Introduction
The large-scale war initiated by Russia against Ukraine entered its fourth year amid ambitious claims by U.S. President Donald Trump that he could resolve the conflict at its root. Trump began the process with what he considered the "easiest" path to peace—pressuring Ukraine, a country whose territory is under occupation and whose major cities are targeted by daily missile strikes, threatening it with falsehoods rooted in Kremlin propaganda, and publicly belittling its leadership (BBC, March 2025).
This was the opportunity Putin had long awaited. Having launched the war with the expectation of capturing Kyiv in three days and having destroyed the myth of the "world's second-largest army" within a week, killing tens of thousands in pursuit of a fantasy to annihilate Ukraine as a state, mobilizing all resources including convicts and foreign mercenaries, yet failing to make any significant advances since 2023, Putin found new momentum in Trump’s arrival (Zmina Info, 2022).
Naturally, this new lease of life was not for ending the war, since any resolution involving concessions would equate to defeat for Putin and contradict the fundamental logic of his authoritarian regime. However, Trump's speculations under the guise of "peace," in reality intended to coerce Ukraine into capitulation, served Putin's interests—gaining time to regroup his devastated military and propaganda machinery and attempting to corner Kyiv by taking advantage of the unraveling of the anti-occupation coalition in the West. Although Turkey’s renewed mediation role may seem harmless in intention and nature, it in fact benefits Putin.
This KHAR Center analysis explores why the so-called "peace negotiations" between Russia and Ukraine are devoid of real prospects.
Purpose of the Analysis
This analysis seeks to explain the characteristics of Putin's authoritarian regime in the context of the ongoing war with Ukraine, the underlying motives for its large-scale aggression against Ukraine’s sovereignty, and how the peace process has been reduced to a "deferred capitulation." It also examines how Western actors—particularly the U.S. and Turkey—have framed "peace initiatives" and how these intersect with Russia’s strategic interests.
The analysis aims to assess the extent to which the concept of peace is realistic or illusory in the specific context of an asymmetric and existential war between an authoritarian regime and a democratic state.
Main Research Question: Why is a just and lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine impossible within the context of Vladimir Putin's authoritarian regime?
Sources of Information:
- News and Analytical Portals: BBC News, Zmina Human Rights Center, The Guardian, The Moscow Times, Al Jazeera English (Russia-Ukraine War section), Brookings Institution, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, etc.
- Academic and Scholarly Sources: Timothy Snyder (The Road to Unfreedom: Russia, Europe, America), Mark Galeotti (Putin's Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine), John J. Mearsheimer (“Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault”), Mark Kramer (“The Kremlin’s Authoritarian Turn: Implications for Russian Foreign Policy”), RAND Corporation reports on Ukraine and Russia, etc.
Analytical Tools:
- Geopolitical and Strategic Analysis: Understanding Russia’s regional and global strategic objectives.
- Conflict and Peace Studies: Examining the nature of the conflict and prospects for peace.
Limitations
- Bias of Information Sources: This analysis relies primarily on open sources—news portals, Western analysts, and political experts. Some of these may not align with official data from Russia or Ukraine and may represent specific political positions. Due to restrictions on free information flow within Russia, it is difficult to reliably assess the regime's strategic intentions.
- Uncertainty of Future Predictions: As the conflict is ongoing, any change in circumstances may give rise to new scenarios. Trump’s potential political moves or shifts in Western politics could fundamentally impact the dynamics of peace and conflict. It is currently impossible to predict with certainty when and in what format negotiations may occur.
Keywords: Putin’s authoritarianism, Russia-Ukraine war, illusion of peace, deferred capitulation, geopolitical conflict, Trump and international diplomacy, authoritarian regimes and war, conflict and peace prospects, Western policy and mediation, Ukrainian sovereignty, Russian propaganda, hybrid warfare, just peace, Turkey’s mediation role, international security
Chronological Retrospective: Initial Talks
The first official meeting between Russia and Ukraine occurred four days after the onset of the large-scale invasion. Later, reports indicated that the initial peace proposal was submitted by Russia’s negotiator Dmitry Kozak and involved halting the war in exchange for Ukraine renouncing NATO membership, but Putin rejected the offer (Reuters 2022a).
