif Gurbanov
Speaker of the III Republic Platform.
He received higher education in medicine and law. He actively advocates for the development of an independent civil society and republican ideals in Azerbaijan. He is a consistent and principled critic of Azerbaijani authoritarianism. Due to his political and public activities, and his struggle for freedom of expression, he was arrested in Azerbaijan in 2024. He has been recognized as a political prisoner by local and international human rights organizations. He is a finalist for the 2024 Václav Havel Prize.
This article analyzes the "National Salvation" day narrative, considered the political and ideological foundation of authoritarian Azerbaijan, against the backdrop of the global regularities of the post-communist transition period. The successful lustration and transitional justice experiences of Central and Eastern European countries are compared with the post-Soviet space.
Attention is drawn to the historical consequences caused by the failure to remove the old nomenklatura from the system and the failure to carry out necessary constitutional reforms in time in Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. The analysis substantiates that the events of June 1993 were not the salvation of the people, but rather a systemic revenge by the KGB elite and the post-Soviet nomenklatura. It puts forward the necessity of a new political vision based on republican principles and the collective will of society to ensure the transition to a real democracy in the country.
By examining the officially celebrated "National Salvation Day" in Azerbaijan within the framework of a political analysis, this article aims to inspect its ideological foundations, identify the real reasons for the failures during the transition period, and support future democratization.
The analysis attempts to answer questions such as what the role of lustration is during the transition from authoritarianism to democracy, what the institutional differences are between the democratization process that started against the backdrop of the USSR's collapse in Central and Eastern European countries and Azerbaijan, and what the mistakes of the transition period in Azerbaijan were.
National Salvation, or nomenklatura revenge?
June 15 is officially celebrated as National Salvation Day in our country. The ideological and political narrative of the Aliyev government is built upon this day. It is claimed that on June 15, 1993, the state and the people were saved from chaos and civil war - a national salvation took place. Furthermore, it is asserted that all this happened solely due to the political competence, skill, foresight, and innate talent of one person. That person is also considered the founder and creator of modern Azerbaijan, and is called the "national leader." To instil this discourse into public opinion, parallels are drawn with the example of Atatürk in Turkish history.
Let us look at both the events that took place 33 years ago - the June 4 rebellion and June 15, which formalized the coup d'état, as well as the subsequent processes, to see whether the outcome was truly a "National Salvation" or a revenge?!
To answer this question, we must look at the geography of the countries of the Socialist Pact (Warsaw Bloc) led by the USSR, where regimes with communist ideology reigned. At the same time, it will be necessary to conduct a comparative analysis of what happened in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet republics, excluding the 3 Baltic countries.
The overthrow of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe started almost simultaneously - in 1989. This process first began in Poland: between February and April, the communist government sat at the negotiating table with representatives of the opposition "Solidarity" organization, and in June, semi-free parliamentary elections were held (ENRS, 2005). In the same month, the government in Hungary initiated a reform process by inviting the opposition to discussions. In the autumn, peaceful mass protests began in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. In Romania, changes occurred violently - in December 1989, the ruling regime opened fire on peaceful demonstrators; 1,104 people were killed, and 3,552 were injured. On December 25, the country's president, Nicolae Ceaușescu, and his wife Elena were executed by firing squad following the decision of a military tribunal (Editura Lumen, 2006).
The struggle for freedom and independence in the Baltic countries had begun in 1988, and Lithuania became the first Soviet republic to declare its independence (March 11, 1990). The victory of the "Sąjūdis" organization in the elections to the Supreme Soviet resulted in the adoption of a declaration on the country's independence and the illegality of the country's annexation by the USSR.
In August 1991 – after the "GKChP" (State Committee on the State of Emergency) coup took place in Moscow to remove USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev from power – Latvia and Estonia also declared their independence (ERR News, 2024).
The transition from a totalitarian system to democracy entails the protection of human rights, the provision of freedoms, the creation of new institutional structures, the separation of state power into three branches (executive structures, legislative body, and judicial system), the distribution of powers and mutual checks and balances, and the creation of mechanisms that ensure fundamental changes in the nature of state-society relations.
