(This article was prepared within the framework of the Khar Center's research on Azerbaijani authoritarianism)
The Azerbaijani authorities have suspended cooperation in all areas with the European Parliament, a structure of the European Union (EU). A decision to this effect was adopted at a meeting of the Milli Majlis on May 1, 2026. (Report, 2026). According to the decision, the Milli Majlis has ceased its participation in the activities of the EU-Azerbaijan Parliamentary Cooperation Committee and has initiated procedures to terminate its membership in the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly. Furthermore, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan summoned the European Union Ambassador to Baku and presented him with a note of protest. (APA, 2026).
The reason for Baku's aggressive reaction and radical decisions is the adoption of a resolution titled "Support for Armenia's Democratic Resilience" in the European Parliament. The resolution expresses support for the rights of "Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians," including their right to a safe, unhindered, and dignified return under appropriate international guarantees. The document contains a call to hold those responsible for the destruction of Armenian religious and cultural heritage accountable and to establish an international assessment mission in this regard. Condemning the unjust detention of Armenian prisoners of war and hostages in Azerbaijan, the European Parliament also demanded their immediate release. (Golos Armenii, 2026).
Parallel Dynamics in the Peace Process and Contradictions Created by Normative Interventions
The European Parliament's resolution coincides with a period of development in the peace and cooperation process between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the taking of mutual steps in this direction. Just one day before the adoption of the resolution, the Deputy Prime Minister of Azerbaijan and Chairman of the State Commission on the Delimitation of the State Border between the two countries, Shahin Mustafayev, visited Yerevan. This visit is of historical significance as the first official visit between Armenia and Azerbaijan during the independence period and was highly appreciated by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. (TASS, 2026). Remaining committed to the agreements reached at a meeting held in Washington on August 8, 2025, with the participation of the U.S. President, the parties have already started economic cooperation. Azerbaijan exports fuel to Armenia and participates as a transit point in the transportation of goods from Russia to Armenia.
This progress achieved in the peace process is also welcomed in the European Parliament's resolution, and both countries are called upon to move toward signing a comprehensive peace treaty. However, at the same time, bringing forward accusations against Azerbaijan and raising a risky issue such as the return of the Armenian population to Karabakh is inconsistent with the call for the early signing of a peace treaty. If the authors of the document believe that such an approach will contribute to peace, they are seriously mistaken. On the contrary, this is a dangerous position that will undermine the prospects for peace. While the return of the Armenian population to Karabakh is not a subject of discussion or dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is difficult to understand for what purpose a third party is bringing it to the agenda. Undoubtedly, there is no disruptive intent, but the irresponsibility is clearly visible. Regarding the fate of Armenian prisoners in Azerbaijan, this, too, progresses more successfully through discussion and resolution on a bilateral level as the positive dynamics in the relations between the two countries strengthen. Indeed, a while ago, several individuals from the former separatist regime were handed over to Armenia, and this process was already ongoing.
Ruining Everything While Trying to Fix It...
Although the European Parliament's resolution is intended to support Nikol Pashinyan's government, it may actually create problems for him as the country enters an election campaign. The June 7 elections are crucial for both the future of Armenia and the region, and they will clarify several dilemmatic questions:
- Peace or confrontation?
- "Historical Armenia" or "Real Armenia"?
- European Union or Eurasian Union?
Armenian citizens will choose between two antagonistic visions. At such a moment, the adoption of this resolution is a "disservice" to Pashinyan; it aligns with the theses of the ultra-nationalist-revanchist Armenian opposition and strengthens their position. These forces question why various circles in the West and Russia raise the issue of Karabakh Armenians while the Armenian government avoids it, posing difficult questions to Pashinyan. In this regard, even if we believe the European Parliament resolution was prepared with good intentions, it is impossible to speak of its positive effects on the peace process or Armenian domestic politics.
The Opportunity for Legitimacy: The Resolution Grants to the Aliyev Regime
When approaching the issue within the context of Azerbaijani domestic politics, it must be noted that an "assist" has been inadvertently handed to the Aliyev regime. Following the victory in the Second Karabakh War, a phase of solidifying authoritarianism began in Azerbaijan, and it is now possible to speak of the system's transformation into a dictatorship. Foreign policy also serves this purpose, and it is evident that Azerbaijan has moved away from the modern, democratic world during this period. It is pertinent to recall the fact that after the voting rights of the Azerbaijani delegation were restricted in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) in January 2024, the government suspended its activities in this organization altogether. (Qafqazinfo, January 2024). Having succeeded in crushing the opposition, free media, and independent civil society, the regime continues its production of political prisoners and does not yet consider returning to PACE necessary.
