(This article was prepared as part of the KHAR Center's "Authoritarian Regimes and Transregional Influence Mechanisms" research.)
Introduction
Following the onset of the Iran war, an imperceptible yet palpable line of tension has emerged in the relations between Türkiye and Russia. This is not a tension in the format of a classical diplomatic crisis. No elements of radical confrontation are visible in official statements either. However, the signals given by both Moscow and Ankara, and particularly the events occurring in the relations of the two countries over the past month, indicate that the former comfort of the managed balance between the two nations no longer exists. Russia's demand for an "open stance" from Türkiye and Ankara's strengthening NATO discourse against the backdrop of the Iran tension have created points of mutual silent tension.
The main point that actualizes the subject is precisely this—changing geopolitical realities in the world have brought forward the reality of the formation of new power centers and new alliances, or the reformation/consolidation of old alliances. In this context, Türkiye also wishes to evaluate the new opportunities arising for itself and to gain new areas of maneuver. Especially after Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the status of the Black Sea as an economic and security zone and the ensuing threats there, the Montreux regime, the strengthening of Türkiye's transit role for Europe seeking to rid itself of Russian energy, and NATO's regional defense plans have increased Türkiye's strategic importance. Against the backdrop of the Iran war and the US-European Union tension, new layers have been added to this strategic role. The Trump administration's threatening and zigzagging stance regarding NATO provides Türkiye with the opportunity to come to the forefront as a central power within the alliance, and Ankara wants to capitalize on this. However, such a demonstration of proximity to NATO unnerves Putin's Russia, with which the Erdoğan administration has maintained relations of friendship and partnership for many years at the expense of cooling relations with the West. Even if neither side expresses this openly, this unease has manifested itself in the form of a veiled show of force over the past two months. Although at first glance they appear as separate incidents, the panorama of the two months demonstrates that the cracks in the "balance" line are not episodic. On the one hand, Ankara strives to continue its economic and regional relations with Russia, particularly in energy; however, on the other hand, it wishes to benefit from the new opportunities opened up by geopolitical realities and to make corresponding revisions to its traditional balance policy.
This article draws attention to this balance revision in Türkiye's foreign policy and Russia's reaction to it. The paper examines Türkiye's behavior not through the prism of classical bloc selection, but through the prism of Ankara's policy of balance and maneuver. In the articles written on this topic so far, the events of the last two months have been reviewed as separate episodes, whereas in this analysis by the KHAR Center, the occurrences are analyzed as elements of revision in the foreign policy course.
The main question of the analysis Does the silent tension observed in Türkiye-Russia relations following the Iran war consist of a collection of episodes, or does it demonstrate Ankara's broader-framed foreign policy revision and Moscow's reaction to it?
The "TurkStream" pressure on Ankara
Since the beginning of this year, Russia has been conducting a systematic campaign for Türkiye to exert pressure on Ukraine. The main element of this campaign is the "TurkStream" pipeline—Moscow persistently tries to "prove" that Ukraine has attacked this line and to achieve a public reaction from Ankara to this. This campaign has actively involved Russian official circles and propaganda actors, the pro-Russian Eurasianist camp in Türkiye, as well as the Kremlin-aligned former Hungarian government, which turned the line of anti-Ukrainian hostility into the locomotive of its election campaign.
Previously, this campaign carried a routine character for Russia—these claims were voiced repeatedly last year as well—but it has taken a systematic form especially since late February of this year. On February 24, Russian President Vladimir Putin gave the starting signal for the campaign by stating that special services had information regarding Kyiv's possible sabotage plans against gas pipelines in the Black Sea—the "TurkStream" and "Blue Stream" lines—and that this information was shared with Ankara (TASS, 2026a). One day after Putin, his spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that they had repeatedly informed Turkish officials about the alleged sabotage plans and reiterated this statement once again on February 27 (TASS, 2026b).