In some CEE countries, a democratic constitution was adopted, while in others, significant changes were made to the existing constitution. The new constitutional order guaranteed human rights and freedoms and established the principle of changing power through free and fair elections; it determined the functional division, mutual checks, and limitations among the branches of power. Free market and liberal democratic institutions (free elections, an independent parliament, an independent judiciary, law enforcement/armed forces open to public oversight) were established in place of the Communist Party's "single-handed" rule and planned economy. The former "people's democracy" societies gained civil and political rights and freedoms (freedom of speech, assembly, and association, the right to participate in political activities, the right to vote and be elected, etc.).
The main distinguishing feature of the democratic transformation in CEE countries was that the post-communist elite strove to take concrete steps to eliminate the regime's repressive legacy. Measures intended for transitional justice primarily included: ensuring the rule of law, establishing a new social contract on new foundations, rejecting undemocratic practices in the transition from an authoritarian or totalitarian system to a democratic one, overcoming the legacy of the past, i.e., recognizing the injustice towards all victims of the regime, rehabilitating those unjustly tried, ensuring public exoneration and financial compensation for those subjected to repression, returning confiscated properties to their owners (restitution), and bringing to criminal responsibility those who violated human rights and abused their power (lustration).
Lustration is a legal restriction and ban against those who held positions in the former government, the political elite, and those who collaborated with them in various structures (in the education system, mass media, etc.) from holding positions in civil service or the public sphere. These measures are administrative in nature and range from revealing the names of people associated with repressive institutions and the secret police to imposing bans on holding positions in the state, public, and sometimes even the private sector (Radio Liberty, 2013).
Identifying individuals in the lustration process is mainly made possible by opening the archives of the Communist Party and the secret police.
Goals and motives of the parties to lustration
Revealing truths about the past and restoring justice
The main goal of the lustration process and the opening of related archives is to uncover the truth about human rights violations and state terror. In CEE countries, launching an inquiry to uncover information about the scope of the crime and its participants was considered a baseline requirement for the restoration of justice. The logic behind this was that the principle of responsibility lies at the core of democracy. Responsibility requires uncovering the truth and necessitates that the suffering of the people, and the state and its agents causing the suffering, become known. This is the formation of new principles of legitimacy.
The revenge of anti-democratic forces and the threat of returning to totalitarianism
The first stage of democratic changes is accompanied by a serious threat - the possibility of revenge by representatives of the former nomenklatura and secret service agents. Usually, they are ready to do anything to bring about a counter-revolution and restore the previous totalitarian order. The lustration process precisely prevents this.
Wild lustration and blackmail threats
One of the main threats to the new order is that people who had ties to the former security organs and hold important posts in the new system become a weak link for blackmail. They can at any moment face the threat of kompromat (compromising material) through archive files and turn into an instrument of pressure. Under the threat of exposing their past, such individuals can be used in activities contrary to state interests and undermining the foundations of the democratic structure.
This fear slowed down the speed of the process in many countries, creating a situation called "wild or uncontrollable lustration." Archive data was irregularly leaked to the media, used as kompromat; some documents were destroyed, while others were sold on the black market (Kieran Williams, 2007). Therefore, systematic lustration measures are of great importance in preventing a chaotic process and regulating it.
National security threat, removing former employees from the new system
When effective regulation of archival documents is not carried out, it creates the possibility of the dossiers falling into the hands of foreign intelligence agencies and lays the groundwork for a threat to national security. For example, in late 1995 and early 1996, Poland's Prime Minister Józef Oleksy was accused of collaborating with USSR and Russian intelligence. The scandal resulted in his resignation (Jan de Weydenthal, 1996).
Restoration of the old nomenklatura network and the strengthening of their economic-political influence
During the transformation process from totalitarianism to democracy, it became clear that the former elite maintained its influence in the new system, continued to work in important state positions, took over the financial structures of strategic industrial sectors and large corporations, and gained immense wealth and property from the privatization process by activating their connections and resources. Therefore, both representatives of the new elite and the country's population viewed lustration as a process to dismantle the former nomenklatura network, reduce its political-economic influence, and prevent its political power from growing.
