(The article was prepared within the framework of the "Authoritarian Regimes and Transregional Influence Mechanisms" research of the KHAR Center)
Araz Aliyev – researcher, analyst.
Founding member of the Third Republic Platform.
Introduction
The Western Balkans region has remained one of the main centers of ethnic, religious, and political tension since the 1990s. The relative calm observed in the region over the last 20 years could be replaced by the reignition of historical conflicts against the backdrop of ongoing geopolitical shifts. In recent years, it has been observed that events threatening the relative stability in the region and causing the balance of power to shift dangerously have occurred. Regional changes openly threaten the normalization process between states and communities by increasing tension and reigniting historical conflicts. It is noteworthy that there has been a more intensive resort to war rhetoric in the region in recent years.
In the presented paper, we explore the reasons for the gradually escalating tension in the Western Balkans region. Among these reasons, first, the ideological differences observed on the plane of Transatlantic cooperation (NATO) against the backdrop of the global geopolitical crisis and the changes these differences have created in the power relations within the Western Balkans region are examined. Then, the focus shifts to authoritarian trends in the region's countries, as well as the consolidation of the domestic audience against the backdrop of existing protests with war rhetoric and attempts to bargain with the West using the thesis of regional stability. In addition, local political dynamics and unresolved structural issues are analyzed as the main causes of the tension. This approach provides us with a crucial reference point for understanding the real picture and inter-community relations in the region, and for an objective approach to the processes.
Considering the extensive history of conflicts and ideological differences in the region, we deemed it appropriate to begin the research period of the article in 2021. For this reason, we take the collapse of the dialogue platform mediated by the European Union between Kosovo* and Serbia since 2013, as well as the events that led to this collapse (the 2021 license plate dispute), as a reference point. These events, which we will discuss in detail later, constitute the starting point of our research period because they initiated a new era of tension in the region and triggered protests/clashes and subsequent escalation. This period also covers the events in the region up to April 2026, especially the most significant events affecting the Serbian community, such as the implementation of the Law on Foreigners (March 15, 2026) and Kosovo's strict integration line.
Research objective: To investigate the reasons for the increasing war rhetoric in the Western Balkans region in recent years, and to identify the real causes and their development dynamics against the backdrop of the existing tension in the region.
Research questions: What are the causes of the tension observed in the Western Balkans region in recent years? What are the underlying reasons for the war rhetoric and new military alliances? What is the role of local political dynamics and unresolved structural issues in triggering the Serbia-Kosovo tension?
Research sources: During the research, references were made to the media resources of the regional countries, international reports and studies concerning the region, as well as the views of Teodora Zivanovic, a human rights defender and representative of the Serbian community in Kosovo, to study local political dynamics.
I. Geopolitical context:
New power relations in the region Vucic's war rhetoric. “Croatia, Albania, and Kosovo are preparing to attack Serbia”. These words were spoken by Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic during an interview with a local television channel on March 15, 2026 (RTS, 2026). He noted that the three countries are waiting for an opportune time for the attack, that is, for the international geopolitical situation to become even more tense. In his interview, Vucic also added that Serbia has significantly developed its defense capabilities against potential risks. He emphasized that Serbia recently purchased new 400-km range, air-to-surface hypersonic missiles from China and successfully integrated these missiles into Russian-made MiG-29 aircraft (RTS, 2026). The war rhetoric used by Vucic has raised expectations regarding the intensification of tension in the region and the possibility of a new conflict.
First of all, it should be noted that Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic's statements regarding war rhetoric are not new. Previously, he also made headlines with alarming speeches about the risk of conflict in the region. Vucic warned that the countries of the region were preparing for war in his speech at the European Political Community summit held in Copenhagen in October 2025. He stated, “I know there will be a war. I am telling you this because I see how everyone is preparing. No one is preparing for negotiations, they are just looking at who will be on whose side. They are digging their trenches and waiting for the war to start.” (Telegrafi, 2025)
The reasons for Aleksandar Vucic's regular use of war rhetoric can primarily be analyzed within the framework of the power relations observed in the region in recent years. We argue that, in particular, cracks in the Transatlantic cooperation plane have weakened trust in traditional security mechanisms and forced Kosovo, which directly benefits from this mechanism in the region, to maintain the balance of power through new allies. The reaction created by this approach can be considered as one of the causes of the rise in war rhetoric and tension in the region.
