Introduction
While forms of authoritarian leadership around the world manifest in different shades, Azerbaijan’s political reality under Ilham Aliyev arguably represents the most absurd and ironic expression of these variations. In 2003, Ilham Aliyev inherited power from his father and transformed what was originally intended as transitional leadership into a personal autocracy. In doing so, he established a new, harsher and more ruthless form of the authoritarian model that dominates the post-Soviet space.
Despite official rhetoric promising stability, development, and modernization, the actual landscape consists of repressive governance, systemic corruption, extrajudicial decision-making, and state structures based on personal loyalty.
This opinion piece by the Khar Center analyzes how Ilham Aliyev’s authoritarian system has normalized political absurdity in Azerbaijan, while also portraying his political persona. This portrait is not merely a depiction of an authoritarian leader—it is also a case study in how authoritarianism mutates in the post-Soviet world.
The Aesthetics and Psychology of the One-Man System
The most colorful and, to a pathological extent, entertaining spectacles of non-democratic governance are created by “one-man” rulers—those “irascible dictators” who manage to concentrate all power in their hands. These are individuals who have freed themselves from normative systems and institutional constraints, and as a result, subject state policy to their personal, and often absurd, whims (and almost all of them are men).
They organize ridiculous “elections” to be “elected” as presidents for life, and then carry on as if nothing unusual has happened. They treat the state like their father’s private property, and their seemingly limitless authority allows their personal oddities to spill over into state governance. To explain this phenomenon, a few historical examples are enough:
Take Hastings Kamuzu Banda, for instance—he declared himself the “Life President” of Malawi in the 1970s and 1980s and once proudly stated, “Everything I say is law. Word for word, it is law.”
Banda didn’t stop at concentrating all major appointment and dismissal powers in his own hands—he also personally managed many key ministries. In 1972, he said: “There is nothing in this country that is not my business… Everything is my business. Everything.” (Marquez 2020)
Throughout history, democratic governance has represented not only a mechanism of political participation but also the embodiment of rational administration, legal norms, and collective decision-making. However, in regimes that turn these systems into parody—especially those governed by irascible dictators—democracy itself becomes a kind of theater.
Leaders such as Banda in Malawi, Saparmurat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi) in Central Asia, and Ilham Aliyev in Azerbaijan are figures who have subordinated national laws, the public interest, and even social morality to their personal desires.
Authoritarian leadership is not merely about the centralization of legal powers—it is also an aesthetic system constructed upon personal cults, symbols, and simulations. The term “one-man” refers not only to someone who unilaterally makes political decisions, but also to a figure who subjugates all state symbols to his own personality, and attempts to mold the worldview, emotions, and imagination of citizens according to his own will.
Ilham Aliyev is one of the most “systematic” practitioners of this model in the post-Soviet region.
In the system led by Aliyev, the aesthetics of the state—official ceremonies, presidential portraits, school textbooks, documentaries broadcast on television—all echo a single message: the leader is sacred, the leader is immutable, the leader has no alternative. The boundary between state symbols and the leader’s persona is dissolved—as if the state of Azerbaijan is the visual and institutional extension of Ilham Aliyev’s “self.”
There are no accidental details in this aesthetic regime. For example, Ilham Aliyev’s appearance, voice, posture at state ceremonies are all choreographed as parts of a performance. Every camera angle is part of this choreography. His speeches are not merely speeches; they are rituals. This is not just governance—this is authoritarian theater. The aim of this theater is to distort reality and shift public loyalty from the state to the individual leader.
Psychological factors play a deep role here as well. The “one-man” ruler does not rely solely on administrative or repressive power to sustain his rule; he also depends on emotional hegemony. Aliyev presents himself as the “father figure” of the people—strong, protective, but at the same time positioned above the populace. This image often resonates with citizens who, shaped by the post-Soviet syndrome, seek “stability through strength.” The citizen looks for “security in a dangerous world,” and Aliyev identifies this stability with his own personal existence.