Defense of democracy
In countries where communist regimes were brought to an end, the lustration process was seen as a tool for defending the still-fragile democratic system.
The idea of defending democracy was also supported by representatives of the European Court of Justice. In its decisions, this body emphasized that democratic states are justified in demanding loyalty to constitutional principles from their civil servants. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe has also repeatedly noted that a constitutional state has the right to defend an emerging democracy (Uwe Backes, 2006).
Resolution 1096, adopted by PACE in 1996, is titled "Measures to dismantle the heritage of former communist totalitarian systems." It establishes the connection between the defense of democratic development and the adoption of lustration legislation. It also outlines the criteria for measures that comply with the rule of law and the principle of a state governed by law (PACE, 1996).
In CEE countries, proponents of lustration viewed the process as an opportunity for openness and transparency in public institutions, as well as the restoration of public trust. The right to receive extensive information about representatives of the public interest was accepted as one of the main pillars of a democratic state. At the same time, the goal was not to punish, but to restore civic trust in elected representatives. Because in a democratic system, trust is considered a fundamental principle.
Lustration mechanisms and the opening of archives
In CEE countries, the lustration process was implemented in various forms and differed quite significantly from each other in terms of scope.
Hard lustration – Germany and Czechia
Early and strict lustration was applied in Germany and Czechia. The decommunization process carried out through these programs was conducted consistently and rapidly (Bundesarchiv, 2021).
Soft lustration – Poland and Hungary
In Poland and Hungary, a soft lustration variant was chosen; the transition to democracy took place against the backdrop of compromises reached as a result of negotiations between the Communist Party and the opposition. Therefore, unlike Germany and Czechoslovakia, the decommunization process was carried out with less decisiveness and consistency.
Lustration without archives – Baltic Republics
The situation in the Baltic countries was different from that in CEE, because the majority of KGB archives were relocated from the union countries to the center - Moscow. Therefore, special personnel selection mechanisms were developed to ensure that communists and individuals associated with special services were not represented in the government. In Latvia and Estonia, the former political elite was gradually distanced from levers of influence through the citizenship law (Una Bergmane, 2018).
Delayed lustration - Romania and Slovakia
The political forces that came to power in Romania after Ceaușescu and in Slovakia after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia consisted of politicians who opposed the decommunization process. Therefore, measures regarding transitional justice in these two countries were adopted by the opposition that came to power in the late 90s and early 2000s.
The experience of Russia and other Soviet Republics
Lustration was rejected in Russia. Unlike the CEE countries, transitional justice was scarcely demanded throughout the post-Soviet period. Although President Yeltsin issued decrees suspending the activities of the Communist Party and transferring its property to the state (Soviethistory, 1991), he immediately promised that no communist would be persecuted in Russia. He repeatedly stated that governance in the country was in the hands of professionals. By abandoning lustration, he essentially protected himself and his inner circle. After all, he himself had been the First Secretary of the Sverdlovsk Oblast for more than 10 years. Restrictive measures to be applied to the former party elite would have also applied to him.
As for the parliament, the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies, elected on March 4, 1990, before the dissolution of the USSR, maintained their existence. Therefore, there was no chance of supporting any legislative initiative regarding measures to clear the arena of the former elite. Although hundreds of thousands of people took to the streets with the slogan "Down with the CPSU!" in protest of the GKChP event in 1991, free parliamentary elections were not held either after that event or after the de jure dissolution of the USSR in December. This was absolutely necessary for a democratic transition, and its failure to occur had a negative impact on Russia's socio-political life – laying the groundwork for the crisis of dual power in the country. The confrontation between Yeltsin and the Supreme Soviet resulted in the shelling of the parliament building in the autumn of 1993, and subsequently brought about the end of Russia's reform project.