Transatlantic crisis or the Munich reality. US Vice President J. D. Vance's speech at the Munich Security Conference in February 2025 was highly unexpected and concerning for Europe. Even the content of the speech and the views expressed were figuratively characterized as “the beginning of the transatlantic divorce process” (Foreign Policy, 2025). In his speech, Vance voiced on behalf of the Trump Administration that it is imperative for Europe to take steps to ensure its own defense. Vance stressed that the main threat to Europe is not Russia, China, or another external actor, but “internal problems”. Vance made it clear that Trump believes his European friends should play a larger role in the continent's future (Munich Security Conference, 2025).
These words by Vance were primarily understood as a warning regarding the future of US-Europe relations. The Vice President's message was translated as follows: NATO was established during the Cold War as an expression of the US's determination to defend common Western values, but if these values are no longer common, NATO's moral purpose will disappear (The Guardian, 2026).
Vance's 22-minute speech lay at the foundations of the concern over the future of the Europe-US alliance and NATO, the main outcome of this alliance. This concern was of vital importance not only to all European countries but also to the Balkan countries, especially Kosovo, which placed the existence of NATO at the center of its security.
Kosovo's national army issue. On March 18, 2025, just a month after the Munich Security Conference, a declaration on military cooperation was signed between Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo. According to the declaration, the 3 named countries decided to strengthen their defense capabilities and integration in order to improve the regional security of the Balkans. The declaration also encompassed aspects such as developing military capabilities through joint investments, achieving interoperability of military forces, mitigating the risk of hybrid threats through intelligence sharing, and promoting Kosovo's integration into the NATO defense ecosystem (Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute, 2025).
At this point, it is beneficial to recall that Kosovo's army-building process is a continuation of a 10-year strategy initiated in 2018, long before the Munich Security Conference in 2025. Currently, Kosovo's main security system is organized by the NATO military force called KFOR, and these forces have been deployed in the territory of Kosovo since 1999. The mandate of the KFOR forces, consisting of approximately 5,200 military personnel from 33 countries, includes issues such as preventing threats against Kosovo, ensuring public safety and order, and supporting international humanitarian efforts (Nato.int, 2026).
In Kosovo, which unilaterally declared its independence from Serbia in 2008 with the support of the US, Security Forces were also established in 2009. These forces were mainly for civil defense purposes, and their number consisted of 2,500 personnel until 2018. In 2018, the Kosovo parliament passed a law on increasing the personnel of the security forces from 2,500 to 5,000 and transforming them into an army. The law envisages the completion of the process of transforming the Kosovo Security Forces into an army by 2028 (Euronews.com, 2025).
In this context, the trilateral declaration can be understood more as steps taken towards Euro-Atlantic integration than a rapid reaction to the changes in Transatlantic relations. The possible impacts of the Munich Security Conference and the new reality it created can also be considered merely as an accelerating factor for this integration process. From this perspective, we can consider the declaration of military cooperation between Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo as a new power configuration that further accelerates Kosovo's Euro-Atlantic integration process in the Western Balkans region.
It is also necessary to emphasize that Kosovo's army-building process is not uniformly interpreted at the international level. Although many NATO members support Kosovo's gradual development of its military potential, several other states that do not recognize the independence of Serbia and Kosovo consider this step to be illegal. From this viewpoint, we find it more appropriate to present the army-building process as legally justified within Kosovo's domestic system, conditionally shaped at the international level by existing mandates, and politically controversial.
For this reason, the first country to be concerned about Kosovo's joint military cooperation with Albania and Croatia was precisely Serbia. Serbia, which does not recognize Kosovo's independence, called the agreement illegal at the level of Foreign Minister Marko Djuric and stated that this agreement "poses a security threat to the Serbian people and the entire region." Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic, on the other hand, accused Albania and Croatia of fueling a regional "arms race" and demanded a justification for participation in the agreement from these countries (Bloomsbury Intelligence and Security Institute, 2025).
