(This research has been prepared within KHAR Center’s research program “Authoritarian Regimes and Transregional Influence Mechanisms”.)
Introduction
Europe’s greatest challenge in the 21st century is not only economic or military competition. Just as serious is the question of how it can confront Russian propaganda, which has a comparable degree of influence. The systematic Russian propaganda machine holds almost all EU member states under its influence in one way or another. Russia’s long-term and sophisticated anti-Western propaganda disrupts the EU’s internal cohesion, deepens polarization both within individual countries and inside the Union as a whole, reduces trust, and negatively affects decision-making mechanisms in a serious way.
The roots of this problem—particularly visible after Russia launched its full-scale war against Ukraine in 2022—run much deeper. Europe is losing badly to a propaganda machine that does not rely on classical methods, constantly evolves through alternative news platforms and social media, and operates through cultural, social, and economic channels, taking on an increasingly hybrid character. Only in recent years has the Union begun to recognize the seriousness of this threat and to assess Russia’s strategy as part of a geopolitical war (EEAS, FIMI Threat Report, March 2025a).
In the first piece of this KHAR Center analytical series on this grave problem, we will examine the overall landscape of Russia’s anti-Western propaganda.
Key Questions of the Research
What is the main target of Russia’s anti-Western propaganda?
How does this mechanism work?
What Is Propaganda?
Although the New Latin word propaganda derives from propagare, meaning “to spread” or “to multiply,” modern propaganda no longer fits within this simple definition. Today, propaganda is not merely the dissemination of ideas; it is a mechanism for manipulating, directing, and controlling people’s thoughts and behaviors.
In their foundational work on propaganda studies, Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O’Donnell define it as “a deliberate and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist.” According to the authors, both disinformation—the presentation of factually baseless information in a way that leads the audience to false conclusions—and manipulation—the covert use of tactics to influence others’ perceptions, thoughts, and behaviors—are integral components of propaganda (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1986a).
Propaganda often does not rely on facts, numbers, or truth; instead, it appeals to the emotional reactions of the target audience. It uses selective, biased information, ignoring counterarguments or devaluing them. Its language is simple and its messages are highly repetitive. It employs symbols and myths to strengthen ideological associations. What differentiates propaganda from other forms of communication is intent: while education informs and fosters critical thinking, propaganda manipulates and indirectly restricts free choice (Jowett & O’Donnell, 1986b).
Soviet Propaganda – Constructing an Alternative World
The anti-Western propaganda Russia inherited was a core element of state governance in the Soviet Union. The aim of Soviet propaganda was to construct an illusion of an alternative world across all domains—politics, art, media, literature, social life, and even daily routines.
“Enemies” and “heroes,” “us” and “them” formed the central framework of propaganda, and their meanings could change completely depending on the political context. The status of “enemy” applied not only to individuals but to entire nations, social classes, and states. “Enemies” were divided into “external” and “internal.” For the USSR, “internal enemies” were those who did not support communist ideology or opposed the regime. Depending on political circumstances, the concept of “external enemy” also changed. According to Soviet propaganda, these countries were states seeking to undermine the Soviet political system and corrupt Soviet values (Sirenko, 2015).
From its inception, the Soviet Union controlled both physical and intellectual space through propaganda. Control over physical space was exercised through changing street and square names and installing symbolic monuments. Alongside these static symbols, the state actively used dynamic propaganda elements such as military parades, worker demonstrations, wreath-laying ceremonies, and pioneer and komsomol induction rituals in public squares (SETA, 2022).
Control over the Soviet information space did not rely solely on writers’ self-censorship. Founded in 1922, Glavlit (the Main Directorate for Literature and Publishing Affairs) was the state censorship authority across the publishing, media, and education sectors. Its function was not limited to eliminating “harmful” texts—the main goal was to ensure the presentation of the ruling ideology as the sole truth. Along with the “intellectual cleansings” of the 1930s, Glavlit effectively centralized the production of ideas. All newspaper articles, textbooks, and even works of fiction passed through this institution (CIA, 1972).
