(The article was prepared within the framework of the KHAR Center's research on "Authoritarian Regimes and Transregional Influence Mechanisms".)
Introduction
The Baltic states—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—are among the constant targets of Russia's propaganda operations. The history of Russian influence operations in this region dates back long before the 2014 occupation of Crimea and the popularization of the concept of "hybrid warfare". There is more than one reason for this, and the most important reason is that the Baltic states possess a special status among post-Soviet countries, such as membership in the European Union and especially in NATO.
These countries are among the few NATO and EU members that have a direct land border with Russia - apart from them, among the EU and NATO members, Poland, Finland, and Norway (only a NATO member) have a land border with Russia. If we also consider the border of Latvia and Lithuania with Belarus, the map of the threat expands even further.
Their location on the coast of the Baltic Sea also makes these countries an automatic target for the Kremlin. Statistical research shows that a significant part of Russia's maritime trade, especially oil exports, is conducted specifically through Russian ports in the Baltic Sea (CREA, 2023).
The Baltic Sea also serves as a route between the Kaliningrad region, which is Russia's heavily militarized outpost, and Russia's "mainland"; moreover, Russia has a transit agreement with Lithuania for access to this exclave (Parks, 2024).
On the other hand, these countries have been under Russian and Soviet occupation for a long time. In order to "justify" its aggression, Russia presents the territories of the new states that restored their independence after the collapse of the USSR in 1991 as "Russia's historical borders", and in this context, the Baltic states are portrayed as possible "next targets" after Ukraine in revisionist Russian narratives.
There are other important factors as well. Estonia and Latvia are among the countries within the EU with the highest number of ethnic Russians and Russian citizens. At the same time, the Baltic states trail only behind Poland among the countries that have accepted the highest number of Ukrainian refugees relative to their population size (UNHCR, 2026). These countries are also at the forefront of international support for Ukraine. All these characteristics turn the Baltic countries into one of the main targets of Russia's influence operations from political, geographical, security, and psychological perspectives.
In this article, the KHAR Center examines Russia's propaganda narratives and mechanisms in the Baltic countries, analyzing Russian propaganda on three levels: strategic goals, narratives, and dissemination mechanisms...
The main purpose of this article is to systematically analyze the propaganda activities carried out by Russia in the Baltic states: • To determine the strategic goals pursued by Russia in these countries, • To uncover the main narratives (ideological messages) it uses, • To investigate through which media channels and local mechanisms these narratives are disseminated.
The article answers the questions, "Through which main narratives, channels, and local amplification mechanisms does Russia conduct propaganda operations in the Baltic countries? What common and distinct features do Russian propaganda and its dissemination mechanisms bear in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia?"
RUSSIA'S TACTICS IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES: INTERVENTION IN NATO WITHOUT CROSSING THE THRESHOLD OF NATO INTERVENTION...
Russia views the Baltic region as a key area in its broader confrontation with the European Union and NATO. Particularly after 2022, Russia has presented the war against Ukraine as a component of a larger-scale global confrontation with the "collective West". Putin has linked both his domestic legitimacy and the restructuring of Russia's political-economic system to a grand geopolitical confrontation with the West. This confrontation has become a part of Russia's new "identity", and in this context, the target status of the NATO-member Baltic states for the Kremlin has increased even further. This status in the current situation entails intervention through non-military hybrid influence tools that serve the strategic goal of weakening Europe and its allies, rather than being an open war target. This is because a military aggression against the Baltic countries would provoke NATO intervention. For this reason, in Russia's view, hybrid intervention is the most effective option to destabilize Europe and undermine its support for Ukraine without crossing the threshold that would trigger NATO's collective defense mechanism (Article 5) (Parks, 2024).
Analytical reports show that Russia has aggressively expanded the use of hybrid influence tools in the Baltic Sea region following its launch of the full-scale war in Ukraine in 2022. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are daily targets of Russia's hybrid tactics, and these tactics target the sovereignty of the aforementioned countries. Historically, Moscow has utilized numerous political, economic, energy, and cyber tactics to weaken the Baltic countries. However, its efforts in recent years have shifted to a more aggressive form as they also encompass military pressure (Bajarunas, 2025).