We must note that the tension on the plane of Transatlantic cooperation and the integration and new power relations accelerated by this tension in the Western Balkans, i.e., the geopolitical context, do not allow for a complete explanation of the current situation. For this reason, along with authoritarian trends in the region, there is a need to look at the region's internal logic independently of other reasons.
II. Political context: Authoritarian trends and internal consolidation Serbia's arms race. Despite the Vucic government calling the army-building process in Kosovo a threat to itself, the reality appears somewhat different. The analysis of data from recent years shows that the fastest arming country in the Balkan region is precisely Serbia. Among the Balkan countries, Serbia is still the country with the highest defense expenditure in GDP (more than 2 percent) (Balkan Defence Monitor, 2024).
Data from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute also shows that Serbia is the country with the highest defense expenditure in the Balkan region. In 2024, while Serbia's defense spending constituted 2.6 percent of GDP, this indicator was 1.79% in Croatia, 2.04% in Albania, and 1.48% in Kosovo. According to the data provided by SIPRI, Serbia has regularly maintained its military expenditures at the level of 2 percent of GDP since 2018 and continues to increase them. While the country's military expenditure for 2015 constituted 1.7 percent of GDP, this figure rose to 2.6 percent in 2024 (SIPRI, 2026).
An assessment of military expenditures in dollar equivalent also reveals a similar picture. Based on 2024 data, Serbia's military expenditure ($2.322 billion) is almost equal to the military expenditures of Albania ($535 million), Croatia ($1.629 billion), and Kosovo ($165 million) combined (SIPRI, 2026). It should be recalled that until 2020/2021, the balance between military expenditures seemed to be in favor of Albania, Croatia, and Kosovo. However, starting from 2021, Serbia's military expenditures begin to equal and surpass the total expenditures of the other 3 countries. The analysis of the data shows that Serbia is the main country in the Balkan region that regularly increases military expenditures and introduces new military technologies into its arsenal.
The risky future of the Transatlantic cooperation plane is also seen as the reason for Serbia increasing its military expenditures and arms procurement. However, it is possible to say that this approach aims to exploit a potential power vacuum rather than for self-defense (The Kosovo Dispatch, 2026).
Economic factor. On the other hand, a change in the economic growth rates of the region's countries is also noticeable. If until the 90s the main economic powers within Yugoslavia were Croatia and Slovenia, in recent years it has become noticeable that this picture and traditional economic centers have gradually shifted.
According to the International Monetary Fund, significant changes are observed regarding the GDP indicators of the region's countries, especially in recent years. Between 2000 and 2020 (a 20-year period), Croatia clearly outpaced Serbia in terms of GDP indicators. However, since 2020, the GDP gap between the two countries has narrowed to a minimum ($57 and $55 billion). According to IMF forecasts, it is expected that this gap will disappear during 2026-2027 and that Serbia will outpace Croatia in terms of GDP volume towards 2030 (International Monetary Fund, 2026).
This trajectory provides grounds to say that Serbia will turn into the largest economic power in the Balkan region in the coming years. This economic potential could result in Serbia increasing military expenditures and forming a revisionist approach to the power relations in the region. As Serbia's economic potential rises, it is understandable that its tendencies to have a say in the region and its desire to possess resources (military) to ensure this will increase in direct proportion.
Authoritarian trends propelled by cooperation with China and Russia. The role of extra-regional actors, Russia and especially China, in the rise of Serbia's economic potential should be noted. First of all, it should be noted that Serbia's cooperation with Russia has mainly been energy-oriented and relies on historical narratives. Especially in recent years, it has been observed that the economic relations between the two countries have weakened significantly against the backdrop of economic and geopolitical changes caused by the Ukraine war. Statistical data shows that the mutual trade volume, which amounted to $4.2 billion in 2022, regressed to $3 billion in 2023 and $2.4 billion in 2024. Despite this, Russia still holds the highest share with 56.15 percent in the Serbian oil industry (NIS). The Serbian state itself owns a share of approximately 30 percent (The Western Balkans, 2025). Cooperation with Russia in the energy sector has had special importance for the Vucic government. Until recent periods, the Vucic government widely used functional arguments such as "energy security" supposedly achieved as a result of this cooperation (Khar Center, 2025).
