Introduction
At the end of September, the Serbian government was highly optimistic that signing a new gas deal with Russia would strengthen its position both domestically and abroad. However, a sudden move by the United States reshuffled the cards: Washington announced that it was ending the energy sanctions waiver previously applied to Belgrade, and Moscow, in turn, refused to sign the new gas contract with Serbia.
Facing ongoing protests since the beginning of the year, and having masked its authoritarian tendencies behind the rhetoric of “cheap gas,” the Vučić administration is now heading into a difficult winter full of complex decisions.
Experience, especially across European countries, shows that relations with Russia in the field of energy are not just about energy. Partnerships with Moscow often shape both the domestic and foreign policy directions of its partner states. Hungary and Slovakia are the clearest examples of this pattern. In this sense, Serbia — an aspiring member of the European Union — is not very different.
In this analysis, KHAR Center examines Serbia’s resistance to reducing its energy dependence on Russia, the risks this poses for the country, the authoritarian tendencies masked by the “cheap gas” narrative, and the growing potential for societal resistance within Serbia.
Key Questions of the Analysis
What factors determine Serbia’s energy dependence on Russia?
What awaits Serbia if Russia decides to halt or limit its gas partnership?
ENERGY DEPENDENCE – COMPULSION OR WILLING SUBMISSION?
Serbia remains far from the European Union’s target of ending dependence on Russian natural gas by 2027. Although since 2023 Serbia has begun importing additional gas from Azerbaijan and completed the Serbia–Bulgaria gas interconnector, linking the country to the Southern Gas Corridor and the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), the majority of Serbia’s energy needs are still met by Russian gas. According to recent analyses, Serbia’s annual gas demand is around 2.7 billion cubic meters, more than 90 percent of which is imported (Brkić, 2023a).
According to data provided by the Serbian Energy Agency (ARES), in 2023 Serbia imported 94 percent of its natural gas from Russia. In 2024, that share decreased only slightly — to 92 percent. The remaining 8 percent came from Hungary, Switzerland, and Azerbaijan (Serbian Monitor, 2024a).
One striking nuance stands out: Serbia increased its dependence on Russian gas after Moscow launched its large-scale invasion of Ukraine. In 2021, before the war, Serbia’s gas imports from Russia accounted for 89 percent of total demand (Carnegie, April 2025). Earlier — between 2009 and 2019 — this figure had been around 74 percent (Brkić, 2023b).
In May 2022 — just three months after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine — Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić announced that he and Vladimir Putin had agreed to extend a ten-year gas deal that had expired in 2021 and was temporarily extended for six months. Vučić also said that he and the Russian president discussed expanding Serbia’s gas storage capacities (Euronews, 2022).
The new three-year contract between Serbia and Russia envisioned an annual supply of 2.2 billion cubic meters of gas, with prices linked to global oil prices. The Serbian government denied claims that this agreement was a “reward” for Belgrade’s loyalty to Moscow — specifically, its refusal to join Western sanctions against Russia at the height of the sanctions regime. The Serbian Prime Minister stated that, as a matter of principle, Serbia opposed sanctions (Balkan Insight, 2022).
The Collapsed Hope for a New Deal
However, the subsequent course of events revealed that “loyalty to Moscow” was indeed a decisive factor in Russia’s decisions. As the expiration of the existing agreement approached, Putin invited Vučić to visit Russia for new discussions. The invitation coincided with the BRICS Summit held in Kazan on 22–24 October 2024, where gas negotiations were also expected to take place.
Vučić declined the invitation, saying that “important foreign guests” were visiting Serbia at that time. Later, he neither accepted nor explicitly rejected the invitation (Serbian Monitor, 2024b).
Despite Belgrade’s repeated claims that a new deal was “close to being signed,” Russia did not renew the contract that expired in May. In that month, Vučić attended the May 9 Victory Day Parade in Moscow — despite EU criticism — and again discussed a long-term gas deal with Putin (Seenews, 12 May 2025a). However, this time he seemed far less confident about its prospects, merely saying that experts were preparing a new long-term contract and that Serbia would continue purchasing gas under existing terms until it was finalized (Seenews, 12 May 2025b).
Meanwhile, Dušan Bajatović, Director General of Serbia’s main gas importer and distributor “Srbijagas,” announced that a new ten-year deal for 2.5 billion cubic meters annually was expected to be signed by the end of May (Seenews, 13 May 2025).
The contract, however, was not signed. Instead, the existing agreement was extended until September. Later, Bajatović stated that the new deal would be signed in June during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. He corrected earlier information, saying that the new contract would be for three years, and that its continuation would depend on the war in Ukraine, Western sanctions against Russia, and the EU’s plan to end Russian gas imports by 2027 (Intellinews, May 2025).
