In October 2024, the parliamentary elections in Georgia led to a constitutional crisis due to serious legal violations and controversial outcomes. When the official election results were announced, widespread protests broke out as citizens voiced their dissatisfaction with the government.
Despite the protests, the ruling Georgian Dream party convened parliament in violation of constitutional requirements and elected Mikheil Kavelashvili as the country’s new president on December 14, 2024. Kavelashvili, formerly known as a player for Manchester City football club, is now recognized as a staunch opponent of the West. His inauguration on December 29, 2024, was met with mass protests from the general public, while opposition forces expressed their disapproval.
International observers deemed the electoral process illegitimate. According to their observations, the principles of transparency and fairness were not upheld during the elections. Critics believe that Mikheil Kavelashvili’s election as president could lead Georgia to drift away from its European Union integration and foster closer ties with Russia. The European Parliament expressed concern about this democratic backslide and the growing rapprochement with Moscow, calling for new and transparent elections to be held in Georgia.
Georgia, often regarded as the country closest to Western values in the South Caucasus, has in recent years distanced itself from democratic processes and shown hesitation on the path to European integration. This shift has sparked serious discussions at both international and regional levels. To delve deeper into the issue, the 'KHAR Center' expert group has investigated the reasons behind Georgia’s derailment from the European track and the geopolitical and internal factors driving this process.
Introduction
Just a few years ago, Georgia was regarded as an island of freedom in the South Caucasus. However, by 2025, the country found itself overshadowed by elections deemed fraudulent by the opposition and democratic institutions, street protests, and a breakdown in relations with the West.
The consequences of the Russian occupation included territorial losses, protests sparked by Mikheil Saakashvili’s abuse of power during his second presidential term, disappointment in the West’s inconsistency in defending freedoms and democracy in the post-Soviet space, the inherent challenges of European integration, and the influence of Kremlin propaganda, which exacerbated these challenges. (Georgia Today 2024) The 'Georgian Dream' party, which came to power in 2012 against this backdrop, turned into a nightmare for Georgia’s freedom-loving society 12 years later.
Twelve years ago, neither the West nor Georgian society could have predicted that Bidzina Ivanishvili, the founder of the 'Georgian Dream' party, would become a serious obstacle to Georgia’s integration with the West. In fact, people believed that Ivanishvili would use his billions to improve the country’s welfare. [1] (Katamadze 2024) They also thought that, under the influence of Georgia’s strong pro-Western civil society and media, he would sever ties with Putin and become a champion of Western values.
However, after consolidating his power, Ivanishvili gradually led Georgia away from the democratic values it had gained, pulling the country further under Russia's influence.
This became particularly evident after 2022, when Russia launched its large-scale war against Ukraine. Georgia, the leader of Western integration in the post-Soviet space (except for the Baltic states), was just a step away from European Union membership. Following the Kremlin’s example of exerting total pressure on Russian society, the country found itself facing frozen negotiations and sanctions.
The European of the Caucasus
In the post-Soviet countries, brought back under the Moscow umbrella through authoritarian and corrupt nomenklatura leaders, the 2000s began with hopes for new changes.
Authoritarian leaders, who had consolidated their power since the mid-1990s, intensified efforts to dismantle the gains achieved through the freedom movements of the late Soviet era and the democratization attempts of the early years of independence, including independent media and civil society institutions.
However, at that time, the methods used by authorities to destroy civil society were neither as ruthless nor as diverse as they are today; they were more primitive (intimidation, blackmail, bribery, and, very rarely, arrests). Moreover, in countries like Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Belarus, and Azerbaijan, the opposition was far stronger in terms of resources — material, political, and human — and society's will for change and determination to fight were markedly greater. One of the most crucial factors that boosted hopes for change in the late 1990s was the growing Western interest in post-Soviet countries and its support for democratic institutions.
The first major confrontations of the decade, which could be seen as the initial phase of post-independence authoritarianism, also took place during this period.