RUSSIAN NARRATIVES IN THE BALTIC COUNTRIES
Eitvydas Bajarunas, an experienced Lithuanian diplomat holding the status of an ambassador responsible for countering hybrid threats, assesses Russia's recent influence activities in the Baltic countries across seven categories - information warfare and propaganda; sabotage, vandalism, covert acts of violence, and conventional aggression; public vulnerability; election interference; cyberattacks; energy; illegal migration. Dozens of narratives are produced and disseminated within each of these fields of activity, taking into account the characteristic features of each country (Bajarunas, 2025).
Alongside the production of specific disinformation and manipulation theses for each country, Russia's overarching propaganda narratives encompassing the Baltic states bear the elements of the five main templates it applies worldwide. These are "the elites vs. the people", "threatened values", "lost sovereignty and threatened national identity", "imminent collapse", and "Hahaganda" narratives (KHAR Center, 2025).
The Ukraine Narrative
The "Ukraine package" is among the most functional Russian narratives in the Baltic countries, just as it is worldwide, especially after 2022. Claims that Russia's aggression against Ukrainian territories is a proxy war of the West-NATO, that the West is the instigator of the escalation, and that Russia is giving a "forced response" constitute the immutable pillar of the narrative. The highest level of disinformation regarding Ukraine has been recorded in Lithuania. In this framework, disinformation and manipulations aim to exaggerate Russia's "successes", discredit local authorities, and intimidate the residents of the Baltic countries. The allegations label Ukrainians as "Nazis" and suggest that support for Ukraine could "provoke" Russian aggression against the Baltics. Additionally, a smear campaign is conducted by putting fake stories into circulation about Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky allegedly using drugs (BECID, 2025).
The Refugee Narrative
The issue of Ukrainian refugees, as an important element of this package, is continuously kept at the center of Kremlin disinformation. Refugees are portrayed as a "privileged class", people who "benefit from the country's resources while the public's welfare deteriorates", and a "source of danger"; all these claims are conflated with economic problems and dissatisfaction, and efforts are made to create a "local versus newcomer" conflict in society. Two years ago, research centers uncovered documents regarding plans by the SDA (Social Design Agency), one of the Kremlin's most important troll factories, to incite Russian speakers against Ukrainian migrants in the Baltic countries. According to this plan, which particularly encompassed Latvia, Russian propaganda strategists prioritized fueling hatred towards Ukrainian refugees starting from late 2022. The plan envisioned steps such as social media messaging, complaint campaigns, and influencing political parties to spread the narrative that Ukrainian refugees live better than lower-earning local Russians. Investigations show that the first and second parts of the plan were implemented; for this purpose, web pages imitating popular local media outlets were created, fake news was spread, and these were multiplied on social media as supposedly legitimate news material (EDMO, 2024).
The NATO Narrative
The formation of an environment of distrust towards NATO constitutes one of Russia's largest narrative packages in the Baltic countries. This primarily includes claims that the Baltic countries (and also Poland) do not trust NATO's Article 5 guarantee and thus demand additional security guarantees, as well as "analyses" asserting that NATO would betray this region in a potential conflict between Russia and the Baltic states, leaving Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia to stand alone (EUvsDisinfo, 2021). In general, the foundation of this narrative is the claim that Russia is the only sovereign country and that only Russia can guarantee true independence to its allies, and according to this claim, the Baltic countries, like Ukraine, are "governed by foreign masters" (SCEEUS, 2022).
In another narrative line "sold" alongside this "package", the Baltic countries are depicted as "warmongers" and "Russophobic outposts" of the "Collective West". It is claimed that the governments of these countries face an economic and social collapse because they direct all their money to Ukraine and disregard the "interests of their own citizens" (Praks, 2024). This also includes theses suggesting that EU policy hinders the public's level of welfare and increases inflation. These narratives are mainly aimed at dividing EU solidarity against Russia in the energy-economy context. In recent years, much of the disinformation in this direction has aimed to undermine confidence in alternative energy sources like LNG. The dose of this disinformation further increased last year with the disconnection of all three Baltic countries from the Soviet-era power grid of Russia (BRELL-Belarus-Russia-Estonia-Latvia-Lithuania). This decision, declared by the President of Lithuania by saying "Goodbye Russia, goodbye Lenin" and evaluated as a second independence for the Baltic countries, was accompanied by massive attacks of Russian propaganda. Kremlin propaganda evaluated this as an "energy disaster", "darkness, and chaos", and attempted to present planned power outages as the effect of this decision (Kazlauskas, 2025).
Among the manipulative theses popular during election periods in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in particular, there are a wide variety of household-type claims, such as that the EU will immediately force everyone to drive electric cars, the repair of old cars will be halted, and heating homes with firewood will be banned (Re:Baltica, 2024a).
