(This article was prepared as part of the KHAR Center's "Authoritarian Regimes and Transregional Influence Mechanisms" study.)
Introduction
In recent years, the European Union has begun to seriously evaluate the fight against manipulation and disinformation operations centered in China and Russia as one of its key foreign policy directions. For several years, the European External Action Service (EEAS) has categorized these operations as Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) and has sought to analyze the potential damage this interference causes to the EU's internal decision-making mechanisms and values.
According to the most common definition, FIMI is a pattern of behavior that is manipulative, intentional, and coordinated, carried out by state or non-state actors, which threatens or has the potential to negatively influence values, procedures, and political processes (EEAS, 2023).
However, analyzing the threat of propaganda solely as FIMI often does not lead to accurate conclusions. Academic research on disinformation shows that local and foreign propaganda exist in a symbiotic relationship, directly linked by a mutual benefit that is often difficult to detect (ISS, 2023). The Western Balkans provide one of the most striking examples of this. Undoubtedly, Russia faces little difficulty in spreading its propaganda narratives in this region; however, many studies indicate that most of the disinformation content circulating in the Western Balkan media is actually of local origin (European Parliament, 2021).
In a study focusing on Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (specifically the Republika Srpska), the "KHAR Center" highlighted how FIMI and local propaganda systems are intertwined (KHAR Center, 2026). In this article, we attempt to demonstrate the symbiosis of FIMI and the local disinformation ecosystem through the examples of three different countries: Montenegro, a leader in Euro-Atlantic integration in the region; North Macedonia, where frustration over the stalling of EU membership has become a primary factor in propaganda production; and Kosovo, which is more vulnerable to international manipulations due to status and security disputes. In our analysis, we look at the channels through which this mechanism operates in these three countries.
MONTENEGRO
Montenegro is considered one of the best examples of Euro-Atlantic integration in the Western Balkans. In addition to being a NATO member (NATO, 2017), the country is a candidate for European Union membership and began accession negotiations in 2012 (EU Council, January 2026). These characteristics make Montenegro one of Russia’s primary targets in the Western Balkans. The Kremlin views Montenegro as part of its historical sphere of influence in the Balkans; shared Slavic and Orthodox Christian ties have been factors shaping diplomatic relations. However, Montenegro's separation from the state union with Serbia in 2006 to become independent, and more importantly, its turn toward NATO, marked a turning point. Russia strongly opposed Montenegro's NATO membership and was even alleged to have supported a coup attempt in 2016 to prevent this integration (Nemec, 2025).
On the other hand, while international reports present Montenegro as a leader in the EU integration process, factors such as state capture, the weakening of judicial independence, threats to media independence, a widespread system of patronage, and corruption remain strong. Ethno-religious or economic polarization in the country exacerbates political processes and creates cracks that illiberal foreign actors like Russia and China can exploit. Russia often advances its geopolitical interests in Montenegro by acting in synergy with "brotherly" Serbia, exerting influence through a combination of political, economic, and cultural means (Nemec, 2025).
Local Proxy Actors
Unlike Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Republika Srpska part), where Russian influence is seen most severely and directly, Moscow's messages in Montenegro do not necessarily take the form of centrally managed exports. Instead, they manifest through the activities of local proxies who transform foreign narratives into products used in domestic polarization. Here, Russia primarily utilizes local political proxies who represent a segment of the political scene and largely pursue their own interests (Clingendael, 2023).
The former Democratic Front coalition, which shifted from liberal conservatism toward right-wing populism and Serbian nationalism, was Russia's main proxy in Montenegro for a long time. The political forces within this alliance do not hide their ties to Russia—they organized the campaign against Montenegro's integration into NATO and visited Moscow in 2016 to sign a declaration of alliance with Russia's ruling party (Gardaseviç, 2018).
This coalition disbanded in 2023, but its successors—the New Serbian Democracy led by Andrija Mandić and the Democratic People's Party led by Milan Knežević—formed the "For the Future of Montenegro" (Za budućnost Crne Gore) movement. This revisionist, pro-Serbian, pro-Russian, anti-Western, socially and religiously conservative, right-wing populist movement won nearly 15 percent of the vote in the 2023 elections and entered parliament with 13 deputies (Dzankic, Kacarska, Keil, 2023). Andrija Mandić, known for his stance against Montenegro's NATO membership and Kosovo's independence, was elected Speaker of Parliament (AA, 2023).