During the Cold War, propaganda became a global ideological weapon for Moscow. Through Radio Moscow and newspapers such as Pravda and Izvestiya, anti-imperialist and anti-Western messaging was disseminated. The USSR crafted an image of itself as a “peace-loving state,” contrasting Western colonial history and capitalist inequality to emphasize its supposed “moral superiority” (Prostakova, 2023).
Modern Russian Propaganda – The “Firehose of Falsehood”
Soviet ideology began losing appeal in the late 1970s. During perestroika, media control temporarily weakened, but the system survived. With Putin’s rise to power, propaganda again became an active war tactic.
Within a decade, Russia learned to turn the principles of liberal democracy against the West, developed innovative propaganda techniques, and mastered the weaponization of information (Pomerantsev & Weiss, 2014).
For Russia, information warfare—informatsionnoye protivoborstvo, or “information confrontation”—is a field of strategic importance equal to conventional and even nuclear warfare. It is considered an integral part of national security and geopolitical influence not only during war but also in peacetime (Wallner, Copeland & Giustozzi, June 2025a).
From the 2000s, especially after the five-day war with Georgia in 2008, major changes emerged in Russian anti-Western propaganda strategy; these became fully visible after the annexation of Crimea in 2014. According to RAND Corporation researchers Christopher Paul and Miriam Matthews, Russia’s current anti-Western propaganda partially draws on Soviet-era techniques—such as deliberate obfuscation and influencing audiences to unknowingly adopt the propagandist’s perspective. Yet it is also fundamentally new, shaped by the features of the contemporary information space (Paul & Matthews, 2016a).
In 2016, Paul and Matthews described this new model as the “Firehose of Falsehood.” They highlight its defining features:
- High volume and multi-channel dissemination – TV, social media, blogs, news sites, and bot networks simultaneously spread the same narrative;
- Speed, continuity, and repetition – false claims are transmitted to hundreds of platforms within seconds;
- No commitment to factual accuracy and a shameless willingness to disseminate completely fabricated information – truth is irrelevant; the goal is impact;
- Inconsistency – contradicting yesterday’s claim today is not a problem; sustaining chaos is what matters.
Russian information actors tailor their strategies to the vulnerabilities of target audiences, local contexts, and desired outcomes; therefore, approaches differ across regions and groups (Andriukaitis, 2020; Liagusha & Iarovyi, 2024).
According to the EU External Action Service’s (EEAS) 2025 report, Russia’s anti-Western propaganda operations typically follow this phased scheme:
- Seeding – introducing an initial question or doubt; taking a fragment of fact out of context;
- Amplification – rapid dissemination via bots, troll accounts, and franchise channels, including memes and short videos;
- Information laundering – reintroducing the initial claim through “independent experts” or local media, obscuring the original source;
- Normalization – the topic is repeated in TV programs, panel discussions, and officials’ statements, equating falsehood with fact.
Through this cycle, falsehood and doubt quickly become part of public discourse, and subsequent official corrections lose effectiveness (EEAS, FIMI Threat Report, March 2025b).
Russia’s Propaganda Weapons
Russian propaganda is a complex yet highly systematic mechanism. Moscow’s information warfare model integrates psychological operations and the cyber domain into a unified strategy. Under Putin, this system has become institutionalized: state media, online troll factories, and private “patriotic” organizations operate as components of a single structure serving the Kremlin’s strategic communication goals (StartComCentre, 2015).
Various actors participate in this propaganda ecosystem:
- Official state bodies and special services,
- State-funded media outlets (RT, Sputnik, etc.),
- Proxy organizations and covert groups,
- Ideologically motivated individuals and “independent” bloggers,
- Commercially motivated journalists and online platforms.
A key feature of this structure is its decentralization: some actors are part of formal command chains, while others act “independently” but mirror the Kremlin’s strategic objectives. This enables the Russian state to retain plausible deniability while sending different messages to different audiences—a flexibility impossible within formal communication channels (Wallner, Copeland & Giustozzi, June 2025b).