On March 2, the Russian embassy in Ankara announced that there had been sabotage attempts against the "TurkStream" and "Blue Stream" lines (TASS, 2026c). Following the political statements, on March 11, the Russian state company "Gazprom" entered the circuit—the institution claimed that the "TurkStream" and "Blue Stream" had been subjected to attacks 12 times (Reuters, 2026a). On March 17, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that during Sergey Lavrov's meeting with his Turkish counterpart Hakan Fidan, the issue of "pipeline security in the context of Ukraine's efforts to pose a threat to the Blue Stream and TurkStream lines" was discussed (Russian MFA, 2026a). The Turkish MFA did not release a statement regarding the telephone conversation between Fidan and Lavrov, and the official state agency's news report only included the sentence "energy security was also discussed" (AA, 2026a).
Russia, on the other hand, stubbornly tried to keep the narrative "Ukraine is attacking TurkStream" on the agenda. On March 19, Peskov (Reuters, 2026b), on March 20 and 25 MFA spokeswoman Maria Zakharova (Russian MFA, 2026b), and on April 2 "Gazprom" once again repeated the "new attack" claims (AA, 2026b). However, no official-diplomatic reaction came from Türkiye to all these claims, and Russia's claims were limited only to the news of the Kremlin's propaganda tools and the social media posts of Eurasianists in Türkiye citing them.
Moscow did not conduct this systematic and consecutive campaign alone. Even last year, when this campaign was conducted inconsistently, Moscow's main ally was precisely Hungary. Immediately after the Russian Ministry of Defense's claim of an attack on "TurkStream" in January 2025, Hungary's Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Péter Szijjártó, shared this statement, declaring that "TurkStream" was indispensable for Central Europe and evaluated any sabotage attempt as an attack on Hungary's energy security (About Hungary, 2025). Szijjártó later repeatedly brought this claim to the agenda in parallel with Moscow.
Viktor Orbán and his team, who maintain good relations with the Erdoğan government, became one of the main carriers of the "TurkStream is in danger" propaganda starting from late February. Accusing Kyiv of attacking the "TurkStream" and "Blue Stream" lines became one of the most functional narratives of the Hungarian government, which turned anti-Ukrainian hostility into the core element of its campaign ahead of the parliamentary elections (Ukrainska Pravda, About Hungary, 2026). Following the April 12 elections in Hungary, Orbán's departure from power will most likely cause Moscow to lose this important propaganda partner. Because the new leader Péter Magyar has stated that he will not act as Russia's proxy, that he will strengthen the EU and NATO alliance line, and that he will transition from Orbán's line of hostility to a line of normal neighborliness in relation to Ukraine.
In early April, Kremlin propaganda attempted to involve its other ally in Europe—the Serbian government—in the "TurkStream is in danger" campaign as well. On April 5, it was announced that explosives were found near the "Balkan Stream" gas pipeline, the continuation of "TurkStream" in the Balkans. Although no convincing evidence could be found indicating the organizers or suspects of the mysterious sabotage, the Hungarian and Russian governments turned this into an opportunity for an anti-Ukrainian hostility campaign. Following the extraordinary meeting of the Defense Council held in Budapest, the Orbán-Szijjártó duo accused Ukraine of the sabotage attempt in Serbia. Even though the head of Serbian intelligence stated that there was no evidence to accuse Kyiv and that they had previously provided information to the government that this sabotage might be related to migrants, Hungary did not take a step back and announced that it had taken the pipeline under military control. On April 6, although Peskov admitted that there was no evidence regarding the sabotage attempt in Serbia, he indirectly accused Ukraine (CWBS, 2026).
According to analyses, the main target in this matter was for Belgrade to join the Moscow-Budapest campaign in order to "prevent attacks against energy facilities" and to mobilize military units alongside Hungary to protect the gas pipelines. According to this plan, which aimed to support both Russia's propaganda war and Orbán's election campaign, Serbian officials were supposed to immediately reveal a "Ukrainian trace" after the explosives were found. However, it seems that Aleksandar Vučić decided to play his own game—the explosives were found, the sabotage was prevented, but Serbia did not seem very eager to find a "Ukrainian trace," on the contrary, it systematically rejected this claim and strongly propagated the thesis that the sabotage could be the work of migrants. That is, despite his close ties with the Kremlin and shared interests with the Orbán government, Vučić disrupted the Russia-Hungary "TurkStream" operation with an unexpected pragmatism, taking into account the difficult election campaign awaiting him in Serbia (CWBS, 2026).