The alliance's leaders, Andrija Mandić and Milan Knežević, were accused of organizing a coup on the day of the 2016 parliamentary elections and were sentenced to prison in May 2019 along with 11 others, including two Russian military intelligence officers and 8 Serbians. However, in the summer of 2024, they were acquitted due to insufficient evidence (Balkan Insight, 2024). The acquittal provided the pro-Kremlin alliance with an opportunity for symbolic rehabilitation and further strengthened its position. In 2024, when Montenegrin Prime Minister Milojko Spajić restructured the government by parliamentary decision, this alliance was given seats in the cabinet (Government of Montenegro, 2024), thereby gaining a greater say in the country's administration. However, in January of this year, the Democratic People's Party led by Knežević announced it was withdrawing its support for the government and that its representatives would resign because demands such as making Serbian the official language, changing the citizenship law, and altering the status of the flag were not met (European Western Balkans, January 2026). Mandić, however, still serves as Speaker of Parliament, and his representatives remain in the government.
Thanks to local political allies, the Kremlin's disinformation and manipulation operations appear not as "exported propaganda" but as tools of internal competition.
Informal Economic Channels
In the early 2000s, Russia was an important political and economic partner for Montenegro, especially in the energy, industry, tourism, and real estate sectors. Russian business circles and oligarchs invested heavily in real estate in Montenegro, particularly in coastal zones. Research shows that in 2016, foreign direct investment from Russia into Montenegro accounted for approximately 30 percent of Montenegro's GDP and 13 percent of all incoming investment. That year, Russia was Montenegro's largest investor (Nemec, 2025).
Montenegro has complied with EU sanctions against Russia since 2014 (Clingendael, 2023). However, although formal economic ties weakened due to Montenegro's adherence to EU sanctions and its NATO membership, new—informal—channels of influence have emerged and developed. After the invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russians became the largest group seeking refuge in Montenegro. From February 2022 to July 2023, Russian citizens opened 5,846 companies in Montenegro. In 2022, 54 percent of foreign-owned companies in Montenegro belonged to Russian citizens (Nemec, 2025). Despite the official sanctions regime, informal economic channels serve as a pillar for the continuity of Kremlin influence.
"Foreign" Looking Local Platforms
Research reveals that Montenegro's media sector is strongly influenced by foreign media, mainly from Serbia, or by propaganda portals reflecting Kremlin narratives (IREX, 2024). Montenegro is an open target for content leakage along the Moscow-Serbia axis. This is because there is no language barrier—material from Serbian-language media easily enters Montenegro's information environment and is localized (Clingendael, 2023).
The online media space, characterized by opaque registration, plays the most critical role in the circulation of Russian narratives in Montenegro. According to research by the "Digital Forensic Center," Russia and Serbia use these platforms for hybrid campaigns aimed at obstructing Montenegro's Euro-Atlantic integration (Support4Partnership, 2024).
The IN4S portal is cited at the top of this list. The portal—which has offices in Podgorica, Belgrade, Novi Sad, Nikšić, North Mitrovica, and Donbas, and spreads disinformation, hate speech, and denies Montenegrin identity—is not officially registered in the country. While official statements claim the editor-in-chief is Cuban boxer Félix Savón, research indicates the true owner and editor-in-chief is Gojko Raičević, known in Montenegro as an anti-NATO and pro-Russian figure. The other founder of the site is Vladimir Božović, the current rector of the University of Montenegro (Media Ownership Monitor, 2023).
Another important carrier of Russian narratives in Montenegro is the portal "Borba." News from Russian media outlets like TASS and "Ria Novosti," as well as their branches in Serbia such as "Sputnik Srbija" and "RT Balkan," are distributed through IN4S, "Borba," and other similar portals (Support4Partnership, 2024).
These channels also make extensive use of the power of social networks. In late 2024, at least 50 Telegram accounts spreading anti-Western narratives were identified as active in Montenegro. Narratives spread on these Telegram accounts were subsequently recirculated on the Twitter/X platform and supported by automated bot accounts (Nemec, 2025).