Putin demonstrated his lack of intent to end the war during the first round of negotiations held in Gomel, Belarus, on February 28, 2022, which concluded without result except an agreement to hold further discussions. Ukraine demanded an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of Russian troops, but Moscow ignored these demands and continued its assault (Al Jazeera 2022).
The second round, held in Brest near the Polish and Ukrainian borders on March 3, 2022, resulted only in mutual acceptance of humanitarian corridors for civilian evacuations (IntelliNews 2022).
Under Vladimir Medinsky, Russia demanded Ukraine recognize Crimea as Russian, Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states, dismantle its military, and undergo "denazification." Ukraine rejected these terms but agreed to continue negotiations.
In the third round on March 7, Moscow escalated demands. Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov added the requirement of a constitutional guarantee of Ukraine’s neutrality and claimed military operations would cease immediately if Ukraine complied (Reuters 2022b).
While fighting continued fiercely, Turkey joined the process as mediator. On March 10, 2022, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and Ukrainian Foreign Minister Dmytro Kuleba met in Antalya under Turkey's mediation. No results emerged, and Russia even refused to open a humanitarian corridor to Mariupol (Anadolu Ajansı 2022).
A day before the fourth round on March 17, Russia bombed a theater sheltering civilians in Mariupol (The Guardian 2022). That and the fifth round, held four days later, were also fruitless. President Zelensky’s offer to negotiate directly with Putin was rejected.
The Istanbul Talks and Putin’s Speculations
Negotiations perceived to be closest to a breakthrough took place in Istanbul on March 29, 2022. The talks remain a subject of speculation, particularly Russia’s narrative that "peace was within reach, but Boris Johnson blocked it" (REN TV, 2024). What really happened?
Russia entered the Istanbul talks in a weaker position than in Gomel, Brest, or Antalya. President Erdogan declared that Ukraine was ready to compromise on four out of six points and offered Putin a "dignified exit" (NTV 2022).
The document discussed in Istanbul, titled "Key Provisions of the Treaty on Security Guarantees for Ukraine," proposed Ukraine's neutrality, non-nuclear status, and prohibition of foreign military bases.
Ukraine had two key demands: security guarantees and negotiations over Crimea’s status. Following the talks, Ukraine even agreed to defer discussions on Crimea’s status for 15 years. From the Kremlin's perspective, this could be seen as a concession, and Russia for the first time admitted that Crimea’s status could be negotiable. In return, it promised to halt operations near Kyiv and Chernihiv (CNN 2022).
However, it was already known that Russia's forces had exhausted their offensive capabilities in those areas, and the troop withdrawal was presented as a concession.
Despite optimism, the talks failed. The key reason was the lack of concrete security guarantees for Ukraine. Contrary to Russian propaganda’s narrative of a completed agreement blocked by Boris Johnson, no country—including Turkey—was prepared to provide security assurances.
The talks were also overshadowed by the atrocities in Bucha. As the world was shocked by images of the massacre, Russian propaganda networks, including those in Turkey, falsely blamed Ukraine (Sputnik Türkiye 2022).
Another reason for failure was Russia’s swift violation of the provisional agreement to discuss Crimea’s status. On April 6, Kremlin spokesman Peskov stated that Ukraine had no choice but to accept that Crimea and Donbas belonged to Russia (Lenta.ru 2022).
Nevertheless, online negotiations continued even after the Bucha massacre. Documents discussed on April 12 and 15 deviated from the original Istanbul framework (Meduza 2024a). While the Istanbul draft included automatic military assistance from guarantor states, Russia later added a "by agreement" clause, effectively granting itself veto power (Meduza 2024b).
Ukraine agreed to reduce its armed forces to 250,000, but Russia insisted on 85,000.
Thus, the Istanbul process ended without result, and by May 2022, peace negotiations disappeared from the agenda.