The History and Occupation Narrative
Another narrative package is centered on the history-occupation discourse. This is a separate direction specific particularly to the three Baltic republics. Russia has repeatedly accused the Baltic states of systematically distorting the history of the Second World War, heroizing Nazi collaborators, and persecuting Russian speakers. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs plays a primary role in disseminating these accusations in international institutions. Through open statements and diplomatic channels, the Ministry attempts to bring to the forefront the supposedly Russophobic policies of the Baltic states. Russia uses these accusations to exert pressure on the Baltic states, thereby trying to justify its aggressive foreign policy and geopolitical interests (VSD, February 2026).
This package includes the following theses: the denial of the fact that the Baltic countries were occupied by the Soviet Union, attempts by Russia and Belarus to unjustifiably place the responsibility for Nazi crimes in the Second World War on the peoples occupied by the USSR (including Latvians), presenting the efforts to dismantle monuments glorifying the Soviet army and the USSR regime in the Baltic countries as "proof of the revival of Nazism", utilizing the myth of "victory" in the Second World War as an ideological pillar and portraying it as a "framework of the fight against Nazism even now", the claim that "Russophobia is growing in the Baltics, this is a revival of fascism, there is a threat to compatriots", an increase in aggression on the eves of historical commemoration days, "Soviet-era" nostalgia, etc... (VDD, February 2026).
The Elites vs. the People and Threatened Values Narrative
The Kremlin's "elites vs. the people" narrative stands out as a direction that becomes particularly active in the Baltic countries on the eve of election campaigns. The goal is to reduce trust in democratic processes through disinformation about election fraud, corruption, and anti-government sentiments. At the same time, in these campaigns, the leaders of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are accused of incompetence and of being puppets of the West, and the legitimacy of coalitions is called into question (Balticdisinfo, 2024a).
The "threatened values" package, one of Russia's most popular and continuous disinformation narratives across Europe as a whole, is also characteristic of the Baltic region. The main line of this narrative is the claim that the West opposes traditional family values and is morally decaying. In this framework, disinformation is spread claiming that children will be taught sex in schools, children will be encouraged to be gay, the gender of minors will be changed without their parents' consent, and mechanisms like the Istanbul Convention will be used to tear children away from the family (Re: Baltica, 2024 b).
MAIN PROPAGANDA ACTORS
In the Baltic countries, Russian propaganda mechanisms operate with a classical system: official state bodies, state propaganda media, local proxies, soft power, coordinated networks, and auxiliary tools such as narrative amplification following cyberattacks, infiltration, and sabotage...
Although the ranking of these mechanisms varies by country, the most widely used content production and multiplication mechanism in all three countries is "Telegram". In 2024, a Russian institution named "Pravfond" awarded a grant of 109 thousand euros to a "Telegram" channel network with the aim of spreading propaganda about the Baltic countries. With this money, channels broadcasting in Russian on Telegram such as "Балтийский мост" (The Baltic Bridge), "Тени Прибалтики" (Shadows of the Baltics), and "Прибалтика без цензуры" (The Baltics Uncensored) were created, along with channels named "Laimes lācis" for Latvia, "Vardan tos Lietuvos!" for Lithuania, and "Vana Toomase teataja" for Estonia.
"Балтийский мост", the largest of these channels, also broadcasts weekly programs on "YouTube" and "Rutube", and the program is prepared by a Sputnik employee. However, in recent months, "Youtube" has closed down most of the Kremlin propaganda channels (Re:Baltica, 2025).
"Pravfond" also provides legal assistance to Kremlin propaganda staff in the Baltic states. According to an investigation by "Re: Baltica", since 2017, this fund has transferred 164 thousand euros for the legal support of at least 15 pro-Kremlin activists in Lithuania. Even after being included in the EU sanctions list in 2023, "Pravfond" was applied to for 56 thousand euros. According to information obtained by investigative journalism organizations from the internal correspondence and documents of "Pravfond", this institution, which is an apparatus of Russia's hybrid war, carries out espionage-propaganda activities in at least 40 countries in Europe and abroad. Normunds Mežviets, the head of the Latvian State Security Service, states that those who introduce themselves as "Pravfond" employees are operatives of Russian intelligence agencies (Re: Baltica, 2025).
