(This article was prepared within the framework of the KHAR Center's research on "Authoritarian Regimes and Transregional Mechanisms of Influence")
Introduction
The new federal amendments signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin, which ensure the protection of the country's citizens facing criminal prosecution abroad, represent the formalization of strategic and psychological shifts in Moscow's military-political doctrine. In this regard, the State Duma has introduced amendments to Article 6 of the Federal Law "On Citizenship of the Russian Federation" and Article 10 of the Federal Law "On Defense" (Pravo.gov.ru, 2026). According to the law, which was signed by President Putin on May 25 following its approval by the Federation Council, the Russian Armed Forces may, by presidential decree, be involved in executing duties to protect the country's citizens who have been arrested, detained, subjected to criminal liability, or facing other forms of prosecution by the decisions of foreign courts, international judicial bodies to which Russia is not a party, or courts whose jurisdiction is not based on an international treaty signed by Russia or a United Nations Security Council resolution. By presidential decree, state bodies, including the armed forces, must take necessary measures within their mandate to protect these citizens.
Enacted in the context of the deteriorating social and economic situation resulting from the war in Ukraine and the steps taken toward the establishment of a special tribunal in the West, this law can be evaluated as the Kremlin's struggle to maintain its diminishing global influence. Particularly encouraged by the geopolitical chaos within the transatlantic bloc, Putin might attempt to obscure his failure in Ukraine with a defeat in a larger war by expanding the boundaries of military intervention toward the Baltic region.
In all circumstances, the newly adopted law bears an adventurist character and appears to have emerged as a product of Putin's security paranoia.
The objective of this analysis by the Khar Center is to examine the probabilities of the adopted law being utilized as an instrument of Putin's expansionism, and thereby, to answer the following question:
How might the amendments made by the State Duma in Russia to Article 6 of the Federal Law "On Citizenship of the Russian Federation" and Article 10 of the Federal Law "On Defense" affect the trajectory of Russia's potential expansionist policy? What strategic and psychological factors are associated with this potential impact?
The Legal Framework for the Use of the Army Abroad
In fact, the President of Russia possessed the authority to utilize the armed forces abroad even prior to this law. According to Article 102 of the Constitution, the Federation Council may grant authorization for the use of the country's armed forces abroad. As early as 2009, the Federation Council adopted a resolution "On the Operational Use of the Formations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Outside the Territory of the Russian Federation." The resolution is of indefinite duration and currently remains in force. It grants the president authority for the execution of four specific tasks:
- Repelling an attack on Russian troops deployed abroad;
- Preventing an armed attack on another state that has appealed to Russia for assistance;
- Protecting the citizens of the country from an armed attack outside the territory of the Russian Federation;
- Combating piracy and ensuring the safety of navigation (Pravo.gov.ru, 2009).
During the onset of the covert occupation of Crimea, on March 1, 2014, the Federation Council adopted a resolution "On the Use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation on the Territory of Ukraine," specifying a particular country (Pravo.gov.ru, 2014). On February 22, 2022, two days prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the Federation Council adopted a resolution "On the Use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Outside the Territory of the Russian Federation" (Pravo.gov.ru, 2022). The distinction of this indefinite resolution from previous ones is that it does not stipulate any limitations regarding the determination of the tasks set by the president. The president unilaterally determines the quantitative composition of the armed formations to be utilized, the directions to which they will be deployed, and the duration for which they will remain outside the territory of Russia.
The Distinction of the New Law
A logical question arises: if the Russian president already possessed the right to use the army abroad, what necessity prompted the new law? Approaching this from a strictly legal standpoint, it can be noted that the protection of Russian citizens from criminal prosecution abroad is not included among the army's duties. The authority granted to the president by the Federation Council in 2009 encompasses the protection of Russian citizens from armed attacks outside the country's territory. The Law "On Defense" (Article 10) states that the involvement of the Armed Forces in the execution of tasks outside their designated purpose is carried out by the president in accordance with federal legislation. Thus, the Law "On Defense" deems it necessary to have another legal act to involve the army in the protection of Russians from criminal prosecution outside the country's borders.
The Erosion of Deterrence and Attempts at its Restoration
It is essential to analyze the underlying causes that necessitated the new law for the Putin regime within the context of domestic policy, as well as regional and global geopolitics. Against the backdrop of the invasive war in Ukraine entering its fifth year, an unprecedented manifestation of public dissatisfaction within Russia over the past period has been observed, alongside the emergence of questions and hesitations regarding Russia's deterrent power on a global scale.
In the global media, one frequently encounters articles indicating that the war has reached a stalemate and the Russian army's advancements on the front have practically ceased, that the initiative is gradually shifting into Ukraine's hands, and that the nature of military operations has radically changed as a result of Ukraine refining and intensively applying its drone technologies. Numerous military experts and political analysts, including Russian military bloggers, emphasize that Moscow's probability of a military victory has already significantly diminished, or even dissipated, and that achieving any results is only possible through a new mobilization. If the war is to be continued, the implementation of a new mobilization is deemed necessary due to the fact that the number of military personnel Russia currently recruits into the army per month via its existing system has begun to fall behind the number of casualties sustained on the front during the same period. However, a new mobilization, specifically transitioning from the current system based on volunteerism in exchange for financial incentives to a mandatory conscription system, would represent a risky measure in terms of the regime's sustainability.