Cyberattacks
Russia also attempts to influence the political situation in Montenegro through cyberattacks. In the Global Cybersecurity Index, Montenegro ranks second in the region for vulnerability to cyberattacks, preceded only by its neighbor Bosnia and Herzegovina (ITU, 2020).
The Church Factor and Soft Power
Disinformation campaigns in Montenegro are often linked to elections or other serious political processes. During important events, disinformation campaigns are conducted alongside agenda-setting and information overload techniques (CCE, 2020). Topics such as identity, history, and religious leadership serve as the primary "fuel" for discussions related to foreign influence in Montenegro. Through campaigns regarding the country's identity, official language, and symbols, Russia continuously fuels a "war of values" and produces corresponding narratives. The Kremlin weaponizes the role of the Russian Empire as the "historical defender and patron of Slavic brothers"; the enemy of that time, the Ottoman Empire, is equated with today’s "enemy," the West (Nemec, 2025).
The Kremlin directs its soft power in Montenegro through the Serbian Orthodox Church (under the influence of the Moscow Patriarchate) to exploit religious-ethnic tensions and incite nationalist and revisionist sentiments. A clear example of this was the fueling of the Montenegro-Serbia dispute through disinformation and influence operations following the adoption of the "Law on Freedom of Religion" in Montenegro in late 2019 (Nemec, 2025).
Following the 2022 agreement between the Montenegrin government and the Serbian Orthodox Church, the influence of Belgrade and Moscow in Montenegro via religion has increased even further (Bogdanovski, 2025).
Main Narratives
Kremlin narratives in Montenegro are divided into several "packages."
The first and largest "package" is the line that evaluates NATO membership and European Union integration as a loss of the country's independence. Especially on the anniversaries of significant events (such as the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia or Montenegro's accession to NATO), anti-Western emotions are fueled with "aggressive NATO" and "hypocritical West" rhetoric. In this context, Russia's invasion policy is justified, and Russia is presented as an ally instead of the West (Support4Partnership, 2024). Portraying Montenegro's pro-European foreign policy as a "course controlled from the outside" is also among these narratives.
The second narrative "package" consists of the classic propaganda messages regarding Ukraine used by Russia in all European countries. Here again, the "NATO is to blame" line stands at the center, with claims of "neo-Nazism," "Russophobia," and "genocide in Donbas" in Ukraine, as well as theses that the West is waging a proxy war against Russia and that Moscow was forced to respond with a "special operation" (DFC, 2023).
The third and most active "package" concerns Montenegrin identity. Russian and Serbian propaganda mechanisms continuously keep theses about the illegitimacy of Montenegrin identity, the threat to Serbs, and their exposure to discrimination on the daily agenda. The "Serbian World" (srpski svet) thesis, a proxy for Russia's "Russian World" concept, is promoted (DFC, 2024). According to analysts, since 2020, society in Montenegro has faced an unprecedentedly rapid expansion of the "Overton Window" effect (the legitimization of ideas previously considered unthinkable). The once-unthinkable idea of "all Serbs living in one state" is being legitimized by proxies as "realpolitik," and Russian propaganda provides open support for this (DFC, 2024).
Increasing political polarization through fake polls in elections, false citations, and attacks on politicians is also a separate branch of the Kremlin's narrative production in Montenegro (Metamorphosis, 2024).
One of the Kremlin's strongest propaganda narratives in Montenegro is related to the church—within this framework, any kind of ecumenical relationship is labeled as "uniatism" or "revival." Moscow views such relationships as a way for the Vatican to expand Catholic influence; this narrative is used to present Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church as the primary defenders of Orthodox Christianity (Bogdanovski, 2025).
NORTH MACEDONIA
Over the past decade, North Macedonia has clearly demonstrated how internal weaknesses can be exploited through Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI). Since becoming an independent state in 1991, the country has faced numerous challenges regarding political polarization, ethnic divisions, and trust in public institutions. This has created fertile ground for influence operations targeting the country's democratic processes and social solidarity (IDEA, 2025).
Although North Macedonia has been a candidate for EU membership since 2005 (European Council, 2022), Greece initially blocked this path. After this issue was resolved and an agreement was reached to change the country's name, North Macedonia became a NATO member and received an invitation for EU negotiations, only to face the Bulgaria problem. Sofia blocked the negotiations, citing North Macedonia’s failure to comply with bilateral agreements on "good neighborly relations" (OSW, 2020). The EU negotiating framework proposed in 2022 to overcome the Bulgarian veto—which linked North Macedonia's membership to bilateral "good neighborly" agreements with Bulgaria and Greece—created a favorable environment for Kremlin influence operations (ISD, 2024).