This psychological model is also built on the systematic manipulation of fear and gratitude. Pro-government media constantly amplify themes such as “foreign enemies,” “traitorous opposition,” and “Western double standards,” so that the public believes in a fabricated “rescue mission” instead of confronting real issues. This allows propaganda outlets to portray Aliyev not just as president, but as a savior, a protector, and the embodiment of the homeland itself.
As a result, Ilham Aliyev ascends to the status of a cult figure. His name appears in textbooks, his portraits are hung in administrative offices, his speeches are endlessly replayed on television. This system contains a ritualism reminiscent of religious worship—and it is this very element that places him firmly within the classic category of “irascible dictators.”
“Not an Election, but a Simulation”
Presidential and parliamentary elections held in Azerbaijan are not acts of democratic participation, but rather parts of a theatrical performance aimed at legitimizing the regime. Under Ilham Aliyev’s rule, elections are based not on logic or law, but on a pre-written script. In this script, the winner is predetermined, and the opposition is either completely excluded from the system or consists of “puppet opposition figures” allowed to play symbolic roles.
The operation of the Central Election Commission, the isolation of domestic and international observers, election fraud, and pressures during the voting process are all systemic in nature. The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has repeatedly stated that elections in Azerbaijan do not meet the requirements of being “free and fair” (OSCE/ODIHR 2018). However, these criticisms bear no legal or political consequences—because the regime has effectively privatized not only the will of the people but also the authority to speak on behalf of the people.
The electoral institution has completely lost its functional meaning here. Election outcomes do not change because the game itself never changes. Candidates may vary, but the result of the script always leads to Ilham Aliyev's victory. This is not proof of legal legitimacy—it is proof of ritualistic legitimacy. In reality, this is not an election but merely a “ceremony for declaring victory.”
Aliyev decorates this simulation regime with modern technology and mass propaganda, presenting it to Western audiences as a “model of stable development.” This is a strategy of showcasing only the institutional “plateware” of democracy, while filling it with authoritarian content. Compared to the authoritarian experiences of countries like Russia, Belarus, and Turkmenistan, Aliyev’s regime is more successful in its “makeup”—because modern authoritarianism operates not only through brute force but also through simulation mechanisms.
The Subordination of Law to Personal Will
The independence of the judiciary and the rule of law are foundational pillars of any democratic system. But in Ilham Aliyev’s regime, the legal system is merely a technical tool for implementing authoritarian will. The regime’s control over the courts is so systematic that the concept of “court” in Azerbaijan has become purely formal—these institutions have turned into apparatuses that merely present the executive branch’s orders in legal language.
Politically motivated arrests, fabricated criminal cases against human rights defenders and independent journalists, and the alteration of legal norms in line with personal interests—all reflect how Aliyev’s regime has transformed law into a personal instrument of power. Reports by international human rights organizations indicate that judicial independence in Azerbaijan is virtually nonexistent. Judges remain in the system only if they are politically loyal, and they do not possess real decision-making authority; rather, they act as “execution mechanisms.” (Human Rights Watch 2024)
Here, law serves the function of rationalizing punishment and fear. That is, the regime attempts to justify its repressions through legal language: arrests are carried out under the pretext that “the law was violated,” but the so-called “law” is nothing more than Aliyev’s personal will. This is a classic model of “repression through law”—a form of totalitarianism cloaked in legalism.
For the Aliyev regime, law is merely a tool of governance—its purpose is not justice but control. Citizens’ rights exist only formally and can be restricted at any moment with vague expressions like “state interests,” “special security,” or “sabotage.”
Like Banda, Aliyev is able to change the legal system at will, manipulate court rulings, and silence those he labels “enemies of the state.” The number of political prisoners, the persecution of human rights defenders, and the performative nature of court trials all point to this reality. In this process, law becomes nothing more than a tool of administration, and courts serve as a legal showcase for personal will.
