KHAR Center’s Perspective
The Russia–Ukraine war, which began in February 2022, has evolved into what could be described as a symbiotic conflict—a war that simultaneously reflects the strategic heritage of past global conflicts and integrates the technological frontiers of contemporary warfare. On one hand, it has been fought with traditional methods reminiscent of the two world wars; on the other, it has introduced hallmarks of New Generation Warfare. In the early stages of the invasion, Russian forces employed classic military tactics, with armored columns spearheading offensives followed by advancing infantry. The infamous 64-kilometer-long Russian military convoy en route to Kyiv remains etched in public memory (Anadolu Agency, 2022).
However, the character of the conflict began to shift dramatically with the introduction of unmanned aerial systems—both reconnaissance and combat drones. Today, in the operational zones on both sides of the front, cheap first-person-view (FPV) drones and quadcopters capable of dropping bombs and retreating swiftly are being deployed with such frequency that the movement of armored vehicles, supply trucks carrying personnel, ammunition, food, and other essentials has become nearly impossible along the frontline. Tanks and armored fighting vehicles are now being destroyed before they can even approach enemy trenches or fortifications. As a result, offensive operations increasingly rely on small infantry units—significantly raising casualty rates.
Drone technologies are advancing at a staggering pace. In recent months, both sides have begun deploying fiber-optic guided drones, which are resistant to radio-electronic interference and thus capable of navigating toward targets unimpeded. According to Vasyl Maliuk, head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), drones are now responsible for 85% of all destroyed enemy military equipment and personnel (New Voice, 2025).
In short, while the war in Ukraine has not rendered armored combat vehicles obsolete, it has sharply curtailed their operational relevance. The age of the tank is drawing to a close. Even anti-tank weapons like rocket-propelled grenades are no longer as vital. The next stage of technological development may involve unmanned tanks and ground combat platforms—provided they can withstand the drone threat.
A Blow to Russia’s Pride
An incident on June 1 raised an entirely new strategic question: Is manned aviation, too, becoming obsolete? On that day, the Ukrainian Security Service conducted a special operation targeting Russian air bases that host strategic bombers. Drone strikes were launched against facilities in Murmansk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur oblasts, targeting Russia’s strategic Tu-95, Tu-22M3, and Tu-160 bombers, as well as A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft. Ukraine claimed that 41 aircraft were destroyed or damaged in what it called Operation Spiderweb (BBC, 2025). Russia’s Ministry of Defense confirmed that “several” planes had been set ablaze in Murmansk and Irkutsk (Interfax, 2025).
Regardless of the exact numbers, the precedent is significant: this marks the first time in modern military history that strategic aviation assets have been struck by unmanned aerial vehicles while stationed at their home bases. These aircraft form one leg of Russia’s nuclear triad (alongside land-based and submarine-based systems), capable of delivering cruise missiles—including nuclear warheads—over long distances.
Prior to the strike, Russia’s Aerospace Forces were believed to possess 58 Tu-95s and 54 Tu-22s, though the operational readiness of these aircraft remains unclear (The Wall Street Journal, 2025). Several strategic bombers had already been lost or damaged in earlier accidents and Ukrainian attacks. Importantly, these aircraft are Soviet-era products and are no longer manufactured in modern Russia. Their dwindling numbers significantly erode Russia’s parity with the United States in this domain.
Undoubtedly, Ukraine’s innovative use of drones in this context will be closely studied by military and intelligence services worldwide. Such operations offer dual utility: as both a model for delivering deep-strike capabilities and a warning of the need to develop effective defenses against similar threats. The lessons of this operation will spur investment in both offensive drone capacities and counter-drone systems.
Ukrainian Mossad-style Operation
Ukraine’s ability to carry out such a high-risk operation deep within enemy territory is a testament to the professionalism, capability, and transformation of its intelligence services. It positions agencies like the SBU among the world’s most formidable intelligence structures. Prior examples include the dramatic destruction of the Kerch Bridge in October 2022 and the December 2024 assassination of Lieutenant General Igor Kirillov, head of Russia’s Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Forces, in Moscow (RBC, 2024).
