✍️ Ahad Ahadli. Master of Political Science, Central European University.

Introduction

Elections are among the key political institutions that ensure the accountability of governments and parliaments. As an element of democracy, this institution allows citizens to punish the ruling elite for its missteps or to give political groups aspiring to govern a chance to assume power.

Azerbaijan is currently classified among authoritarian countries. Freedom House assesses the country as “not free” (Freedom House 2025). The organization V-DEM also describes Azerbaijan as an electoral authoritarian regime in its most recent report (V-DEM 2025, 14). For this reason, this article will analyze how the government in Azerbaijan manipulates elections.

Question of the analysis: How does the authoritarian government of Azerbaijan manipulate elections held in the country?

The article primarily refers to the Election Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Law on Political Parties, and reports by credible media outlets. The author’s own data collected from open sources (the Central Election Commission’s Infocenter portal) is cited accordingly. Researchers wishing to access these data may request them from the institution.

Structural Analysis of Institutional and Procedural Manipulation

Although elections—processes for renewing legislative or executive power—are concepts typical of democratic societies, authoritarian regimes also periodically organize elections for both parliament and the presidency, thereby imitating democratic regimes. While not differing in substance from classical authoritarian systems, these regimes differ in appearance (formal democratic institutions, a formally democratic constitution and liberal laws, formal elections). Schedler refers to such systems as electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2013, 77–83; Schedler 2002, 37–39). These regimes practice systematic authoritarian governance behind a “democratic façade.” Their number is not small: according to the 2025 V-DEM democracy report, there are 56 electoral authoritarian regimes, and Azerbaijan is one of them (V-DEM 2025, 14).

Free and fair elections are among the most crucial elements of genuine democratic regimes. Citizens’ right to elect their parliaments—and in some cases, presidents—provides them with broad oversight over the political system. Precisely for this reason, electoral authoritarian regimes that imitate democracy also use elections as a tool of legitimacy. Azerbaijan does the same.

Authoritarian regimes may pursue various objectives when they hold periodic elections. First and foremost, the regime attempts to demonstrate to external actors (states, international organizations) that the current system is legitimate and legal. Even if external actors know that these elections are not free and fair, in countries governed by a republican system (where power does not formally pass from father to son), demonstrating that legitimacy originates from a certain source carries importance.

Second, the regime relies on various methods (intimidation, inducement) to secure a high share of the vote. By doing so, it sends a signal to the elite that citizens support the ruling system so that no internal splits or defections occur.

Third, elections perform an informational function for authoritarian systems. By examining turnout, activity on election day, and citizens’ reactions (protest or support), the regime learns the actual size of its support base, the demands of those who are dissatisfied, and more—information that helps it address such issues in the future (Gandhi & Okar 2009, 405).

Even though the results of elections are predetermined, by holding elections authoritarian regimes nonetheless “press the button of uncertainty.” Elections inevitably energize public life. The ruling party, leader, or elite’s communication with society may generate negative impressions. For example, the failure to fulfill promises made during previous elections may create mistrust in new promises. Forcing citizens to vote may generate resentment. The opposition’s open communication with citizens during the election period may shift public opinion in their favor (even if only slightly). In addition, after elections, the dissatisfied public may launch new protests against the “victorious” regime.

For this reason, authoritarian regimes strive to guarantee that this “uncertainty” works in their favor by fighting opposition forces on two fronts. As Schedler describes, this is a “two-level asymmetric struggle.” At the level of electoral competition, the ruling regime battles the opposition for voters’ preferences. At the institutional level, it fights to change the rules of the game. Election outcomes are the result not only of election day itself but of the totality of this two-level struggle (Schedler 2013a, 215). Since the outcome depends on both layers, the ruling regime seeks to reshape “uncertainty” into “certainty” through both institutional (rules of the game, election legislation, practical restrictions) and procedural (election-day fraud, pressure on voters and candidates, etc.) manipulation.

The Azerbaijani ruling regime’s use of the same methods to predetermine election results aligns fully with the nature of such authoritarian systems. It is true that in recent years, no real struggle has been visible at either the institutional or procedural level. The last two presidential elections were boycotted by the main opposition parties—the Popular Front Party of Azerbaijan (AXCP) (Azadliq.org 2023) and the Musavat Party (Azadliq.org 2018). AXCP also boycotted the last three parliamentary elections (Meydan TV, 2024). Nevertheless, the government continues to preserve (and sometimes expand) institutional changes that guarantee outcomes, and also engages in manipulation on election day.