Elections held in Azerbaijan and Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 2004 were marked by widespread violations and violence. The October 2003 presidential election in Azerbaijan marked the onset of a deepening authoritarianism in the country. This was driven by the regime's brutality, the opposition’s failure to consolidate protests, and the West's prioritization of Azerbaijan's oil and regional security over the country's democratization. (“Crushing Dissent” 2023)
In Georgia, however, events took a different turn. Following the November 2003 parliamentary elections in Georgia, Eduard Shevardnadze's Georgian Citizens' Union party — amid widespread allegations of corruption and authoritarian practices — claimed victory. (“Georgian Parliamentary Elections Marred by Confusion Over Voter Lists” 2003) However, the public, angered by what international organizations also deemed fraudulent elections, took to the streets. Mikheil Saakashvili, the head of Tbilisi City Council, allied with prominent opposition leaders Burjanadze and Zhvania, seizing leadership of the movement.
On 22 November 2003, 35-year-old charismatic and courageous Mikheil Saakashvili, holding a rose, entered the parliament alongside his supporters as Shevardnadze attempted to hold its opening session. The rose was chosen to symbolize the peaceful nature of the revolution. (Carnegie Cooperation of New York, n.d.) Unlike the Azerbaijani government, Georgia's leadership at the time chose to surrender to the people rather than resort to violence, paving the way for a swift and bloodless resolution. In the 2004 democratic elections, Saakashvili made history as Georgia's most popular president, winning a record 96.2% of the vote.
Saakashvili's greatest achievement, however, was not his election numbers. Georgia's young leader showed courage and resolve in putting an end to emerging separatist movements in the country. (Бумага 2023) Aslan Abashidze, who had declared himself president of Adjara, left for Moscow and announced his resignation after negotiations with Tbilisi. The Apsaridze family, which had illegally seized power in Svaneti, was eliminated, while another separatist leader from Svaneti, Emzar Kvitsiani, was forced to flee to Moscow in 2006.
Though Saakashvili occasionally veered into populism, he implemented reforms of a scale that inspired freedom-seeking nations across the post-Soviet space. (Gleichgewicht 2018) These reforms were carried out with such speed and determination that, shortly after the Rose Revolution, Georgia transformed into a model state. It became a beacon of success in tackling police arbitrariness and corruption — issues endemic to post-Soviet countries — and excelled in areas like governance, education, and tourism.
The relationship between Georgia and Russia, as well as its integration with the West during Saakashvili's presidency, requires separate consideration. The commonly held belief is that Saakashvili took an antagonistic stance towards Russia from day one. However, this is not accurate. In fact, relations with Russia in the final years of Shevardnadze’s presidency were hardly friendly; he had even explicitly expressed his aspiration for Georgia to become a member of NATO. Saakashvili, upon taking office, announced that relations with Russia would be normalized, and just one month after his election, he made an official visit to Moscow. [2]
Nevertheless, Saakashvili firmly positioned Georgia as a Western-oriented state. Every reform and step taken was aimed at deepening the country's integration with the West. NATO and European Union membership were among Saakashvili's most crucial foreign policy priorities, and significant steps were taken toward achieving them. However, both Georgia's experience and the subsequent relations between Russia and other post-Soviet states, such as Ukraine, Armenia, and others, demonstrated that Moscow had no intention of tolerating the Westward integration of the post-Soviet countries within what it considered its sphere of influence. When such a policy becomes serious and consistent, Moscow resorts to punishment mechanisms. Georgia felt this harsh reality in 2008.
Price of Europeanization
In April 2008, at the NATO summit in Bucharest, membership was promised to Georgia and Ukraine. [3] While no specific timeline was provided, this was a significant political gesture toward these countries. However, just a few months later, in August 2008, Russia, in full view of the world, launched an attack on Georgia. The act of aggression, which went down in history as the “Five-Day War,” resulted in the loss of part of Georgian territory and a significant portion of the achievements accumulated since 2004. (Dickinson 2021) At the same time, the prospect of Georgia joining NATO, as a country with territorial integrity issues, grew more distant. Saakashvili had expected support from the West during the 2008 war; its absence led to disappointment, both for him and for the society. This disappointment became one of the factors that led Georgia to its current situation.
Georgian society began to question Saakashvili. Although the "Five-Day War" did not lead to his removal from power, it reduced his popularity and weakened his political position. Of course, it would not be fair to blame Saakashvili for the events. At that time, Russia's propaganda machine, which the West had not yet taken seriously, began operating at full force in Georgia. The issue was not only the occupation of land; Putin, seeing Saakashvili as his personal enemy, was determined to completely eliminate him. It is no coincidence that experts from the RAND Corporation, which studies modern Russian propaganda, Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, wrote in 2016 that the character of the Kremlin's propaganda machine, which they likened to a "firehose of falsehood," underwent significant changes during the Russia-Georgia war. (Paul and Matthews 2016)
The fact that the Kremlin's propaganda machine tested its power for the first time during that war has been repeatedly emphasized in Russian media. On August 8, 2008, the coordinated spread of false reports by Russia's major media outlets about the Georgian army leveling Tskhinvali to the ground laid the foundation for the “Georgia started the war” and “the war was initiated by Saakashvili's populism” [4] narratives, which still persist today.
