Introduction
On 23 November, early presidential elections were held in Republika Srpska (RS), the Serb territorial entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to replace former Serb leader Milorad Dodik. Dodik had been removed from office by a court decision in August of the previous year for failing to comply with the obligations of the Dayton Agreement, and he was barred from holding public office for six years. Known for his secessionist and populist rhetoric—and more recently for steering Republika Srpska toward growing authoritarian tendencies—Dodik had previously served two non-consecutive terms as the entity’s prime minister and had been elected president three times. His long period in power enabled Dodik and his party, the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (Serbian: “Савез независних социјалдемократа”), to promote, over the long term, a secessionist discourse that Bosnian Serb politicians had advanced since the early post-Dayton years and that intensified after Kosovo’s* declaration of independence.
Against the backdrop of rising authoritarian tendencies in recent years, the RS leadership’s refusal to comply with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s central authorities began to take on structural and legal dimensions. This ultimately prompted the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Christian Schmidt—who monitors parties’ compliance with the Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the genocidal war and established only a negative peace excluding the resumption of violence—to invoke the so-called Bonn Powers granted to him by law. Previously, Dodik had attempted to push through the “Law on the Non-Implementation of Decisions of the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina” and amendments to the “Law on the Publication of Laws and Other Acts,” which aimed to prevent the publication of decisions by the High Representative and the Constitutional Court in the official gazette of Republika Srpska—effectively preventing these decisions from entering into force within the RS territory (Balkan Insight 2023; Sarajevo Times 2023). However, the High Representative immediately struck down these attempts, and two years later Dodik was removed from office (EWB 2025; Sarajevo Times 2023; RFE/RL’s Balkan Service 2023). A one-year prison sentence against him was converted into a monetary penalty, and he received a six-year ban on holding public office (Balkan Insight 2025).
Dodik’s disqualification necessitated early presidential elections in Republika Srpska. The ruling Alliance of Independent Social Democrats nominated Siniša Karan, who had long held senior positions in security structures and had served as Minister of Scientific-Technological Development and Higher Education during Dodik’s last presidential term. His opponents included the main opposition candidate Branko Blanuša of the Serb Democratic Party—supported by a broad opposition spectrum including the People’s Front and the Party of Democratic Progress—Dragan Jokanović of the Alliance for New Politics, Nikola Lazarević of the Republika Srpska Ecological Party, and independent candidates Igor Gašević and Slavko Dragičević. The winner of the elections would serve until the next regular presidential election in November 2026, acting in place of the removed president.
The government’s candidate, Karan, ran under the slogan “Vote for President Dodik!”, openly presenting himself as Dodik’s “Medvedev.” Throughout the campaign, Dodik himself appeared on Karan’s posters and made his message explicit: “I remain the central figure—I will be the president of all presidents of Republika Srpska. Is that enough?” (Huskić 2025).
In the 23 November elections, the government candidate Karan narrowly defeated Blanuša, receiving 50.41% of the vote compared to Blanuša’s 48.23%. Only 35.21% of eligible voters participated—a low turnout (Central Election Commission of Bosnia and Herzegovina 2025). The heavy snowfall on election day likely contributed to this low participation. Although observers from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the European Parliament, and the Council of Europe’s Congress of Local and Regional Authorities assessed the voting process positively regarding compliance with the legal framework and procedural norms, they noted that the abolition of the public campaign financing fund distorted the balance of resources between the ruling party and the opposition (ODIHR 2025).
Thus, despite a significant loss of public support compared to previous elections (Huskić 2025), Dodik’s party secured at least one more year in power. During this year, Republika Srpska’s attempts to defy Bosnia and Herzegovina’s central institutions—as well as its separatist rhetoric—can be expected to continue.
This analysis argues that, in the context of escalating human rights violations, authoritarian tendencies, and global and regional political turbulence, this rhetoric may increasingly produce concrete outcomes and may even push developments in a direction dangerous to the territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The second section examines the historical formation of Republika Srpska as an entity and analyzes its longstanding secessionist discourse. The third section explores Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitutional, institutional, and political vulnerabilities, while the fourth section evaluates the attacks on civil liberties, authoritarian tendencies, and conditions in Republika Srpska since 2023—assessing how these dynamics may influence the likelihood of a separatist scenario.