Another propaganda mechanism of Russia that encompasses all Baltic countries and even their neighbors is "scientific research centers". Starting from 2020, in the Kremlin's official discourse, the Baltic Sea region is described as the "Baltic-Scandinavian macro-region"; this label is used to conceal attempts to re-establish ties with researchers and policymakers in that territory. This policy was implemented by the Directorate for Cross-Border Cooperation of the Russian Presidential Administration; since 2021, the said directorate has planned and coordinated the Kremlin's policy towards the Baltic countries and Belarus. In 2023, the BSM concept was expanded to include Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Germany, and Poland (Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, 2026).
Within the framework of this concept, an international discussion format known as the "Baltic Platform" was created; through this format, the Kremlin has attempted to revive ties with scientists, politicians, and local government representatives in the Baltic and Scandinavian countries and presented this as an academic cooperation effort. However, the Kremlin's attempts regarding the Baltic Platform have largely been unsuccessful (Estonian Foreign Intelligence Service, 2026).
Latvia
The Baltic country where Russia is most active as an official state institution propaganda actor is Latvia (VDD, February 2026). According to the 2025 report of the Latvian State Security Service (VDD), the Russian embassy in Riga plays an active role, particularly in memory politics and propaganda activities, together with a network of compatriot organizations, activists, cultural associations, and related individuals in this country. This role consists mostly of legitimization and coordination.
For instance, it is emphasized that Viktors Gušcins, as one of the main coordinators of Russia's "compatriot policy" in Latvia, maintained close relations with the Russian embassy for a long time and that these contacts continued in 2025. The Russian embassy's line of influence on youth also draws special attention. Accordingly, the embassy advertises state-funded places for education at Russian universities; the collection and selection of applications are handled by "Rossotrudnichestvo" (VDD, February 2026).
Additionally, the VDD emphasizes that there is a decrease in Kremlin support for local influence actors, but Moscow compensates for the decline in its direct influence capabilities through more agile, digital, and indirect propaganda networks. Although the operation of Russia's traditional propaganda resources is banned in Latvia, their content is reshared and delivered to the audience via "TikTok", "Facebook", "Instagram", and "YouTube". Furthermore, the content of Russian media resources such as "RIA Novosti" and "Izvestia" is transported to Latvia's information space via "Telegram" (VDD, February 2025).
In 2025, Russia intensively used "Telegram" in Latvia both to spread propaganda content and to build an alternative pro-Kremlin channel network. Monitoring by "Balticdisinfo" also confirms this; among the main pro-Kremlin "Telegram" accounts tracked in Latvia are Aleksejs Rosļikovs's channel, "Antifascists of Pribaltics", "Sprats in Exile", and "Baltnews", the channel of "Rossiya Segodnya". These channels are also active in other Baltic countries, and in 2025, their most viral period was the month of August (Balticdisinfo, 2025a).
Russia also heavily utilizes pro-Kremlin figures who have fled Latvia in its propaganda. The VDD reports that Russian activists who fled to Russia and Belarus played an important role in the information influence against Latvia, presenting themselves as "victims of political persecution" and "Baltic experts", and giving interviews to Russian and Belarusian propaganda resources. The names of individuals such as Sergejs Vasiljevs, Aleksejs Stefanovs, Ruslans Pankratovs, Andrejs Mamikins, Romans Samuls, and blogger Dmitrijs Matvejevs, who later went to Minsk, are mentioned in this category. The VDD specifically associates Stefanovs with "Sputnik"-"Rossiya Segodnya" and highlights his active role in the Kremlin media ecosystem (VDD, February 2026).
Latvia's conservative-populist political actors also hold a special place in Russia's propaganda ecosystem. In this context, the "Stability" party and its leader Aleksejs Rosļikovs, the "Union of New Latvians" and affiliated figures Glorija Grevcova and Rūdolfs Brēmanis, and "Latvia First" and Ainārs Šlesers are mentioned. (VDD, February 2026).
Russia has also established "expert", "academic", and "compatriot policy" networks for propaganda. It is highlighted that institutions like the "Institute of CIS Countries" organize events related to the Baltic countries, that pro-Kremlin figures of Baltic origin who fled to Russia participate in these events, and that they are utilized to legitimize Russia's foreign policy narratives (VDD, February 2026).
Lithuania
Unlike Latvia, the Russian embassy in Lithuania is not in the role of an active propaganda actor; rather, it primarily fulfills the function of an institutional cover to conceal the espionage network Moscow has sought to rebuild in recent years, sabotage operations and their organizers, and propaganda channels. The dissemination of narratives against Lithuania is ensured by a coordinated network consisting of Russia's state-controlled media, social networks, and pro-Russian websites. Bots, troll networks, and targeted advertising are used to amplify the broadcast (VSD, February 2026).