These troubling patterns persisted throughout Saakashvili's second presidential term: domestic political missteps, violent crackdowns on protesters during the 2009 rally, suppression of independent media, targeted persecution and arrests of opposition figures, growing criticism from Western allies, and the gradual erosion of Saakashvili’s political support. Of course, throughout these events, the Russian propaganda machine worked relentlessly, trying to bring Georgia back to its corrupt past.
The Georgian Dream or Putin's Dream?
This was the state of affairs when Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgia’s “grey cardinal,” entered the political stage. Previously proud of Saakashvili’s government reforms and even claiming to have financed them, billionaire Ivanishvili announced his ambitions to lead the opposition in 2011. (Doward 2017) In 2012, the Georgian Dream coalition, founded by Ivanishvili along with several opposition parties, won the parliamentary elections, surpassing Saakashvili’s party. [5] Alongside the public’s genuine dissatisfaction, Ivanishvili’s billions played a significant role in this victory.
Paradoxically, the man considered 'Putin's oligarch' managed to become the prime minister of 'pro-European' Georgia. In the 2013 presidential election, the candidate from Ivanishvili’s coalition, Giorgi Margvelashvili, defeated Saakashvili’s party’s candidate, David Bakradze. Both Margvelashvili and Ivanishvili emphasized in their post-election speeches that Georgia's goal of joining the European Union remained unchanged. (Neil MacFarlane 2015)
After these elections, Ivanishvili announced that he had achieved his main goal and declared his resignation as prime minister and party leader. However, neither at the time nor later did anyone believe that Ivanishvili had truly stepped away from power.
Ivanishvili repeatedly proved the skeptics right: he changed the prime minister and party leader multiple times, returned to politics twice, announced his withdrawal twice, and finally, in 2023, declared his third return to politics, stating that he would serve as the honorary chairman of his party as well as its political adviser. [6]
A Return to Darkness
Over 13 years in power, "Georgian Dream" failed to fulfill any of its promises. Corruption, bribery, and legal disorder, typical of the post-Soviet region, returned once again.
Despite internal corruption, political pressure, a policy of persecuting opponents, and concessions to Russia in foreign affairs, Georgia's leadership managed to maintain its "pro-Western" facade until the last three years. (НАЗИМОГЛУ 2014) Ivanishvili, along with the prime ministers, foreign ministers, and parliaments he appointed, declared integration with the West as the country's main foreign policy priority and aligned their policies accordingly. (“Парламент Грузии Принял Резолюцию О Приоритете Интеграции В ЕС И НАТО” 2013)
The main reason for the regime's behavior was undoubtedly Georgian society, or rather, the unspoken consensus between society and the "Georgian Dream." Pro-European Georgian society turned a blind eye to the lies and manipulations of the "Georgian Dream" in domestic politics, believing that the most important factor was the unchanging vector of the country’s integration with the West, while the "Georgian Dream," knowing society's pro-European orientation, refrained from changing that vector.
Even in 2013, when the Ukrainian government refused to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union, the Georgian leadership, without hesitation, announced that it would continue the process.
The signing of the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement, the most significant steps since Georgia joined the EU's Eastern Partnership Program in 2009, were also made possible by the signature of the "Georgian Dream."
In June 2014, Georgia signed both agreements, demonstrating its commitment to the goal of integration with the West. Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili stated that 85% of the country's population supports integration with the West, and that from June 27, 2014, a completely new and highly important phase of relations with the European Union began. [7]
In 2016, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement came into force, and Georgia’s integration into the European economy officially began. In 2017, the European Union lifted the visa regime for Georgian citizens for short-term trips. [8] This was one of the most important steps for Georgia, both economically, politically, and symbolically. However, the Georgian government was unable to maintain its "pro-Western" policy to the end.