The analysis aims to answer the following questions:
What are the trends in human rights violations and authoritarian tendencies in Republika Srpska? And can these trends lead to secession?
Republika Srpska: Antagonism and Secessionism
Republika Srpska (RS), one of the two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and operating within the country’s internationally recognized territorial integrity, declared its existence in 1992 amid ongoing wartime conditions and was formally established in 1995 through the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina—commonly known as the Dayton Agreement.[1]
The first president of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadžić, was convicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) for his role in the Srebrenica genocide and sentenced to 40 years’ imprisonment—later increased to life on appeal (United Nations 2019).
Since the entity’s inception, denial of the Srebrenica genocide—recognized by the ICTY—and other acts of genocide and war crimes committed against Bosniaks has been a structural component of RS political discourse. Milorad Dodik, who ruled RS for many years, referred to the Srebrenica genocide—where at least 8,000 Bosniaks were murdered on ethnic and religious grounds in a coordinated and systematic manner, with special brutality and efforts to conceal the crimes—as a “fabricated myth” (Rahim 2019).
In August 2018, the RS Assembly annulled the findings of a 2004 RS Commission Report that acknowledged the Srebrenica crime and other massacres committed by Serb military units against Bosniaks (Rahim 2019). In 2019, the Dodik government created a so-called “independent international commission,” whose 2021 report declared that no genocide had occurred in Srebrenica (Tallan 2022). The RS government officially cites this report. Following the High Representative’s 2021 decree criminalizing genocide denial, the RS leadership formally boycotted state institutions and adopted draft laws asserting that decisions of the High Representative were not valid within RS territory (Balkan Insight 2021).
Genocide denial is widespread in RS. Public spaces and dormitories are named after Karadžić, and war criminals are portrayed as national heroes. School curricula omit the Srebrenica events entirely. ICTY verdicts are taught to students as “anti-Serb propaganda” (Hodžić 2025). This entrenched atmosphere of genocide denial undermines legal coherence within Bosnia and Herzegovina and deepens long-standing distrust within the post-war society.
Alongside this, secessionism has always remained a potential option for RS. In 1996—only a year after the Dayton Agreement—then RS President Biljana Plavšić proposed secession from Bosnia and Herzegovina and unification with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (later Serbia and Montenegro, and eventually Serbia) (Pepi 2022). Among several purported justifications, she claimed that Bosniaks were genetically inferior to Serbs due to religious and ethnic factors (Shatzmiller 2002, cited in Pepi 2022). Plavšić was later indicted by the ICTY on two counts of genocide, five counts of crimes against humanity, and one count of murder.[2]
In the 2000s, Dodik—who had risen to dominance in RS politics—regularly invoked secessionist rhetoric, while Bosniak leaders in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) called for the abolition of RS as an entity (Congressional Research Service 2019). The declaration of Kosovo’s* independence in 2008 and its recognition by many states had a pivotal effect on strengthening RS separatist narratives. The most recent and forceful wave of RS secessionism coincides with the authoritarian turn of the 2020s and increasing human rights violations. On one hand, media freedoms and NGOs faced attacks through defamation laws and restrictive legal measures; on the other hand, these were accompanied by secessionist legislative proposals and rhetoric.
After examining Bosnia and Herzegovina’s constitutional, institutional, and political vulnerabilities in the next section, the article will discuss how RS’s authoritarian trajectory since 2023 affects the prospects for secession.
