Elman Fattah – Director of the KHAR Center
For those familiar with the nature of authoritarian regimes, this news came as no surprise: Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev appointed his daughter, Saida Mirziyoyeva, as the head of the Presidential Administration. This event is yet another example of familial-political consolidation that we have observed for years across the post-Soviet space.
The Invisible Legacy: A Generation Raised in Karimov’s Shadow
Islam Karimov’s 25-year personalist-repressive regime entrenched one fundamental truth within Uzbek society: the source of power lies in the figure of the leader, while institutions merely execute his will (Geddes, 2003). While Mirziyoyev has polished this political legacy with technical modernization, the power center of the regime has begun to shift from individuals to families. The appointment of his daughter Saida is a sanctioned form of this process.
Modernity or Masked Patriarchy?
Saida Mirziyoyeva’s appointment as head of the Presidential Administration is grounded not in meritocracy but in family ties and authoritarian continuity. Unlike other technocrats, Saida possesses the strongest entry ticket to the political system—her lineage. Her rise could be seen as a model step for women’s participation in public life—had it not occurred within the context of familial affiliation. Thus, her appointment must be viewed through the lens of nepotism and familial co-optation.
Heydemann’s model of “familial co-optation in authoritarian modernization” provides a useful theoretical framework to explain this phenomenon. According to this model, authoritarian leaders bring family members into technocratic positions to ensure loyalty within the system and project an image of “reform” and “modernization” to the outside world. In this framework, modernity remains at a superficial level—while the essence is grounded in patriarchal and familial control.
The Rise of Women Without Emancipation
The main paradox here is that while it seems women’s roles are expanding, their positions in the system remain tied to familial structures. Saida’s rise is solely dependent on her father’s political trajectory, and her advancement represents not a normative step for women’s broader social-political development, but rather an exceptional case.
To Western audiences, Saida becomes the face of a “clean, cultured, and modernizing Uzbekistan.” She speaks French, collaborates with UNESCO—an echo of the story of the Azerbaijani president’s wife, Mehriban Aliyeva, a few years ago—and presents an image of openness. But behind this glossy window display lies the deepening of structures like inequality, political monopoly, and intra-family control. This is “the most delicate, yet most dangerous, form of modern patriarchy.”
Saida’s Role: Technocrat or Political “Bridge”?
Saida Mirziyoyeva is simultaneously the president’s daughter, the strategist behind information and public opinion policy, the regime’s showcase to the international community, and a potential bearer of intra-family political succession. This spectrum of roles makes her not merely an administrator or civil servant, but a central actor in the project concerning the regime’s future. In other words, Saida Mirziyoyeva’s appointment is neither a feminist achievement nor a technocratic success. She exemplifies how authoritarian regimes instrumentalize female figures to appear modern. It is not the woman who is elevated here—it is the family. What is visible is the woman; what is invisible is her embodiment of dynastic rule.
When the Family Becomes the State...
Family rule is not a rare political phenomenon in the post-Soviet region—it has become a deeply entrenched and legitimized regime model. As the foundations of authoritarian stability shift, a new form of dominance is constructed around family structure. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and now Uzbekistan present clear and vivid examples of this model. Here, the family becomes the central political subject of the state and an informal megastructure of governance.
This structural condition is best explained through the classical concept of neopatrimonialism. According to scholars like Christopher Clapham and Jean-François Médard, even though formal state institutions and rules exist, the real decision-making process operates through personal and familial patron–client networks (Clapham, 1985; Médard, 1991).
Authoritarian Transformation or Surface-Level Cosmetics?
When President Shavkat Mirziyoyev came to power, the rhetoric of a “new Uzbekistan” entered the discourse. The implementation of e-government, establishment of digital management systems, liberalization of the currency market, and the creation of a more favorable environment for foreign investors were all promoted as signs of reform by the international community and economic actors. Even the World Bank and the European Union reacted positively to these efforts. However, beneath this reformist image lies a profound contradiction: the core structures and power balances of the political system remain unchanged (World Bank, 2020; European Union External Action Service, 2020).
As Steven Heydemann, one of the pioneers of the “authoritarian modernization” concept, emphasized, some authoritarian regimes pursue selective reforms in economic and technocratic areas to maintain internal stability while presenting themselves as reformists on the international stage (Heydemann, 2007). Uzbekistan, too, conforms to this model by renewing the forms of reform without altering their substance.
Saida Mirziyoyeva’s appointment as head of the Presidential Administration clearly reveals the true political intention beneath this reformist cosmetic layer: to plan and legitimize the continuity of authoritarian governance within the framework of the family. This appointment is an explicit indicator of how limited and goal-oriented the “era of reforms” truly is.
Saida Mirziyoyeva’s rise proves that reforms are essentially internal family rotations. The placement of family members into power under the mask of technocracy is part of the regime’s privatization and centralization. The use of “modern female leadership” rhetoric on the international level and the promotion of “trusted family experience” at home shows that the regime is developing new forms of legitimacy.
In doing so, the regime transitions into a form of “evolved authoritarianism”: a flexible authoritarian model that combines technocratic modernization with a family-based succession structure while preserving a reformist image.
In Conclusion: The Regime Won’t Change—Only the Surname Will
Putin merely changes the constitution, Aliyev changes both the constitution and elevates his family. Mirziyoyev, it seems, is choosing the second path—gradual and institutional transfer of power within the family. Whereas in the past, authoritarianism was based on the will of a single leader (Karimov), today that system is transforming into a network of familial governance. This transformation illustrates that not only methods of governance are changing but also the very nature of political legitimacy. In the past, the leader’s power was tied to charisma and repression; now, that power is legitimized through generational succession and family institutions.
This also marks the emergence of a systemic dynastic model in yet another country in the region—Uzbekistan. In Tajikistan (Rahmon), Azerbaijan (Aliyev), and Turkmenistan (Berdimuhamedow), this process has taken place in different ways. Uzbekistan is now constructing its own dynastic model through Mirziyoyev’s script: first experience, then status, and finally succession. Yet throughout all these phases, the message conveyed to society remains the same: the family is the safest platform for stability.
References:
- Geddes, B. (2003). Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics. University of Michigan Press.
- Clapham, C. (1985). Third World Politics: An Introduction. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Médard, J.-F. (1991). The state in Africa: the politics of the belly. In J. F. Médard (Ed.), States and Patrons in Africa: Neo-Patrimonialism and Political Order (pp. 23–42). London: Frank Cass.
- World Bank. (2020). Uzbekistan: Country Economic Update – Summer 2020. Washington, DC: The World Bank. Retrieved from https://documents.worldbank.org/
- European Union External Action Service. (2020). EU–Uzbekistan Relations: Progress Report on Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation. Brussels: EEAS. Retrieved from https://www.eeas.europa.eu/
6. Heydemann, S. (2007). Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World. Brookings Institution.