The large-scale war Russia launched against Ukraine in 2022 served as a litmus test for Georgia, just as it did for many other countries. For the first time since the early 2000s, Georgia and Ukraine stepped out of the post-Soviet sphere of allied nations. Georgia stated that it would not join sanctions against Russia, referring to its own interests. [9]
As a result, in the summer of 2022, the European Union granted Ukraine and Moldova candidate status for membership, but did not extend this right to Georgia. The European Commission asked the Georgian government to fulfill 12 recommendations in order to gain candidate status. Many of these recommendations — such as addressing polarization and oligarchy in society, improving the electoral system, creating guarantees for the functioning of state institutions, implementing transparent and effective judicial reforms, carrying out anti-corruption measures, and ensuring gender equality — were, of course, not fulfilled. [10]
In March 2023, the "Georgian Dream" coalition presented a draft law on "foreign agents" to parliament. [11] The draft was similar to a law previously adopted in Russia, aimed at dismantling civil society and the free press. After two days of massive protests and a strong response from the West, the draft was withdrawn.
However, in September, the Georgian government attempted to declare impeachment against President Salome Zourabichvili. The opposition and civil society in the country viewed this as punishment for Zourabichvili’s actions, similar to her predecessor Giorgi Margvelashvili, in "brazenly defying Ivanishvili," as well as for her efforts to secure candidate status for the country.
At the end of 2023, the European Union decided to grant Georgia candidate status — not because of the reforms being implemented, but to ensure that Georgia was not left to face Russia on its own. Georgian society and the opposition emphasized that this was a geopolitical gesture by the EU, while the government presented it as its victory and proof of its commitment to democracy and Western values. However, the European Commission stated that Georgia had still not fulfilled 9 out of the 12 recommendations, and meeting these requirements is a condition for membership discussions to begin.
The Endgame
The year 2023 marked the final displays of "democracy" and "pro-European orientation" by Georgian Dream.
By early 2024, it had become clear to both Georgian society and Tbilisi’s Western partners that the Georgian authorities were rapidly distancing the country from Europe and steering it toward what could be described as a "Global Authoritarian Coalition."
At the beginning of the year, Georgia’s government signaled a rapprochement with China and reached an agreement to construct the Anaklia port. At the same time, they started aligning themselves with Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vučić, both widely regarded in Europe as Putin’s allies. Georgian observers described the situation as “Garibashvili gets close to anyone who shakes hands with Putin.” (Паресишвили 2025) By the end of the year, they were proven right — Vučić was among the first to congratulate the ruling party on the October parliamentary elections, held amid serious violations. Orbán, meanwhile, flew to Tbilisi the day after the elections, which the EU did not recognize, to extend personal congratulations to the Georgian Dream.
Starting in early 2024, the Georgian Dream and the pro-Russian People's Power Party, created by the authorities, began accusing a mythical "global war party" of wanting to turn Georgia into Ukraine. Echoing Kremlin rhetoric, they claimed that the 'global war party' had allegedly bought off Salome Zourabichvili back in 2021 and is now trying to shape her into a figure like Zelensky. (Паресишвили 2024)
One of the most notable "anti-Western" moves by the Georgian Dream in 2024 was the adoption of the "foreign agent" law, which had been withdrawn from parliament a year earlier. This move came as a major shock to the West.
Despite the European Union's warning that 'a candidate country should not behave this way,' the Georgian Dream did not act as it had in March 2023. This time, instead of withdrawing the law, they passed the 'Foreign Influence Transparency' bill in May, violently suppressing protests against the Kremlin plan.
After the law came into effect, in July 2024, the EU announced the suspension of Georgia's membership process and the cancellation of the 30 million euro aid planned for 2024. [12]
The U.S. Department of Defense also postponed the "Noble Partner" military exercises with Georgia, initially scheduled for early August, to an indefinite date. EU leaders further stated that the financial assistance requested by Georgia's Ministry of Defense would not be provided. [13]
However, these actions did not impact the Georgian government's behavior; on the contrary, accusations against the West grew stronger. In July, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service claimed that the U.S. was preparing a coup in Georgia. [14]
The announcement from Washington regarding the cut of 95 billion dollars in aid to Georgia, as well as the U.S. Department of State's visa restrictions for 30 representatives of the law enforcement agencies and the members of Georgian Dream, did not alter the rhetoric of the Georgian government. The Ivanishvili regime even, by repeating Russia's theses, accused its Western partners of trying to open a second front in Georgia and carry out a regime change through a Maidan scenario.