Challenging Constitutional, Institutional, and Political Factors in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Formed by IV Annex of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, BiH's political framework, set the country's political profile, creating a complex, multi-tiered setup that divides administrative power among the two state entities (the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina [FBiH] and Republika Srpska [RS]), and the Brčko District (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2024; Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024). This complex constitutional structure is characterized by fragmentation across five levels of government: municipal, cantonal (in FBiH), entity, Brčko District, and central state, which results in duplicated services and widespread inefficiencies (BTI 2024; Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023). The institutional design, introduced with the anticipation of maintaining the absence of violent conflict, incorporates veto mechanisms intended to safeguard the interests of the three constituent ethnicities (Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs). However, in fact, these provisions also accord priority to ethnic representation over institutional functionality, creating perpetual political deadlock, frequently termed as a "vetocracy" (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023). The administrative complexity involves 14 governments and legislative bodies reaching roughly 600 delegates as parliament members across different levels (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024). The executive branch consists of the state-level Council of Ministers (CoM) with nine ministries, the FBiH Government with 16 ministries, the RS Government with 17 ministries, and the 10 cantonal governments in FBiH collectively running 95 ministries (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024). Such an excessive organizational scope makes the executive apparatus "extremely costly” and burdensome, and results in a poor ratio between administrative costs and investment costs (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024). Also, the system is fundamentally undermined by a pervasive lack of coordination and subordination among multiple levels of government, and this setting directly impedes fast decision-making and nuanced implementation of policies against human rights violations and cessationist attempts (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024; BTI 2024; European Commission 2024). The extensive fragmentation embedded in the political gridlock of the overall governing system exposes the country to the risks of recurring instability and administrative paralysis (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024; European Commission 2024).
The climate of endemic corruption, which is strongly related to the “state capture” syndrome embedded in internationally recognized and endorsed institutional fragmentation, creates a hostile environment in which independent CSOs and critical media attempt to operate, setting the stage for specific institutional misconducts (Transparency International Bosina and Herzegovina 2023).
Political parties in BiH function mostly as clientelist networks. They control approximately 90% of public sector jobs but tend to distribute them based on loyalty rather than candidates' professional qualities (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024). The systematic politicization of the public sector employment, which is about 30% of the country’s workforce, exposes the judiciary, law enforcement, and other official institutions to vulnerability in front of political interference and selective application of laws (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024; BTI 2024; Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023). This setting inherently makes critical CSOs and independent media, which play a crucial role in exposing corruption and holding the government accountable, existential threats to the authorities (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023). The political discourse, particularly emanating from the Republika Srpska (RS) leadership, consistently and systematically utilizes exclusivist rhetoric to stigmatize critics, eventually impairing public trust and setting the narrative justifications for legislative repression (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023; Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2024).
The media landscape in BiH is fragmented with weak real pluralism, despite the fact that the number of existing outlets is considerably high (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2024; Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024). Media is mostly financially dependent on government finances and state advertising, and this creates ample chance for political interference and pressure (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024; Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2024). Consequently, media function in an "extremely unfavourable political and economic milieu", despite the legal environment being relatively favourable (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2024; Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024). Independent media, in this context, the media, which focus on crucial topics like human rights, anti-corruption, and clientelism, have increasingly had to function as non-profit civil society organizations reliant on foreign donor funding to survive, which suggests any decrease in external funding leads to civic rights shrinkage per se (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024). Analogously, in general, the free civil society sector of BiH is characterized by low organizational capacity and heavy dependence on international donors for operational funds, rather than having support from local communities or the private sector (BTI 2024; Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024). CSOs that are undesirable are routinely deprived of public financial support, while an excessively unequal share of public funds is invested into government-aligned or war veterans' associations, which frequently lack transparency and accountability (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023; Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024). This institutional dependence sets up CSOs as the front target when political contention escalates, and international support diminishes.
Republika Srpska’s Strategic Attack on Civic Liberties, 2024–2025
A critical escalation of pressure happened during the period leading into and throughout 2024 and 2025, exceeding limits of simple contestation to institutionalizing attack on civic liberties through legislative mechanisms designed to debilitate critical CSOs and media. Republika Srpska (RS) executed the most acute forms of limiting civic rights. The entity’s government pursued laws unambiguously aimed at silencing dissent and investigative reporting (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2024). In July 2023, the RS Parliament introduced legislative amendments [1] to the criminal code, criminalizing defamation, reversing two decades of democratic reform, and marking a significant degradation in the protection of media activities and freedom of expression (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024; Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2024; European Commission 2024). Authorities immediately took action regarding the implementation of the legislative change. Already, by November 2023, 23 reports for defamation were recorded under the new amendments (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024). Forcing critical journalists into "long and costly proceedings", the lawsuits are intended to be used as silencing blackmailing threats, contributing to the "chilling effect" on critical reporting and investigative journalism (Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly 2024; European Commission 2024; Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024). Thus, it leads to a decline in the sector’s operational effectiveness, as resources are diverted toward legal defense rather than programmatic work, potentially also generating fatigue as a placebo effect alongside (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024).