However, over the last 10-year period, it has been observed that by developing bilateral relations with Serbia, China has come to the forefront as the main partner country, overtaking Russia. The free trade agreement signed between the two countries in Beijing in 2023 indicates that this cooperation has shifted to a more serious plane. Considering the economic indicators, it is possible to see the development dynamics of this mutual cooperation more clearly. The trade turnover between the two countries, which was $1.5 billion in 2014, rose to $6 billion in 2023, $7 billion in 2024, and finally to $8.2 billion in 2025 (Europa.rs, 2024, Serbia Business, 2026). On the other hand, while the volume of products exported by Serbia to China in 2013 was only $8.9 million, ten years later in 2023, this figure reached $1.23 billion. (China Observers, 2025).
The volume of Chinese investment directed to Serbia is also among the factors proving the expansion of this cooperation. In 2024, the volume of Chinese investment in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, and North Macedonia was below 1 percent of the GDP of these countries. In the region, only in Serbia is this indicator higher, constituting approximately 9 percent of GDP. Moreover, this increase occurred over the last 10-year period (The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, 2025). In the data published by the Development Agency of Serbia for February 2025, it is seen that China owns 5.7 percent of the foreign investment projects in Serbia by number, and the highest at 19.1 percent by value (Ris.gov.rs, 2025).
The development of economic relations with China simultaneously gives impetus to the expansion of military cooperation. It is no coincidence that Serbia carried out 57 percent of its arms purchases from China between 2020 and 2024. China has clearly surpassed Russia (20%), Serbia's traditional arms supplier. Thus, during that period, the combined share of Russia and China in Serbia's arms procurement was 77% (Radio Free Europe, 2026).
Although economic cooperation with China contributes to the development of Serbia's economic and military potential, it has also created new opportunities for the authoritarianization of the government. In this context, experts are highly skeptical about the possible impacts of cooperation with China on Serbia. It is undeniable that Chinese-funded construction projects, ranging from highways and bridges to power plants and railways, have altered Serbia's physical landscape. However, the fact that this cooperation does not occur under conditions of accountability and transparency, and that contracts are approved without public discussion and scrutiny, causes concern. This approach is also understood as the Vucic government, receiving China's material and symbolic support, strengthening its own power. In a plane where authoritarian trends are strengthening, the expansion of cooperation with China and the economic development created by this expansion are accompanied by democratic backsliding and democratic erosion (CEPA, 2025).
Economic and geopolitical balancing with the West. At this point, it must be particularly emphasized that the West's approach to Serbia is also unambiguous. Some authors accuse the West of being "tolerant" towards Serbia and believe that this approach has greatly contributed to Vucic establishing an authoritarian system (Euractiv, 2021). It is also noted that the passivity of the international community, exemplified by Brussels and Washington, has created fertile conditions for Serbia to expand its cooperation with China. The fact that the West does not place concrete demands before Serbia, especially in the context of European Union membership, leads the Vucic government to expand relations with China, and to move towards democratic erosion and autocratic hardening through economic development (CEPA, 2025).
Despite the deepening economic ties with China, the Vucic government's cooperation with the European Union on the economic plane is also at a high level. During the January-December months of 2025, the share of European Union countries in Serbia's total trade turnover was 58.3%. Note that this indicator was 58.8% in 2024 and 59.7% in 2023 (Statistical Office of Republic of Serbia, 2023, 2024, 2025). Statistical data shows that although the mutual trade volume between Serbia and the European Union is gradually decreasing, it is still quite high. The preservation of this cooperation at a certain level is perceived as the Vucic government's "balancing" policy between the West and the non-West.
