Introduction
Although Turkiye claims neutrality in the Russia–Ukraine war, the political and geographical conditions it finds itself in make the sustainability of this position quite difficult. This difficulty is not limited to Ankara’s inability to mask—under the label of neutrality—a stance that is not contrary (at the very least) to Russia’s interests in the region and on the international stage. It is also related to the fact that Turkiye’s geography places it at one of the most critical contact points of the Russia–Ukraine war and exposes Ankara to the risk of being dragged into the conflict even against its will.
The mutual attacks carried out by the parties in the Black Sea since late November have clearly demonstrated this risk. Within the span of a single month, Turkiye has remained constantly on the agenda both in terms of maritime trade and repeated violations of its airspace by UAVs. Since November 28, Ukraine has struck at least two vessels belonging to Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet” within Turkiye’s exclusive economic zone in the Black Sea (Balmforth and Hunder, November 2025). Subsequently, another vessel was hit near Sinop; however, Ukraine neither claimed responsibility for the attack nor did it deny it outright, instead stating that the incident was an act of sabotage (X, December 2, 2025).
Russia, for its part, struck two Turkish vessels in Ukrainian waters on December 12 and 13 (Reuters, December 13, 2025). Following this, a series of ambiguous UAV-related incidents began to circulate in Turkiye. Ankara initially announced that a UAV allegedly coming from the Black Sea direction had been shot down by F-16s in Çankırı (AP, December 18, 2025). One day later, a UAV crashed in Kocaeli, and Turkiye’s Ministry of Interior announced that it was an Orlan-10 type UAV used by Russia (Ministry of Interior, December 19, 2025). The following day, news emerged of another UAV crash in Balıkesir; the Ministry of Defense limited its response to stating that the footage of the downed UAV was old (Cumhuriyet, December 2025).
Turkiye’s official stance regarding all these developments was highly “cautious.” Official institutions equated Ukraine’s strikes on Russian vessels within Turkiye’s economic zone with Russia’s strikes on Turkish vessels (!) and issued statements expressing “concern” while “warning both sides” (Directorate of Communications, December 12, 2025; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 13, 2025). No reaction was heard from Ankara regarding the UAV incidents that occurred after Erdoğan’s meeting with Putin in Turkmenistan. Moreover, the reactions of pro-government commentators—who traditionally articulate on television and social media what the government itself refrains from saying—were far removed from the rhetoric of “Turkiye’s survival.”
Suspicion Toward Ukraine, Restraint Toward Russia
If the issue were limited solely to attacks on ships, the striking of Turkish vessels by Russian missiles and UAVs, or Ukraine’s targeting of Russian shadow fleet vessels in Turkish waters, could be interpreted as incidental consequences of the warring parties expanding their military operations. However, the mysterious UAV incidents darken the picture considerably. Following the Ministry of Defense’s initial announcement that a UAV had been shot down, its subsequent silence, the failure to disclose the drone’s origin, contradictory reports on social media regarding whether parts of the UAV were recovered, and expert opinions raising doubts about tail markings despite official statements identifying later drones as Russian in origin all raised numerous questions (Haber Sol, December 20, 2025)—questions that remain unanswered to this day.
On the other hand, it is impossible to overlook the persistence with which Turkish official institutions continue to draw an equivalence between the occupier and the occupied—even in situations where Turkiye itself is directly targeted—as well as the tendency within Turkiye’s media and social media landscape to ignore any negative developments involving Russia while blaming Ukraine for virtually every incident. A brief look at what pro-government media outlets and their affiliates—among the most important carriers of Russian propaganda in Turkiye—have written and said on these issues is sufficient to grasp the overall picture.
The pro-government daily Yeni Şafak described Ukraine’s strikes on vessels belonging to Russia’s shadow fleet as a “tanker provocation in the Black Sea” (Yeni Şafak, November 2025), while reporting Russia’s strike on a Turkish vessel in Odessa under the headline “A Turkish ship was hit in Ukraine,” without even mentioning Russia’s name in the body of the article (Yeni Şafak, December 12, 2025).
İbrahim Karagül, a pro-Russian columnist for Yeni Şafak, attempted to absolve Russia of responsibility for the UAV shot down in Çankırı, arguing that the goal was to provoke a war between Turkiye and Russia: “The current priority of the US, Europe, and Israel is a Turkiye–Russia war. They want to dump on Turkiye the task that Ukraine has failed to accomplish” (İbrahim Karagül, December 18, 2025).
