(This article was prepared by the analytical group of the Khar Center within the framework of post-Soviet authoritarianism studies)
Introduction
The parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7, 2026, in Armenia represent a strategic choice that is not confined to local governance issues but holds regional and even global significance. Alongside Armenia, the entire region is at a crossroads: the prospects of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace and cooperation process; the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP); the Turkey-Armenia rapprochement; and Armenia's course toward Euro-integration all depend on the Armenian people's choice on June 7. Two visions clash in these elections: a constructive perspective that advocates shedding the historical burden composed of myths and traumas to embrace national sovereignty within existing borders, regional security, and cooperation, versus a diametrically opposed traditional approach rooted in irrational-illusory irredentism and revanchism, which accepts the guiding influence of genetic memory traumas and mythological archaism on the modern era. Nikol Pashinyan has presented these two antagonistic visions as the dilemma of "Real Armenia" versus "Historical Armenia." The categorical choice the citizens of the Republic of Armenia will make between the "two Armenias" will be of historical significance. This analysis by the "Khar Center" aims to examine the June 7 parliamentary elections within a broader framework than merely a domestic struggle for political power. It seeks to investigate issues such as Armenia's geopolitical choices, the future of Russia's influence in the region, the emerging new security architecture in the South Caucasus, and the attempts by external powers to influence the process. The analysis will address the following questions:
Will Armenian society, in the June 7 elections, choose the traditional political model based on remaining within Russia's sphere of influence, or a new developmental course aimed at integration with the West and adaptation to the realities of the post-conflict period? What will be the consequences of this choice for the political future of the South Caucasus?
Pashinyan's real alternatives
According to statistical data from the Migration and Citizenship Service of Armenia, the number of citizens included in the voter registry stands at 2,485,000. (News.am, 2026). Sixteen political parties and two electoral blocs have registered with the Central Electoral Commission, securing the right to participate in the elections. According to recent amendments to the Electoral Code, the minimum vote threshold for political parties to gain parliamentary representation is 4%, for an electoral bloc consisting of up to three parties it is 8%, and for a bloc comprising more than three parties, it is 10%. (Arminfo, 2026). Despite the various registered parties and blocs, the electoral campaign demonstrates that Armenia's political environment is highly consolidated. Given the established electoral thresholds for parliamentary entry and the political preferences of the electorate, the prospects for the majority of participants to be represented in the legislative body are extremely limited. Consequently, aside from the ruling "Civil Contract" Party, primary attention is directed toward a few priority political forces, including the "Strong Armenia" and "Armenia" blocs. In this regard, although the opposition to the ruling party is fragmented, it is essential to distinguish two political forces—the "Strong Armenia" and "Armenia" blocs—as the primary alternatives. The "Strong Armenia" bloc is the political project of Russian businessman Samvel Karapetyan. A dollar billionaire, S. Karapetyan is the owner of the "Tashir Group," which operates in the construction and real estate sectors in Russia. In August 2025, he manifested his political ambitions in Armenia by establishing a political movement named "According to Us" (which can also be translated as "In Our View" or "In Our Opinion") (News.am, 2025a). In February 2026, the "Strong Armenia" Party was founded on the basis of this movement, and with the accession of two other political parties ("New Era" and "United Armenians"), an electoral bloc of the same name was formed. Samvel Karapetyan was nominated for the position of Prime Minister (RBC 2026). In June 2025, S. Karapetyan was arrested on charges of making open calls to seize power, violate territorial integrity, renounce sovereignty, and forcibly alter the Constitutional order (News.am, 2025b). Subsequently, he was also indicted for large-scale tax evasion and money laundering. In January 2026, he was released under house arrest. According to the Armenian Constitution, only individuals who have permanently resided in the country for the past four years and exclusively hold Armenian citizenship are eligible to be elected as members of parliament and hold the office of Prime Minister. S. Karapetyan, however, holds both Russian citizenship and (according to Pashinyan) the citizenship of a third country (Arminfo, 2026). The "Strong Armenia" bloc anticipates resolving this issue by coming to power and amending the Constitution in parliament (Golos Armenii 2026). Because S. Karapetyan was under house arrest, the nationwide promotional campaign was led by his nephew, Narek Karapetyan, who ranked first on the bloc's candidate