While these high indicators are evaluated as an important means of the European Union's influence over Serbia, some analysts consider such an economic pressure approach dangerous. In their view, especially in a region dominated by an uncertain geopolitical situation, such economic pressures against the Vucic government could create a "snowball effect" and trigger new conflicts. The way out, it is noted, is for the West to incline toward greater involvement in the region through diplomacy and direct dialogue platforms (Atlas Institute for International Affairs, 2026).
Ongoing protests and internal consolidation attempt. Systematic protest actions have been organized in Serbia since November 2024. The factor that triggered the protests is the death of 16 people as a result of the collapse of the roof of the Novi Sad railway station, built with China's financial support. Although this tragedy is at the center of the protests, the main issue is related to the Vucic government's authoritarianization attempts, opacity, and corrupt activities. The Vucic government, which does not agree with the protesters' demands and has toughened its intervention in the rallies, also actively uses periodic shows of force in its attempts to manipulate public opinion. Issues such as rallies in support of the government and the organization of a military parade displaying newly purchased weapons are understood as a show of force by the Vucic government. Also, such means are attempts by the Vucic government to overshadow the protests within the country and consolidate the domestic audience (Khar Center, 2025).
We are of the opinion that this is one of the main reasons for Vucic resorting to war rhetoric, intensifying regional escalation, and highlighting the external risk factor in recent years. From this perspective, it is noted that Vucic uses such statements mainly to calm active protests inside Serbia and as a "policy of distraction" through the narrative of external aggression. (Robert Lansing Institute, 2025)
On the other hand, it is observed that as Vucic's authoritarian tendencies strengthen, Anti-Western sentiment is also promoted inside Serbia. It is no coincidence that the latest protests are characterized by the pro-government media as an "attempted orange revolution" organized by the West. In this regard, the intensification of war rhetoric, besides being an attempt to consolidate the domestic audience, can also serve as a message for the West. Because over the last 13 years, Vucic has managed to receive support from the West due to his political line offering stability in the region, albeit at the cost of democratic shortcomings (Lowy Institute, 2025). In the current context, the possibility of Vucic hoping to bargain with the West in some form by threatening the "regional stability" narrative with a potential risk of war should not be ignored. The experience of Vucic's "friend" in the South Caucasus, who turned regional security into a bargaining tool with the West by increasing the risk of war, should also not be forgotten.
III. Community context: The internal logic of regional tension
Although the two approaches mentioned above provide insights into the reasons for the rise of tension and war rhetoric in the Western Balkans region, they are not entirely successful in terms of seeing the whole picture. For this reason, there is an absolute need to consider the local perspective directly affecting the escalation of tension in the region. We argue that the new phase of tension observed in the Western Balkans region in recent years and the war rhetoric conditioned by this tension can be explained by the joint evaluation of all three contexts we listed (geopolitical, political, and community).
Dual governance in the Serbian region. Until 2011, only Serbian state institutions operated in Northern Kosovo, where the Serbian community constitutes a majority, and security and police services were also carried out by Serbs. An agreement was signed between Serbia and Kosovo in Brussels on April 22, 2013, with the aim of regulating the ongoing tension and starting a normalization process between the two countries. The agreement signed with the mediation of the European Union was accepted at the time as an important step towards easing tension in the region; Serbian Prime Minister Ivica Dacic even called the agreement "the best possible offer" (The Guardian, 2013).
The agreement provided for the creation of an Association/Community with the participation of four Serb municipalities in northern Kosovo. The Association/Community, which could only be dissolved by the municipalities themselves, would have full authority in the areas of education, healthcare, and urban and rural planning. The police forces in the region were to be integrated into the Kosovo police system and their salaries were to be paid by Pristina. However, the police commanders in the four municipalities were appointed from among the Serbs, and the composition of the police was organized according to the ethnic makeup of the region. Serbs working in security structures would be offered positions in corresponding Kosovo structures, the integration of judicial bodies would begin, and these institutions would operate within the framework of Kosovo legislation (United Nations, 2013).