Putin’s Friends as ‘Doves of Peace’
With the long-awaited Western arms deliveries—especially HIMARS systems—Ukraine achieved significant frontline advances by late summer 2022. Amid continuing successes in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions, Mexico announced in September that it would present a peace plan to the UN regarding the Russia-Ukraine war (US News 2022). President Andrés Manuel López Obrador called for a ceasefire and accused the West of fueling the war through military support for Ukraine. Kyiv, however, rejected the plan, viewing it as a self-serving move to aid Russia and buy it time under the guise of peace (GordonUA 2022).
Throughout this period, Russia did not send a single signal indicating willingness to negotiate. Instead, following Ukraine’s liberation of Kherson in late September 2022, Moscow announced the annexation of Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions. In response, Ukraine submitted a formal application for NATO membership. President Zelensky then signed a decree stating that no negotiations would be conducted with Russia while Putin remained in power (Nova News 2022).
Russia followed this with large-scale missile strikes across Ukraine in October 2022. In November, President Zelensky presented a 10-point peace plan at the G20 summit (President.gov.ua 2022).
In February 2023, China released a 12-point proposal. However, the plan was perceived not as a neutral peace initiative but as an attempt to extract Russia from its predicament. It called for lifting sanctions against Russia, halting NATO expansion, and reaching a ceasefire—while omitting any mention of Ukraine’s demands. Although Zelensky welcomed diplomatic engagement with China, he emphasized that the plan lacked neutrality and substance. As such, the Chinese peace initiative failed to materialize into effective mediation (Reuters 2023).
In April 2023, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva proposed that Ukraine relinquish Crimea in exchange for Russia’s withdrawal from other occupied territories (Al Jazeera 2023). Ukraine rejected the plan, affirming its unwavering stance on territorial integrity. Indonesia’s proposal for an immediate ceasefire and the establishment of a demilitarized zone under UN supervision was similarly declined.
Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov argued that China, Brazil, and Indonesia were acting not as neutral mediators but as proxies for Russia (NV UA 2023).
In June 2023, the presidents of South Africa, Senegal, Egypt, and Zambia visited Kyiv and Moscow to propose an immediate ceasefire, the release of prisoners and children, and the launch of negotiations. Ukraine acknowledged the gesture with respect but reiterated that negotiations could only begin once Russia withdrew from occupied territories. Putin rejected these terms and stated that the ceasefire would not be declared (BBC 2023).
Slovakia and Hungary—often seen as Russia-friendly voices within the EU—soon joined the chorus advocating “peace” at the expense of Ukrainian sovereignty.
In August 2023, President Zelensky’s 10-point plan was discussed in Saudi Arabia in a forum attended by 40 countries. However, no concrete outcomes emerged.
As the military potential for breakthroughs waned, Russia increasingly attempted to freeze the war along current frontlines through back channels. Ukraine dismissed these as stalling tactics aimed at regrouping for future offensives.
In June 2024, a global summit held in Switzerland under Zelensky’s peace initiative again failed to deliver transformative results (FDFA 2023). In September, during a visit to the United States, Zelensky offered joint exploitation and processing of Ukraine’s mineral wealth in exchange for long-term security guarantees against Russian aggression. This proposal was formally included in Ukraine’s Victory Plan unveiled in October. The plan’s pillars included NATO accession, strengthened national defense, deterrence capacity, expansion of strategic economic capabilities, and security assurances (Reuters, February 2025).
Trump’s Arrival and New Peace Speculations
Donald Trump, who came to power in the United States in late 2024 on a promise to end the war, threatened to cut aid to Ukraine. He met with President Zelensky and European leaders in Paris. Just two days after his inauguration in January 2025, Trump urged Putin to end the war and warned of harsher sanctions if he did not comply (BBC 2024; Politico 2024; The Moscow Times, January 2025).
However, only days later, Trump shocked the international community by declaring Ukraine responsible for starting the war. In the following weeks and months, Trump and his administration targeted Zelensky, tried to shift the blame onto Kyiv, and attempted to negotiate Ukraine’s fate without Ukraine’s participation. Resistance from both Ukraine and the European Union eventually forced Washington to backtrack. Trump abandoned the idea of “Ukraine without Ukraine” talks.