list. S. Karapetyan, meanwhile, held meetings and delivered speeches to groups of voters brought in from the provinces to the garden of his mansion in Yerevan. During the course of the electoral campaign, information circulated suggesting that Narek Karapetyan might also hold Russian citizenship. Specifically, records confirming his current or former Russian Federation citizenship were discovered in the unified register of legal entities of the Russian Federation. The Speaker of the Armenian Parliament, Alen Simonyan, published a document on social media confirming that N. Karapetyan was a Russian citizen at least as of 2020. Consequently, the Investigative Committee of Armenia opened a criminal case against N. Karapetyan on charges of concealing information that impedes the assumption of official status (Armenpress, 2026). However, the CEC did not annul his candidacy. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs promptly stated that N. Karapetyan is not a citizen of their country (News.am, 2026). The "Armenia" bloc was founded by the country's second president, Robert Kocharyan, on the eve of the snap parliamentary elections of June 20, 2021. Having suffered significant losses and defeat in the Second Karabakh War, Armenia was experiencing the most difficult period in its modern history at that time. Kocharyan, who had been one of the leaders of the separatism in Karabakh and was elected President of Armenia in 1998 on the basis of this success story, hoped to return to power by playing the "Karabakh card" once again against the backdrop of societal confusion and uncertainty regarding the country's future. However, the "Civil Contract" Party secured another victory with nearly 54 percent of the vote, while Kocharyan's bloc garnered 21 percent. The bloc, which also includes the Armenian Revolutionary Federation "Dashnaktsutyun," announced Robert Kocharyan's candidacy for prime minister in March of this year (Interfax, 2026). The "Strong Armenia" and "Armenia" blocs require a minimum of 8 percent of the vote to gain parliamentary representation. Both political forces appeal to a pro-Russian, nationalist electorate. There are other participants who will divide the votes of this electorate, among which "Prosperous Armenia" must be highlighted. Founded in 2004 by businessman Gagik Tsarukyan, this party demonstrated strong results in parliamentary elections held during the Kocharyan-Sargsyan regimes: 15% in 2007, 30% in 2012, and 27% in 2017. Following the 2018 "Velvet Revolution," however, a radical downward trend was recorded in the party's electoral performance. Although the "Prosperous Armenia" Party managed to secure parliamentary representation again in the 2018 elections by collecting 8% of the vote, it failed to enter the legislative body in the 2021 snap elections, receiving only 4%. These outcomes provide grounds to argue that the oppositional stance of "Prosperous Armenia" during the era of the Karabakh clan was pseudo and fictitious, and that it served as the regime's controlled opposition. Besides their proximity to Russia, another commonality among all three individuals is their status as wealthy businessmen. Samvel Karapetyan owns a large holding operating in 51 cities across Russia; in 2026, "Forbes" estimated his net worth at $4.1 billion. Karapetyan ranks 44th on the list of Russian billionaires (RBC 2026). Gagik Tsarukyan is the owner of the "Multi Group" concern operating in Armenia; while his wealth is estimated at approximately $500 million, it is no secret that it is substantially higher in reality (Dzen, 2021). Although perhaps not to the same extent as Karapetyan and Tsarukyan, Kocharyan can also be considered financially affluent (Verelq, 2023). He served for 12 years as a member of the Board of Directors and a shareholder of the Russian Joint-Stock Financial Corporation "Sistema," resigning in connection with the 2021 elections (TASS, 2021). In short, an opposition possessing substantial financial resources and capital currently exists in Armenia. This represents a rare paradox within the post-Soviet space. Prime Minister Pashinyan refers to these forces as the "three-headed party of war."
Spy scandal
A comprehensive investigation concerning Armenia, prepared and published by "The Insider"—a resource specializing in international investigative journalism, fact-checking, and political analytics—caused the electoral campaign to be rocked by an espionage scandal (The Insider, 2026). The investigation states that following fiascos in Moldova and Hungary, Moscow is directing all its efforts toward Armenia in an attempt to thwart Pashinyan's victory. Researchers have identified that the information campaign waged against Pashinyan is directed by Vadim Titov, the former General Director of "Rosatom" and currently the head of the Russian President's Directorate for Strategic Partnership and Cooperation. Valery Chernyshov, head of this Directorate's Department for Interregional and Socio-Cultural Ties, and his deputy Dmitry Avanesov, are operatives of the Russian special services and directly curate the Armenian trajectory. Another official involved in the Armenian elections is Mikhail Kalugin, head of the 4th CIS Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. M. Kalugin formerly worked at the Russian Embassy in the United States and left the US after his name was implicated in interference in the 2016 presidential elections.