Paralleling the defamation laws, the RS authorities put forward a draft law titled the Law on the Special Registry and Publicity of the Work of Non-Profit Organizations [2], widely and internationally understood as a "Foreign Agents Act" (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024; Móra et al. 2024). This initiative aimed to label organizations receiving foreign funding as "foreign agents," subjecting them to excessive state scrutiny (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024). The proposed law was designed to put forward restrictions through several mechanisms:
The legislation imposed heavy burdens, excessive reporting duties, along with intrusive inspections, and the requirement that every publication or material carry the “non-profit organization” label, regardless of whether the activity had any political character (Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2024), being content-wise quite close to the similar legislation previously adopted in the Russian Federation.
Perhaps one of the most troubling aspects of the law was its attempt to regulate advocacy actions and campaigns. By barring foreign-funded organizations from participating in public policy debates, the legislation could extensively limit democratic participation in Republika Srpska, as the elastic language of the law, using broad terms such as “political activity” and “political action”, was giving authorities sweeping power to sanction organizations at will. International actors, including the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the European Commission, flagged that such provisions could violate both constitutional protections and international human rights standards. Indeed, the law was struck down by the Decision U-6/25 of the Constitutional Court of BiH [3] on the grounds of not being compliant with the constitutional provisions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Article 11 of the ECHR. However, what will be the subsequent actions of Republika Srpska’s authorities remains uncertain. RS also substantially limits the citizens’ freedom of assembly. RS’s police addressed the protests by the cross-entity "Justice for David" movement following the death of student David Dragičević in Banja Luka with repression and prosecution, ultimately leading to the movement's dissolution (BTI 2024). Since 2021, RS authorities have extensively halted protesters from exercising their right to assemble (BTI 2024; Transparency International in Bosnia and Herzegovina 2023).
The abrupt USAID funding cut in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) was rapidly transformed into a political weapon by the actors leaning towards authoritarianism. Conservative political structures, many of whose institutions had long benefited from U.S. aid, welcomed anti-USAID rhetoric emanated by the Trump administration with “open delight,” exposing authoritarian tendencies and open hostility toward civil society (Salkanović 2025). This was amplified by a coordinated disinformation campaign, including false claims of $250 million in missing funds, as if a lawyer named Martin De Luca, falsely alleged to be part of Trump’s team, had arrived to investigate the purported disappearance of funds in BiH (Salkanović 2025). With this and with other fake news, public broadcasters and pro-government outlets in Republika Srpska labeled CSOs and independent media as “CIA outposts,” while government-aligned experts accused USAID of financing terrorism in the “Middle East” [Western Asia] (Salkanović 2025). Fostering narratives by such kind of accusations and fabricated news, provided grounds of justification for the controversial “foreign agents” law, portraying civic actors as “foreign mercenaries” and foreign aid as a sovereignty threat, while discussions about the law was ongoing.
By targeting organizations and attempting to delegitimize democratic participation, these campaigns deepened authoritarian opportunism and further endangered the fragile state of civic rights in BiH (Salkanović 2025). Moreover, the financial destabilization among CSOs, independent media, and watchdog organizations, combined with the hostile public narratives, created an environment where local authoritarian tendencies could flourish, posing the risk of lasting dismal consequences for BiH's volatile political milieu (Salkanović 2025).
One of the risks arising from this context is the secessionism increasingly present on the agenda in Republika Srpska. Put simply, the normalization of legal violations in the country may create fertile ground for secessionism. But how could this happen? Has secessionist rhetoric succeeded in shifting public opinion in its favor?