Russia’s "special interest" in North Macedonia began after 2010. While analyzing Russia's disinformation and destabilization activities in Southeast European democracies, the Sofia-based Centre for the Study of Democracy reported that between 2000 and 2022, 6 billion USD from Russian sources entered North Macedonia’s financial flows secretly and illegally (Nezavisen, 2023). After 2015, Russia’s overt influence on North Macedonia's internal politics began to be observed. However, after the SDSM came to power in 2017, Russian influence relatively decreased. Accusing Russia of interfering in its internal affairs, the Skopje government expelled 13 high-profile Russian diplomats between 2018 and 2023 (Daskalovski, Damjanovski, 2024).
Despite this, many reports on public opinion indicate a high sensitivity to Eurosceptic disinformation, particularly among audiences with low media literacy. This helps narratives that portray Western actors as "no better than Russia" succeed in blurring the lines between democratic and authoritarian influences (IDEA, 2025).
In other words, much of the anti-EU rhetoric in North Macedonia actually stems from frustration with the EU enlargement process, independent of Russia. However, a dynamic has formed where mainstream civil society actors echo and amplify voices close to the Kremlin line; as a result (sometimes unintentionally), they end up reinforcing Russian narratives (ISD, 2024).
The difference between anti-EU actors and overtly pro-Russian actors is that the latter additionally call for withdrawing from NATO, applying for BRICS membership, or remaining "fully sovereign" and outside of geopolitical blocks (ISD, 2024).
The Kremlin’s Political Allies
North Macedonia is among the countries where pro-Kremlin actors are abundant on the political scene. Russia’s main political ally in North Macedonia is the far-left, Eurosceptic "Levica" (Left) Party. This party regularly criticizes EU and NATO policies, frames Western influence as imperialist, opposes key reforms related to minority rights and EU integration, and characterizes NATO as a "terrorist organization" (ISD, 2024). The Levica Party, which increased its number of deputies from 2 to 6 in the 2024 parliamentary elections (Clingendael, 2024), also supported Russia's invasion of Ukraine (SWP Berlin, 2023). The party leadership does not hide its close ties with the Russian embassy in Skopje (Truthmeter, 2024).
There are also other small but divisive political forces in North Macedonia that play a role in spreading Kremlin narratives. Among these, names of small parties such as Homeland Macedonia (Rodina Makedonija), United Macedonia (Edinstvena Makedonija), and One Macedonia (Obedineta Makedonija) can be mentioned (Truthmeter, 2022).
At the same time, the Macedonian Action-Conservative (MAAK) Party, the GROM party—which advocates for ties with Russia and the Eurasian Union and blames Zelenskyy for the war in Ukraine—and the DPS (Democratic Party of Serbs in Macedonia), the largest political force of Serbs in Macedonia which is represented in the government for the first time with a deputy prime minister, are also among the carriers of Kremlin narratives (Truthmeter, 2024).
In North Macedonia, the government formally supports integration into the European Union. However, the VMRO-DPMNE block, which emerged stronger from the 2024 elections and forms the basis of the ruling coalition, has turned the disappointment arising from the prolonged accession process into political capital (Clingendael, 2024). This is a line that indirectly facilitates the work of Kremlin narratives. On the other hand, the close relationship between the former leadership of VMRO-DPMNE and Russia should not go unnoticed.
The Russian Embassy – A Regional Propaganda Center
Russian embassies are among the main carriers of propaganda worldwide and actively use social networks for this purpose. The Russian embassy in Skopje is the most active among Moscow’s missions in the Western Balkans and makes particularly heavy use of Facebook. Research shows that this embassy ranks second in the Balkans for Facebook activity, behind only the embassy in Romania. Macedonian intelligence assesses its activity as part of a strategy to isolate North Macedonia from Western influence (Sajdova, 2024). The Russian embassy is also highly active on the X platform (Metamorphosis, 2024).