The tanker struck in the strait and Russia's demand for a stance from Ankara
Russia's pressure on Ankara to "teach Ukraine a lesson" was not limited to the narrative of a "threat to TurkStream." At the end of March, an event occurred that Moscow thought would strengthen its hand—the "Altura" tanker, flying the Sierra Leone flag but operated by a Turkish company, was attacked in the Black Sea, in a zone close to the Bosphorus Strait, with crude oil loaded from Russia's Novorossiysk port. Immediately afterward, Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov made a statement, expressing their belief that Ankara would exert influence on Ukraine (Lenta.ru, 2026).
However, despite this pressure, and the "attack" against Ukraine by pro-Russian accounts in the Turkish segment of social media and their like-minded individuals close to the government wing, Ankara's statement regarding the striking of the tanker was quite restrained—it was stated that such attacks created risks in terms of life, property, navigation, and the environment, and it was emphasized that contacts with both sides continued to prevent the spread and escalation of clashes in the Black Sea (Turkish MFA, 2026).
Moscow was undoubtedly not satisfied with this silence from Ankara. On March 27, Türkiye's Ambassador to Moscow, Levent Bilgen, was summoned to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and met with Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko. The statement released by the Russian MFA indicated that the parties discussed the security situation around the "Blue Stream" and "TurkStream" infrastructure along with the attack on the Turkish tanker. The Russian side emphasized the necessity of a "clear public reaction from the Turkish side condemning the criminal actions of the Kyiv regime" during this meeting (Russian MFA, 2026c). The Russian embassy in Ankara also shared this news from its social media account by tagging the Turkish MFA and stated that Moscow expected a concrete stance from Ankara. This was practically the diplomatic expression of the pressure on Türkiye: "Why don't you openly protest Ukraine?"
This line was also continued by MFA spokeswoman Maria Zakharova: "The necessity of the Turkish side giving a clear public reaction condemning the criminal acts of the Kyiv regime and taking additional measures to ensure energy supply security in the region was emphasized. We believe that considering the importance of the supply of energy resources from Russia for the development of this country's economy, preventing such reckless actions is in Türkiye's own interests" (Russian MFA, 2026ç). Following these words, Zakharova also gave a message to Ankara with the words: "Let everyone who trusts Zelensky, gives him money and weapons, remember and know this: he will primarily turn all of this against you yourselves." However, Ankara did not provide any public reaction either to the summoning of the ambassador to the Russian MFA or to the statements coming from Moscow.
Ankara's indifference to Moscow's claims and demands created serious disappointment among Eurasianists, who are the main amplifiers of Russian narratives in Türkiye. The "Aydınlık" newspaper-"Ulusal Kanal" line, one of Moscow's main propaganda apparatuses in Türkiye, presented the striking of the tanker exactly in accordance with the Kremlin's style with sentences like: "The Kyiv regime, which organized sabotages against 'TurkStream,' has now struck Türkiye's oil tanker" (Aydınlık, 2026a), while "Oda TV" claimed that the tanker was struck by a Ukrainian-origin unmanned naval drone (Oda TV, 2026). Ankara's continued silence also hardened the rhetoric of the Eurasianists in the same parallel as the Kremlin. Two days after the Turkish ambassador was summoned to the Russian MFA, Doğu Perinçek, Russia's closest "man" in Ankara, stated that Ukraine deliberately struck the Turkish tanker (Ulusal Kanal, 2026). Three days after Zakharova's statements, the "Aydınlık" newspaper wrote again that the Turkish government covered up this incident, that Ukraine's name was not even mentioned in official statements, and that this behavior by Ankara caused concern in Moscow (Aydınlık, 2026b).
NATO headquarters, a naval base for Ukraine and Moscow's Montreux warning
While the veiled Ukraine tension between Moscow and Ankara continued, a new topic of discussion came to the agenda—news simultaneously spread in the media that the establishment of a NATO multinational corps headquarters in Türkiye and the commencement of operations of the Naval Component Command in Beykoz, Istanbul, within the framework of the Ukraine Capability Coalition were planned. This issue caused serious discussions among the Turkish public.