The pro-government newspaper Yeni Akit responded to Ukraine’s strikes on Russian tankers by echoing Putin’s rhetoric: “Breaking statement from Putin! Attacks on tankers in the Black Sea will be answered excessively” (Yeni Akit, December 12, 2025). While employing accusatory language toward Ukraine in its commentary, the newspaper framed Russia’s strikes on Turkish vessels as “an attempt by certain actors to drag Turkiye into the war” (Yeni Akit, December 17, 2025). Its reporting on the downed UAVs—officially identified as Russian-made—was likewise notably restrained.
Similarly, the pro-government television channel A Haber reported Russia’s strike on a Turkish vessel in Odessa under the headline “Attack on a Turkish ship in Ukraine,” just like Yeni Şafak, and claimed that the incident was an act of sabotage. One of the central figures of Russian propaganda in Turkiye, Gaffar Yakınca, stated on the channel that the attack was not carried out by Moscow but was instead a sabotage operation by Britain and Europe aimed at disrupting peace negotiations (A Haber, December 12, 2025).
On television programs featuring carriers of Russian narratives in Turkiye, the downed UAVs were described as “false flag operations,” with Russia portrayed as completely innocent and Ukraine, the US, and Europe depicted as the guilty parties orchestrating provocations and sabotage in the Black Sea (Medyatakip, December 2025).
Figures such as Hasan Ünal, Cem Gürdeniz, and Türker Ertürk—known as conduits of Kremlin propaganda (Institute, 2023a)—sought to exonerate the Kremlin both in relation to the ship attacks and the entry of UAVs into Turkish airspace, while placing blame on the West and Ukraine (TR Haber, December 2, 2025; Türker Ertürk, December 19, 2025).
The most openly pro-Russian group in Turkiye—the Perinçek group—through its newspaper Aydınlık, targeted the few media outlets that claimed the UAV incursions were Russia’s responsibility (Aydınlık, December 21, 2025).
Likewise, the pro-government Strategic Thinking Institute emphasized that the events of the past month were the work of third parties seeking to test Turkiye’s reaction (SDE, December 20, 2025).
The “Turkish-Style Neutrality” Model
The examples outlined above, drawn solely from developments over the past month, illustrate the general framework of Turkiye’s so-called “neutrality” toward the Russia–Ukraine war. Assigning responsibility equally to the occupier and the occupied by issuing “warnings to both sides,” even when Turkiye’s own interests are directly harmed, is hardly neutrality. This is not a случай choice of language or style; rather, it is a behavioral mechanism in which state reflexes and media reflexes overlap. This mechanism can provisionally be termed the “Turkish-style neutrality” model.
In this model, when the subject is Ukraine, sentences are constructed directly; the informal tone becomes accusatory or condescending under the guise of “pity”; the “culprit” is immediately identified; a verdict of “Ukrainian provocation” is delivered; and it becomes “Ukraine struck.” When the subject is Russia, however, the incident, the action, and the damage are acknowledged, but the subject and the address disappear—phrases such as “a ship was hit” or “an object was attacked” are used instead. At times, responsibility is shifted through wordplay: for example, “a Turkish ship was hit in Ukraine.” Or when Russia’s involvement is unmistakable, the “two sides” equivalence is immediately activated: the occupier and the occupied are merged into the same sentence of “concern,” and the issue is downgraded from one of occupation and aggression to the level of “mutual tension” (AA, 2022).
The reactions of official institutions also remain confined within the framework of “mutual tension”—either a “balanced” statement, a call for de-escalation, or silence. The information vacuum created by this silence is then filled by television and social media, which in most cases do not seek facts or explanations but instead rely on ready-made templates such as “incitement,” “provocation,” “false flag,” or “Western, Israeli, third-party sabotage” in order to weaken the possibility that “Russia is guilty.” As a result, the official tone appears “neutral,” while pro-government media normalize what the official position refrains from saying by accusing Ukraine. Although this mechanism is presented as political flexibility, wisdom, or prudence, it in fact turns into a behavioral regime that covers up the guilt of the “thief.”
For example, when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Turkish government did not describe it using the language of international law as an occupation, a war, or an attack, but instead adopted the Kremlin’s terminology and referred to it as a military operation (MFA Türkiye, 2022). The language used by the media was shaped accordingly. In the first weeks, terms such as “military intervention” and “military operation” were employed, and only after the government began using the word “war” did the language of pro-government media outlets start to change in parallel (NewslabTurkiye, 2022).
Room for Maneuver, or the Loss of the Red Line?