Moscow allocates substantial funding to maintain this global machinery. In the 2026 draft federal budget, these allocations have further increased: state TV, other state media outlets, and internet media will receive 146.3 billion rubles. Compared to the current year, official spending on propaganda will increase by 7%, and compared to 2021, by 28% (The Moscow Times, October 2025a).
State Intelligence Agencies
Russian intelligence agencies, especially the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU), play a central role in information warfare. GRU’s two most well-known cyber units — 26165 and 74455 — are referred to in Western cyber-security reports as APT28 (Fancy Bear) and APT29 (Cozy Bear), respectively.
These structures have participated in election interference operations, strategic hacking campaigns, and social-media influence operations against Western countries. However, these “Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)” groups rarely act as the “public face” of Russia’s cyber operations.
Instead, that function is often fulfilled by hacktivist groups, which “leak,” republish, or amplify information obtained from the GRU or other state bodies, making attribution and accountability significantly more difficult (Wallner, Copeland and Giustozzi, June 2025c).
RT and Sputnik – The Kremlin’s Global Megaphones
International media brands affiliated with the Russian state — such as RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik — lie at the heart of Russia’s propaganda mechanism. These global platforms produce Russian narratives in multiple languages and use regional diversification to access wider audiences. Because these outlets appear to hold legitimacy in certain segments of the international media ecosystem, their content often becomes the original source of information for external actors.
Founded in 2005 under Putin’s direct supervision, RT has an annual budget of 32 billion rubles, approximately 400 million USD (United24media, November 2025a). The creation of RT was a turning point in re-engineering media control during Putin’s second presidential term. The channel quickly evolved into a global broadcasting tool used to reinforce Kremlin narratives and sow instability in rival countries during political crises.
During Russia’s 2008 invasion of Georgia, RT served as the primary weapon amplifying the Kremlin’s deceptive manipulations and disinformation. Initially broadcasting only in English and Russian, RT later expanded to Arabic, Spanish, German, and French, becoming the Kremlin’s international megaphone (United24media, November 2025a).
Most Western researchers describe RT — especially its foreign-facing branches — as the core hub of Russia’s international disinformation system (Paul & Matthews, 2016d). Margarita Simonyan, RT’s editor-in-chief and one of the Kremlin’s main propagandists, compares the channel’s mission to the “functions of Russia’s Ministry of Defense” (EUvsDisinfo, 2018).
Sputnik, established in 2014 within the “Rossiya Segodnya” media group (which also includes RT), is another of the Kremlin’s global propaganda weapons. With offices worldwide and broadcasts in more than 30 languages, Sputnik operates as a news agency, website network, and radio broadcaster. The leadership of this network has also been entrusted to Margarita Simonyan.
RT and Sputnik are directly or indirectly involved in approximately 70% of all disinformation cases concerning the European Union. These outlets are the primary producers of anti-Western narratives on topics such as EU sanctions, the war in Ukraine, and European energy policy (EEAS, FIMI Threat Report, 2025c).
Alternative Domains, Mirror Sites, and Proxy Companies
After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the European Union banned the activities of RT and Sputnik (European Council, 2022). However, sanctions targeted broadcasting licenses, not content production or legal existence in their host countries, causing minimal operational disruption.
Due to Brussels’ delays in implementing sanctions, the adaptability of Russia’s propaganda networks, and support from local allies, the Kremlin’s main propaganda outlets effectively transformed into information guerrilla groups (United24media, November 2025b).
According to the analyst Maxime Audinet, a leading researcher of these propaganda instruments, the Kremlin uses several mechanisms to circumvent restrictions in Europe:
Secret domains and mirror sites: Hosting duplicated domains in jurisdictions where legal status is ambiguous, and enforcement of sanctions is difficult.
Alternative video platforms: Publishing content on platforms with weaker moderation than YouTube or Facebook — such as Odysee, Rumble, RuTube, VK, and others.
Third-party proxy companies: Using intermediary companies to republish RT content. For example, Tenet Media in the United States, supported by Elon Musk, shared a large number of RT-owned videos. Clips from these videos still circulate on X (Twitter).