But no agreement was reached in June — or in the following months.
In early September, after meeting Putin in China, Vučić announced that Belgrade and Moscow were preparing to sign a new contract. “We have received assurances that the gas agreement will be on favorable terms. I believe progress will be made by the end of September,” he said (Anadolu Agency, September 2025).
By the end of September, media citing Bajatović again reported that a new 2.5 billion cubic meter annual deal was expected to be signed in October (Reuters, September 2025).
Vučić himself stated that the contract was expected to be finalized by the end of October (TASS, October 2025).
However, only a few days later, Vučić revealed that Gazprom had proposed not a new contract, but merely a temporary extension until December 31, and he did not hide his disappointment. The Serbian president acknowledged that nearly all of the country’s gas was imported and said: “Such a high level of energy dependence cannot be managed through short-term solutions” (Bloomberg, October 2025).
Vučić attributed the failure of nearly a year-long negotiations to Western sanctions:
“Why are they extending it only until the New Year? The logic is very simple — and I won’t hide it. What they’re trying to tell us is this: if we start nationalizing NIS or anything else, they can cut off gas on December 31. For me, this is a very, very bad message in every sense” (Seenews, October 2025).
The NIS Crisis
At the center of this entire discussion is NIS (Naftna Industrija Srbije) — Serbia’s oil and gas company that owns oil and gas fields, the Pančevo Refinery, storage facilities, and over 400 petrol stations across the Balkans. NIS is under Russian control and has been targeted by Western sanctions.
In 2008, the Serbian government sold 51 percent of NIS shares — valued at €2 billion — to Gazprom Neft for €400 million, along with a promise that Serbia would be included in the South Stream gas pipeline project that was meant to supply gas to Europe. At the time, critics argued that this deal was a politically motivated concession to Moscow, made in exchange for Russia’s diplomatic support for Serbia regarding the Kosovo issue, and that Belgrade gained nothing economically. Even back then, doubts persisted over whether the South Stream would ever be completed as promised (Atlantic Council, 2008).
In 2011, Gazprom Neft acquired an additional 5.15 percent, increasing its ownership in NIS to 56.15 percent (Brkić, 2023c). In 2014, the South Stream project was officially terminated (Anadolu Agency, 2014).
This decision hit Serbia particularly hard. Experts estimate that Belgrade had already spent €30 million on preparatory work and had expected €200 million annually in potential transit fees, as well as €450 million worth of construction contracts for Serbian companies. More importantly, NIS had been sold for only a quarter of its real market value because of the South Stream promise. None of the contracts with Russia included clauses for compensation or buyback options — meaning Serbia was never reimbursed for these losses (Radio Slobodna Evropa, 2014).
Following this, the Serbian government deepened its ties with Moscow, and NIS continued operating under Gazprom Neft’s ownership.
In 2022, when Russia decided to proceed with its invasion of Ukraine, Western sanctions targeted many Russian energy firms, including Gazprom Neft (OFAC, 2022). This automatically placed Serbia’s largest oil and gas company under sanction.
To avoid EU sanctions, Gazprom Neft sold 6 percent of its NIS shares to Gazprom in 2022, a cosmetic maneuver that allowed the company to evade direct sanctions (Serbian Monitor, February 2025a). Over the next three years, the EU and the U.S. repeatedly postponed the enforcement of sanctions on NIS.
In January 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced a new sanctions list, including NIS among companies owned by Gazprom Neft and Surgutneftegaz, covering more than twenty entities where these companies held over 50 percent ownership (U.S. Department of the Treasury, January 2025).
In February, the Belgrade Stock Exchange announced that NIS’s ownership structure had changed: Gazprom Neft had transferred 5 percent of its shares to Gazprom without any sale or compensation, raising Gazprom’s ownership to 11.3 percent. Experts said this move was an attempt to circumvent U.S. Treasury sanctions announced on January 10 (Serbian Monitor, February 2025b).
This maneuver earned Serbia an additional 30-day grace period from the Trump administration, which was later extended several more times (Vedomosti, October 2025a).
According to official data, NIS’s shares are now distributed as follows: Gazprom Neft (44.85%), Republic of Serbia (29.87%), Intelligence (11.30%), and other shareholders (13.98%) (NIS, 2025). “Intelligence,” based in St. Petersburg, is a Gazprom subsidiary, and its NIS shares were officially transferred in late September 2025 (Vedomosti, October 2025b).
