Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov’s visit to Baku might, at first glance, appear to be a routine diplomatic ceremony—one of many official visits scheduled on the calendar. However, the symbols and messages behind this visit clearly reveal that it is far from an ordinary diplomatic event.
First and foremost, the person making the visit is not an ordinary statesman. He is the figure who defines Turkmenistan’s political trajectory—the Arkadag. His arrival in Baku is a vivid demonstration of how power is shared and sustained within a ruling family. This visit is also an exchange of experience. What will Ilham Aliyev learn from the Arkadag in terms of sharing power with his son Heydar Aliyev? Do not be surprised by what you witness in the future.
Berdimuhamedov, as the political shadow and ideological guide of his son—President Serdar Berdimuhamedow—is the primary authority in the country. With his partially formal and partially symbolic position, he stands as the emblem of Turkmenistan’s dynastic governance model.
On the other side stands the host—Ilham Aliyev—a figure who inherited the authoritarian regime established by his father and presents himself both as the bearer of that legacy and as a modern, victorious leader. Aliyev’s leadership is also built on the political capitalization of a family inheritance. For now, he partially shares power with his wife.
Moreover, the protocol of the visit—laying flowers at Heydar Aliyev’s grave, visiting symbolic landmarks together—is not just a matter of formal courtesy; it is a manifest of political symbolism. Each of these gestures underscores the ideas of “family governance,” “leader cult,” and “historical continuity,” showcasing the shared ideological codes of both regimes. This sends a message to both domestic audiences and foreign actors: “We are carriers of the same system—we recognize and strengthen each other’s legitimacy.”
In other words, although Berdimuhamedov’s visit to Baku is officially presented as a move to strengthen energy, transit, and trade ties between the two countries, it should actually be interpreted as a ceremonial display and affirmation of the dynastic model of post-Soviet authoritarianism (James Nichol, 2007).
In recent years, both Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have entrenched their regimes in family inheritance and personalist rule. Ilham Aliyev presents his father’s legacy as “the will of the people,” while Serdar Berdimuhamedow presides under the shadow of his father. In both countries, the political system revolves around the family—decision-making bodies, media, and the public have no other “freedom” but to glorify this will (Horák, S. 2016).
Thus, the meeting between these two figures should be evaluated as a mutual recognition and reinforcement of “authoritarian inheritance” and “dynastic succession,” as well as an exchange of experiences.
The ‘Friendship’ Field
The most important technical agenda of the visit was the energy field named “Dostlug” (Friendship). This site in the Caspian Sea had long been a point of dispute, but since 2021 it has been divided between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. Through a “Memorandum of Understanding” signed in January 2021, the Kapaz/Serdar field was officially renamed the “Friendship” field (Azerbaijan MFA, 2021). Located deep in the Caspian, this field is estimated to hold around 30 billion cubic meters of gas and nearly 300 million barrels of oil (BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 2023). Its legal status was resolved with the 2018 Aktau Convention, and the field holds strategic significance as a potential route for the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline (TCGP) (Cambridge University Press, 2019).
The TCGP, which would extend from Türkmenbaşy to Baku, is poised to become the main artery for energy flows to Europe and Turkey. The agreements surrounding this field are part of larger geopolitical plays—the Trans-Caspian pipeline, European access, balancing Russia’s influence. But the key point is that these projects are being conducted not in a transparent and democratic environment, but based on the mutual trust of authoritarian family regimes.
Club Diplomacy: The New Language of Authoritarianism
Recent efforts at regional integration in the post-Soviet space cannot be explained solely through economic or security frameworks. A subtler and less studied trend is also emerging: regimes recognizing and affirming each other on an ideological and symbolic level. Unlike classical interstate diplomacy, this can be termed “club diplomacy”—a system of relations realized primarily among authoritarian regimes.
The members of this club are united by ideological affinity, similarities in regime structure, and governance based on repression in the name of political stability. Dynastic rule, cults of leadership, total media control, the neutralization of opposition, and the de facto destruction of electoral systems are the main admission criteria for this club.
In this context, Berdimuhamedov’s visit to Baku is not merely about developing diplomatic relations between two countries, but a demonstration of solidarity, mutual recognition, and legitimacy among regimes. The statements issued, documents signed, and site visits during such trips serve symbolic rather than procedural purposes: “We are alike, we are united.”
Ilham Aliyev welcoming Berdimuhamedov as though he were still the official head of state, and their joint visit to Heydar Aliyev’s grave at the Alley of Honor, is a ceremonial celebration of this “authoritarian brotherhood.” In reality, what is unfolding is not just diplomacy between states, but trust and coordination between regimes, systems, or more precisely, models of family-based power.
What Is the Purpose of This Club Diplomacy?
1. Shielding from external isolation: When authoritarian regimes face international pressure, they provide each other with political backing and diplomatic platforms.
2. Ideological reinforcement: Each regime seeks to demonstrate to its domestic audience that it is not alone—that its governance model enjoys regional support.
3. Creating and exporting a model: By showcasing the dynastic model as a successful one to neighboring countries, they seek to normalize and proliferate it.
In this sense, the Baku meeting is not merely Berdimuhamedov’s visit. It should also be read as the Aliyev regime symbolically opening a door to its authoritarian comrades, absorbing the Turkmenistan model, and attempting to export its own political model. Here, the energy fields, flags, and protocol elements are the visible aspects. On the invisible side lies a process of mutual recognition and construction of the foundations of familial authoritarianism.
This is precisely why such meetings are not acts of classical diplomacy, but rather products of ideological solidarity and strategies for political survival. For these regimes, the existence and recognition of one another serves as an additional guarantee of their own existence.
References:
- James Nichol, 2007. Turkmenistan’s Political Succession:. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235153773_Turkmenistan's_Political_Succession_Developments_and_Implications
- Horák, S. 2016. Legitimacy Building in Turkmenistan: Beyond Personality Cults. Central Asian Survey, 33(4), 449–462. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781315597386-9/personality-cults-nation-building-turkmenistan-1-2-slavomir-hor%C3%A1k-abel-polese
- Azerbaijan MFA, 2021. MoU on the Dostlug Field. https://geneva.mfa.gov.az/en/news/azerbaijan-and-turkmenistan-sign-mou-on-joint-exploration-and-development-of-dostlug-field-in-caspian-sea
- BP. 2023. Statistical Review of World Energy. https://www.energyinst.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/1055542/EI_Stat_Review_PDF_single_3.pdf
- Cambridge University Press, 2019. Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea (Aktau Convention). https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-legal-materials/article/abs/convention-on-the-legal-status-of-the-caspian-sea/D002CAF45F8DDDF6D534AB742788CEFB