Undoubtedly, if Turkiye—as a major regional power with military-economic ties to Ukraine and economic-commercial ties to Russia—had explained its decision not to become a party to the war in terms of a cost–benefit calculation and openly admitted that it was seeking to avoid the risks of direct involvement, the “neutrality” model it presents would not raise so many questions. Because an objective assessment indeed shows that Turkiye is dependent on Russia in many areas: energy dependency, tourism and trade relations, the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant, the Syrian issue, the Caucasus issue, and the risk of escalation in the Black Sea.
If we set aside the reasons behind this dependency and the lack of any particular enthusiasm to eliminate it, and look only at the facts, each of the aforementioned issues on its own is sufficient to explain Ankara’s “softness” toward Russia. The problem, however, lies in Ankara’s presentation of this policy of interdependence and constraint, this cost–benefit assessment, as “greatness,” “wisdom,” “moral equivalence,” and “neutral mediation.”
On the one hand, Turkiye pursues a line of “strategic autonomy” with the aim of remaining within Western institutions while simultaneously expanding its relations with non-Western powers in order to create room for maneuver (KHAR Center, September 2025). This search for strategic autonomy entered a new phase after the Russia–Ukraine war. Under wartime conditions, Turkish foreign policy simultaneously involves supporting Ukraine while deepening economic and security relations with Russia—an apparently contradictory position. However, the objective is to preserve room for maneuver for proactive middle-power activism in an international conflict. The intention is to gain international status as a “peacemaker” by participating in the negotiation process between Russia and Ukraine, while at the same time pragmatically maintaining economic ties with Russia as part of diversification efforts.
The centralization of decision-making domestically and the leadership style enable this strategy to be implemented in a more flexible yet simultaneously riskier manner. Undoubtedly, these efforts are largely linked to domestic political calculations: in a period of severe economic crisis, populist dividends have contributed to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s electoral success (Öniş, Ulusoy, 2025).
Ankara’s extremely “restrained” response to Russian UAVs flying over its airspace can also be explained precisely by these domestic political calculations. These calculations are based on the relationship between Erdoğan and Putin, which rests on a framework of mutual benefit. Experience suggests that if the drones in question had indeed come from Ukraine or Europe, as Eurasianists and pro-government commentators claim, Ankara would not have remained this silent. This claim can be substantiated with two separate examples.
In 2022, during the very week when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the head of the Association of Turkish Travel Agencies (TÜRSAB), Firuz Bağlıkaya, met on the same day with both the Russian and Ukrainian ambassadors and announced that relations would continue. Ukraine’s ambassador in Ankara, Vasyl Bodnar, described this as hypocrisy and interpreted it as equating the occupier with the occupied (Reuters, 2022). In official statements, it was said that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been informed about these meetings, tourism was described as the language of peace, Bağlıkaya said that “they are acting emotionally,” and pro-government media representatives immediately began insulting the Ukrainian ambassador and “putting him in his place” across mainstream and social media (İnternethaber, 2022).
One year later, when Anastasia Zoteeva, CEO and Chair of the Board of the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant, made the assertive statement: “This plant belongs to Russia; we are building a plant for ourselves in another country. The Akkuyu port is also our port; we accept ships from everywhere,” Ankara’s response was remarkably courteous: “The Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant is a Turkish company” (Cumhuriyet, 2023). Pro-government journalists and Eurasianists who had rebuked the Ukrainian ambassador did not address at all the claims contained in the Russian official’s statement. These two contrasting behaviors have become among the many examples of Ankara’s “masked neutrality.”
Kremlin Propaganda and the Turkish Media
When Ankara’s attempt to camouflage its own interests under the label of neutrality combines with the strength of Kremlin propaganda in Turkiye, the scale of the threat grows even larger. Russia, which has extensive experience in propaganda warfare, is highly active in disinformation campaigns in Turkiye (Ünver, 2023a).
As everywhere else in the world, Russia’s propaganda mechanisms in Turkiye are flexible and easily adaptable to circumstances. For example, Sputnik—Russia’s official propaganda outlet that still operates openly in Turkiye—began hiring journalists who were opposed to Erdoğan’s government after relations between the two countries deteriorated following Turkiye’s downing of a Russian jet. Once relations improved, Sputnik dismissed most of these journalists (with the exception of a few figures particularly loyal to the Kremlin) and ceased publishing critical news about Turkish politics. This approach was also reflected in bot and troll networks under Russian control (Romandash, 2024a). In return, Ankara remained silent about the unlawful dismissal of its citizens from Sputnik. The dismissed employees stated that the warm relations between Ankara and Moscow had granted Sputnik a kind of immunity (Balkan Insight, 2024).