According to "The Insider's" investigation, when Samvel Karapetyan obtained an international passport in Kaluga in 1999, the Ministry of Internal Affairs placed a note reading "FSB Information Center" in the "place of employment" column. Typically, secret informants or foreigners operating under the supervision of the Federal Security Service (FSB) are designated in this manner. Investigative journalists claim that Gagik Tsarukyan is a frequent guest in the offices of high-ranking officials in Moscow. In February 2019, his "Prosperous Armenia" Party signed a cooperation protocol with Putin's "United Russia" party. The leaked documents of the Russian President's former Directorate for Cultural Relations with the Near Abroad (now abolished) included a copy of Tsarukyan's passport and the financial estimates for his 2017 electoral campaign. Reacting strongly to the investigation, Nikol Pashinyan stated that if Samvel Karapetyan is an employee of the Russian Federal Security Service, then his party constitutes an agent network. The Prime Minister emphasized that every member and supporter of Karapetyan's party must choose whether they are a citizen or an agent (News.am, 2026). Several days after the publication of the investigation, Andranik Tevanyan, who ranked second on the candidate list of "Prosperous Armenia," was arrested on charges of high treason and espionage with the authorization of the CEC (Kavkaz-uzel, 2026). Following "The Insider," "Euronews" also released a comprehensive investigation detailing a large-scale disinformation campaign waged against the Armenian government (Armenpress, 2026). It is reported that the operation commenced in March of this year via an AI-driven network named "Matryoshka." By early May, researchers had identified 343 fake videos on social media. Certain fake videos instil the narrative that a war will erupt between Russia and Armenia should Pashinyan emerge victorious. Alongside "Matryoshka," researchers also recorded the activity of the "Storm-1516" network. This network conducts campaigns aimed at the destabilization of democratic institutions through information manipulation.
Russian interference in election discourse
At the beginning of the campaign, the opposition constructed its propaganda primarily on two main pillars:
- Socio-economic themes;
- National security in the post-conflict period.
Maintaining the electoral discourse on this plane was advantageous for the opposition, especially since it is well known that topics related to the economy and population welfare dominate the rhetoric and electoral propaganda of oppositional forces worldwide, regardless of a country's level of development. In Armenia, there are indeed substantial problems in this domain. Samvel Karapetyan's personal success story in big business became the principal reference point for him and his supporters in the promotional campaign. Karapetyan promises to lead Armenia toward rapid development, enhancing the welfare of the people by providing them with decent jobs and wages. "I am a creative person; throughout my life, I have built thousands of buildings, factories, workplaces, hospitals, and schools in dozens of countries. My name has enabled me to establish business ties all over the world. Now, my potential must serve Armenia and our people," he stated in a video address to the nation at the launch of the electoral campaign (Arminfo 2026). The bloc's program includes appealing social promises such as the creation of 300,000 jobs, the construction of 20,000 affordable housing units for young families, the provision of child allowances to ensure demographic growth, and others (Armenpress 2026). "Strong Armenia" also presented a program titled "Strong Peace" in the security sector to the public (News.am, 2026). During the presentation, court photographs of the representatives of Karabakh's former separatist administration standing trial in Baku were displayed, alongside a promise that Karapetyan would bring them back. Armenia's defeat in the war was attributed entirely to Pashinyan's weakness, thereby highlighting the necessity of replacing him. Karapetyan stated that he perceived the loss of Karabakh very painfully, evaluating it as the loss of national dignity. Undoubtedly, in an environment of fierce political competition, the absence of "black PR" and negative campaigning is impossible. Karapetyan's declaration that the Pashinyan government was preparing to bring and settle 300,000 Azerbaijanis in Armenia significantly escalated tensions. "This government has one principle: how to satisfy Aliyev, how to execute his orders, how to bring 300,000 Azerbaijanis here and provide them with housing and work. Because their leader has ordered so. We will put a stop to this," Karapetyan stated (News.am, 2026). Going even further, he asserted that if the fatal policy of the current government is not immediately halted, a few years later Armenians will face the threat of losing their identity, and their primary occupation will become performing the namaz (News.am, 2026).
Lowering the level of discourse even further, Dashnak Ishkhan Saghatelyan, one of the leaders of the "Armenia" bloc, referred to Pashinyan as Heydar Aliyev's son: "It is a lie that Pashinyan is a faithful man; no Christian would wage such a struggle against the Armenian people. Sometimes I think that Heydar Aliyev had two sons — Ilham and Nikol. They fight against the Armenian people in coordination with each other..." (News.am, 2026). Kocharyan, in turn, emphasized that choosing Pashinyan is equivalent to choosing Aliyev (News.am, 2026).