On March 11, U.S. and Ukrainian officials met in Saudi Arabia, where Kyiv accepted a 30-day ceasefire proposal from Washington (Axios, March 2025). But just two days later, on March 13, Putin rejected the offer. During a subsequent phone call, Putin promised Trump not to attack Ukraine’s energy infrastructure for a month, but he quickly violated that promise (ISW, March 2025).
On April 25, the U.S. presented both sides with a draft peace agreement. Under this plan, Russia’s control over Crimea would be legally recognized, the occupation of Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Donetsk would be de facto accepted, Ukraine would pledge not to join NATO, would receive vague security assurances, and sanctions on Russia would be lifted (Reuters, April 2025). Neither Ukraine nor Russia accepted the deal.
In May, Putin reiterated his claim that Ukraine had violated the 2022 Istanbul agreement and proposed resuming talks in Turkey. Zelensky responded, “I will personally wait for Putin in Istanbul.” While Zelensky arrived, Putin did not, instead assigning Vladimir Medinsky to lead the Russian delegation—just as in 2022. Trump, who was invited to participate directly, also did not attend.
Negotiations between delegations resumed on May 16 and continued on June 2. Contrary to expectations that peace might be near, the talks produced no tangible outcome. The only agreement reached was on the exchange of 6,000 corpses from both sides. Ukraine proposed an unconditional ceasefire lasting at least three months; Russia responded by asking for a two- or three-day ceasefire to collect bodies.
In addition, Moscow demanded the withdrawal of Ukrainian forces from Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson, recognition of Crimea’s annexation, guarantees of Ukrainian neutrality and NATO non-accession, military downsizing, official status for the Russian language, the complete halt of Western military support to Kyiv, and general elections in Ukraine within 100 days (Medyascope, June 2025).
President Zelensky dismissed the Russian proposal as an ultimatum, stating it left no room for compromise (Ukrainska Pravda, June 2025). Putin, in turn, accused Ukraine of orchestrating railway explosions in Kursk and Bryansk on May 21 and June 1 and declared he would not meet with Zelensky. Later, during a call with Trump, he vowed to retaliate against Ukraine’s so-called “Pautina” operation (Ukrainska Pravda, June 2025).
Thus, despite Turkey’s attempts to portray the meeting positively (Haberrus, June 2025), the new round of Istanbul negotiations not only failed to produce peace but further underscored how distant a resolution remains.
Why Peace Is Not Possible?
In the ongoing context of the Russia–Ukraine war, the question “Why is peace not possible?” is not merely a matter of diplomacy or military strategy; it is closely tied to the nature of political systems and the ideological motivations of leaders. At the present stage, the main obstacle to ending this war—and the primary barrier to peace—is the authoritarian governance regime prevailing in the Russian Federation and the personal ambitions of Vladimir Putin.
Many international observers and analysts explain the origins of the war not through geopolitical or security-based reasoning, but through Putin’s neo-imperialist worldview and his desire to restore the political influence of the Soviet Union. In this context, Ukraine is not just a target—it is also perceived by Russia as an “alternative political model” and a sovereign state seeking closer ties with the European Union.
The aggression of Putin’s regime against Ukraine cannot be understood solely in terms of territorial conquest. According to the Kremlin’s ideologues and Putin himself—who have repeatedly emphasized this point—Ukrainian sovereignty is regarded as a historical mistake and a consequence of the disintegration of the “Russian civilization.”
For Putin, there is no such thing as a Ukrainian state or even a Ukrainian people. In his well-known 2021 article, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians,” he tried to prove that neither the Ukrainian people nor the Ukrainian state had ever existed:
“At that time, the name ‘Ukraine’ was used only in the old Russian sense of ‘borderland’ [‘okraina’]. This can be found in written sources from the 12th century referring to various frontier regions. According to archival documents, the word ‘Ukrainian’ referred to people who guarded the borders” (Kremlin, 2021).
In a 2024 interview with Carlson—Trump’s supporter—Putin again referred to Ukraine as an artificial state (TASS 2024). All of this demonstrates that, for Russia, peace is only possible through Ukraine’s political capitulation—that is, at minimum, its de facto renunciation of independence and full acceptance of terms dictated by Moscow.