Privatization of the State: Transition to Family Rule
In Azerbaijan, political power belongs to the Aliyev family. Those who hold political posts are not political actors but simply managers. This is a feature of the classic kleptocratic model—where state structures serve the interests of the ruling family. In 2017, Ilham Aliyev’s direct appointment of his wife as Vice President was not just a symbolic act—it was the formal legal confirmation of a family regime.
This approach recalls Banda’s famous phrase, “All the ministers are me.” In this system, administrative quality is irrelevant; what matters is loyalty and closeness to the ruling family.
Authoritarianism Without Limits: The Legal and Ethical “Untouchability” of the Aliyev Regime
One of the most dangerous features of authoritarian regimes is their self-perception as exceptional. Rejecting the principle of the universality of law, such systems present political leaders as exceptions and laws as flexible tools. In this sense, Ilham Aliyev’s regime is not merely one country’s form of authoritarian rule—it is a mechanism of untouchability that knows no borders, both domestically and internationally.
Domestically: The Privatization of Law and the Architecture of Fear
Under Aliyev’s leadership, the legal system has entirely lost its function. Courts cannot make independent decisions, and the Prosecutor’s Office and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) carry out the political orders of the regime. The primary mission of these structures is not the application of law but the preservation of regime continuity.
Charges such as “smuggling,” “treason,” and “illegal financing” brought against political opponents are not legal measures but instruments of symbolic violence.
In this system, a citizen is untouchable only as long as they are obedient; once they dissent, they are instantly categorized as a “public threat.” Fear is one of the regime’s central tools of governance. Total surveillance, Big Brother-style monitoring, and militarist indoctrination in education and media constitute the psychological infrastructure of this system.
Internationally: Geopolitical Blackmail and Western “Concern”
One of the most cunning features of the Aliyev regime is its ability to present itself in a sympathetic light on the international stage. This largely stems from the geopolitical importance of Azerbaijan’s energy resources. Europe’s desire to reduce its energy dependence on Russia has created an opportunity for Aliyev: in exchange for natural gas, human rights are silenced.
Despite being categorized as a “not free” country in international rankings, Western states continue to cooperate with the Aliyev regime. The very countries that see themselves as cradles of democracy effectively legitimize Aliyev’s rule under the label of “strategic partnership.”
This approach grants Aliyev untouchability even in the international arena. For the West, no matter how authoritarian Aliyev may be, he remains an “acceptable autocrat” as long as he ensures the flow of energy (KHAR Center 2025). This, in turn, enables the Aliyev regime to weaponize the argument of “double standards” in response to international criticism and provides further justification for intensifying domestic repression.
For Aliyev, law exists solely as a means to ensure others’ subordination to him. When it comes to his family, inner circle, and regime, laws are either changed or simply not applied. This is not merely a denial of the “rule of law” principle—it is a system of personalized sultanism in which the law is applied selectively. (Elman Fattah 2019)
When a head of state appoints whomever he pleases to key positions, enacts any law he wants, and ensures that courts deliver rulings as he desires, that system becomes a legalized form of authoritarianism. In this model, the only logic is Aliyev’s will, and the only norm is his political interest.
The Identity of the Irascible Dictator: The Destruction of Rational Boundaries
Most authoritarian leaders attempt to justify their rule through rationality and “state interests.” However, irascible dictators—that is, autocrats who detach from the real world and replace normative frameworks with personality cults—establish their governance beyond the realm of political rationalism. Ilham Aliyev belongs to this category: his rule has evolved into an authoritarian performance driven more by psychological egocentrism than by systemic authoritarianism.
One of the main traits of such leaders is the disruption of logical order and the overshadowing of national needs by personal desire. For example, Aliyev’s use of any national event to reinforce his mythical status—be it state ceremonies held in Shusha or the praise-filled passages about him in school textbooks—brings him close to a classical dictatorship psychosis. The leader’s existence becomes the soul of the state. The state becomes Aliyev, and Aliyev becomes the state.