While debates, mutual criticism, and accusations predominantly revolved around these themes, Russia's transition to a harsh, threatening rhetoric and initiation of sanctions against the Pashinyan government brought the geopolitical context of domestic competition to the forefront, redirecting the discourse accordingly. Ukrainian President Zelensky's participation and speech at the European Political Community summit held in Yerevan acted as a catalyst for developments in this direction. Following the summoning of Armenia's Ambassador to Russia to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where a severe protest was delivered at the level of Deputy Minister, a daily regimen of statements and declarations by high-ranking Russian officials regarding Armenia commenced (Vzglyad, 2026).
Warnings and sanctions
In a statement to journalists following the May 9 parade, President Putin called on Armenia to promptly make a choice between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union and to hold a referendum. He issued a warning to Armenia by recalling that the problems concerning Ukraine also originated from the issue of Euro-integration (Arminfo, 2026). The notion of Armenia's economic dependence on Russia runs as a red thread through all statements by Russian officials, who assert that Armenia is the beneficiary of bilateral cooperation with Moscow and multilateral cooperation within the framework of the Eurasian Economic Union, and that it stands to lose these advantages. Sanctions against Armenia began on May 20 with the temporary restriction of floral product imports from the country (News.am, 2026). Subsequently, an official letter sent by the Russian Minister of Energy to the Armenian Ministry of Territorial Administration and Infrastructure indicated that if the course towards integration with the European Union is maintained, Moscow might unilaterally suspend the 2013 agreement on the supply of natural gas, petroleum products, and rough diamonds to Armenia (Kommersant, 2026). Under this agreement, Moscow had abolished export duties on these products bound for Armenia. Armenia meets its natural gas requirements almost entirely through Russia. In 2025, "Gazprom" delivered 2.7 billion cubic meters of gas to Armenia at $177 per thousand cubic meters. Concurrently, Armenia imported 476 million cubic meters of gas from Iran under the "Gas for Electricity" program. Annually, Armenia purchases nearly 1 million tons of petroleum products duty-free from Russia. In recent years, Yerevan has been able to diversify its imports in this sector. Specifically, out of the approximately 121,000 tons of gasoline imported in 2025, only one-quarter originated from Russia. The Russian government later imposed a ban on the import of fruits and vegetables (cucumbers, tomatoes, greens, peppers, strawberries), "Jermuk" mineral water, cognac, and wines from Armenia. In 2024, Armenia exported $53.2 million worth of fruit and $74.1 million worth of vegetables to Russia. Russia sells products such as natural gas, gasoline, wheat, flour, and fertilizers to Armenia at prices three times lower than market rates. Russia accounts for 98% of Armenia's agricultural exports and 78% of its alcoholic beverage exports. Furthermore, Armenian citizens work in Russia without quotas or permits, and in 2025, they remitted $3.9 billion to their home country. Nearly 40% of the tourists arriving in Armenia last year were Russians (RBC, 2026).
As is evident, Armenia has a conspicuous economic dependence on Russia, which is the result of the policies pursued over many years by the governments of the independence era (Ter-Petrosyan, Kocharyan, Sargsyan).
Russia has also sought to enlist the support of the Eurasian Union in its policy of pressure against Armenia, and on May 29, a joint declaration by the leaders of four countries (Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan) was adopted at the organization's summit held in Astana. The declaration notes that at the subsequent meeting scheduled for December 2026, a report will be heard on the possible consequences of suspending Armenia's participation in the Eurasian Economic Union. The other three states supported Russia's position regarding the conduct of a referendum in Armenia in the shortest possible timeframe (News.am, 2026). As a logical consequence of the tensions, Russia recalled its ambassador to Armenia for consultations on May 30 (Meduza, 2026).
Western support for Pashinyan
The panorama presented by the pre-electoral situation in Armenia demonstrates that the competition between Russia and the West over the region has entered a decisive phase. While Moscow attempts to retain Armenia and the South Caucasus within its sphere of influence, Brussels and Washington perceive the region as a crucial node of the Central Asia-Europe corridor by ensuring regional security and cooperation. In this regard, the TRIPP project holds strategic significance for the long-term engagement of the United States as a global power in the region and poses a severe threat to Russia's interests. Although Moscow itself does not openly target this project, its political proxies within Armenia conduct propaganda against it. According to Robert Kocharyan, TRIPP is designed for Azerbaijan and Turkey and will yield no benefits for Armenia (News.am, 2026).