Institutional-Level Manipulations

Formation of the Central Election Commission (CEC): According to the Election Code, the Central Election Commission must consist of 18 members. Six of them represent the party that won the elections, six represent minority parties in the Milli Majlis, and six represent independent MPs who do not belong to any party [1][2].

However, because real opposition parties are not allowed into parliament, the individuals who “represent” opposition parties in fact represent the government. This issue has also been highlighted by OSCE reports. Specifically, OSCE/ODIHR election observation mission reports for the 2024 parliamentary elections (OSCE.org 2025, 11), the 2024 presidential elections (OSCE.org 2025a, 9), and the 2020 parliamentary elections (OSCE.org 2020, 8) clearly refer to this point. These reports also cite relevant judgments of the European Court of Human Rights [3].

Absence of Free Airtime for Candidates: According to the Election Code, candidates can obtain free airtime only if they are nominated by a party that has more than 60 candidates. That is, only parties and blocs that have more than 60 registered candidates receive nationwide free airtime [4].

The government applies this law manipulatively: it registers fewer than 60 candidates for real opposition parties, thus depriving them of nationwide airtime. Another manipulation is that while nationwide airtime for eligible parties is mandatory for media outlets, airtime for individual candidates at the local level is left to the discretion of those media organizations [5].

Financing: The financing of political parties in Azerbaijan is regulated both by the Election Code and by the Law on Political Parties. The Election Code heavily restricts the income sources of party or candidate election funds. For example, foreign citizens, foreign legal entities, charitable organizations, and religious associations are prohibited from donating to election funds. Donations from ordinary citizens are also significantly complicated: citizens must provide names, surnames, residential addresses, and other personal details that are unnecessary for donating but useful for exerting pressure on donors [6].

The Law on Political Parties further strengthens the regime’s control over party financing. For example, a political party may receive funds only in national currency and only via bank transfer to its account [7]. The maximum amount an individual may donate to one or more parties in a year cannot exceed 35 times the minimum monthly wage. Since the minimum wage in 2025 is 400 AZN, a citizen cannot donate more than 14,000 AZN annually.

Political parties also receive state funding. According to the law, 5% of state funds is distributed among parties that nominated candidates who won valid votes in parliamentary elections but are not represented in parliament [8]. This creates an opportunity for the government to provide state funding to satellite parties even if they do not win seats. Real opposition parties such as AXCP and Musavat are deprived of this funding because the government limits the number of their registered candidates. Thus, the government deprives genuine opposition parties of state support through manipulative methods and simultaneously restricts citizens’ ability to donate to them.

Participation of Independent Candidates: Although independent individuals may play an active role in politics, political parties are always the primary drivers of political processes. Parties unite individuals or groups with shared interests, create ideological lines, influence public opinion, and so on. Because political parties play such an active role in society, authoritarian regimes try to limit and weaken them.

One method of restricting party activity is to replace them with independent candidates. The Azerbaijani government pursues this strategy for two main purposes:

1. To create an appearance of democratic competition.
   In elections where winners are predetermined, few individuals are genuinely interested in running. Investing time, energy, and resources in such a process is naturally unattractive to most people. This greatly reduces the number of potential candidates. By increasing the number of controlled “independent candidates,” the government gives elections a more “competitive” look.
   
   
2. To divert voters’ attention from individuals outside government control who might attract public support.

This method of manipulation has existed for many years. Unfortunately, the Central Election Commission has not provided detailed data prior to 2015 (Əhədli 2025). However, based on the available data since 2015, we can see how many independent candidates ran in each parliamentary election. In the 2015 elections, 57% of candidates (437 persons) were independents; in the 2020 elections, 77% (1010 persons); and in the 2024 elections, 68% (677 persons) were independent candidates [9].

Election-Day Fraud

In addition to institutional-level manipulations, the Azerbaijani government also attempts to eliminate opposition candidates through election-day fraud. Although different elections may involve different methods of falsification, the practices listed below are widely applied in all elections.

Forcing Voters to the Polls: Where trust in the freedom and fairness of elections is low, citizens naturally lose interest in participating. This can be observed in turnout figures. According to the official data of the Central Election Commission for 2024, the total number of registered voters is 6.47 million (Apa.az 2024). However, in the 2024 early parliamentary elections, only about 2.3 million voters participated. In other words, approximately 70 percent of voters did not take part in the elections.