Relations between the two countries are not based on institutional mechanisms of mutual oversight, but rather on the needs, preferences, and decisions of Erdoğan and Putin. Kremlin propaganda behaves accordingly in Turkiye: it treats Erdoğan more gently than Western leaders, seeks to maintain a measured tone even in steps that displease Moscow, and does not attack Turkiye to the same extent as it targets Western countries (Romandash, 2024b). However, recalling the accusations directed at Turkiye—from the Kremlin to the Russian Ministry of Defense, from official newspapers to social media propagandists—after the 2015 jet crisis, such as terrorism and illegal oil trade (TASS, 2015), is enough to show that the “mutual non-aggression” understanding between the two countries is far from stable. In other words, everything depends on the Kremlin’s goodwill.
Similarly, Turkish media are not particularly concerned with how an incident occurred, its causes, or its roots; what matters to them in many cases is how the government reacts, which line it adopts, and which narratives it relies on. For example, studies show that even in 2022, when war coverage peaked, only 7 percent of articles in Turkish media focused on the background, causes, documents, and facts of the war. Positions were largely determined by the government’s behavior (NewslabTurkiye, 2022b).
This creates an extremely fertile environment for Russian propaganda in Turkiye. Russian influence operations in Turkiye rely less on “watching Russian channels” and more on local actors—political-ideological networks, experts, pro-government media, and social media templates—disseminating Kremlin narratives. Of course, official Kremlin propaganda outlets such as Sputnik and RT, which are still broadcast in Turkiye, prepare ready-made anti-Western, anti-NATO, and anti-sanctions narratives tailored to Turkiye’s agenda. However, the main distributors are local actors.
Turkiye being one of the countries most exposed to disinformation, where such disinformation has become normalized (Ünver, 2019b), the Turkish public’s susceptibility to conspiracy theories, high levels of anti-Western sentiment, and the government’s special care to avoid damaging relations with Russia while controlling a large portion of local actors, make the Kremlin’s job considerably easier. Apart from well-known Kremlin propaganda tools such as Sputnik, RT, and Aydınlık, no media outlet in Turkiye admits to being pro-Russian; on the contrary, they deny it. Yet research shows that media outlets from all sides of the Turkish political spectrum disseminate news and analyses that can be considered supportive of Russia or close to Putin’s position, under different contexts and labels. In other words, mainstream media in Turkiye are substantially sliding toward pro-Russian narratives when it comes to Ankara–Moscow relations. This drift in the mainstream media atmosphere further complicates the identification of pro-Russian institutions and networks (Ünver, 2019c).
A large portion of the media in Turkiye is under government control, exercised either directly by the state or through private companies close to the AKP government (RSF, 2023). Some media organizations under AKP control present themselves as center-left or center-right “mainstream,” while others act as if they cater to harsher wings of the political spectrum. Despite their differences, however, all are compelled to operate within the rules set by the AKP government. This ecosystem also includes the Kremlin-aligned line represented by the Eurasianist Turkish segment, which significantly influences the language of the media—especially television—on the Russia–Ukraine war (Institute, 2023b).
In overall terms, Eurasianist media groups are also part of the broad media environment shaped under AKP leadership, because the government’s behavior often overlaps with the line pursued by this group. More precisely, the two sides mutually benefit from each other’s positions: the government uses the Eurasianist group as a domestic political ally and turns a blind eye to its overtly pro-Kremlin positions, while the Eurasianist group supports the government’s authoritarian tendencies in domestic politics, benefits from Erdoğan’s warm relationship with Putin, and encounters no obstacles in freely disseminating pro-Russian narratives. As a result, pan-Eurasianism has become increasingly visible in Turkiye in recent years—both in official positions, mainstream media, and social media—and often functions as a component of the Kremlin’s global propaganda machine (KHAR Center, July 2025).
The audience differences between other government-controlled media groups and Eurasianist outlets mainly affect how they present news about Ukraine’s occupation. For instance, mainstream media attempt to create a sense of “balance” by covering the humanitarian dimension of the war alongside commentary by pro-Russian writers, whereas openly Eurasianist channels such as Aydınlık and Ulusal Kanal almost entirely lack such nuances. Their editorial line and columnists place the blame for the war on the West—particularly NATO and the United States—and present the war as a Western “provocation.” The language and rhetoric of these outlets often overlap with the theses of the Russian leadership and Russian state media (Aydınlık, 2022; Veryansin TV, 2024).