After this cosmetic adjustment, NIS applied to Washington again to be removed from the sanctions list (European Western Balkans, October 2025). But for Belgrade, which for years tried to dodge sanctions by shifting shares “from one pocket to another,” the grace period finally expired after the eighth extension. The U.S. Treasury Department extended the waiver for the last time — from September 26 to October 9 — and announced that there would be no further extensions (RFE/RL, October 2025).
Following that decision, Croatia’s JANAF pipeline, which supplies crude oil to NIS, announced that it would terminate cooperation with the company due to sanctions. NIS imports all of its crude oil through JANAF. Vučić stated that the Pančevo Refinery could only continue operations until early November without JANAF’s oil deliveries (Seenews, October 2025).
According to the Serbian press, after U.S. sanctions formally took effect, Vučić proposed to Moscow that part of Gazprom’s NIS stake be sold to Belgrade, with the option of returning it once the situation stabilizes. However, Moscow reportedly rejected this offer, suggesting instead that the shares be sold to a third country — allegedly one chosen by Russia, namely the United States (Vreme, October 2025a).
The Srbijagas Link
The NIS crisis is only one part of Russia’s influence over Serbia’s energy sector. The main carrier of this influence is the energy system itself. Serbia is the only European country where the monopoly over the oil and gas market is controlled by a foreign power that is in military-political confrontation with the West. According to experts, despite sanctions, Belgrade is doing everything it can to maintain its artificial dependence on Russian gas and oil. As a result, Gazprom together with Lukoil (which controls 10 percent of the Serbian market) jointly hold 80 percent of Serbia’s market (Vreme, October 2025b).
The principal actor on Serbia’s domestic gas market is Gazprom. In 2009, the company became the major partner in Yugorosgaz, established for the import, delivery, storage, and distribution of natural gas to Serbia’s southern regions. Seventy-five percent of Yugorosgaz shares belong to Gazprom — 50 percent directly through Gazprom Export, and 25 percent through Centragas Holding, a Gazprom subsidiary established in Austria. The remaining 25 percent belongs to Serbia’s state gas company Srbijagas. The company brings natural gas into Serbia, operates pipelines particularly in the southern and eastern regions such as Niš, Leskovac, and Vranje, supplies industrial enterprises and municipalities with gas, and, via Srbijagas, sells gas wholesale into the national network (Energy Community Secretariat – Case ECS-13/17).
Until the construction of the Serbia–Bulgaria gas interconnector, which began trial operations in 2023, Serbia was entirely dependent on pipelines located on its territory but largely owned by Gazprom. Currently, Russian gas reaches Serbia via the Balkan Stream, a branch of the TurkStream project. The Serbian section of TurkStream is also largely owned by Russia and primarily carries Russian gas. Over the last two years, only 10 percent of the pipeline’s capacity has been opened to several European companies (Serbian Monitor, 2024).
Russia also holds the main stake — 51 percent — in Banatski Dvor, Serbia’s only underground gas storage facility. The primary executor of Gazprom’s interests — the key decision-maker over the country’s natural gas infrastructure — is the state company Srbijagas (Support4partnership, 2021).
Dušan Bajatović has led Srbijagas for 18 years. He is a deputy chairman of the Socialist Party of Serbia, a partner in the ruling coalition. Bajatović is also known as one of Moscow’s key figures in the country. In the 2023 elections in Serbia, Bajatović repeatedly made headlines for openly supporting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, appearing at a campaign rally wearing a T-shirt with the letter Z, the symbol of that aggression, and for receiving a state award from Russia (Support4partnership, 2024). Earlier this month, Bajatović was appointed honorary consul of Russia in the Vojvodina region (Vreme, October 2025).
The foregoing shows that Serbia’s energy dependence on Russia is not a compulsion but a voluntary choice. Experts also emphasize that Belgrade is not without alternatives when it comes to reducing this dependence. Serbian energy specialist Miodrag Kapor points to Bulgaria as an example: in 2022 it depended on Russian gas by 90 percent, whereas today it does not import gas from that country at all; he adds that Belgrade is doing everything it can to prolong its artificial dependence on Russian gas (Mirilović, October 2025a).
Another energy expert, Aleksandar Kovačević, likewise argues that his country’s excessive dependence on Russian gas is more a political choice than a matter of technical or market conditions: “The infrastructure for diversification exists, but decision-makers have chosen partnership with Gazprom instead of diversification.” (Serbia Business, June 2025)
Historical closeness with Russia, Moscow’s policy of not recognizing Kosovo’s independence and supporting ethnic Serbs in order to keep Belgrade within its sphere of influence, as well as distrust toward the European Union within the country, enable the Vučić government to continue this dependence with little difficulty and without public scrutiny.