The signing of the agreement led to the start of an integration process between the Serbian community in Northern Kosovo and official Pristina. At the same time, the process laid the groundwork for institutions affiliated with Pristina, alongside Serbian state institutions, to operate in the region. The integration process conditioned by the Brussels agreement formed a dual governance system in the northern municipalities inhabited by the Serb population that continued until recent years, where both Serbia and Kosovo exercised their sovereign powers in parallel (International Crisis Group, 2024).
According to this system, the municipal systems of both countries operated in the region, the Serb population could obtain official documents from both Serbia and Kosovo, and they could simultaneously hold office in the legal systems of both countries. While the school and healthcare systems were tied to Serbia, the judicial and police systems were tied to Kosovo. In the region where the financial system was divided, both Serbian and Kosovo banks operated, and the Serbian dinar and the euro were equally accessible to the local population. To own property and reside permanently in the region, there was a need for at least one official document issued by Kosovo. Also, since most of the Serb population had work or kinship ties with Serbia, official documents issued by Serbia were also needed. (International Crisis Group, 2024)
It should be noted that over these years, Serbia has been providing financial support to the Serbian community in Northern Kosovo in various directions, and the volume of this funding was estimated to be approximately 200 million euros annually (International Crisis Group, 2011). According to the Kosovo constitution, Serbia was allowed to finance education, medical assistance, and municipal services provided it was coordinated with official Pristina. However, the Kosovo side considered Serbian support to be the main factor preventing the integration of the Serbian community in the north into Pristina. Likewise, due to the lack of transparency about real figures and public data, this financial flow was considered dangerous by Pristina, and it was noted that instead of improving the situation of the Serbian community, the aid was spent by Serbia to strengthen its political network (Prishtina Insight, 2025).
This dual governance existing in Northern Kosovo caused a clash between official Pristina's attempts to integrate the Serb population more into itself and official Belgrade's attempts to preserve and strengthen its influence over the Serb population. The Serbian community's distrust of Pristina and its attachment to Serbian state services was another important point affecting this system of relations. As a result, these ideological differences and conflicting interests kept the atmosphere of tension in the region constantly active and prepared the ground for new clashes.
Pristina's strict integration line. The processes showed that the environment of integration and normalization created by the Brussels agreement was not long-lasting. The parties' failure to comply with the provisions in the agreement, and the changing geopolitical and economic conjuncture not only altered the conditions in the region but also caused historical tensions to reignite. The most recent phase of tension between Serbia and Kosovo started in September 2021 with the expiration of the temporary agreement on license plates signed between Pristina (Kosovo) and Belgrade (Serbia).
For information, it should be noted that although the use of Serbian license plates was allowed in Kosovo until that date, a similar rule was not valid for cars with Kosovo license plates in Serbia. For this reason, official Pristina's announcement that it would apply a similar approach to Serbian license plates became the main point igniting the tension and caused the first wave of protests. According to UN decisions, Kosovo has the authority to conduct police operations on its territory. The use of this authority resulted in official Pristina deploying police forces to the northern territories populated by the Serbian community to quell the protests. The tension was only temporarily quelled with the mediation of the US and the European Union (International Crisis Group, 2024).
The activities of the Kosovo police, which began a nationwide operation against smuggling in October 2021, again encountered local resistance. From the autumn of 2021, the Kosovo police began to block unauthorized roads leading to Serbia, and due to the resistance of smugglers, an armed clash occurred between the parties on July 17, 2022, resulting in the injury of 5 police officers. Official Pristina evaluated what happened as "mistrust" and removed the regional police command in North Mitrovica, where Serbs constitute a majority, from operations. It began to deploy more ethnic Albanian officers to the border crossings with Serbia. It should be noted that this step by Pristina contradicted the Kosovo constitution, which demands that "police match the ethnic composition of the communities they serve," as well as the 2013 Brussels agreement.
The next stage of the escalation began with official Pristina hindering the participation of Serbs living in the north in Serbian elections, violating previously existing practice. The Serbian community had the opportunity to vote on Kosovo territory for elections in Serbia until this time. As a result of the cancellation of this opportunity, the Serbian community's ability to participate in the Serbian constitutional referendum (January 16, 2022) and parliamentary elections (April 3, 2022) was restricted.