The root of the problem stemmed from the USSR constitution adopted in 1978. According to this document, which was in force until the collapse of the USSR, the Congress of People's Deputies was essentially the center of power in the country. Researchers on democratization, Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, note that if elections at all levels had been held in the autumn of 1991, the "Democratic Russia" movement supporting Yeltsin and those united around it would have won (Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, 1996). This would have added a solid base for radical market reforms. And the President would have received significant support from the legislative branch to formulate democratic reforms. During that period, Yeltsin's popularity was indeed high and enough to win an election. But instead of initiating reforms in this direction, he took additional powers from the Congress to implement economic reforms. With this decision, Yeltsin jeopardized not only his post-communist economic project but also critically important liberal economic reforms by failing to form the necessary institutional environment. By doing so, he also hindered the development of parliamentarism (Kharcenter, 2025).
Another obstacle to the realization of transitional justice measures in Russia was the absence of social forces supporting corresponding calls. Among the representatives of the liberal public, including former dissidents, the thought that lustration was dangerous and unnecessary prevailed. There was a public opinion against reckoning with the past, labeling it a "witch hunt." In the leadership of civil society, including "Memorial," the dominant thought was to call lustration an "act of revenge," "great terror," "red terror," and to compare it with the repressions during the Bolshevik era. Another widespread idea regarding the uselessness of lustration legislation in Russia was the claim that it is impossible to distinguish the guilty from the victims in Soviet society.
But despite all this, even though they constituted an absolute minority, there were also supporters of lustration in post-Soviet Russia. For instance, Boris Pustintsev, the head of the St. Petersburg organization "Citizen's Watch," openly supported this idea. In early 1993, Galina Starovoitova, co-chair of the "Democratic Russia" movement and people's deputy, submitted a federal draft law "On temporary prohibition of professional activity for persons conducting policies of the totalitarian regime" to the Supreme Soviet. But neither the "Democratic Russia" majority in the parliament nor other deputies supported that draft. Starovoitova, who resubmitted the document to the State Duma in 1997, faced the same situation. She was assassinated on November 20, 1998, and her draft law remained the sole initiative (Journal of Democracy, 1999).
In August 1991, Yeltsin signed a decree on handing over the archives of the Party and the KGB to the state. A special commission was created for this purpose, and Colonel General Dmitri Volkogonov, who had served as the head of the political directorate of the Navy, was appointed chairman. That commission worked for two years, but its activities practically yielded no results. Amy Knight, who researched the activities of Soviet intelligence services, wrote in the fall of 1993: "Although the KGB was formally abolished at the end of 1991, the state security apparatus created in its place showed a strong interest in preserving the archives and did everything to prevent those documents from being declassified. At the same time, Yeltsin himself made no effort to realize his decree. The Russian president completely stepped back from solving this issue" (Amy Knight, 1993).
In April 1992, the Law "On operational-search activities" was adopted. On July 5, 1995, this document was adopted in a new edition by the State Duma. Information concerning operational, agency activities, names of individuals collaborating with the organs, etc., was declared a "state secret." This became the most serious obstacle to working with archival data. In November 1991, Yeltsin signed the Law "On the Rehabilitation of Victims of Political Repression." However, this too remained on paper. As a result, what Galina Starovoitova had predicted in early 1993 regarding the revenge of the nomenklatura came true. Ultimately, power fell into the hands of Putin and other representatives of the security structures.
The Example of Georgia and Ukraine
Georgia, which initiated the democratization process in later years, took steps in this direction, albeit significantly delayed. In 2011, the parliament unanimously adopted a law called the "Charter of Freedom." Employees of USSR security organs, officials of the Communist Party and Komsomol organization were prohibited from being elected and holding positions in state bodies. These prohibitions also applied to the higher education system, the judicial system, and the management of public television (OSVV, 2011).
The lustration process also started in Ukraine during the transition period following Yanukovych, who was overthrown as a result of the EuroMaidan events. Well before that, during the Yushchenko era, no work had been done in this direction either.