Furthermore, the war serves a functional role in reinforcing political control and authoritarian consolidation within Russia. The image of an external enemy, the mobilization of society, and the legitimization of repressive instruments all align with the Kremlin’s interests. Thus, peace is perceived not only as a threat from abroad but also as a threat to domestic political stability.
For authoritarian regimes, the concept of peace is not a negotiation platform based on mutual concessions, as it might be in democracies. Rather, it functions as a tool for advancing political goals and asserting hegemonic claims. The regime led by Vladimir Putin exemplifies this approach: in this context, “peace” is in fact a geopolitical and discursive instrument aimed at securing the enemy’s submission, achieving strategic advantage, and reinforcing internal legitimacy.
An examination of Putin’s rhetoric and concrete actions toward Ukraine shows that his notion of “peace” fundamentally contradicts key principles such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the right to self-determination. The Kremlin either outright rejects these principles or interprets them through double standards.
On the other hand, the approaches of international actors also vary.
Turkey—particularly through President Erdoğan—seeks to enhance its regional and global diplomatic standing by mediating in peace talks.
In the United States, especially under President Donald Trump, the conflict has been instrumentalized for domestic political gain, framed as part of a broader narrative of global leadership.
Ukraine, meanwhile, is compelled to participate in these negotiations, not out of optimism, but as a tactical necessity—to achieve humanitarian advances and reduce international pressure. At the same time, the talks allow Kyiv to gain some strategic leverage and time.
Thus, “peace negotiations” often function less as genuine efforts to end the war and more as political, military, and diplomatic tactics for various stakeholders. As long as the ideological and political structure of the Russian regime remains unchanged, these negotiations are highly unlikely to produce lasting peace.
In short, the primary reason peace remains elusive is not military dynamics, but the authoritarian political will that created and perpetuates the conflict. This implies that solving the problem requires not only diplomatic tools but political transformation as well.
Conclusion
The attainment of a just and lasting peace between Russia and Ukraine appears exceedingly improbable given the current geopolitical realities and the nature of the prevailing political regimes. The conflict cannot be explained solely through military or diplomatic resources; rather, its origins lie in deep ideological and political motivations.
Specifically, the current political model of the Russian Federation—a personalized authoritarian system—has turned the war into an instrument not only for pursuing geopolitical interests but also for maintaining internal political stability (Snyder 2022).
For the regime led by Vladimir Putin, the concept of “peace” is synonymous with the full capitulation of the opposing side—in this case, Ukraine—and the de facto recognition of Russian hegemony. This stands in fundamental contradiction to the principles of modern international law and the sovereignty of states (Kuzio 2023). Therefore, many so-called “peace initiatives,” especially the “ceasefire” rhetoric promoted by certain Western political circles, function in practice as strategic maneuvers used by Russia to prolong the conflict and reinforce its position (Galeotti 2022).
The Trump administration’s critical rhetoric toward Ukraine and delays in providing military support created a favorable political opening for Putin. Simultaneously, the mediation initiatives of the Republic of Turkey—despite projecting an image of neutrality—carry the risk of indirectly supporting the Kremlin’s interests (Charap & Colton 2023). In this context, most “peace” efforts function either as tactical manipulations or as instruments for securing domestic and international political standing.
For peace to be achieved in the Russia–Ukraine conflict, a climate of mutual trust and an appropriate international environment must be established—grounded in mutual respect, security guarantees, political will, and the active involvement of credible international mediators. Without these conditions, a complete cessation of hostilities and the establishment of sustainable peace will remain unattainable. The Kremlin’s current political will categorically denies such a framework.
Thus, a lasting peace between Ukraine and Russia is possible only under two conditions: first, a political transformation within Russia that dismantles authoritarianism and imperialist policies; and second, a firm and consistent position by the international community in defending Ukraine’s territorial integrity. In the absence of these factors, the concept of peace will remain nothing more than a political illusion or a tool of geopolitical manipulation (Nitu 2024).
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