Information laundering: Attracting influencers, public figures, and individuals posing as “independent journalists” or “alternative experts” to republish RT content under the guise of “personal opinion” (Audinet, March 2025).
Russia’s multi-platform propaganda machine is fast and agile — it repackages content to suit each platform:
- long TV segments are converted into short TikTok and YouTube Shorts,
- video fragments are cut and circulated on X,
- Telegram channels are used for initial coordination and “first taps,”
- domains are constantly rotated while the underlying narrative architecture remains identical,
- “clean” websites repost the same material,
- clipped pieces are redistributed as “commentary,” “reaction,” or “questions” to parallel audiences.
As a result, sanctions target institutional licenses, but the content itself survives.
Russia channels its narratives to Western audiences through proxy websites and agencies such as:
Strategic Culture Foundation, Global Research, New Eastern Outlook, News Front, SouthFront, Katehon, Geopolitica.ru, and others.
These platforms reproduce Kremlin messaging, disguise disinformation as “alternative perspectives,” and enhance the perceived legitimacy of Russian propaganda.
Thus, the Kremlin disseminates its messages as “independent expert opinions” while avoiding direct responsibility (Wallner, Copeland and Giustozzi, June 2025ç).
Troll Factories and Social Media Manipulation
One of the most effective components of Russia’s propaganda system is its troll factories — state-funded, centrally coordinated structures that operate through hundreds of thousands of fake accounts. The nucleus of Russia’s centralized troll operations was, for a time, the Internet Research Agency (IRA), founded in St. Petersburg in 2013 and employing hundreds of paid trolls for propaganda.
According to one of the most comprehensive academic studies from the University of Melbourne, the IRA represents a sophisticated model combining information warfare and social engineering techniques. Evidence confirms that IRA’s objective was not only to spread disinformation but also to shape public behavior, evoke emotional reactions, and indirectly influence political decision-making (UNSW, 2021a).
Formally owned by Concord Management and Consulting, the IRA was effectively controlled by Yevgeny Prigozhin, later known as the founder of the Wagner Group. Prigozhin’s key role in the IRA was to institutionalize civilian influence operations. Initially, the IRA focused on Russia’s domestic politics—monitoring online dissent against the Kremlin and ideologically framing public discourse. Soon, however, it expanded to foreign operations.
With the events in Ukraine in 2014 and the annexation of Crimea, the IRA’s role grew rapidly. It became a tool for shaping public opinion in Western countries as well (UNSW, 2021b).
The first detailed reports on the IRA emerged in 2015 (NYTimes, 2015). By then, the agency was already targeting U.S. elections. Reports show that during the 2016 presidential campaign, the IRA operated tens of thousands of fake accounts across Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube, organizing nearly 40 rallies and demonstrations within the election cycle (The Independent, 2017).
IRA’s operations in Europe intensified after 2017.
Examples include:
- an anti-Macron campaign during the French presidential elections,
- a tailored anti-migration and anti-energy-policy campaign in Germany, using local linguistic and cultural adaptations.
After public exposure and sanctions in the West, the IRA changed its name and structure in 2018, shifting from a centralized troll factory to a network model, expanding operations to Africa and Asia.
Between 2019–2021, it adopted a franchising and subcontracting system, with content production carried out in a coordinated but decentralized manner.
The group relied heavily on mirror sites and alternative video platforms.
Although formally dissolved, the IRA model re-emerged after 2021, transformed into a new-generation information army integrating artificial intelligence and automation (UNSW, 2021c).
Between November 2023 and November 2024, Europe recorded:
- 505 foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) incidents,
- across 25 platforms,
- involving 38,000 channels,
- affecting 90 countries and 332 institutions,
- producing over 68,000 disinformation items.
Nearly half of all cases were linked to Russia’s activities against Ukraine. Other primary targets included France, Germany, Moldova, Poland, and the Baltic states (Olejnik, April 2025a).
Artificial Intelligence — A Disinformation Catalyst
Russia’s attitude toward artificial intelligence is ambivalent: the Kremlin views AI both as an opportunity and as a threat due to Western dominance in the field. Therefore, Russia seeks to build a “sovereign AI ecosystem.”