In April 2014, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the Law "On restoring trust in the judicial system of Ukraine" (RADA, 2014). The main goal of this process, considered the lustration of judges, was to determine court decisions, Ukrainian legislation in the field of human rights, and their compliance with international norms. In October of that year, the Law "On government purification" was adopted (RADA, 2014). Ukraine approached this issue as the consolidation of society and the elimination of negative consequences related to the activities of the previous authoritarian regime. That law aimed to form suitable conditions for restoring trust in the government and building a system of state bodies in accordance with European standards; it banned former officials and their supporters from working in the public sector and local self-government for 10 years. This ban applied both to those who worked during the Soviet era and to individuals who held positions in the Yanukovych government in 2010-14, as well as to those who violated human rights and freedoms during the Maidan events. The result of that lustration process was seen in February 2022 - in the unity of the Ukrainian government, its army, and the people against the Russian attack. Russia was unable to create a division in Ukraine's political government and state institutions, because a serious cleansing had been carried out. But in 2014, against the occupation of Crimea and the events in Donetsk and Luhansk, this very factor played a serious role in Ukraine's helplessness. Likewise, the firing on peaceful people in the Maidan by "Berkut" was also connected to the old nomenklatura.
The Azerbaijani Experience
Unfortunately, a systematic lustration process regulated by law, like in Central and Eastern European countries, did not take place in Azerbaijan. In 1992-1993 - during the government of the Azerbaijani Popular Front (APF) - there were only flickers of lustration in a peculiar "Azerbaijani experience" (or example of failure) that did not take a systematic character; occasionally at the level of political statements, and occasionally in closed discussions and chaotic personnel changes (Audrey L. Altstadt, 2017).
The reason for this was the failure to hold new parliamentary elections in the country, the existence of a 50-member "National Council" faction that made decisions in the legislative body (Milli Majlis), and the balance of power in that group, namely that the post-Soviet nomenklatura and the Frontists were equal in number (25/25). Representatives of the communist elite blocked the idea of lustration, which meant their suicide, by all means.
One of the biggest topics of discussion in 1992, when the APF came to power, was the opening of the former KGB archives. There was a serious questioning in society regarding who was an agent and who was a traitor.
However, the APF leadership (especially key figures) opposed the opening of the archives. Their argument was that opening the archives at a time when there was a war going on in Karabakh could tear society apart from within and cause a civil war. Because the agent network included many well-known intellectuals, clerics, and political figures. Keeping the archives closed practically meant the rejection of lustration from the foundation.
Elchibey's "national reconciliation" policy
President Abulfaz Elchibey was by nature against repressive and radical methods. Instead of completely declaring the post-communist elite an enemy, he tried to involve them in the building of the new independent state. Thus, rather than punishing them, Elchibey chose the formula of "forgetting the past and looking to the future," which resulted in the word lustration not even being mentioned in official documents.
That is, the Azerbaijani experience of 1992-1993 is an "experience of non-lustration". Because the old elite was not legally isolated from the system, in the June 1993 crisis, that nomenklatura and secret service network consolidated very easily, retook power, and ensured their political revenge.
Political scientist Samuel Huntington, in his book "The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century," notes that the decision on lustration is linked to the type of society transitioning to democracy; he notes that the former elite and the opposition play the main role in this process. Depending on the role of ruling and opposition groups in the democratization process, the researcher identifies three types of countries (Samuel Huntington):
- The ruling elite takes the initiative by establishing democracy and subsequently realizes the transformation of the regime (the example of Hungary and Bulgaria).
- In countries where opposition groups take power, the authoritarian regime collapses or is overthrown, resulting in a replacement (the example of East Germany and Romania).
- Democratization occurs as a result of the joint action of the government and opposition groups (the example of Poland and Czechoslovakia).
According to Huntington, measures regarding transitional justice become possible in countries where replacement or displacement in political governance occurs. That is, the former elite is removed from power against its will. In other cases, the former communist leadership either initiated the reform process itself or obtained a trend of "forgiving and forgetting" for itself by entering into negotiations with the opposition.