Narrative Carriers in the Media
There is a large vacuum in North Macedonia for disinformation narratives to enter the "mainstream." The Kremlin exploits this gap—primarily by translating articles published in Serbia and resharing statements from official Kremlin sources. Along with "Sputnik RS" and "RT Balkan," Serbian online tabloids are sources still used to spread Kremlin messages in North Macedonia, as a large part of the population knows the Serbian language. Traditional media such as television and newspapers are no exception. One of the daily newspapers, "Nova Makedonija," regularly publishes interviews with the Russian and Chinese ambassadors, amplifying their propaganda and misinformation (Metamorphosis, 2024c). In monitoring, outlets such as "TV Alfa," "Kurir," "N Aon," "Republika," "Vecer," "Express," and "Lider" are cited as the main carriers of disinformation content and polarization among local media channels in North Macedonia (Metamorphosis, 2024).
Additionally, analytical reports show that social networks and online media are the primary sources and carriers of disinformation in the country. Unlike Montenegro, online media in this country is not under foreign ownership, but the opacity of its funding and ownership and its openness to producing disinformation create ideal conditions for foreign influence (Tuneva, 2024). There are also analyses regarding the possibility that these online media organizations receive financial support from various "foreign power centers," including Russia, which can be observed through the more aggressive promotion of those actors' interests (IKS, 2025).
One direction of the Kremlin’s propaganda activities specific to North Macedonia is the dissemination of narratives through non-news media outlets. Medical magazines such as "Russian Herbalist," "Russian Medicine," and "Ruski Doktor" conduct Russian propaganda through the lens of traditional medicine (Sajdova, 2024).
The North Macedonian leg of the "Pravda" (Portal Kombat) network, created by Russia after 2022 and covering almost the entire world, was activated in 2024 as part of an expansion covering 28 countries (EDMO, 2024). Overall, the domain architecture of the "Pravda" disinformation network in the Balkans was built in four stages. In North Macedonia, pravda-mk.com was activated in the first stage, mk.news-pravda.com in the second stage, and north-macedonia.news-pravda.com in the third stage. The fourth stage does not yet cover this country (Rizanaj, 2025).
Like all Pravda websites, the branch in North Macedonia uses the same sources—Russian state or state-controlled propaganda channels like TASS, RIA, "Lenta," and "Tsargrad," Russian-language Telegram channels automatically translated into local languages, pro-Russian Telegram channels broadcasting in local languages, and, very rarely, local reputable channels that broadcast content viewed positively by Russia. The network also actively uses the X platform (Rizanaj, 2025).
The media channels listed above combine imported narratives with domestic EU frustration and identity disputes to carry them to a wide audience. Networks like "Pravda" and social media tools rapidly amplify content that deepens polarization in North Macedonia (Kovacevska, 2024).
Proxy NGOs and the Church Line
One of the main channels spreading Russian influence in North Macedonia is the Orthodox Church. Stevo Pendarovski, the president of North Macedonia from 2019–2024, revealed in 2023 the connection between individuals represented in the leadership of the Orthodox Church and Russian intelligence. This influence also explains the cold relationship of the Macedonian Orthodox Church with the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, just as in Montenegro (Sajdova, 2024).
Another fact—in 2023, Archimandrite Vasian (Nikolay Zmeyev) was barred from entering North Macedonia along with three Russian diplomats. Since he was the head of the Russian Church's services in Sofia, he was expelled from Bulgaria a week later. The Bulgarian National Security Agency explained that the measure was taken due to their "activities directed against the national security and interests of the Republic of Bulgaria" (Svoboda, 2023). Media noted that Vasian's behavior significantly exceeded the boundaries of activity permitted by international law (Metamorphosis, 2024).
Several NGOs that are primary carriers of polarizing discourse in North Macedonia also play the role of Moscow’s proxies. Most of these promote anti-gender rhetoric under the guise of protecting children's rights and traditional values. Although it presents itself as apolitical and interested in the welfare of minors, the Coalition for Protection of Children is in open opposition to comprehensive sexual education and strongly resists legislative initiatives advancing gender equality and LGBTQ+ rights. This NGO is known for its proximity to the "Rodina" Party (IDEA, 2025).
According to international reports, although some anti-feminist and anti-LGBTQ+ groups in the country act as "defenders of traditional values," their influence networks are transnational, and elements of foreign support (including from Christian organizations) are visible in their activities. It is noted that the Macedonian Orthodox Church supports this discourse in some cases (Kovacevska, 2024).