The Turkish Ministry of Defense released a statement emphasizing that the NATO headquarters and the naval base for Ukraine were previously planned steps and had no connection to each other or to the Iran war. The statement highlighted that the plan to establish a NATO multinational corps headquarters under the 6th Army Corps in Adana was approved in 2023, that an application was made to NATO in this regard in 2024, and that the headquarters, which is still in the establishment phase as NATO approval procedures continue, will be commanded by a Turkish general: "The function of the headquarters in question is to support deterrence and defense activities in its area of responsibility by ensuring the integration of the forces allocated to it within the framework of regional plans. On the other hand, since the NATO South-Eastern Regional Plan, prepared within the framework of threat assessment, was approved earlier, the multinational headquarters planned to be established has no relation to recent events in the region" (TRT Haber, 2026).
However, in the discussions actively participated by Eurasianists, who advocate for an alliance with Russia and China, and anti-NATO elements in general, it was stated that this step was against Türkiye's interests. The direction of the statements and articles was more towards defending Russia's interests in the region rather than Türkiye's (Güller, 2026) and coincided with the position of the Eurasianists in Russia. "Tsargrad," the main broadcast platform of the neo-Eurasianist Aleksandr Dugin in Russia, reported the news of the NATO headquarters and the Ukraine naval base under the headline: "Erdoğan's big secret is revealed. NATO is no more, a secret alliance is being built against Russia." The article claimed that European leaders thought the end of NATO had come, that they held secret meetings to discuss plans for a new military unit against Russia within the framework of the Capability Coalition, and that Türkiye was leading this parallel military alliance not inclusive of the US: "Türkiye has been balancing on the edge of the abyss for years. On the one hand, it sells 'Bayraktar' to Ukraine; on the other hand, it does not close the Black Sea straits to Russian ships, it trades with Russia, and it strengthens its position in NATO. Now, while Europe and the US are arguing over who will be the primary controller of the Black Sea after a possible ceasefire in Ukraine, Erdoğan has made a bold move. A headquarters in the strait directly controls entry to and exit from the Black Sea. Any Russian ship could become a target with a single move. The main question is why Türkiye needs new headquarters when it has a NATO command in Izmir and a rapid reaction corps in Istanbul. The answer is simple—the old structures are too slow and have too many political limitations. The new structure is mobile, multinational, and adapted to current conflicts. Erdoğan, who just yesterday introduced himself as a friend, is now openly creating an infrastructure aimed at encircling Moscow" (Tsargrad, 2026a).
The Russian embassy in Ankara also joined the discussions regarding the NATO headquarters and the naval base in Istanbul. In a social media statement issued by the embassy "in response to questions regarding the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits," it was said: "Moscow supports the preservation and implementation of the Montreux regime by all parties and highly appreciates Türkiye's 'balanced and responsible' stance, especially at a time when tension is rising in the Mediterranean and the Middle East." This social media message, which appeared as an appreciation but essentially contained a warning, was published accompanied by the headline news "New victory for Atatürk's Türkiye" from the "Ulus" newspaper published on the date the Montreux Convention was signed (Russian Embassy in Ankara, X account, 2026).
A day after the Russian embassy's statement, the Turkish Ministry of Defense issued another statement emphasizing that no concessions regarding the Montreux Convention could be out of the question. The statement noted that incomplete information and opinions were provided in the media and social networks regarding the NATO headquarters and the Ukraine base, and that some concepts were confused. It was noted that the Ukraine Capability Coalition, which 33 countries expressed a desire to join regarding security plans after the Russia-Ukraine war concludes with an agreement, had nothing to do with NATO, and that the Multinational Force Ukraine (MNF-U) planned by this coalition would also be formed outside of NATO: "The naval component duty of this force will be fulfilled by our country with the aim of maintaining security and stability, continuing the principle of regional ownership, and preserving the balance created by the Montreux straits convention. An agreement on this matter was reached at the meeting held in Ankara on April 15-16, 2025, and as of August 25, 2025, a Naval Component Command was established with a team consisting entirely of Turkish personnel. Fourteen countries applied to participate in this command, but only the littoral countries Türkiye, Romania, and Bulgaria will be included" (AA, 2026c).