A conspicuous trend in recent months is the visible potential for protest in Russian society, where pluralism, freedom of speech and expression, and elements of political competition were virtually eradicated following the commencement of the "special military operation" (SMO). The prolongation of the war and its "swallowing" of budget funds like a bottomless pit, the ensuing economic contraction in the first quarter, the emergence of socio-economic themes on the agenda, the increasing damage to energy infrastructure and industrial facilities as a result of the intensification of Ukraine's drone attacks, as well as recent online repressions, restrictions on social networks and messengers, and the blocking of VPNs have manifestly increased discontent (Bloomberg, 2026). Thus far, this manifests not in the form of street protests and organized structures, but rather at an individual level among bloggers, influencers, and activists. This does not concern liberals in exile or other individuals known for their oppositional stance against the regime, but rather individuals who are either apolitical or affiliated with the authorities. The critical remarks of Ilya Remeslo—who was known for writing denunciations against Alexei Navalny to the police and prosecution authorities while he was alive, and whose proximity to state organs is unquestionable—and model-actress Victoria Bonya have generated a particularly sensational effect. V. Bonya's appeal to Putin regarding the situation in the country has garnered tens of millions of views on social networks (YouTube, 2026). Meanwhile, I. Remeslo, voicing thoughts that no one in Russia has dared to articulate in recent years, labeled Putin an illegitimate president and stated that he should resign and be tried as a thief and a war criminal. Although he was taken to a psychiatric clinic following his shocking post, he was released after staying there for nearly a month. According to I. Remeslo's prediction, Putin may lose power this year (Meduza, 2026).
The lackluster 45-minute military parade, held against the backdrop of a 3-day ceasefire achieved through Trump's mediation, dealt a severe blow to Putin's reputation. The opinion that this parade took place with Ukraine's permission spread widely among Russian military bloggers, internet users, as well as in the international media; whereas Zelensky engaged in unforgettable political trolling by signing a decree granting permission for the parade to be held in Moscow. In such a situation, Putin feels a compelling need to project strength to both domestic and foreign audiences. In this regard, the new law, alongside other objectives, serves the restoration of eroding deterrence. The Chairman of the State Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, explained the necessity of the law by stating that the Western justice system has turned into a repressive machine against dissidents, and under these conditions, it is imperative to do everything to protect citizens abroad. The Chairman of the Duma's Defense Committee, Andrey Kartapolov, added that the incorporation of such provisions into the legislation will prevent incidents similar to the arrest of Russian archaeologist Alexander Butyagin in Poland. Kartapolov emphasized that the adoption of the initiative does not automatically imply the application of military force. In his view, the existence of such authorities can influence the behavior of foreign states (RBC, 2026). The conduct of the subsequent test of the new "Sarmat" intercontinental ballistic missile three days after the May 9 parade; the commencement of large-scale exercises by the strategic nuclear forces on the "preparation and application of nuclear forces under conditions of aggression" on May 19 (BBC, 2026); the subjection of Ukraine to fierce missile strikes on the night of May 24, including the utilization of the prominent "Oreshnik" ballistic missile (Die Welt, 2026); and Foreign Minister Lavrov's phone call to US Secretary of State Rubio to declare that strikes would be launched against "decision-making centers" in Kyiv, urging the US to evacuate its diplomatic personnel, can all be considered integral components of the projection of strength and attempts to restore deterrence (RBC, 2026).
Potential Risk Zone – The Baltic Region
The situation of the Russian-speaking minority in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia has remained the focus of Moscow's attention throughout the entire post-Soviet period. For many years, Russia has periodically claimed that the rights of Russians and Russian speakers in the Baltic region are being violated, that they are subjected to discrimination, and has accused these countries of Russophobia and a policy of "linguicide" (linguistic genocide) (TASS, 2025). On the day Putin signed the new law, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement announcing that an appeal would be made to the UN international court "in connection with the systematic violation of the rights of ethnic Russians in the Baltic countries" (RBC, 2026). Moscow asserts that a "sharp increase in state-sponsored Russophobia" is being observed in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, while local governments ignore calls for dialogue and continue policies that violate international norms.
The arrest of pro-Russian activist Alexander Gaponenko in Latvia has particularly dissatisfied Moscow. This individual was detained after participating in discussions organized by the Russian Institute of CIS Countries in February 2025 on the topic "The ethnocide of Russians in the Baltic countries as a factor in preparation for war with Russia." In his speech, A. Gaponenko stated that one of the ways to stop the ethnocide of Russians could be Russia's military intervention in the Baltic countries, and that ideological preparation for this must be carried out. He was found guilty of "inciting inter-ethnic enmity and assisting a foreign state in activities against Latvia" and was sentenced to 10 years in prison (Svoboda.org, 2026). Gaponenko is not a Russian citizen; in this regard, there is no basis for applying the new law, but it is known from practice that the Putin regime utilizes such incidents to legitimize its provocative and aggressive actions. In recent weeks, the consecutive statements echoing from Moscow regarding the Baltic countries providing their territories to Ukraine for drone attacks against Russia cannot be a coincidence. This also appears to be an intention to lay the groundwork for some form of escalation.
Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are NATO members, and until now, this has been the primary factor deterring Russia. However, following Trump's re-election, the monolithic nature of the transatlantic alliance has been shattered; the ideological antagonism between the US and Western European governments, the US administration's open support for extra-systemic radical right-wing forces in Europe, and even the inclusion of this stance in its National Security Strategy have caused Europe to no longer view Washington as a loyal ally (Kharcenter, 2025). Now, unlike during the Biden era, statements from the US president and other authorized officials about defending every inch of NATO territory are no longer heard; instead, they provide ambiguous answers to questions about whether the US would defend a member country if Russia attacks one of the alliance members. Furthermore, the US plans to reduce its armed forces in Europe and its contribution to NATO.
Given the circumstances where Russia cannot achieve success on the Ukrainian front and voices of protest are rising internally, it cannot be ruled out that it might plan a new expansion by seizing the chaotic situation within the transatlantic bloc as an opportunity. This is a possibility that is also taken seriously by Western intelligence agencies (Die Welt, 2026). Compared to Ukraine, it is possible to achieve faster military success in the Baltic direction, which lacks strategic depth, and to create a fait accompli (an accomplished, irreversible new situation, a de facto state). The scenario of Russia seizing the Suwałki corridor—located between Russia's Kaliningrad region and Belarus, with one part on Lithuanian and another on Polish territory—to simultaneously open a land route to the Kaliningrad exclave and physically isolate the Baltic region from the NATO space is one of the risk scenarios discussed and simulated not only in the media and think tanks but also within NATO circles (Foreign Policy, 2026).
Additional Immunity for Putin, Who Fears Repeating the Fate of Maduro and Khamenei
The preparation and adoption of the new law may also be linked to Putin's personal phobias. This, too, appears to be a plausible version. The International Criminal Court, established on the basis of the Rome Statute, issued an arrest warrant for Putin in 2023, charging him with the illegal deportation of children from the occupied territories of Ukraine to Russia. However, since Russia is not a party to the Rome Statute, it does not fall under the jurisdiction of this court. On the other hand, the International Criminal Court examines crimes committed by individuals, not state-perpetrated crimes. For this reason, in April 2024, Ukraine and its supporting states put forward the initiative to establish a special tribunal in The Hague regarding Russia's crimes of occupation against Ukraine. The creation of such a tribunal was also supported by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and the parliamentary assemblies of the OSCE and NATO. In June 2025, Ukraine and the Council of Europe signed a memorandum of understanding on the establishment of a special tribunal. In January 2026, the European Union allocated 10 million euros as the first donation toward the tribunal's operations. Finally, on May 15, at a meeting of the foreign ministers of the CE countries, 37 countries signed a document regarding the establishment of a special tribunal on crimes of aggression against Ukraine. The tribunal will be located in the city of The Hague (Euronews, 2026).
In December 2025, the Russian State Duma adopted a law on refusing to execute the decisions of foreign courts, as well as international judicial bodies whose competence is not recognized by Russia on a treaty basis or by a UN Security Council resolution (Vedomosti, 2025). This law was drafted with the aim of providing the Russian leadership with immunity from prosecution by the special tribunal and other courts. Deeming this law insufficient, Putin's acquisition of the authority to use the army to protect Russian citizens subjected to legal prosecution abroad is indicative of his psychological state. It is a known historical fact that despots who remain in power for a long time suffer from various psychological disorders. This is especially true when it concerns leaders who have waged wars and committed other grave crimes. They become paranoid and are deeply terrified of assassination, capture, and trial. Symptoms of Putin falling into this syndrome have been observed in recent years. Taking extreme self-isolation measures during the pandemic, receiving guests at a long table, requesting a temporary ceasefire out of fear that Ukrainian drones could reach Red Square during the parade despite Moscow's strong and echeloned air defense, and creating immunities for himself within the normative-legal framework are clear manifestations of Putin's paranoia. There is no doubt that the capture of Venezuelan dictator Maduro by US soldiers and his subsequent removal from the country, as well as the assassination of Iran's supreme leader Khamenei by Israeli aviation bombing earlier this year, have activated Putin's phobias.
Conclusion
The new law signed by Putin reveals that the Kremlin is striving to escape its problems and international pressure. The stagnation on the Ukrainian front, the growing voices of protest within the country, and the establishment of a special tribunal in The Hague compel Putin to project power. This could also lead to the emergence of new geopolitical conflicts. In this context, official Moscow evaluates the complex situation prevailing in NATO and the US as favorable international conditions.
On the other hand, with this step, Putin aims to grant immunity to his political elite, thereby seeking to mobilize them around himself once again. Simultaneously, he is sending a message that hybrid threats against the West will increase. The analysis indicates that the continuation of this trend will direct Putin toward escalating tensions in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet states, particularly in the Baltic countries, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.
References
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