Another researcher, Helga Welsh, emphasizes that the success or failure in transitional justice measures depends on the politicians - that is, the distribution of political forces present in the arena in the post-communist period. The main point is whether the representatives of the former elite and the political heirs of the Communist Party can remain in power. The weaker the electoral power of former communists, the faster the decommunization process accelerates. For example, there were former communists in the governments that started reforms in Hungary in 1994-98, 2002-2010, Lithuania in 1992-96, Poland in 1993-97, Romania in 1990-96, and 2000-2004. In the decommunization process, they were able to successfully hold opposing positions (Helga A. Welsh, 1996).
Researcher John Moran interprets the issue using the terms of Albert Hirschman, emphasizing that in the post-communist period, the "voice" (protest) and "exit" (emigration) factors regarding measures of reckoning with the past are important. According to his logic, in countries where the communist regime approached processes relatively liberally, allowed protests, and retained opportunities for exit abroad, the probability of adopting soft measures regarding transitional justice was high (Poland, Hungary). Where this was not permitted (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany), the adoption of measures for reckoning with the past was demanded more strictly (John Moran, 1994).
Lavinia Stan, in her study on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, emphasizes that if a country under a communist regime is governed through ideological rigidity and repression, transitional justice measures are more radical (Czechia, East Germany, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). In countries where the path was opened to collaboration and certain reforms (Poland, Hungary), the process goes relatively softly. On the other hand, in countries where the opposition is very weak, very little impulse is observed for the realization of transitional justice (Lavinia Stan, 2009).
Nadya Nedelsky, who studied the processes in Czechia and Slovakia, identifies a correlation between the legitimacy level of the communist system and measures of transitional justice: "The higher the legitimacy of the former regime in society, the lower the society's motivation to achieve justice in relation to the government. This means that society will allow the previous elite to return to the political stage. It will not be particularly inclined towards justice concerning them during the transition period" (Nadya Nedelsky, 2004).
Analysis of the post-communist transformation shows that the adoption and implementation of transitional justice measures dictate the existence of at least two factors: first, the existence of functional democratic institutions, the guarantee of changing power through free and fair elections; second, the existence of an influential political force, the emergence of a counter-elite and pro-lustration politicians, achieving sufficient consolidation of numbers to adopt the relevant law.
From the experience of Russia and other post-Soviet countries, including Azerbaijan, it is evident that the only factor is not the failure of power change to occur through elections. Political forces interested in transitional justice measures did not emerge in these countries either.
Scientific and political studies on these measures show that the impacts of lustration on a society's democratic consolidation and trust in government institutions are huge. As a logical continuation of this, we can say that the more comprehensive the lustration and the stricter the political punishments, the higher the level of democracy will be.
Although 35 years have passed since the collapse of the post-Soviet system, the tolerance for the repressive institutions of the totalitarian regime and the lack of personnel restrictions regarding participation in crimes in our country, in Russia, and other republics (excluding Armenia) gradually served the restoration of the violent practices of the Soviet era. The refusal of lustration and other measures led to a significant part of power and property remaining in the hands of the former nomenklatura.
Against the backdrop of the successful democratization experience of the CEE countries, the negative experience of Azerbaijan and other post-Soviet countries clearly shows that without serious institutional reforms, without the complete opening of the archives of the previous regime's bureaucrats, and without other transitional justice measures, the transition from totalitarianism and authoritarianism to democracy is hardly possible.
As I mentioned above, in our country, which gained independence in '91, neither a guarantee for changing power through democratic elections was created, nor were functional democratic institutions formed. Although there was an influential political force (APF) and a counter-elite, politicians supporting lustration did not come to the forefront, and there were not even sufficient attempts at consolidation for the adoption of the relevant law.