In fact, Lithuania (as well as Latvia) banned the operation of RT, the Kremlin's official propaganda organ, in 2020 - two years before the European Union (AP, 2020). When Russia launched a full-scale attack against Ukraine in 2022, 5 more Russian-language channels broadcasting in Lithuania - Belarus 24, NTV Mir, RTR Planeta, Rossiya 24, PBK, and TVCI - were also closed (LRT, 2022). However, the channel ban could not ensure a content ban, and Russian official propaganda continues to infiltrate Lithuania. At the end of 2024, broadcasts conducted by the banned "Sputnik" radio from Kaliningrad were transmitted to listeners in western Lithuania. The Lithuanian State Radio and Television Centre managed to cut off "Sputnik"'s signal. But this time, "Sputnik" content entered Lithuania through "Telegram" channels. On the other hand, the Ministry of Culture, which later took over the responsibility for this issue from the Ministry of Transport, stated that a budget shortage could bring the possibility of "Sputnik" broadcasting again onto the agenda (LRT, 2025a).
Just as in Latvia, the "National Threat Assessment for 2025" report prepared by the Lithuanian State Security Department (VSD) and the Defense Intelligence and Security Service under the Ministry of National Defense (AOTD) notes that Russia uses "Telegram" as the most active platform for its propaganda and disinformation campaigns (KAM, 2025). Alongside "Antifascists of the Baltics", "Antifascists of Lithuania", specifically created for Lithuania, and "Dream" (Mriya24) are the most popular of these channels (Baltikdisinfo, 2024b).
The main "narrative legitimizers" of the Kremlin in Lithuania are local media propaganda resources such as 77.lt, bukimevieningi.lt, ekspertai.eu, laisvaslaikrastis.lt, minfa.lt. These sites process domestic agenda topics that attract the audience's attention more in accordance with Russian narratives, and their main function is to "create the appearance of a local source". The most active among these is the site 77.lt, created in April 2023. This platform operates as both a social network and a news portal and is managed by the Lithuanian pro-Kremlin propagandist Antanas Kandrotas, known by the nickname "Celofanas". He is also quite active on "Facebook" (CRI, 2024). In general, "Facebook" remains the second main platform for spreading disinformation in Lithuania (BECID, 2025).
The disinformation landscape on TikTok in Lithuania has formed more recently; most of the popular TikTok disinformation accounts only gained significant followings on the platform in 2024. This indicates that as TikTok becomes popularized in Lithuania, local disinformation actors also begin to view it as a promising channel for spreading false narratives (BECID, 2025).
New technologies are also increasingly utilized in information operations against Lithuania. AI-based manipulation tools—"deepfake" videos, fake profiles and pages, fake domains, and targeted advertising campaigns—have made the dissemination of disinformation faster and convincing (Debunk, 2025).
In Lithuania, some political actors and their social media infrastructure play an amplifier role in transporting Kremlin narratives into domestic politics. These actors and all the companies they manage, the media institutions they edit, groups on social networks, internet portals, and various associations are interconnected through very tight ties. Various studies show that the main disseminators of Russia's FIMI (foreign information manipulation and interference) content in Lithuania gather around Algirdas Paleckis, a former Lithuanian politician who was convicted and sentenced to prison for espionage for Russia. Paleckis is one of the old pro-Russian propagandists; in the 2010s, he was convicted for denying the Soviet aggression of January 13, 1991, and his "killed by our own" narrative persists to this day and remains one of the important tools of Russian FIMI operations. Even while in prison, Paleckis created an association called "Tarptautinis geros kaimynystės forumas" ("International Good Neighborhood Forum") (later dissolved by a Lithuanian court). That organization maintained close ties with Russia and Belarus (CRI, 2024).
Although Paleckis is currently in prison, his supporters continue to actively share videos on his "YouTube" channel and other platforms. This reveals a third category of Kremlin-linked actors in Lithuania - "background" actors who primarily operate online. As an example of these "background" actors, Jonas Kovalskis, who presents himself as a lawyer and spreads Anti-Western, Anti-EU, and Anti-NATO content, can be pointed out. He manages both personal accounts and groups called "Citizens". The group is managed from Estonia and Kyrgyzstan as well as Lithuania. These actors are very active and make posts several times a day on various platforms. After "Facebook" blocked some accounts, their activities shifted mainly to "Telegram" (CRI, 2024).