Undoubtedly, these explanations provided by Turkish official circles at the current stage are mostly aimed at softening the reactions of anti-NATO elements in the country and the Eurasianists with whom Ankara has previously demonstrated domestic alliances. Nobody doubts that the reason for establishing both the NATO corps headquarters in Adana and the Ukraine Capability Coalition naval base in Istanbul is precisely the Russian threat.
First of all, the formation of the multinational corps headquarters in Adana is based on the defense plan adopted at NATO's 2023 Vilnius summit. The NATO-Russia tension, which rose with Russia's occupation of Crimea in 2014, resulted in the complete severing of relations in 2022. In 2023, NATO adopted a plan in Vilnius to protect its members against Russia and other regional threats across three regional vectors: North-West, Center, and South-East (Kandemir, 2026). Türkiye delayed the approval of these plans, which began to be drafted in 2014, by demanding that NATO recognize the Kurdish YPG as a terrorist organization, but signed all the plans at the Vilnius summit in 2023 (Rand, 2024).
Within the framework of the North-West plan aimed at protecting Poland and the Baltic countries, the corps headquarters established in Poland in 2017 has been expanded and currently operates in Poland under the name Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC-NE). At the same time, multinational division and brigade headquarters operate in Romania and Bulgaria, connected to the corps headquarters that became active in Bucharest in 2018 (Kandemir, 2026). Türkiye, precisely within the framework of NATO's South-Eastern defense plan, proposed in 2024 the transformation of the 6th Army Corps in Adana into a multinational NATO corps headquarters (MNC-TUR). The headquarters, currently in the process of formation, will become active in 2028 (Kandemir, 2026).
Secondly, although Turkish official circles state that the military mission planned by the Ukraine Capability Coalition has no relation to NATO, this does not seem very convincing. Because even though the naval base planned to be established in the Bosphorus Strait is not formally connected to the alliance for the time being, there is no doubt that it will operate in coordination with or directly connected to NATO in the future. This is because the coalition in question was formed by countries, the majority of which are NATO members, including Türkiye, and operates within NATO geography. In this regard, it would not be correct to say that any military component connected to the coalition will have no relevance to NATO (Ceylan, 2026).
The desire to speak with Putin and the Syria gesture to Zelensky
It is unknown whether they discussed this issue, but exactly while the discussions regarding the NATO headquarters and the naval base were ongoing, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke on the phone with Russian President Vladimir Putin (AA, 2026ç). The initiator of the first contact established between the two leaders since February 28, when the US and Israel's attack on Iran began, was Ankara—and this was emphasized not by the Turkish side, but by the Russian side (Kremlin, 2026).
A day after Erdoğan and Putin's phone call, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky arrived in Istanbul (NTV, 2026). In accordance with working visit procedures, Zelensky's reception by the highest-ranking official of the district he arrived in (here, the district governor of Istanbul's Bağcılar) was presented by pro-Russian circles and government "supporters" in Türkiye as "The 'Chief' punishing Zelensky in response to Ukraine striking the Turkish tanker" (Halk TV, Ulke TV, Serdar Özyurt, Zekeriya Say, Emine Çelik X profiles, 2026), and the prevalence of this presentation even overshadowed the Ukrainian President's meeting with Erdoğan in Istanbul; the media headlines primarily highlighted the detail "received by Bağcılar district governor" (GZT, 2026). However, Zelensky traveling to Damascus the next day on the Turkish presidential plane and the participation of Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in his meeting with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa completely voided the "The Chief punished him" argument. This time, both Eurasianists and the opposition accused the government of making a gesture that would provoke Russia—it was emphasized that taking on Zelensky's patronage was overly generous diplomatically and problematic against the backdrop of already sensitive relations with Russia. The Turkish MFA contented itself with answering questions on this matter by stating, "such mutual assistance occasionally happens between states" (Cumhuriyet, 2026).