As autumn approached, tensions between the West and the Georgian government escalated. In September, the invitation for Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze to meet with the U.S. President during the UN General Assembly session was canceled. In early October, the European Parliament passed a resolution calling on the EU to suspend aid to the Georgian government and impose sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili. The Secretary-General of the Georgian Dream, Kakha Kaladze, dismissed the resolution, saying it wasn't worth the paper it was written on.
In mid-October, the European Union announced the suspension of high-level meetings with the Georgian government. At the EU leaders' summit in Brussels, it was officially confirmed that membership negotiations with Georgia had been halted. [15] Despite this, there were still some in Brussels who believed that the Georgian government would turn the situation around by holding free and fair parliamentary elections.
However, the parliamentary elections held on October 26th put an end to any remaining hopes. Georgia held elections with the highest level of violations in the past 20 years. It was announced that the Georgian Dream received 54%, while the opposition forces together received 38%. The opposition did not recognize the election results. President Salome Zourabichvili also stated that the elections were rigged. In protest against the alleged election fraud, supposedly organized with Russia’s interference, tens of thousands of people took to the streets of Tbilisi. Although the protests were violently dispersed, the rallies continued.
Statements from the United States and the European Union claimed that the elections had been rigged. The European Commission's enlargement report noted that the Georgian authorities were jeopardizing the country’s EU membership and effectively attempting to halt the process.
Russia, on the other hand, appeared quite satisfied with the situation. In September, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced their readiness to assist Georgia in fostering relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Immediately after the disputed elections, he expressed Russia’s willingness to intensify contacts with the Georgian government. [16]
The Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, called for the arrest of Salome Zourabichvili over her opposition to the rigged elections.
In early November, parliamentary representatives from Germany, Finland, Sweden, France, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Poland visited Tbilisi. However, they were only able to meet with Salome Zourabichvili and opposition representatives. Leaders of the “Georgian Dream” party refused to meet with the guests, with Kakha Kaladze calling the European parliamentarians “idle people.”
In mid-November, the European Parliament adopted another harsh resolution regarding Georgia. The resolution declared the October 26 elections illegitimate and demanded new elections be held. At the same time, EU leaders were advised to impose sanctions on Bidzina Ivanishvili, Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, Parliament Speaker Shalva Papuashvili, Georgian Dream party chairman Irakli Garibashvili, and Secretary-General Kakha Kaladze.
On November 28, the Georgian authorities announced the suspension of negotiations with the European Union until 2028. Immediately after this announcement, thousands of people gathered in front of the parliament, but the protest was once again violently dispersed.
The United States called this decision by official Tbilisi a betrayal and announced the termination of its strategic alliance with Georgia.
On December 14, the election commission, dominated by representatives of the Georgian Dream party, appointed MP Mikheil Kavelashvili from the People’s Power party, known for its anti-Western stance, as president. Kavelashvili was congratulated only by the leaders of Belarus, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Turkey, Serbia, and Hungary.
After this, the United States and the United Kingdom imposed sanctions on senior officials of Georgia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs, including the minister.
On December 20, the European Union suspended visa-free travel for Georgian citizens holding diplomatic passports.
On December 27, the long-demanded sanctions against Bidzina Ivanishvili, called for by Georgian society for years, were finally introduced. The U.S. justified the decision by citing Ivanishvili’s direct or indirect ties with Russia. Washington emphasized that this move marked the beginning of broader sanctions.
Earlier in the year, a draft resolution was submitted to Congress that included the non-recognition of the legitimacy of Georgia’s current government. However, even this did not deter the Georgian authorities from pursuing anti-democratic actions.
Conclusion
Despite two months of protests and sanctions from the West, the ruling Georgian Dream party shows no intention of backing down. On the contrary, its aggression continues to escalate.
The outlook is far from hopeful: the government is employing every authoritarian method; protesters are facing a wave of total repression; there is no leader among the current political party heads capable of managing the situation; Salome Zourabichvili, who is seen as someone potentially able to do so, has yet to present a concrete strategy of action; the effectiveness of Western sanctions and pressure remains uncertain. Meanwhile, Russia is doing everything it can to ensure that official Tbilisi derails from the European track.
At the same time, Russia and the Georgian Dream government are banking on the idea that the U.S. under Donald Trump’s leadership would easily sacrifice Georgia’s freedom and European future.