This initiative is coordinated by the National Center for AI Development, and its main institutional players are:
- Sberbank (GigaChat) — promoted as an alternative to ChatGPT and a key implementer of Russia’s national AI strategy;
- Rostec — focusing on defense-oriented AI applications;
- Yandex (YandexGPT) — technologically advanced but not fully controlled by the Kremlin, and therefore positioned “second-tier.”
Generative AI is now actively used in Russian disinformation operations:
- creating fake news and deepfake videos,
- deploying automated bot networks to amplify messages,
- cloning Western media sites in operations like “Doppelgänger,”
- using AI-driven bots to saturate public discourse and produce astroturfing (fake grassroots support),
- orchestrating staged debates between bots to create an “illusion of public discussion” (Wallner, Copeland and Giustozzi, June 2025d).
Russia also uses large numbers of bots to ensure mass distribution of propaganda content. These bots especially flood the X platform, repeatedly reposting messages from numerous fake accounts. They help obscure posts from real profiles reach much wider audiences or push particular hashtags up through algorithmic rankings (Hansen, 2019).
Between 2023–2024, 73% of Russia’s propaganda-driven interference in Europe relied on short-lived, one-time disposable accounts, confirming heavy use of bots.
This trend is particularly pronounced on X, where 88% of all bot activity was recorded.
Deepfakes, synthetic audio, and AI-generated content were widely used to produce and spread anti-Western propaganda at scale (Olejnik, April 2025b).
Using the ExTrac AI social-media analysis tool, RUSI analysts categorized AI-related posts across Russian Telegram channels, blogs, and media between 2023–2025. The most active actors fall into three groups:
- Media and ideologues: RT, Sputnik, Tsargrad, PolitNavigator, Readovka.
- Military bloggers and Wagner-affiliated networks: Grey Zone, Rybar, Wargonzo, Reverse Side of the Medal.
- Technology and “patriotic startup” segment: media divisions of Sberbank and Rostec, users of GigaChat and YandexGPT.
All evidence indicates that AI has become a central ideological element of Russian propaganda. Russia’s influence networks construct narratives around AI involving fear, hope, and control. The discourse frames technology not only as an operational tool but also as a symbol of national sovereignty and information independence (Wallner, Copeland and Giustozzi, June 2025e).
“Soft Power”: Language, Culture, Religion, Academic Space, and Diaspora Networks
One of the important elements of Russia’s propaganda mechanism is “soft power.” Unlike the short-term effects produced by traditional media, new-generation media, or troll factories, the channels of religion, culture, and diaspora are quieter, more invisible, more adaptive, and significantly more resilient. Under Putin, the core of this strategy is the concept of “Russkiy mir” (the Russian World). In post-Soviet states and in areas of Europe with concentrated Russian-speaking populations, the Kremlin uses this idea both as an ideological and emotional framework — as a cultural and spiritual bridge. Although the formal aim is the preservation of the Russian language and culture, the deeper purpose is to cultivate groups loyal to Russia and supportive of its agenda (Mikhaylova, 2017).
The main role in Russia’s soft-power strategy is played by the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church functions as one of the Kremlin’s instruments and acts as an effective element of Russia’s increasingly dangerous soft-power apparatus (Solik, Baar, 2019).
Russian cultural propaganda operates through three primary institutions:
- Rossotrudnichestvo – manages the global network of Russian Cultural Centers (Russian Houses) (Elman Fattah, 2019).
- Russkiy Mir Foundation – established in 2007; through its offices in various countries, it spreads Russian narratives under the guise of language and culture promotion.
- Gorchakov Foundation – a non-governmental organization with close ties to the Kremlin. It carries out a wide range of projects, from small grants for youth groups and NGOs, to organizing international events such as the Potsdam Meetings, to promoting increased Russian influence in Georgia (Koval, 2024).
One of the areas where the West has lost the most ground to Russian propaganda is the academic sphere. During the Soviet period, Western researchers were denied access to political archives, forcing scholars either to work on harmless subjects or to ignore inconvenient truths to secure invitations from Moscow. Soviet intelligence used this weakness to infiltrate its own narratives into historical and political research in enemy states, especially the United States (Hosaka, 2025a).