The most dangerous feature of irascible dictators is their tendency to present their mistakes as divine wisdom and their personal decisions as the essence of national destiny. Ilham Aliyev cloaks his unjust decisions, repressions, and strict control system under the guise of “stability” and “national interest.” But this is merely a top-down imposed interpretation. In reality, this model systematically crushes human dignity, declares difference as the enemy, and presents personal hegemony as a “natural law”—a hallmark of a paranoid regime.
Another hallmark of the irascible dictator—obsessive control and totalitarian aesthetics—is clearly visible in Aliyev’s regime. Artificially orchestrated celebratory events, crude propaganda through state-controlled media, and a public aesthetic built entirely on worship of a single figure—these are all components of political theater. (Macmillan 1992)
Like Banda, Aliyev elevates his personal will above the constitution and the law, becoming the “absolute ruler” who determines what the law is. In his political system, “law” is not a real normative framework but a mutable and personal-interest-driven legal mask of individual will. The degradation of law has reached such a level that the country’s constitution has turned into a collection of powers granted to Ilham Aliyev. (Elman Fattah, Radio Liberty 2017)
By claiming ownership of the state like his father, turning elections into theater, and reducing law to a certificate of personal approval, Aliyev embodies all the fundamental traits of irascible dictatorship. The “irascible” nature of the Aliyev regime not only makes him an undemocratic leader but also turns him into one of the major contemporary threats to democracy on an international scale.
Conclusion
Ilham Aliyev is a striking post-Soviet representative of the 21st century’s irascible dictators. He is a leader who subordinates the law to personal interests, transforms elections into theater, weaponizes media and education ideologically, installs his family into state institutions, and manipulates the international system through energy blackmail. The essence of this regime is simple: the state becomes a family enterprise, law becomes a tool, and the citizen becomes a silenced observer.
The political system that has taken shape under Ilham Aliyev is not a classic authoritarian regime—it is a more complex and hybrid structure where modern technology, old Soviet methods, and symbolic personal cult function in parallel. Aliyev’s regime is, by its nature, an example of postmodern authoritarianism—elections are held, but they serve not political participation, but the ritual of legitimization. A legal system exists, but its function is not to protect citizens’ rights—it is to protect the regime. Journalism, politics, and civil society are formally permitted, but in reality, their boundaries are rigidly defined by the regime’s red lines (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2019).
Citizens’ relationship with the regime in Azerbaijan is also complex. Total control, fear, and a restricted information environment have fostered political apathy and a kind of social-psychological resignation—an acceptance of the regime. Patriotism campaigns conducted by the state—particularly after the 2020 Karabakh War—temporarily brought legitimacy to the Aliyev regime. However, this political capital was not used for structural reforms but to further strengthen personal power. Thus, military victories served to maintain political monopoly.
At the same time, the Aliyev regime occupies a peculiar position on the international stage. Azerbaijan’s energy resources have rendered the West’s political and ethical principles ineffective—the European Union, the United States, and other global players remain silent about human rights violations in exchange for oil and gas. (Eurasianet, April 2025) This has become one of the regime’s key pillars of continuity. Energy dependency and geopolitical interests push human rights and democracy into the background.
Against this backdrop, the Aliyev regime is essentially a political anomaly: the state operates not as a structure, but as private property. The presidency has transformed from an institution into an inherited family title. The appointment of Mehriban Aliyeva as Vice President, the full subjugation of parliament and the judiciary, and the pressure on media and civil society all illustrate different stages of this anomaly (Freedom House 2024). In this sense, Ilham Aliyev has revived Banda’s principle of “everything I say is law” in the 21st-century post-Soviet space—but this time in a more systematic, technocratic, and internationally untouchable form.
Ultimately, the political portrait of Ilham Aliyev is not only a reflection of one individual’s authoritarian tendencies—it is also a vivid example of how a society adapts to these tendencies and how the international system enables them. This portrait is a manifestation of the triumph of autocracy in the post-Soviet space.
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