Amidst this bleak picture, the only beacon of hope remains Georgian society. Despite all the repressions, the people of Georgia have been continuing their fight on the streets for two months, showing that the process of integration into Europe is a non-negotiable priority for them..
The outcome will also depend on how the West handles the challenge.
Endnotes
[1] “Bidzina Ivanishvili & Family.” n.d. Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/profile/bidzina-ivanishvili/.
[2] Коммерсантъ. 2004. “Михаил Саакашвили Прилетел В Москву.” Новости – Мир – Коммерсантъ. February 10, 2004. https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/971942.
[3] NATO. n.d. “Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2008).” NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm.
[4] САФРОНОВА, Инга. 2008. “Грузия Стерла С Лица Земли Пять Населенных Пунктов Южной Осетии.” KP.RU, August 8, 2008. https://www.kp.ru/online/news/124346/.
[5] “Billionaire Tycoon Claims Surprise Victory as Key US Ally Georgia Votes.” 2012. NBC News. October 1, 2012. https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/billionaire-tycoon-claims-surprise-victory-key-us-ally-georgia-votes-flna6240847.
[6] “Бидзина Иванишвили Возвращается В Политику, Чтобы «Защитить Власть От Человеческих Искушений».” Civil Georgia, December 30, 2023. https://civil.ge/ru/archives/576231.
[7] “Ираклий Гарибашвили: «27 Июня Мы Подпишем Соглашение Об Ассоциации С Евросоюзом И Этим Шагом Перейдем На Качественно Новый Этап Отношений!».” n.d. Gruzinform. http://ru.gruzinform.ge/news/17994/iraklij-garibaSvili-27-iUnA-mi-podpiSem-soglaSenie-ob-associacii-s-evrosoUzom-i-Etim-Sagom-perejdem-na-kaCestvenno-novij-Etap-otnoSenij-.html.
[8] Freetradezone.Ge. n.d. “DCFTA Georgia.” https://www.freetradezone.ge/dcfta-georgia.
[9] “Премьер-министр Грузии Заявил Об Отказе Присоединиться К Санкциям Против России.” n.d. Mir24.tv. https://ge.mir24.tv/news/16497827/premer-gruzii-zayavil-ob-otkaze-prisoedinitsya-k-sankciyam-protiv-rossii.
[10] Ibid.
[11] “Gürcüstan Parlament Bürosu ‘Xarici Agent Haqqında’ Qanunu Qeydiyyata Alıb.” MEYDAN.TV. April 10, 2024. https://www.meydan.tv/az/article/gurcustan-parlament-burosu-xarici-agent-haqqinda-qanunu-qeydiyyata-alib/.
[12] “Брюссель Приостановил Процесс Вступления Грузии В ЕС.” n.d.https://www.aa.com.tr/ru/%D0%BC%D0%B8%D1%80/%D0%B1%D1%80%D1%8E%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B5%D0%BB%D1%8C-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B8%D0%BB-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%86%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%81-%D0%B2%D1%81%D1%82%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%BB%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%B3%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B7%D0%B8%D0%B8-%D0%B2-%D0%B5%D1%81-/3270251.
[13] U.S. Department of Defense. n.d. “Postponement of Exercise Noble Partner Announcement.” https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3827839/postponement-of-exercise-noble-partner-announcement/.
[14] Rfe/Rl. 2024. “США Хотят Сменить Правительство В Грузии – Служба Внешней Разведки РФ.” Эхо Кавказа, July 9, 2024. https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/33027789.html.
[15] “European Council Meeting (17 October 2024) – Conclusions.” 2024. European Council. European Council. Accessed April 11, 2025. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/2pebccz2/20241017-euco-conclusions-en.pdf?fbclid=IwY2xjawF-V9JleHRuA2FlbQIxMQABHZBfhj6DRobFK_iRgZn03ICUe-E-fcQd5Wq4IJSNfpE1Ngq1WrUG6o2iuw_aem_rWzOcR3Li_Rd_clcG6zorA.
[16] “Глава МИД РФ: Готовы Рассмотреть Предложения О Контактах Со Стороны Тбилиси.” Эхо Кавказа, October 29, 2024. https://www.ekhokavkaza.com/a/glava-mid-rf-gotovy-rassmotretj-predlozheniya-o-kontaktah-so-storony-tbilisi/33177317.html.
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