Among the most active disseminators of the Kremlin's FIMI content in Lithuania is also the "Teisingumo Aušra" ("Dawn of Justice") movement. Kazimieras Juraitis plays a main role in this network - he appears on the "PressJazz TV" internet channel, is an administrator of several "YouTube" channels, and is known as one of the main disseminators of disinformation. Former MP Audrius Nakas also manages the media platform "ekspertai.eu" and is closely connected to "PressJazz TV". Other supporters of Paleckis include Kristoferis Voiška and Eduardas Vaitkus (CRI, 2024).
Eduardas Vaitkus, who was a candidate in the 2024 presidential elections and received the votes of nearly 104 thousand voters (2.64 percent), was the main figure turning Kremlin narratives into a domestic agenda throughout the campaign. Although he disappeared for a while after the elections, he emerged in Belarus in 2025 and continued anti-Lithuanian propaganda. Following this, it was reported that an investigation was initiated against him (NewEastern Europe, 2025). The Lithuanian People's Party, previously chaired by Vaitkus, is listed as a threat in the reports of Lithuanian security bodies, while Lithuanian President Gitanas Nausėda calls Vaitkus the most important representative of the fifth column (LRT, 2025b).
Another pro-Kremlin candidate from the 2024 elections, Remigijus Žemaitaitis, also continues active operations in Lithuanian politics; he is currently the leader of the "Nemuno Aušra" Party, which is a part of the ruling coalition in the Lithuanian Seimas. He controls several social media groups and websites, and is also a co-founder of a "Telegram" page named "Liaudies žurnalistika", where pro-Russian content is actively shared. Žemaitaitis conducts an open and systematic disinformation campaign, particularly on his "Facebook" page, continuing his anti-Ukraine and anti-Western stance (NewEastern Europe, 2025).
Lithuanian intelligence notes that pro-Kremlin actors who have fled the country and hide in Belarus and Russia are also used in the propaganda campaign against the Baltic states. In this lineup, the names of Edikas Jagelavičius, who hides in Belarus and hosts the program "Neighbours" on the regime-affiliated "Belarus" radio, and Giedrius Grabauskas, who hides in Russia and is a co-author of the book "The History of Lithuania", which is a product of Russian propaganda, are specially mentioned. At the same time, it is reported that the flight of such propagandists to Russia and Belarus has become a more prominent trend in all Baltic countries after 2022. Russia created an organization called "Pribaltiyiskoye Zemlyachestvo - Vmeste" to unite these propagandists. Jagelavičius and Grabauskas also participate in the meetings of this movement (VSD, February 2026b).
Estonia
Estonia is considered quite advanced in terms of media literacy. A 35-hour module about media and its ecosystem has been included in the national curriculum and is taught as a mandatory part of the Estonian language class in the 11th grade of high school. Nevertheless, especially after 2020, the local disinformation environment has significantly expanded: both in terms of producers and consumers (EU DisinfoLab, 2025).
Until 2022, official Russian propaganda channels played the leading role in Estonia, particularly among the Russian-speaking segment. So much so that for a long time, officials tried to convince the public that Estonian channels would lose in competition with Russian channels in regions inhabited by the Russian-speaking population, and of the necessity of opening a separate Russian-language state television. Following long-lasting discussions, an additional Russian-language state channel (ETV+) was opened in Estonia in 2015 alongside official Kremlin propaganda channels. However, this channel served Russian propaganda rather than the needs of the Russian minority (ERR, 2025).
In 2022, Russian channels were banned in Estonia, but their content continued to be accessible to potential consumers.
At the forefront of Russia's current main propaganda mechanisms in Estonia is the Russian-language social media space. Large Russian-language groups, especially on "Facebook", the comment environment forming around them, and alternative pages affiliated with these groups create a favorable environment for presenting Kremlin messages as "local grievance", "an ordinary citizen's position", or "the defense of Russian speakers". Large groups like "Русскоязычная Эстония" and pages presenting themselves as neutral like "Новости Эстонии" both create the narrative and amplify selected topics, formulate an anti-Estonian atmosphere, and facilitate the circulation of pro-Russian theses (Propastop, 2025a).