On July 31, 2022, a dispute between the parties over official documents such as passports and ID cards further strengthened the escalation. Serbia had long refused to recognize official Kosovo documents and issued temporary transit permits to Kosovars at the border. Official Pristina's announcement that it would act reciprocally resulted in protests by the Serbian community, followed in subsequent days by the infiltration of heavily armed persons from Serbia into Kosovo, and the tension rose even further. In response, official Pristina established permanent and fortified police bases and a rapid intervention unit in the region.
Despite the protests of the Serb population, the Kosovo government continued to take an insistent stance on implementing the decision regarding license plates, which was the first step of the tension. The dismissal of a Serbian police officer who refused to execute this decision on November 2, 2022, caused a massive wave of resignations in Kosovo. On November 5-9, almost all Serbs resigned from their jobs in Kosovo's state and government bodies. Thus, the hard-won progress achieved over a decade in the process of integrating Northern Kosovo Serbs into the Kosovo state collapsed. Arrests carried out against northern Serbs on December 9 and 10 on charges of attacking the police and burning state property led to the beginning of the third and longest period of escalation. Barricades continued until December 28 with the help and support of armed persons infiltrating from Serbia. Only on this date, due to the mediation of the European Union and the Vucic government's agreement with Pristina regarding the good treatment of arrested Serbs, did the protests partially subside (International Crisis Group, 2024).
Collapsed plane of dialogue. In March 2023, the Ohrid agreement was signed between Kosovo and Serbia with the mediation of the European Union. The agreement was characterized as the logical outcome of the normalization process that had been going on during the 10-year period following the agreement signed in Brussels in 2013. According to the agreement, the parties declared that they would build normal, good neighborly relations with each other on the basis of equal rights, and mutually recognize each other's respective documents and national symbols, including passports, diplomas, license plates, and customs stamps. The agreement also noted that the parties would resolve any dispute between them solely by peaceful means and would refrain from the threat or use of force (Eeas.europa.eu, 2023).
The Serbian side committed not to object to Kosovo's membership in any international organization, while the Kosovo side committed to creating specific arrangements and guarantees to ensure an appropriate level of self-management and the ability to provide services in certain areas for the Serbian community in the country, including the possibility of financial support by Serbia and a direct communication channel between itself and the Serbian community (Eeas.europa.eu, 2023).
Although progressive in content, the Ohrid agreement was verbal in nature and its negative consequences manifested themselves in a short time. After the meeting in Ohrid, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic refused to sign the agreement, claiming that it meant the recognition of Kosovo's independence. Shortly thereafter, President Vucic openly opposed Kosovo's application for UN membership, and this step was considered a direct violation of the agreement (New Eastern Europe, 2025).
After the collapse of the agreement, the escalation started to rise rapidly. In April 2023, official Pristina announced that new elections would be held to replace the resigning Serbs. As a result of the Serbian community boycotting the elections held in November, candidates consisting solely of ethnic Albanians were elected by the Albanian minority in Northern Kosovo. In May 2023, official Pristina provided police escorts to the municipal buildings located in Northern Kosovo and expelled the Serbian employees working there. Reacting to the events at the level of US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and the European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, it was declared that this step was strongly condemned. On May 30, the US took tougher steps against Kosovo, removing Kosovo from the NATO-led "Defender 23" exercise, suspending efforts to secure the country's admission to international organizations, and halting high-level visits (Prishtina Insight, 2023).
The long-standing tension caused a fatal armed incident between the Kosovo police and armed groups near the village of Banjska in September 2023. Although Milan Radoicic, a representative of the Kosovo Serbs, took responsibility for the incident and surrendered to law enforcement agencies in Serbia, he was later released. The Banjska incident created an indispensable opportunity for the official Kosovo government to achieve its goals in the north, and Pristina used this to accelerate the integration of the north, including expelling Serbian state institutions from the country. It also gained the opportunity to involve KFOR, the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo, against armed groups (International Crisis Group, 2024).