The process continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union and intensified as Russia engaged foreign scholars through espionage, incentives, and rewards. Today, the academic sphere still reproduces Russian intelligence interpretations of major global events. One of the clearest examples of how the Kremlin uses international events for intelligence and influence operations is the Valdai Club, held annually since 2004 and gathering over 1,000 scholars from 85 countries each year (Hosaka, 2025b).
Energy Dependence, Economic Leverage, and Corruption Networks
Russia systematically uses economic tools to exert political influence — especially energy supplies, pricing manipulation, and trade concessions. Gas and oil contracts serve not only commercial purposes but also operate as levers to reshape domestic political narratives in target countries. The clearest examples are in Eastern Europe. Russia’s hybrid-warfare strategy targets the energy sector — one of the pillars of national security in these states.
Core mechanisms include:
- Kremlin-aligned managers controlling traditional media through energy and corruption ties,
- disinformation campaigns on social media,
- cyberattacks aimed at undermining trust in national and regional energy infrastructure.
Disinformation campaigns cast doubt on the effectiveness of Western energy projects, social-media platforms amplify these narratives to shape public opinion, while cyberattacks target public confidence in energy resilience to generate internal instability (Warsaw Institute, 2024).
Another tool of Russian propaganda is corruption and the co-optation of elites. Through intermediary companies, foundations, pro-Russian businessmen, politicians, and media executives, the Kremlin actively works to suppress criticism, cultivate sympathy through the organization of cultural, economic, and academic events, and neutralize skeptical voices in target states (Yalamov, 2018).
CONCLUSION
The overall picture shows that Russia’s propaganda machine is a sophisticated governance mechanism and a critical geopolitical weapon. It is not merely simple rumor-spreading or misinformation — it is a multi-layered and complex structure. Its main goal in Europe is to plant seeds of doubt, legitimize falsehoods, manipulate societies, and steer political decisions in target countries. The “Firehose of Falsehood” model is designed precisely for this purpose: to flood the information space with massive, fast, repetitive, emotionally driven narratives detached from truth and factual grounding — thereby clouding political reality and obstructing rational decision-making.
Russia’s propaganda ecosystem is multi-layered — Soviet-era propaganda reflexes, intelligence operations, official media channels, troll factories, mirror sites, social-media manipulation, bot networks, AI-generated synthetic content, diaspora structures, the Orthodox Church, elite capture, economic lobby groups, and energy dependence all reinforce and complement each other.
Although its ideology has changed, the core instincts of Russian propaganda endure: the “us versus them” dichotomy, the creation of internal and external enemies, and the impulse toward total control over information. Since Putin’s rise to power, only the tools have changed and multiplied — the old Soviet Glavlit and Pravda have been replaced by a multi-layered network of interconnected mechanisms. This network combines centralized coordination with informal, deniable elements that enable the Kremlin to evade direct responsibility.
The European Union still struggles to counter this complex architecture. EU responses to the Kremlin’s persistent and systematic propaganda remain episodic, reactive, and focused on refutation rather than prevention or long-term strategy. Forecasting and preemptive measures are weak. Sanctions have limited effect — Russian propaganda adapts rapidly, finds alternative channels, and bypasses restrictions with ease. Before the Ukraine war, the system was easier to track; now it has gone “underground,” and through mirror sites, proxy companies, alternative platforms, franchised networks, “independent commentators,” and soft-power instruments, the circulation of content has increased even more. In recent years, advancements in artificial intelligence have made the situation even more complex.
All of this indicates that the EU — and any state targeted by Russian propaganda — must develop an adequate strategic response. Russian propaganda must be treated not merely as a problem of disinformation or manipulation, but as a security and governance threat requiring coordinated action. Refutations and fact-checking alone are grossly insufficient: this challenge demands a large-scale strategy involving intelligence, cybersecurity, energy security, media regulation, politics, culture, religion, and education — engaging both state and non-state actors within a sustained, systematic framework.
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