The Union of Macedonian-Russian Friendship Associations and the Russian Citizens' Association – Chayka are among the NGOs that receive direct support from Moscow. These associations are supported by the Gorchakov Fund, the Russkiy Mir Foundation, and the Russian embassy in Skopje (AIDDATA, 2023). Alongside these funds, "Lukoil," Russia's largest investment in North Macedonia, is closely involved in financing Russian soft power projects (Support4Partnership, 2024).
Main Narratives
Many of the narrative directions in North Macedonia overlap with those in Montenegro. It is just that here, pro-Kremlin narratives and disinformation directions are localized through local "national values." NATO and EU integration are evaluated as a loss of identity and sovereignty and as external control; the thesis that the country will never be an EU member is worked on; disputes with Bulgaria are placed into a manipulation format that forms the basis of Euroscepticism; and Russia and BRICS are shown as alternatives (ISD, 2024).
The Prespa Agreement, which provided for the change of the country's name, is presented as "betrayal" and "selling out identity"; similarly, those who support the "French proposal" in EU negotiations (the requirement to recognize Bulgarians in the Constitution) are presented as "traitors," those who oppose it as "protectors of national dignity," and the EU as "humiliating Macedonians" (IDEA, 2025).
The Ukraine war is presented through the Kremlin lens as a NATO proxy war, while also being "decorated" with terms produced by Kremlin propaganda such as "biological laboratories" and "Nazis" (IDEA, 2025). Topics of religion and identity, gender and feminism are exploited under the name of "family values" (Kovacevska, 2024), ethnic tensions are incited, and Serbia’s revisionist approach to Srebrenica is echoed (IDEA, 2025).
KOSOVO
In Kosovo, the symbiosis between Russia (Serbia)-centered FIMI (Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference) and local disinformation is primarily built upon status disputes, security discussions, and lines of international legitimacy. Moscow is capable of transforming any internal political tension within Kosovo into these themes. The European Commission’s report on Kosovo also highlights attempts to influence the electoral environment as a risk, including disinformation and the role of the Russian-origin media ecosystem (European Commission, 2025).
For Russia, Kosovo is not merely a territorial issue—it is a geopolitical symbol of "resistance" against Euro-Atlantic integration in the Western Balkans, as well as against the global order led by the West and the state model built on liberal democracy. Russia's strategy of exploiting regional instability to weaken the EU and NATO, while simultaneously supporting nationalist and separatist groups to maintain its influence, is clearly visible in its consistent opposition to Kosovo's independence. Moscow presents itself as the "protector" of Serbia's territorial integrity, a presentation that serves it well in northern Kosovo (Ilazi, Orana, and Lozhaj, 2024).
Kosovo submitted its application for EU membership in December 2022. The authorities remain committed to Kosovo's European path, accompanied by high public support. However, in the last few months, due to a political stalemate (deadlock), the pace of Kosovo's preparation has slowed (European Commission, 2025). Research focusing on Kosovo shows that Russian disinformation campaigns have influenced the emergence of certain "cracks" in the Euro-Atlantic consensus regarding Kosovo; that is, strategically important Euro-Atlantic integration decisions are now becoming part of daily political squabbles, and political elites no longer behave as cautiously on this subject as they once did (Ilazi, Orana, and Lozhaj, 2024).
Since 1999, a NATO international peacekeeping mission (KFOR) has been present in Kosovo. Additionally, organizations such as the NATO Advisory and Liaison Team (NALT) operate to ensure peace and security. While these missions exist to maintain peace, the trend of increasing ethnic tension has appeared deeper and more widespread in recent years. This tension has followed a rising trajectory, particularly since 2021, and has become one of the most important elements of Russian influence in the Balkans. The main center of tension is the Banja Luka-Belgrade-Mitrovica triangle. It is estimated that Mitrovica, in northern Kosovo, will play the role of the primary instigator of possible clashes (Niemann, 2026).