Over the past three years, Ukraine’s security institutions have undergone a visible metamorphosis. Alongside the SBU, the Defense Ministry’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) has gained strategic weight. Its young leader, Kyrylo Budanov, has become one of the war’s iconic figures. Achieving this level of operational competence in peacetime would have been unlikely. Until recently, Ukrainian intelligence was deeply infiltrated and, in some cases, directly controlled by Russian-aligned figures. After the 2014 revolution, President Yanukovych fled to Russia, accompanied by SBU chief Oleksandr Yakymenko—who now reportedly serves as a Russian officer in occupied Ukrainian territories (Ukrainska Pravda, 2023).
After the full-scale invasion began, two SBU generals—Oleh Kulinich, head of the Crimea division, and Andriy Naumov, head of the Internal Security Directorate—were exposed as Russian agents. These revelations underscore the extent of Moscow’s penetration into Ukraine’s intelligence apparatus. The rapid institutional and personal adaptation to wartime realities, along with successful restructuring of command and operations, reflect not only necessity but an existential imperative for Ukraine.
Fighting an Archaic Empire with Asymmetry
Ukraine today finds itself fighting a vastly superior opponent—an inheritor of the Soviet Union’s military-industrial might and one of the two Cold War superpowers. Despite its demographic decline and strategic stagnation, Russia remains an empire rooted in a culture that has never valued the individual as sacred. In pursuit of its objectives, it is willing to absorb massive casualties without hesitation.
In such a confrontation, a symmetrical war is unsustainable for Ukraine. Its resources are insufficient for prolonged parity. Survival depends on asymmetric methods. The resistance on the frontlines must be complemented by deep strikes and sabotage missions in enemy territory. The goal must be to inflict maximum damage with minimal cost—materially and in human lives. Such operations also serve a critical diplomatic function. They embolden Kyiv to reject Russia’s ultimatums with confidence, projecting defiance instead of submission.
It is not coincidental that the June 1 operation occurred just a day before high-level negotiations in Istanbul (The Moscow Times, 2025). In diplomacy, as in war, timing is everything.
References:
1. AA.com. “Russian Military Convoy near Kyiv.” Anadolu Agency, 2022. https://shorturl.at/OtMy8
2. New Voice. “85% of Russian Personnel and Equipment Are Being Destroyed by Drones — Maliuk.” New Voice of Ukraine, 2025. https://nv.ua/ukraine/events/malyuk-zayavil-chto-85-procentov-porazheniy-armii-rossii-nanosyat-drony-novosti-ukrainy-50492341.html.
3. BBC. “Operation 'Spider Web': Ukraine Struck Russian Military Airfields with Drones Launched from Trucks.” BBC Russian, 2025. https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/c0mrgwvywvwo.
4. Interfax. “Russian Ministry of Defense Reports Drone Attacks on Airfields in Five Russian Regions.” Interfax, 2025. https://www.interfax.ru/russia/1028985.
5. BBC. “Explosion on the Crimean Bridge.” BBC Russian, 2022. https://www.bbc.com/russian/articles/cvg9jx3pkgpo.
6. RBC. “General Igor Kirillov Killed in Moscow.” RBC, December 17, 2024. https://www.rbc.ru/politics/17/12/2024/676123059a79477b6ab31311.
7. Ukrainska Pravda. “SBU Accuses Its Former Head of Treason for Collaborating with Occupiers.” Ukrainska Pravda, February 7, 2023. https://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/news/2023/02/7/7388338/.
8. The Moscow Times. “Russia Demands International Recognition of Annexation of Crimea and Four Ukrainian Regions at Istanbul Talks.” The Moscow Times, May 17, 2025. https://www.moscowtimes.ru/2025/05/17/rossiya-naperegovorah-vstambule-potrebovala-mezhdunarodnogo-priznaniya-anneksii-krima-ichetireh-oblastei-ukraini-a163618.
9. The Wall Street Journal. “Ukraine Says It Destroyed Dozens of Warplanes Deep Inside Russia.” The Wall Street Journal, 2025. https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/ukraine-says-its-drones-destroyed-warplanes-deep-inside-russia-50a634c6?mod=hp_lead_pos2.