In fact, Erdoğan giving his plane to Zelensky was the sensational PR gesture part of this visit; the main detail was the Syria-Ukraine line established under Türkiye's patronage. Sources in Syria state that Zelensky requested help from Türkiye, al-Sharaa's biggest supporter in the region, to establish contact with Damascus, that Hakan Fidan's participation in the meeting of the two leaders took place precisely within the framework of this assistance, and that the sale of Ukrainian military technologies to Syria was discussed at the meeting. However, again according to these sources, Türkiye will simultaneously strive to ensure that cooperation between Ukraine and Syria does not develop too extensively in order not to anger Russia and Iran. In other words, Ankara, on the one hand, tries not to escalate relations with Moscow and Tehran, but on the other hand, tries to alter the balance in the region in its favor by utilizing the weakening of Russia's influence in Syria and Iran's preoccupation with the US-Israel tension (The National, 2026). This is not a new tactic for Türkiye—Ankara has already been simultaneously continuing both its military-commercial relations with Ukraine and its ties with Russia for several years, and it is now trying to execute this line through Syria as well. Ukraine's interest in coming to the forefront as an actor that can export new drone technologies and grain to Syria currently aligns with Ankara's balancing tactic. At the same time, there is a conviction that the expansion of Ukraine's role in Syria precisely under Ankara's patronage will also be beneficial for Türkiye. That is, the new format allows Ankara to be the creator of a new regional architecture while also integrating Kyiv into a structure under Türkiye's control—opening up new possibilities for it. This also aligns with Ukraine's policy regarding the export of weapons and experience to the Gulf countries (The National, 2026).
Russia did not officially react to Zelensky's visit, but according to analysts, these steps disturb Moscow. According to Hanna Notte, Director of the Eurasia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Russia cannot openly criticize the countries Zelensky visited, because it is forced to cooperate with the al-Sharaa government to protect its own ties (The National, 2026).
The review of this topic by the Russian press also reflects Moscow's unease. The "Kommersant" newspaper drew attention to the fact that Zelensky visited a country that was once Moscow's ally and where Russian military bases are still located, emphasizing that this was previously impossible (Kommersant, 2026). "Tsargrad" claimed that Zelensky went to Damascus to sever relations between Russia and Syria, and that Hakan Fidan participated in the visit to prevent this (Tsargrad, 2026b). "Regnum", on the other hand, presented this cooperation as part of Britain's plan to escalate the situation and claimed that Türkiye was London's proxy not only in this configuration but generally in Central Asia and the South Caucasus (Regnum, 2026).
An alliance proposal to Moscow from Erdoğan's ally
Objective assessment shows that the strengthening of the NATO discourse in Türkiye has already taken on a visible character. Details such as the NATO emphasis in Ankara's statements regarding the neutralization of missiles fired by Iran at Türkiye in early March (Khar Center, 2026), high-level and high-tone statements ranging from the president to ministers regarding the 77th anniversary of the alliance (Directorate of Communications, 2026), the organization of a conference titled "NATO's Ankara Time" by the Directorate of Communications and SETA (Directorate of Communications, 2026), Minister of Defense Yaşar Güler's emphasis that Türkiye is one of the principal countries shaping NATO's security architecture (AA, 2026d), and the NATO Summit to be held in Ankara on July 7–8 becoming part of the political agenda demonstrate that the Turkish government has made significant revisions to its foreign policy rhetoric. These do not mean that Türkiye has suddenly returned completely to the Western line, but they indicate that the government has begun to normalize rhetoric related to NATO much more openly and comfortably compared to previous periods.
It appears that Ankara is trying to form a new geopolitical maneuver area. It does not enter into an open conflict with Russia, but simultaneously leaves Moscow's propaganda and diplomatic pressures unanswered, strengthens its discourse regarding NATO, makes political and symbolic gestures to Ukraine, and attempts to take on a role as a primary mediator in new regional combinations regarding Syria. At the same time, while doing this, it continues its unique "balance"—MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli sending his deputy to Moscow "to deliver an alliance proposal with Russia and China against the US-Israel alliance of evil" (Medya Günlüğü, 2026) should be evaluated precisely in this context. Of course, this surprise visit also has a domestic politics side: MHP and AKP, who are in an unofficial alliance with the Eurasianists, also need the images of "we also have good relations with Moscow" in order to explain the sharp zigzags in recent months to an electorate that is seriously tuned to anti-NATO sentiments.