The events that took place in the village of Banjska in northern Kosovo in September 2023 are an example of this. The incident unfolded as follows: during the Kosovo police's intervention regarding a road blockade at the entrance to the village, armed Serbs opened fire, and one policeman was killed. Following this, Kosovo security forces conducted an operation against the Serbian gunmen hiding in the village monastery; several gunmen were killed, a large quantity of weapons was seized, and the incident was suppressed (AP, 2023). Milan Radoičić, the then-deputy chairman of "Serb List" (Srpska Lista), the main Serbian party in Kosovo, took responsibility for organizing the attack. While Pristina stated that Belgrade was behind the attack and that the terror attempt aimed at the partition of Kosovo, Radoičić and Serbia denied this (Balkan Insight, 2023). Subsequent investigations indicate that Russia was aware of this attack plan in advance (Ilazi, Orana, and Lozhaj, 2026). Some analysts point out that this event was a direct result of Russian (Serbian)-origin propaganda, hate speech, disinformation, and conspiracy theories (Kovachevska, 2026). Other analyses emphasize that this incident was an element of a well-planned Russian-Serbian strategy aimed specifically at Serbia's occupation of northern Kosovo (Musliu, Kuçi, 2026).
Russia's Main Influence Actor in Kosovo: Serbia and the Serbs
The Albanian community in Kosovo is less sensitive to Russian influence because they generally do not consult Russian sources and view them skeptically. Since the Albanian population has a stable pro-Western orientation, they are less inclined toward Russian narratives (Kovachevska, 2026).
The strongest pillars of Russian influence in the country are Serbia and ethnic Serbs—Belgrade uses ethnic minorities in Bosnia and Kosovo as proxies to delay state-building and deepen divisions, carrying out identity-based actions that threaten regional stability. Russia, in turn, strengthens its influence through local media, proxy forces, and politicians who portray Serbs as victims of Western hatred and humiliation. This tendency has intensified following the full-scale attack on Ukraine; under Russian influence, the probability of ethnic Serbs clashing with other peoples has significantly increased compared to ten years ago (Niemann, 2026). Research shows that the riskiest area in Kosovo currently is the relationship between ethnic groups. According to Democracy Plus’s "Vulnerability Index of Disinformation" report (2024), the targeted disinformation component in ethnic tensions is rated 88 on a 100-point scale (Democracy Plus, 2024).
Serbian politicians, Serbian intelligence, the Serbian Orthodox Church, Russia’s "liaison office" structure in Kosovo, and disinformation outlets are the primary apparatuses of Russian influence in Kosovo. The propaganda ecosystem we described extensively in our writing on Serbia—politicians like Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić (as well as former Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik) who act from a shared position with Russia, the "RT Balkan" and "Sputnik Srbija" structures, state-controlled Serbian media, the Russian cultural center in Banja Luka, the Russian-Serbian Humanitarian Center in the city of Niš, and radical right-wing networks (KHAR Center, 2026)—also works actively regarding Kosovo. Despite "Sputnik" and "RT Balkan" being sanctioned in Kosovo, their websites occasionally remain accessible through mobile internet providers such as Vala, IPKO, and MTS (Ilazi, Paçarizi, Pallasch, 2026).
While Serbia and Russia are the most significant foreign players behind ethnic and religious disinformation, local politicians in Kosovo have also used disinformation to gain political points and polarize society. This is one of the directions that serves Russia’s interests most effectively (Ilazi, Paçarizi, Pallasch, 2026).
Furthermore, Serbian pro-government platforms like "Kosovo Online" provide "institutional weight" to the propaganda. A significant portion of the harshest content—openly hateful and romanticizing war—is spread in Telegram groups. Channels such as "Bunt," "Bunker," "Koridori," "Hodnik," and "Srpska Sparta Info," which "heroize" the war crimes of the 1990s, share conspiracy theories, and turn local incidents in the north into calls for nationalist mobilization within minutes, gather thousands of members (Ilazi, Paçarizi, Pallasch, 2026).
Kosovo is also frequently the target of Russian cyberattacks. Most recently, after government officials announced that military support would be provided to Ukraine, the country's institutions were subjected to a cyberattack; according to officials, this attack was carried out by Russia on May 7, 2025 (Kovachevska, 2026).