To increase voter participation, the government uses administrative resources to force citizens to come to the polls. This issue is highlighted in local media reports (Azadliq.org 2024). A local observation organization, the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center (EMDS), has also documented the same problem (SMDT 2024, 13; SMDT 2018, 16).

Pressure on Observers: Both local and international organizations monitor elections in Azerbaijan. The government, however, relies mainly on pressure against local observers in order to restrict their monitoring activities. EMDS has reported that its observers were subjected to pressure and even physical violence (SMDT 2020, 2). The organization explicitly identified eight electoral districts where observers faced pressure (SMDT 2020, 10–11). Local media outlets have also covered incidents of pressure against observers (BBC.com 2020).

Moreover, the government has targeted local observation organizations such as the Election Monitoring and Democracy Studies Center and the Institute for Democratic Initiatives. The chairman of EMDS, Anar Mammadli, was arrested immediately after the 2013 presidential elections; although he was later released, he was arrested again in 2024. The chairman of the Institute for Democratic Initiatives, Akif Gurbanov, was also arrested in 2024. The Azerbaijani government has not implemented the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the registration of their organizations [10][11]. Furthermore, in the most recent criminal case initiated against them, their “unregistered activity” was cited as one of the grounds for prosecution. State-controlled media carried out smear campaigns against them. The main reason for these actions is that independent observers hinder electoral fraud by documenting irregularities and thereby undermining the government’s claim to electoral legitimacy.

Restrictions on Media Activity: Journalists from independent media outlets are subjected to pressure while monitoring elections. At some polling stations, journalists are not allowed to film election-related events (Azadliq.org 2025), or they are forcibly removed from the premises (Meydan.tv 2018). The government perceives independent media coverage of electoral fraud as a threat to its legitimacy and therefore pressures journalists (Meydan.tv 2015; Amerikaninsesi.org 2018).

Conclusion

Although elections are an element of a democratic environment, authoritarian regimes organize periodic elections to imitate democracy. Even though elections take place in conditions that are neither free nor fair, authoritarian governments employ electoral manipulation to neutralize potential threats during this period. This article was prepared to answer the question of how elections in Azerbaijan, an authoritarian country, are manipulated in favor of the government.

The Azerbaijani case confirms the two-level electoral manipulation described in the political science literature on authoritarian regimes. Like other authoritarian systems, the Azerbaijani government ensures the predetermined outcome of elections not only through election-day fraud but also through institutional manipulations carried out between elections. Institutional changes include forming the Central Election Commission exclusively from pro-government individuals, using legislative amendments to restrict the financial and campaigning capacities of opposition parties and candidates, distracting voters through “independent” candidates, and more.

Additionally, election-day practices such as forcing public-sector employees to vote, using administrative resources to pressure observers and media representatives, carousel voting, and other procedures also play a role.

Through these methods, the Azerbaijani government both holds elections under the facade of democracy—presenting a “democratic image” to the international community—and predetermines electoral outcomes through manipulative actions, thereby ensuring the continuity of the authoritarian regime.

Endnotes

[1] Independent MPs are individuals who participate in elections individually, without being nominated from a party list. We refer to them as “independent” because they are not officially nominated by any party list. In essence, however, the vast majority of them are not independent but are under the control of the government.

[2] Election Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Article 24.3

[3]  Hudoc.echr.ceo.int. CASE OF GAHRAMANLI AND OTHERS v. AZERBAIJAN. 2015. https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22documentcollectionid2%22:%5B%22GRANDCHAMBER%22,%22CHAMBER%22%5D,%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-157535%22%5D%7D

[4] Election Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Article 80.1

[5] Election Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Article 77.2 and Article 77.3

[6] Election Code of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Article 90.2

[7] Law on Political Parties, Article 24.5

[8] Law on Political Parties, Articles 25.2.4 and 25.2.5

[9] The author collected these data from the Infocenter portal.

[10]  Hudoc.echr.ceo.int. CASE OF ABDULLAYEV AND OTHERS v. AZERBAIJAN. 2021 https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-210018%22%5D%7D 

[11] Hudoc.echr.ceo.int. CASE OF ELECTION MONITORING AND DEMOCRACY EDUCATION CENTRE AND OTHERS v. AZERBAIJAN. 2023 https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/#%7B%22itemid%22:%5B%22001-222135%22%5D%7D  

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