CONCLUSION
This panorama shows that the tension observed in Türkiye-Russia relations following the Iran war is not merely the sum of separate episodes. On the contrary, all these episodes are interconnected. The issue pertains to Ankara revising its balance line in foreign policy in accordance with new geopolitical realities, and Moscow trying to influence this revision with various political, diplomatic, and propaganda tools. For the time being, there is no open confrontation; in particular, Ankara tries not to transition to a line of open tension in relations with Moscow, but it also responds to Moscow's overt-covert pressures with different gestures—proximity to NATO, appearances of support for Ukraine, and a tactic of staying away from the language of open pressure demanded by the Kremlin. From this perspective, it would certainly not be correct to say that an open crisis has emerged between Türkiye and Russia, but it is also difficult to claim that relations remain within as comfortable and manageable a framework as before.
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OdaTV, 2026. Türk tankeri Altura'ya drone saldırısı denildi... Gerçek ne çıktı. https://www.odatv.com/guncel/turk-tankeri-alturaya-drone-saldirisi-denildi-gercek-ne-cikti-120140805
Ulusal, 2026. Vatan Partisi Genel Başkanı Doğu Perinçek: “Türkiye NATO tuzağına sürüklenemez”. https://www.ulusal.com.tr/gundem/vatan-partisi-genel-baskani-dogu-perincek-turkiye-nato-tuzagina-suruklenemez-15094610
Aydınlık, 2026b. Ukrayna’nın saldırısını neden açıklamıyorsunuz? https://www.aydinlik.com.tr/haber/ukraynanin-saldirisini-neden-aciklamiyorsunuz-572336
TRT Haber, 2026. MSB: NATO Irak Misyonu'nun çekilmesi kararlaştırıldı. https://www.trthaber.com/haber/gundem/msb-nato-irak-misyonunun-cekilmesi-kararlastirildi-939159.html
Güller, Mehmet Ali, 2026. İki yeni NATO komutanlığının anlamı. https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/mehmet-ali-guller/iki-yeni-nato-komutanliginin-anlami-2490628
Tsarqrad, 2026 a. Большая тайна Эрдогана вскрылась. НАТО больше нет. Секретный корпус собирается против России. https://tsargrad.tv/news/bolshaja-tajna-jerdogana-vskrylas-nato-bolshe-net-sekretnyj-korpus-sobiraetsja-protiv-rossii_1628551?
RusEmbTurkey (X), 2026. Büyükelçiliğimize Montrö Boğazlar Sözleşmesi ile ilgili gelen sorulara cevaben... https://x.com/RusEmbTurkey/status/2039416564840014251
Anadolu Agentliyi, 2026c. MSB: Montrö Sözleşmesi'nden taviz verilmesi söz konusu değildir. https://m.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/msb-montro-sozlesmesinden-taviz-verilmesi-soz-konusu-degildir/3889178
RAND, 2024. From Forward Presence to Forward Defense: NATO’s Defense of the Baltics. https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2024/02/from-forward-presence-to-forward-defense-natos-defense.html
Kandemir Osman Gazi, 2026. Adana'da bir NATO kolordusu neden kuruluyor? https://www.indyturk.com/node/775062/t%C3%BCrki%CC%87yeden-sesler/adanada-bir-nato-kolordusu-neden-kuruluyor
Ceylan Fatih, 2026. Sis Perdesiyle Örülü NATO Çokuluslu Kolordu Karargâhı (MNC-TÜR) ve Deniz Unsur Komutanlığı. https://apm.org.tr/2026/03/30/sis-perdesiyle-orulu-nato-cokuluslu-kolordu-karargahi-mnc-tur-ve-deniz-unsur-komutanligi/
Anadolu Agentliyi, 2026ç. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Rusya Devlet Başkanı Putin ile telefonda görüştü. https://aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/cumhurbaskani-erdogan-rusya-devlet-baskani-putin-ile-telefonda-gorustu/3890842