After 2022, Russia included Kosovo in its "Pravda" (Portal Kombat) network, which spans over 90 countries. Here, the Albanian-speaking audience is specifically targeted. One of the most notable examples of targeting the Albanian audience is the portal albania.news-pravda.com. Moreover, Kosovo-related content in this network is not limited to regional sites; it also appears on domains with no direct geographical connection to the Balkans. Content regarding Kosovo has also been spread on pages associated with African countries. This global reach is facilitated by the English-language versions of these domains, making the content accessible to an international audience and strengthening the platform's narratives beyond the Balkans (Kovachevska, 2024). One interesting point is that Iranian media also supports Russia in Kosovo narratives (Ilazi, Orana, and Lozhaj, 2026).
Russia's Main Kosovo Narratives
Russia has several main propaganda narratives regarding Kosovo. The "Western double standards" narrative, which targets and "demonizes" the West, accounts for approximately 35 percent of the propaganda content. Moscow accuses the West of implementing double standards by supporting Kosovo's independence on one hand and opposing the occupation of Crimea on the other. In this narrative, Russia attempts to present itself as a "principled" actor "protecting international law" to cover up its own international law violations, while accusing the West of "selective application of law," "double standards," and "geopolitical manipulation" (Ilazi, Orana, and Lozhaj, 2026). Generally, Russian media and officials frequently draw parallels between the aggression in Ukraine and the war in Kosovo. For example, they call the Bucha massacre "staged," equating it with their claims regarding the 1999 Reçak massacre in the Kosovo war. They also spread disinformation about the participation of former KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) fighters in the Ukrainian conflict and "organ trafficking." Additionally, they make misleading comparisons between the annexation of Crimea and Kosovo's independence. These narratives aim to distort historical facts and manipulate public perception for the sake of Russian geopolitical interests (Kovachevska, 2026).
The second thesis, making up about 30 percent of Russia's influence narratives, consists of the claim that "Kosovo is not a legitimate state according to international law." By emphasizing that Kosovo's status can only be resolved with Serbia's consent, the Kremlin seeks to consolidate its role as both the "protector of Serbian interests" and a "challenger" to the West. The main goal is to hinder stability in the Balkans and use Kosovo as a card to create a wider rift between Serbia and the EU.
The claim that "Kosovo is a source of instability and organized crime" constitutes Russia's third narrative line. Through this framework, Moscow both questions the legitimacy of Kosovo's statehood and targets the West's role in "enabling" Kosovo's independence (Ilazi, Orana, and Lozhaj, 2026).
The fourth narrative includes the claim that "the West utilizes Kosovo to expand its influence and isolate Serbia." The Kremlin alleges that the European Union and NATO are using the Kosovo issue as a geopolitical tool to force Belgrade to recognize Kosovo's "independence."
Another propaganda narrative aims to deepen ethnic polarization in Kosovo. This narrative works two ways: Kosovo Serbs are told "you have been erased" and "you are victims of Albanian oppression"; Kosovo Albanians are instilled with the fear of "Serbian aggression." The goal is to keep both sides in fear and separation (Ilazi, Paçarizi, Pallasch, 2026).
CONCLUSION
The facts in this article show that it is incorrect to explain the problem of propaganda—disinformation and manipulation—in the internally troubled countries of the Western Balkans merely as FIMI. The examples of Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Kosovo demonstrate the existence of a more serious threat in the form of a symbiosis between FIMI and local factors in the Balkans.
In Montenegro, while political proxies opposed to Euro-Atlantic integration and foreign-registered online channels constitute the local leg of this symbiosis, in North Macedonia, the frustration arising from the blockage of the EU membership process and identity disputes play the role of the Kremlin's main narrative capital. In Kosovo, the ethnic-based security problem emerges as the local factor that makes FIMI more functional. In all three examples, Serbia plays the role of the main actor—both for the FIMI line and local influence channels—serving as Russia's primary extension in the region.
To effectively respond to the FIMI-local disinformation symbiosis, which has increased in scale and depth in these countries—partly due to Serbia's influence—exposure and fact-checking activities alone are not enough. This issue should be viewed as one of the fundamental elements of Europe's response policy and security architecture against Russia's hybrid warfare. Concrete, targeted, multifaceted, and planned struggle mechanisms must be established, and FIMI, local disinformation production, the actors and causes creating them, the factors deepening political polarization, and amplification campaigns must be viewed comprehensively.
Note. * All references to Kosovo in this article are made in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and the International Court of Justice Opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence, without prejudice to positions on status.
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