After the elections to the Supreme Soviet in 1990, the majority belonged to the communists. Although the 50-member National Council ("Demblok") was a force capable of influencing political decisions, it was not strong enough to force through a decision on lustration measures in parliament, or perhaps they themselves had no such thought. The team of former First Secretary Ayaz Mutallibov, who was declared president in '91, was also the former elite. The Elchibey team, which came to power in '92, could not cleanse the former elite either, or they deemed it risky for themselves. They could neither remove them from high positions, open the archives, nor dissolve the Supreme Soviet and hold new parliamentary elections during the period when Elchibey's rating was high. They couldn't even take steps for constitutional reforms. Here, without touching upon the objective (Karabakh war) and subjective (their visions, desires) reasons, I am describing the factual situation.
As a result, the Elchibey government faced a communist revenge (which is one of the main threats in the transition to democracy) and, as expected, preparations for this revenge started with the establishment of the YAP (initiated by the 91s from the former elite) created in '92 by KGB General Heydar Aliyev, who had been a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the USSR. During the June rebellion in 1993, the military unit led by Surat Huseynov created a government crisis in the country. Consequently, the former Communist Party, KGB, and GRU elite, in the persons of Aliyev and Huseynov, consolidated and at the first stage "took" the parliamentary leadership (where their legitimate pillars were strong), and later the entire government. The failure of the government—which had the first and only chance for transition to democracy—to do any work regarding transitional justice concentrated power and wealth in the hands of the former elite. And then in 2003, through succession, it was passed from father to son. Komsomol members began to replace the Communist Party elite.
As a result of this, the transition from totalitarianism to democracy did not take place. On the contrary, authoritarianism strengthened further and a de facto "one-man" regime was formed. This regime merely continues the activities of its predecessors under a new name and form, but with a method of the same essence.
Therefore, this process is not a national salvation. Calling it the "revenge" of the former repressive regime and the communist elite is correct from every perspective.
The incompletion of the transition to democracy during the Elchibey government and the return of the former communists to power increased negative opinions regarding democratization in public opinion; perceptions that the citizen's will has no role in the management of a state that brings no benefit to the citizen, and the breaking of trust in the state and government, as well as elected institutions, took on a permanent character. At the same time, this is connected to factors such as ambiguous views, mistrust, etc., regarding opposition political forces (both during their time in power in 92-93 and because they did not take serious steps for the transition to democracy prior to that). Because the main elite of the opposition forces are also representatives of the society considered the democratic forces prior to '93.
That is why the "One-man" regime approaches the new political generation and initiatives with such fear and does not allow any window of opportunity to open. However, as I noted above, we must continue the work of consolidating society for the transition to democracy—which is one of the two main factors—and forming its political power with our "Republican" initiative. The path to deliverance from a repressive regime lies in winning the psychological battle and continuing the resistance.
Conclusion
The extensive analysis conducted above demonstrates that for a successful transition from deeply rooted authoritarianism to democracy, the collapse of the old system alone is not enough. During this time, the repressive apparatus of the former regime must also be completely exposed, and the process must be completed with the lustration of the old elite. Against the backdrop of the experience of Central and Eastern European countries, the entire society today feels the bitter consequences of the failure to take the necessary institutional and legal steps during Azerbaijan's transition period on its own skin.
That is, the failure to open the KGB archives during the only chance for democratic transition in 1992-1993, the failure to distance the old nomenklatura from governance, and, conversely, the policy of fraternizing with the Soviet nomenklatura prepared the legal and political groundwork for the return that was realized just 1 year later. The consolidation of this revanchist, authoritarian government and its continuation for more than 30 years formed a "one-man" authoritarianism that disregards the citizens' will, turns elected institutions into a formality, and concentrates governance in the hands of a narrow group through the principle of succession.
The analysis shows that the only successful way to escape the existing repressive governance model and transition to real democracy is to learn lessons from the severe consequences of the past. For this, first of all, the progressive forces of society must maintain psychological resistance against dynastic authoritarianism and strive to turn into an organized political force.
As international experience and historical regularities show, democratization is inevitable and will happen sooner or later! What is important is to prepare for this absolute process.
Note: The article you have read was originally written in the Azerbaijani language. Artificial intelligence tools were used only in the translation.
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