The most popular disinformation format used on "Facebook" in Estonia are easily shareable simple posts. Disinformation producers with "Facebook" pages almost always copy and paste their content from their own sites. They all operate with different motivations, but the line of content such as disinformation, Kremlin narratives, Anti-NATO, anti-mainstream, Anti-Ukraine, and conspiracy theories is common to all. Among the main pro-Kremlin channels presented as alternative media and active on META platforms, the most famous is Peeter Proos's "Vanglaplaneet" site. Producing anti-government content on health, geopolitics, environment, and similar topics, this account increasingly promotes Russian propaganda narratives. Hando Tõnumaa's portal named "Telegram" follows a similar line. Markus Järvi's media portal named "Objektiiv" and its "Facebook" page defend the "corrupted Western values" thesis and share Russian propaganda narratives. The contents of "Uued Uudised", the news site of the Conservative People's Party of Estonia, also frequently overlap with Russian propaganda narratives. Created to protest the expansion of the Nursipalu Training Area and NATO's presence in Estonia, "Nursipalu kaitseks" also shares Russian propaganda narratives and false claims. Long-term Kremlin propaganda collaborators who openly support all of Moscow's narratives and Russia's war against Ukraine include Oleg Bessedin, who was arrested last year - he is also the owner of the largest Russian-language "Facebook" group in Estonia, "Таллиннцы" -, Ülle Pukk, the spokesperson for the local pro-Russian "Koos" party, and Kertu Luisk (BECID, 2025).
In recent months, the Kremlin has begun massively spreading the idea of a separatist "Narva People's Republic" on social media using its propaganda network. Channels under the name "Нарвская Народная Республика" were opened on "Telegram", "VKontakte", and "Tik Tok". The channels launched under the motto "#Ждём Россию. Новости самого прекрасного государства на Земле" (Waiting for Russia. News from the most beautiful state on Earth) were created in 2025 and activated from February 2026. Separatist calls are made on these pages demanding "autonomy" for the Ida-Virumaa region. The "Telegram" channel, which systematically shares new content, provides the central information flow, while "VKontakte" and "Tik Tok" fulfill the function of disseminating the narratives. At the same time, communication is carried out via a Telegram bot that provides anonymous communication (Propastop, 2025b).
Disinformation is put into circulation in the Estonian segment of "Tik Tok" in three main ways: original videos, sharing existing viral content without alteration, and via "reframing" videos that quote or respond to initial disinformation. Viral disinformation and propaganda videos are widely spread on Estonian "Tik Tok"; they are often disguised as harmless travel or lifestyle content. At the same time, there is a very large volume of content on Estonian "Tik Tok" aimed at frightening people with a "future war" (BECID, 2025).
The local political proxy line in Estonia is also a separately important propaganda mechanism. For many years, at the center of this line stood the Estonian United Left Party (EÜVP), the continuation of the Estonian Communist Party. After Russia's full-scale attack on Ukraine in 2022, this party formed a coalition with another pro-Kremlin group, "Koos/Vmeste", founded under the leadership of Oleg Ivanov and Aivo Peterson. Entering the 2023 parliamentary elections together with "Koos", the EÜVP failed to cross the threshold with 2.39 percent of the votes, but significantly increased its votes compared to the 0.1 percent in 2019. The party became second after the Center Party in the Ida-Viru region with 14.9 percent of the votes, and increased its votes in two districts in Tallinn. It is reported that these results of the party, which received many votes from regions inhabited by Russian speakers, were achieved at the expense of "Koos" candidates (ERR, 2025).
Oleg Ivanov, one of the leaders of "Koos" who fled to Moscow in 2023, systematically exploits the theses that Russian speakers are allegedly deprived of political rights, the Estonian state is "Russophobic", and "human rights violations" take place against the Russian community; he even threatened the Estonian government with the creation of a "popular front" to "protect the rights of Russians" at the World Congress of Compatriots in Moscow (Balticdisinfo, 2024ç).
In December 2025, the Harju court found Aivo Peterson, one of the main figures of "Koos", guilty of treason related to assisting Russian influence activities directed against the independence and security of Estonia and sentenced him to 14 years in prison. Pro-Russian circles attempted to present the verdict as "political persecution and Russophobia", and Peterson as a "silenced opposition voice". However, Peterson had been one of the most important figures openly disseminating Russian propaganda (Balticdisinfo, 2025b).
Similarly, Vyacheslav Morozov, a professor of international political theories at the University of Tartu whose collaboration with the GRU was revealed in 2024 and who was arrested for this reason, is also portrayed as a "victim" by Kremlin propaganda (ERR, 2025).