The situation created by the armed incident resulted in Pristina further toughening its steps toward the Serbian community. On December 27, 2023, the Central Bank of Kosovo declared the euro as the sole valid currency for cash and electronic transactions within the country, effectively banning the use of the Serbian dinar in the north. This process was followed by police raids on Serbian banks and post offices, and the entry of the Serbian dinar into Kosovo was prevented (International Crisis Group, 2024).
Finally, it was reported that the implementation of the "Law on Foreigners" began in Kosovo on March 15, 2026 (European Western Balkans, 2026). According to this law, foreign citizens entering Kosovo territory had to apply to official Pristina in order to obtain a residence permit. This is considered a factor that seriously affects the Serbian community in Northern Kosovo in particular. Because according to the law, Serbian citizens who organize the work of service sectors such as education and healthcare in the region will have to obtain official permission to enter the region. This delays and in some cases restricts the Serbian community's access to necessary services.
It appears that official Pristina's strict integration line implemented in Northern Kosovo and its authoritarian tendencies face the protest and resistance of the Serbian community in the region. This resistance and Belgrade's intervention in the process cause armed clashes and incidents from time to time. Each incident provides additional opportunities for official Pristina to strengthen its position in the region and further toughen the situation, giving impetus to the tension stemming from local dynamics passing to the interstate plane.
Conclusion
The causes of the tension and strengthening war rhetoric observed in the Western Balkans region in recent years are multifaceted. First of all, the ongoing historical disagreements and clashes of interests at the local level in Northern Kosovo create conditions for the environment of tension in the region to remain constantly active. Official Pristina's strict integration line towards the Serbian community in the northern regions, and Serbia's interventions in the region for the purpose of support, cause the tension to exit the local level and pass to the interstate plane.
Serbia, which is strengthening economically and also bolstering its military potential, refers to the "right to speak" brought by this strengthening and tries to intervene more in matters it considers within its sovereignty in the region. Official Pristina, which cites Serbia's interventionist position as a reason, strengthens the strict integration policy accompanied by constitutional rights violations against the Serbian community. The expansion of intervention against the Serbian community and the unilateral integration attempt further fuel dissatisfaction at the local level, create new opportunities for Serbia's active intervention, and cause protest rallies to turn into armed clashes.
Changes in the global geopolitical conjuncture, especially the ideological differences experienced between the US and Europe on the plane of Transatlantic cooperation, also affect power relations in regions where NATO acts as a security guarantor. Uncertain future prospects spur countries in the Western Balkans region that benefit from the NATO security umbrella (Kosovo) or stand in front of this security umbrella (Serbia) to turn to new collaborations. The parties consider the current situation as an opportunity to reshape power relations in the region. Kosovo strengthens military cooperation with Croatia and Albania within the framework of NATO integration and accelerates the army-building process. Serbia, on the other hand, diversifies its arms supply lines from China.
On the other hand, it appears that constantly fueled tension narratives and war rhetoric, especially in the case of Serbia, are used as a tool to suppress the ongoing protests over the last two years and to consolidate the domestic audience. The Vucic government, which further strengthens its authoritarian tendencies at the expense of the dividends gained from cooperation with Russia and China, aims to silence dissatisfaction at home with a "policy of distraction" and to increase the possibility of bargaining with the West through the policy of a "threat to regional stability."
Also, the failure of the agreements reached between Serbia and Kosovo in 2013 (Brussels) and 2023 (Ohrid) aimed at normalizing tension shows that the plane of dialogue between the parties is unsuccessful. It is difficult to predict to what extent such dialogue attempts will be successful in the future perspective, and the outcome of diplomacy's role in reducing tension. However, considering the current geopolitical situation, the scale of escalation in the region, and the ongoing arms race, we can say that future prospects for the Western Balkans region are not very optimistic.
Note: * References to Kosovo are made without prejudice to positions on status and are in line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) and the International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on Kosovo’s declaration of independence.
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