Kremlin, 2026. Telephone conversation with President of Türkiye Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. https://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/79465
NTV, 2026. Ukrayna lideri Zelenski İstanbul'da. https://www.ntv.com.tr/dunya/ukrayna-lideri-zelenski-istanbulda-1718732
Halk TV (X), 2026. Şaka gibi karşılama! Türkiye’ye gelen Zelenski karşısında kaymakam buldu. https://x.com/halktvcomtr/status/2040713699405553769
Ülke TV (X), 2026. Erdoğan ile görüşmeye gelen Zelenski’yi Bağcılar Kaymakamı karşıladı. https://x.com/ulketv/status/2040474988625424402
Serdar Özyurt (X), 2026. Zelenski’yi İstanbul’da Bağcılar Kaymakamı Abdullah Uçgun ve bir deniz subayı karşıladı. https://x.com/serdarozyurttr/status/2040582486900593093
Zekeriya Say (X), 2026. Bağcılar Kaymakamı zahmet buyurmuş. https://x.com/Zekeriya_Say/status/2040481986435752023
Emine Çelik (X), 2026. Zelenski’yi Bağcılar Kaymakamı karşıladı. https://x.com/emine_celik__/status/2040562360935387174
GZT, 2026. Zelenski neden Bağcılar Kaymakamı karşıladı? https://www.gzt.com/dunya/zelenski-neden-bagcilar-kaymakami-karsiladi-4204587
Cumhuriyet, 2026. Dışişleri kaynaklarından Zelenski’nin Türk uçağını kullanmasına ilişkin açıklama: “Devletler arasında zaman zaman bu tip yardımlaşmalar olur”. https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/dunya/disisleri-kaynaklarindan-zelenski-nin-turk-ucagini-kullanmasina-iliskin-aciklama-devletler-arasinda-zaman-zaman-bu-tip-yardimlasmalar-olur-2492946
The National, 2026. Ukraine faces balancing act as it seeks to build ties with Syria. https://www.thenationalnews.com/news/mena/2026/04/07/ukraine-faces-balancing-act-as-it-seeks-to-build-ties-with-syria/
Kommersant, 2026. Дмитрий Дризе о перспективах новых переговоров по Украине. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/8569902
Tsargrad, 2026 b. "Анкаре это очень не нравится": Вслед за Зеленским в Сирию срочно вылетел турецкий министр. Что происходит? https://tsargrad.tv/news/ankare-jeto-ochen-ne-nravitsja-vsled-za-zelenskim-v-siriju-srochno-vyletel-tureckij-ministr-chto-proishodit_1633431
Regnum, 2026. Лондон хочет эскалации: Зеленский в Сирии строил контур новой войны. https://regnum.ru/article/4030274
Khar Center, 2026. Türkiyənin İran dilemması. https://kharcenter.com/ekspert-serhleri/turkiyenin-iran-dilemmasi
İletişim Başkanlığı, 2026a. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan’ın, NATO Genel Sekreteri Rutte ile görüşmesine ilişkin açıklama. https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/haberler/detay/cumhurbaskani-erdoganin-nato-genel-sekreteri-rutte-ile-gorusmesine-iliskin-aciklama-04-04-26
İletişim Başkanlığı, 2026b. “NATO’nun Ankara Zamanı: Dayanıklı Bir İttifak İçin Stratejik Konumlanma” Konferansı düzenlendi. https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/turkce/duyurular/detay/natonun-ankara-zamani-dayanikli-bir-ittifak-icin-stratejik-konumlanma-konferansi-duzenlendi
Anadolu Agentliyi, 2026d. Milli Savunma Bakanı Güler: Türkiye NATO'nun güvenlik mimarisine yön veren başlıca ülkelerden biridir. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/gundem/milli-savunma-bakani-guler-turkiye-natonun-guvenlik-mimarisine-yon-veren-baslica-ulkelerden-biridir/3899265
Medya Günlüğü, 2026. MHP'nin sürpriz Moskova 'seferi'. https://medyagunlugu.com/mhpnin-surpriz-moskova-seferi/