On the eve of the elections, Armenia has been the stage for an unprecedented level of diplomatic activity. US Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited Armenia separately, while European leaders visited within the framework of the European Political Community summit. The signing of an agreement on cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy and agreements on developing cooperation in defense and high technologies (including artificial intelligence) during Vance's visit (SOVA, 2026); and the signing of the Strategic Partnership Charter, a Memorandum on the extraction and processing of critical minerals and rare earth elements, as well as a framework agreement on cooperation regarding the TRIPP project during Rubio's visit, indicate the elevation of the level of cooperation between the two countries and the concretization of Washington's interest in the region (Armenpress, 2026). Taking into account President Donald Trump's overt support for Pashinyan, all of these developments can also be considered an indirect security guarantee for the Armenian government in the face of possible Russian provocations (Arminfo 2026). The European Union, which has deployed a civilian observation mission (EUMA) in Armenia since 2023, announced the Partnership Mission in Armenia (EUPM Armenia) in April of this year within the framework of its common security and defense policy (Consilium.europa.eu, 2026). The objective is to assist Armenia in preventing threats such as hybrid attacks—electoral interference and information manipulation, cyberattacks, and illicit financial circulation. Although unstated, it is evident that Russia is intended as the source of these threats. An analogous mission was established on the eve of the recent parliamentary elections in Moldova and proved effective. These steps indicate that the EU is acting more resolutely in securing its interests compared to previous periods and does not recognize the red lines drawn by the Putin regime in the post-Soviet space. The holding of the 1st Armenia-EU Summit in early May, within the framework of the European Political Community meeting, confirms that bilateral relations have entered a new phase. In the signed joint Declaration, the law on initiating the European Union membership process, adopted by the Armenian parliament in March 2025, is officially recognized by the EU (Yerevan.today, 2026). This signifies that Armenia's dream of Euro-integration is not unilateral and that its membership perspective is officially acknowledged by the Union. Under the "Global Gateway" strategy, the EU has decided to allocate an investment package of 2.5 billion euros to Armenia and to provide 270 million euros by 2027 to support the private sector and reforms. The EU has also expressed its support for the TRIPP route. Unlike in other regions and issues, the interests of the Trump administration and the European Union converge in Armenia, acting as a primary factor that strengthens the Western bloc in regional competition.
Conclusion
The electoral campaign initially revealed severe polarization within Armenian domestic politics. The primary contradiction rests not on the grounds of ideological platforms or economic programs, but rather on the foundation of foreign policy and geopolitics. Characterizing the "Strong Armenia" and "Armenia" blocs, the main alternatives to the Pashinyan government, merely as pro-Russian is insufficient; they are political forces directly affiliated with Russia, holding financial interests in that country, openly supported by Moscow, and pursuing policies aligned with its regional interests. The fact that these forces have not formed a coalition and are participating in the elections separately stems from Samvel Karapetyan's desire to present himself to society as an entirely new force, avoiding the negative "baggage" of Kocharyan and others, which is, in fact, a correct decision from the perspective of electoral strategy.
Although the transition of Moscow's covert interventions to an overt plane towards the end of the electoral campaign derives from that state's traditional political culture, it may simultaneously indicate that Russia is aware of Armenian public opinion and does not anticipate a change of power in the elections. The agreement between Putin and Pashinyan to meet after the elections can also be considered a confirmation of this (Armenianreport, 2026). The latest opinion poll indicates that "Civil Contract" will win with a substantial majority, and that the Russian vector in the new parliament will be represented by "Strong Armenia" (Euronews 2026). In the post-election phase, momentous and historically significant events are anticipated, such as the implementation of Constitutional amendments in Armenia, the signing of a peace treaty with Azerbaijan, and the opening of the Armenia-Turkey borders. All of these will radically transform the geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus.
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Consilium.europa.eu, 2026. Armenia: EU establishes a new civilian mission to contribute strengthening the country’s resilience. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/04/21/armenia-eu-establishes-a-new-civilian-mission-to-contribute-strengthening-the-country-s-resilience/
Yerevan.today, 2026. Итоги первого саммита Армения-ЕС: совместная декларация. https://yerevan.today/ru/itogi-pervogo-sammita-armeniya-es-sovmestnaya-deklaracziya/
Armenianreport, 2026. Пашинян объявил о договоренности с Путиным о встрече после выборов. https://armenianreport.com/ru/pubs/444427/
Euronews 2026. Пашинян уверенно лидирует в предвыборных опросах в Армении с прозападным мандатом. https://ru.euronews.com/2026/05/31/armenia-pashinyan-polls