The European Parliament's resolution has provided the Azerbaijani government with the manipulative propaganda topic it needed. Following the ongoing peace process with Armenia, the warming of relations with Russia, and relative stability in relations with Iran, there is a need for a new "external enemy" image. This is necessary to distract from real problems and create a synthetic agenda, especially against the backdrop of a deteriorating socio-economic situation. Knowing the society's sensitivity regarding the Armenian issue, the regime strengthens its legitimacy by presenting itself to the public as the only force capable of protecting the achieved success (the liberation of occupied territories).
It should be noted that such decisions by Western institutions continue to undermine trust in European democracy and organizations in Azerbaijan and weaken the positions of oppositionists within the country who favor European integration.
Energy and Security Priorities, the Retreat of Values-Based Politics
Although the European Parliament is a structure of the European Union, its resolutions are advisory in nature and are not legally binding. The policies of the executive structures, especially in foreign policy matters, often differ from the position of the Parliament. The European Parliament usually attempts to approach issues based on values, while the European Commission and the EU leadership prioritize pragmatism. Although the European Parliament has adopted several critical and harshly worded resolutions regarding the human rights situation in Azerbaijan to date, the EU's executive leadership has not referenced those documents in its policy and has not made the topic of rights and freedoms a priority in its dialogue with Azerbaijan.
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, energy security has been almost the sole priority. For example, during the visit of the President of the European Council, Antonio Costa, to Baku on March 11 of this year, the 15-item joint Statement signed with Aliyev makes no mention of democracy and human rights at all. Such an issue is not only missing from the priorities but is absent from the bilateral cooperation agenda entirely.
Currently, a favorable international conjuncture has formed for authoritarian regimes. The fractures in the Transatlantic alliance and the current US administration's policy against liberal Europe expand the maneuvering capabilities of authoritarian leaders. Aliyev skillfully utilizes these opportunities. His development of bilateral relations with individual member states within the European Union and the establishment of strategic partnerships are major factors preventing the EU from switching to a policy of pressure in relations with Baku at the institutional level, even if it wished to. Although Aliyev's friend Viktor Orban has left power, there remain enough Eastern European and even Western European countries (for example, Italy) that would veto the adoption of any negative decision against the Azerbaijani government. It must be emphasized that the principle of consensus has also become one of the factors weakening the European Union in recent years.
Nonetheless, such demarches by Ilham Aliyev before Europe may appear effective in the short and medium term. However, in the long run, if unity strengthens again within the EU or if geopolitical conditions shift, this strategy could "Belarusianize" Azerbaijan, potentially reducing Aliyev—who currently appears as the West's "sympathetic dictator"—to the status of Lukashenko in the future.
REFERENCES:
Report.az. 2026. "Azərbaycanın Avropa Parlamenti ilə əməkdaşlığı dayandırılıb - YENİLƏNİB." May 1, 2026. https://report.az/xarici-siyaset/milli-meclis-avropa-parlamentinin-azerbaycan-eleyhine-fealiyyeti-ile-bagli-qerari-qebul-edecek.
APA.az. 2026. "Avropa İttifaqının səfiri Xarici İşlər Nazirliyinə çağırılıb, nota təqdim edilib." May 1, 2026. https://apa.az/xarici-siyaset/avropa-ittifaqinin-sefiri-xarici-isler-nazirliyine-cagirilib-nota-teqdim-edilib-960472.
Golos Armenii. 2026. "ЕВРОПАРЛАМЕНТ ПОТРЕБОВАЛ ОСВОБОДИТЬ АРМЯНСКИХ ПЛЕННЫХ И УВАЖАТЬ ПРАВА НАРОДА АРЦАХА." May 1, 2026. https://www.golosarmenii.am/%D0%B5%D0%B2%D1%80%D0%BE%D0%BF%D0%B0%D1%80%D0%BB%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B5%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B2%D0%B0%D0%BB-%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%B2%D0%BE%D0%B1%D0%BE%D0%B4%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%8C/.
TASS, 2026. “Пашинян назвал важным и историческим визит вице-премьера Азербайджана в Армению.” April 30, 2026. https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/27273765.
Qafqazinfo.az, 2024. "Azərbaycan AŞPA ilə əməkdaşlığı dayandırdı - Sərt bəyanat." January 24, 2024. https://qafqazinfo.az/news/detail/azerbaycan-aspa-ile-emekdasligi-dayandirdi-sert-beyanat-425194.