Eurasianist media such as Oda TV, Veryansin TV, and Aydınlık apply strategies aimed at steering Turkish public opinion toward a more “understanding” view of Russia’s war efforts: placing responsibility for the war on the West, ignoring or presenting Russia’s atrocities on the ground as “questionable,” and unhesitatingly circulating Kremlin propaganda materials. This propaganda is not limited to Eurasianist media alone; the frequent appearance of Eurasianist figures as “experts” on mainstream television also serves to spread this line within society—something that would be impossible without government consent (Institute, 2023c). On the other hand, the problem mentioned above—the linguistic maneuvering chosen by mainstream media in Turkiye instead of open “pro-Russian” positioning—creates even greater opportunities for the Kremlin, as this atmosphere makes the localization of narratives even easier.
Narratives such as “The West started the war, NATO provoked it,” “Ukraine is a puppet of the West,” “Third forces—the West and Europe—are trying to drag Turkiye into a war with Russia,” “The West wants to bring İmamoğlu to power in Turkiye just as it did Zelensky in Ukraine,” “Aid sent to Ukraine is being embezzled by a corrupt regime,” “Developing relations with Russia benefits Turkiye,” “Those who support Ukraine are Western agents and traitors,” and “The West is trying to divide Turkiye” are among the most widespread Kremlin narratives in Turkiye. Claims that Ukraine attacked TurkStream are also among the Kremlin propaganda’s favorite themes in Turkiye.
However, it appears that this Kremlin-aligned tendency permeating much of Turkiye’s media is still not sufficient for Russia. Although this atmosphere facilitates the localization of Kremlin narratives, after 2022 Russia took things one step further and established “underground” distribution networks independent of the local ecosystem. One branch of this global network—“Pravda” (Portal Kombat)—also operates in Turkiye (DFRLab, 2023).
An investigation conducted in Bulgaria in May showed that Pravda’s Turkish branch (Turkiye.news-pravda.com) was being used as a hub for regional disinformation. According to the investigation, websites affiliated with the Pravda network—such as Turkiye.news-pravda.com, eadaily.com, topwar.ru, and jednotneslovensko.info—spread news in mid-May claiming that Oleh Holovko, the interpreter of the Ukrainian delegation that came to Istanbul for peace talks, had fled to Bulgaria to avoid returning to Kyiv. Some of these reports, citing journalists and unnamed TV channels, used “Doppelganger” technology (cloning known media outlets), claiming that a video on this issue had been broadcast on CNN Türk. However, the investigation revealed that the alleged CNN Türk video did not exist on the channel’s website or social media accounts, had been fabricated using the CNN Türk name, and that no Ukrainian interpreter named Oleh Holovko existed (Novinite, May 2025).
Conclusion
The picture we observe in this article is the result of multiple interlinked components: the authoritarianism of the Turkish government, the control over the media, the conspiracy-prone and anti-Western mood of Turkish society, the flexibility of Russian propaganda, and the abundance of local pillars supporting the pro-Kremlin ecosystem. Taken together, all of these components have produced a distinctive “neutrality” model in Turkiye.
Rather than openly acknowledging its maneuvering constraints—energy, trade, tourism, regional risks, Akkuyu, Syria, the Caucasus, and the Black Sea—as pragmatic necessities, Ankara repackages them in the language of moral equivalence and neutrality. In this new package, “neutrality” does not serve to name reality as it is, but to distort it—by removing the addressee, distributing responsibility, concealing the subject, and blurring the overall picture.
In Turkiye, official and semi-official circles are very fond of presenting this as a matter of national interest. However, silence on issues that directly affect the country—such as the flights of UAVs—raises legitimate questions about where this interest actually lies. The absence of an answer to the question “Who is responsible?” does not strengthen Turkiye’s neutral status. On the contrary, attempts to “protect the thief” undermine credibility; remaining silent in the face of Russia’s overt intelligence operations weakens deterrence as a regional power; and creating a broad space in the information environment for Kremlin narratives erodes neutrality. This mechanism may serve the government’s domestic narrative of being able to “talk to everyone,” but it is wholly incompatible with the image of a “powerful state that challenges the world with its UAVs.”
Thanks to Turkiye’s “neutrality” model, Kremlin propaganda functions not as a separate component of “foreign interference,” but as a catalyst embedded within the local ecosystem. The Eurasianist line constructs the framework, defines the map of culpability, and disseminates it through extensive television platforms. Mainstream media, both by participating in this dissemination and by employing a language that eliminates the subject, open up broad space for the overall pro-Kremlin course. When Russia’s propaganda networks—such as the dynamically evolving “Pravda”—are added to this picture, Turkiye’s claim to neutrality is significantly weakened.
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