In an article published by the London School of Economics, Semir Dzebo (2025a) presents his statistical research showing that although populist discourse serves as an elite-level political strategy for Dodik, it has failed to produce attitudinal change among ordinary citizens. Public opinion continues to be shaped primarily by traditional factors such as ethnic identification and economic grievances. However, this discourse has emerged as a tool used by the Republika Srpska elite to circumvent institutional constraints on separatist advocacy (Dzebo 2025b). To simplify, this means that secessionist rhetoric cannot convince the public to support separation, but it does help the elite overcome legal barriers on the path toward separatism. In other words, Dodik and his circle cannot realize their separatist ambitions through democratic means and may therefore attempt to do so through authoritarian ones.
To better understand this argument, we may also refer to another KHAR Center publication, “Territorial Autonomy as a Factor of Political Stability in the Post-Yugoslav Context: Positive or Negative?” The article argues that when human rights and freedoms and the rule of law are not guaranteed, and when “the distribution of competences is not designed consistently and properly in line with democratic principles and human rights,” autonomy may lead to systemic violence (KHAR Center 2025). In this regard, the RS elite undermines the decentralization of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Another noteworthy factor is the decision of the United States to lift sanctions on Dodik and his entourage ahead of the elections (Reuters 2025). Although former U.S. diplomat Jay Truesdale — who has professional experience in the region — linked this development to Dodik’s “compliance with the Sarajevo court,” the findings of this analysis suggest that the decision does not appear rational.
Ultimately, recent years show that Dodik and the secessionist elite of RS are determined to pursue authoritarianism. Assuming the existence of separatist intent, we can argue that the consequences of authoritarianism will likely be used to advance secessionism, and pursuing these objectives through authoritarian means does not promise non-violent outcomes. Thus, the current RS leadership jeopardizes not only public harmony within Bosnia and Herzegovina but also international security in the broader region.
Conclusion
This analysis, which explored human rights violations and authoritarian tendencies in the Republika Srpska entity of Bosnia and Herzegovina and examined their relationship to separatism and secessionism, allows us to draw several conclusions.
Against the backdrop of global actors shaping their behavior within a neorealist paradigm, restrictions on human rights and freedoms and the growth of authoritarian tendencies in Republika Srpska are increasingly evident. These restrictions manifest through concrete examples: the limitation of freedom of assembly and association, persecution of citizens attempting to exercise these rights, systematic smear campaigns against NGOs and independent media, the misuse of defamation laws, attempts to exhaust critics of the government through long and burdensome legal proceedings, and legislative efforts to restrict civil society participation in public debates. The fact that the incumbent government effectively retained power in the recent early elections suggests that these attacks and attempts will continue.
Alongside the ongoing human rights violations and authoritarian tendencies, the separatist discourse of the Republika Srpska leadership poses a growing threat to Bosnian federalism. In an environment marked by rights violations and diminishing international pressure, any internal crisis may be manipulated, framed as a consequence of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s political structure, and used to reinforce separatist tendencies. Thus, the analysis argues that under conditions of human rights violations and rising authoritarianism, the likelihood of a separatist scenario increases.
Endnotes:
* References to Kosovo are presented without prejudice to positions on status, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and the Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
[1] Office of the High Representative (OHR). 1995. “Dayton Peace Agreement.” OHR.int. Accessed November 29, 2025. https://www.ohr.int/dayton-peace-agreement/.
[2] International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 2003. Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavšić, IT-00-39&40/1-S: Sentencing Judgment. 27 February 2003. https://www.icty.org/x/cases/plavsic/tjug/en/pla-tj030227e.pdf.
[3] Закон о измјенама и допунама Кривичног законика Републике Српске, Службени гласник Републике Српске, бр. 73/23.
[4] Закон о посебном регистру и јавности рада непрофитних организација РЕПУБЛИКА СРПСКА. МИНИСТАРСТВО ПРАВДЕ. Бања Лука, јануар 2025 године.
[5] Ustavni sud Bosne i Hercegovine, Odluka broj U-6/25 od 29. Marta 2025. godine. https://www.ustavnisud.ba/en/158th-plenary-session-the-course-of-the-session-so-far
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