FROM AN “À LA CARTE” POLICY TO AN UNRELIABLE PARTNERSHIP
The situation in Serbia shows that the Russia dependence — created and amplified by the government’s own hand — is now tripping it up. The policy of cheap gas, presented as the basis of social stability, is now progressing on very fragile ground: the West is pressuring Serbia to reduce its dependence on Russian energy and Russia’s dominance in its energy market (Reuters, October 2025); Moscow, operating on a carrot-and-stick principle, sells cheap gas when it wants and threatens to shut off the tap when it wants (Mirilović, October 2025b); and domestically, the protests that began in 2024 after the roof collapse at the Novi Sad railway station that killed 16 people have turned into a constant headache for Vučić (AP, September 2025).
Throughout his time in power, Vučić has chosen an “à la carte” line in foreign policy rather than solidarity with the West — benefiting from EU funds and economic opportunities, using Russia’s stance on Kosovo and its abundant natural gas for his own interests, and building economic relations with China and other countries unfriendly to the West. Belgrade’s policy of avoiding alignment with any bloc and “playing its own game” brought short-term economic gains and helped mask authoritarian trends. But none of this has made Vučić a trusted ally in the long run — neither for the European Union nor for Russia (Morina and Vascotto, February 2025).
Appeal to Europe for Gas
On October 15, Serbian President Vučić asked Ursula von der Leyen, President of the European Commission — who came to Belgrade and stated at a press conference that in a world of widening rifts between democracies and autocracies, Belgrade must choose its place — for energy support for the difficult winter ahead (AP News, October 2025a).
Von der Leyen, emphasizing that the Bulgaria–Serbia gas interconnector is a crucial project that will keep Serbian homes warm throughout the winter, invited Belgrade to reduce its dependence on Russia and to join the EU’s joint gas purchasing mechanism (Reuters, October 2025).
The European Commission President also demanded that Vučić take concrete steps toward the goal of EU membership. She named reforms in the rule of law, electoral legislation, and media freedom as initial steps, and called on Serbia to align with the Union’s foreign policy — including sanctions against Russia — to demonstrate that it is a reliable partner: “We support freedom over pressure, partnership over submission, and diplomacy over the use of force” (AP News, October 2025b).
At the same time, the European Parliament is preparing to debate polarization in Serbia and pressure by the authorities on society.
Vučić’s concern — and his appeal for support from all sides — is understandable: the deadlock in the energy sector, combined with the domestic tensions that have been growing for nearly a year and intensified by the government’s use of force, promises a very difficult winter for Serbia.
Layoffs related to sanctions, rising fuel prices, and, consequently, overall price increases will become inevitable — further complicating Vučić’s domestic political position.
Unrelenting Protests
Systematic protests have been held in the country since November of last year, which also trace back to the same story of authoritarianism, lack of transparency, and corruption that the Serbian government has masked through its “à la carte” foreign policy.
On November 1 of last year, the concrete roof of the Novi Sad station — part of the Belgrade–Budapest high-speed rail project launched with China under an intergovernmental agreement without a public tender — collapsed. The tragedy, which killed 16 people (including a 19-year-old student), sparked serious protests across the country. Protesters accused the government of corruption, non-transparency, and unaccountability. Beginning with daily 16-minute silences at 11:52 a.m. — the time of the tragedy — by university students in memory of the 16 victims, and spreading under the slogan “Serbia, stop,” the demonstrations quickly engulfed the entire country and by early 2025 became Serbia’s most massive and publicly supported movement in the last 25 years (European Parliament, September 2025a).
Protests, street demonstrations, and large rallies against the government’s authoritarian drift are nothing new for Serbia. During Vučić’s tenure — in 2017, 2018, 2020, and 2023 — there were multiple large-scale protests. By labeling political opponents as foreign agents and using the power of police and other law-enforcement bodies, Vučić has so far managed to keep the situation under control (Morina and Vascotto, February 2025b).
But the Novi Sad movement did not resemble the protest waves that Vučić had previously suppressed with relative ease. As a result of protests — with a large participation of youth — Prime Minister Miloš Vučević and the Mayor of Novi Sad resigned, yet the protesters did not give up their main demand for snap elections. In the first months, the Serbian authorities did not intervene harshly; however, in June, at a 140,000-strong rally in Belgrade, force was used against protesters. In the following weeks, protests continued, met by severe interventions from law-enforcement agencies. In August, Vučić called the protesters “terrorists trying to overthrow the state,” but when the protests did not subside, he invited student representatives to a televised dialogue. The students rejected the offer, saying they would be ready for talks only when new elections are announced (European Parliament, September 2025b).