Another pro-Kremlin group in Estonia is the Estonian People's Party (ERE), established in 2023. This party includes individuals such as former members of "Koos", former Võru City Council member Kertu Luisk, and businessman Harry Raudvere. Although the Conservative People's Party (EKRE), represented by 10 deputies in the Estonian parliament (Riigikogu), is not a pro-Kremlin party, there are facts indicating that some of its members harbor sympathies for the conservative aspects of Kremlin ideology and support Kremlin narratives (ERR, 2025).
The church line also plays a separate role in propaganda in Estonia. Particularly, the legal-political dispute concerning the Orthodox Church affiliated with the Moscow Patriarchate has recently become a sensitive topic used by the Kremlin both in domestic politics and in the information space. The parliament bringing the legislative initiative aimed at cutting the church's ties with Moscow back onto the agenda in 2025 has made this issue even more current (Church Times, 2025).
The Russian embassy in Estonia is not in the role of an open propaganda coordination center as much as in Latvia. However, Estonia's expulsion of a diplomat from the Russian embassy in Tallinn in August 2025 in connection with sanctions violations and crimes against the state, and the Estonian foreign minister's open criticism of the Russian embassy's interference in internal affairs show that this channel also continues its role as a propaganda cover in Estonia (Reuters, 2025).
RESISTANCE ACTORS
The Baltic countries are among the states that best "read" Russian propaganda and form resistance against it. In all three countries, there is systematic resistance against Russia's interference operations—at the level of state security agencies, intelligence and counter-intelligence structures, strategic communication institutions, investigative journalism and fact-checking centers, media literacy programs and corresponding initiatives in the education system, civil society institutions, and regional cooperation initiatives.
Regional platforms like the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence (NATO StratcomCOE) in Riga, the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence (BCME), and the Baltic Engagement Centre for Combating Information Disorders (BECID) make serious efforts both to monitor Russian propaganda and to increase media and public literacy. Institutions such as "Re:Baltica" and its fact-checking arm "Re:Check" in Latvia, "Debunk" in Lithuania, "Propastop" in Estonia, the Estonian Public Broadcasting Corporation (Eesti Rahvusringhääling, ERR), and the University of Tartu act as the main centers of resistance against Russian propaganda.
CONCLUSION
Russian propaganda in the Baltic states functions as a systemic mechanism of intervention woven with interconnected narratives, structured by very different influence channels and tools, serving broad geopolitical interests. The main purpose of this mechanism is to undermine the societies' trust in the state and liberal values, to affect stability by magnifying existing grievances and doubts, to call into question the Baltic states' path of security and development tied to the West, to incite hostility by using Russian-speaking communities, and to use this to create an intervention narrative.
The Kremlin pays special attention to specific points alongside general narratives in the Baltic countries, just as it does worldwide. In addition to overlapping propaganda narratives, channels, and mechanisms in all three countries, there are distinct lines of action or priority rankings for each country.
In all three countries, "Telegram" acts as the main amplification platform for central disinformation and manipulative content; in all three countries, narrative packages such as "Russophobia", "discrimination", "threatened values", "the moral collapse of the West", "the unreliability of NATO", and "the harm of supporting Ukraine" are functional; in all three countries, local political and ideological actors, exiled figures, alternative media platforms, and social media networks transform the Kremlin's messages into domestic politics.
But at the same time, there is a separate ranking of narratives and channels for each country - while in Latvia the official state channel/embassy is in the role of an open propaganda actor, in Lithuania and Estonia it mostly bears the function of a covert cover for propaganda activities, or while in Lithuania local "alternative" media channels are mostly in the role of propaganda legitimizers, in Estonia the "Facebook"-"Tiktok" networking of the Russian-speaking community holds the main role, or while in Estonia and Latvia the narrative base is built on "Russophobia", in Lithuania defense expenditures and privileges for Ukrainian refugees are the main subjects of manipulation and disinformation.
In all cases, Russia prefers to present propaganda in "localized" packages rather than as originating from abroad in the Baltic states, as it does in other European countries, and for this, it utilizes local actors, emotions, and additionally, Russian-speaking communities.
The Baltic countries view Russia's manipulation and disinformation operations not simply as media influence operations, but as a primary security threat, and a serious resistance has formed in this direction, especially in recent years. This significantly complicates the Kremlin's work, but the fact that Moscow still finds allies and channels even in this region that best knows Russia and best perceives the impending threat from it shows that the scale of the problem is much larger than it appears.
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