A Show of Force
In September, interventions by law enforcement against demonstrators became even harsher. More than 100 university professors who supported the protests were fired and replaced by people loyal to the president. The ruling party also began organizing pro-Vučić rallies (Al Jazeera, September 2025). On September 20, Vučić gathered 10,000 soldiers in Belgrade along with tanks purchased from Russia, air-defense systems from China, drones from the United Arab Emirates, artillery systems from Israel, and military aircraft imported from France, staging the largest military parade in the country’s history. Rather than a demonstration of the army’s strength, this was widely interpreted as a show of force by a regime that is becoming more authoritarian under increasing international pressure and sanctions (AP News, September 2025).
This also meant that a new and serious discourse — security — was added to Vučić’s habitual rhetoric of cheap energy and stability. With this display, the Serbian president sought to add shades of military power — tanks, fighter jets, and the like — to his image as a leader who boasts of secure energy supplies from Russia and “warm homes for cheap” (B92, August 2025).
But this did not affect the dynamics of the protests. In early October, in the 11th month since the Novi Sad tragedy, tens of thousands again took to the streets across the country. This time, the authorities did not resort to force. True, for now the likelihood that Vučić will meet the demand to bring forward the 2027 elections remains low; but it also seems impossible to cover up or soften the mounting pressure on all fronts with a military parade or similar attempts.
CONCLUSION
The facts and their analysis show that Serbia’s energy dependence on Russia is not a necessity or compulsion, but a political choice. The Vučić government is content that Moscow has total control over energy and its infrastructure — Russian cheap gas and an energy sector unaccountable under Moscow’s control are also the main pillars of Vučić’s hold on power.
But now Belgrade faces a serious choice in what is essentially its biggest domestic argument — energy security — and is compelled to choose between two possible scenarios:
- Join the EU’s joint gas purchasing mechanism, prioritize other options proposed for diversification (such as the Bulgaria–Serbia line), nationalize NIS and/or reduce dependence on Russia, and join sanctions against Russia.
- Maintain the status quo, continue the agreement with Moscow through short extensions, preserve dependence on Russian gas with the support of allies like Hungary, and avoid sanctions through cosmetic changes in NIS ownership.
Both scenarios carry risks for the Vučić government. Another major risk is that the “à la carte” policy may simultaneously provoke the anger of both Brussels and Moscow.
This risk also threatens Vučić domestically. Until now, the Serbian president believed that energy security and economic growth would cover up all the shortcomings in domestic politics. The Western skepticism and pro-Russian sympathies in Serbian society — shaped by a synthesis of historical narratives, nationalist propaganda, and real problems — also served Vučić’s interests at this point.
Now the biggest key to this confidence — cheap energy — is in jeopardy. The damage it brings could break the consensus between Vučić and society. The character and scale of the protests in the country show that Serbian society is already concerned about corruption, increasing non-transparency, and the lack of rule of law and media freedom — in other words, it is also aware of the problems of democracy and human rights (Hartwell, 2024).
If Vučić fails to resolve the energy crisis, new problems will be added to those he already faces. The process shows that Vučić is trying to solve the problem together with Moscow and in the way Moscow wants. The latest statement from Moscow — “We are trying to solve the problem created by the United States together with our Serbian friends within the framework of the 2008 agreement (the sale of NIS)” — also shows this (TASS, October 2025). But whether the West, especially the United States, will turn a blind eye to this is hard to say.
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https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2025/775906/EPRS_ATA(2025)775906_EN.pdf
Morina Engjellushe, Vascotto Angelica, fevral 2025b. A double bind: How unrest and geopolitics could end Serbia’s government
https://ecfr.eu/article/a-double-bind-how-unrest-and-geopolitics-could-end-serbias-government/
European Parliament, sentyabr 2025b. Anti-government protests in Serbia
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2025/775906/EPRS_ATA(2025)775906_EN.pdf
Al Jazeera, sentyabr 2025. Political crisis rumbles in Serbia as duelling camps hold parallel rallies
AP News, sentyabr 2025. Serbia stages a large military parade to showcase tanks, jets and missile systems
https://apnews.com/article/serbia-military-parade-vucic-protests-5b4faf5636f974eb9858b4b90fd3b56e
B92, avqust 2025. Jeftinije grejanje! Vučić najavio popuste na struju i povoljniji ogrev
Hartwell Leon. Everything you need to know about Serbian sentiments: from economic worries to foreign policy.
TASS, oktyabr 2025. Russia, Serbia looking for optimal decision on NIS to overcome US sanctions. https://tass.com/politics/2031063
