Introduction
“The Constitution is dead. Long live politics.”
The above statement, “The Constitution is dead. Long live politics,” as cited from Slavoj Žižek in The Guardian, sets the tone for this paper’s inquiry into the Italy-Albania migration agreement (Žižek 2005). Far from a random epigraph, it reflects the disillusionment with modern constitutional protections, particularly in the context of refugee rights and European migration governance.
The Italy–Albania agreement is yet another significant warning sign pointing to the failures of the European project and indicating that the European Union is moving toward a "Fortress Europe" policy (Marino and Dawes 2016). Once again, the EU is attempting to address only the symptoms rather than the root causes of the problem (Mitzen 2018).
At a deeper level, this reflects what might be coined as Europe's attempt at “power politics” or “event politics” modeled on the ability to extend influence beyond the boundaries of the emerging super-state (Broerse 2024, 31). However, it also highlights its inability to manage internal differences and conflicts effectively using the capabilities of its own institutions and societies.
EU neighborhood policy, the border police, technology at the border, the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, and many other EU political agendas that seek to keep migrants out of Europe and legitimize an ethical foreign policy are all victims of power politics that politicizes human rights. The latest case of the Italy-Albania agreement is an example of a democratic country, a member of the EU, Italy, which rather than reconciling democracy and human rights in the veil of Italian constitutionalism, uses the migrant crisis as a scapegoat for a certain political agenda and to do so invokes an unforeseen deal with a fragile democratic state, Albania.
Not seldom are civil liberties the first victim of governmental fears and public anxiety, which has cursed European politics and given rise to ultranationalist and authoritarian leaders. I use the word curse, but it’s a curse of the self, stemming from the EU’s egocentrism and the constitutional inability of European nation-states to guarantee human rights to those who have lost them and continue to do so because of power politics.
The agreement raises very significant concerns due to its negative human rights impacts on thousands of people. As highlighted by the former Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Dunja Mijatović:
“The MoU raises a range of important questions on the impact that its implementation would have for the human rights of refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. These relate, among others, to timely disembarkation, impact on search and rescue operations, fairness of asylum procedures, identification of vulnerable persons, the possibility of automatic detention without an adequate judicial review, detention conditions, access to legal aid, and effective remedies.”
(Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights 2023)
Ban-opticon
The Italy-Albania agreement denies refugees this essential recognition and belonging by subjecting them to automatic detention, limited access to legal aid, and procedural uncertainty. Scholars such as Didier Bigo and Chantal Mouffe have critically examined the European Union’s evolving approach to migration through the lens of securitization theory (Bigo 2002). Such arrangements risk undermining core international protection standards, as they shift the EU’s legal obligations beyond its borders and distance accountability from its institutional framework. The moral imperative to protect displaced persons, enshrined in the Geneva Convention and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, is subordinated to deterrence and containment objectives. Critics argue that these policies contribute to a hierarchy of rights, where access to asylum becomes contingent on geopolitical arrangements rather than on individual protection needs ( Guild, Carrera & Balzacq, 2016). This trend reflects what Bigo terms the “ban-opticon”—a regime of visibility, control, and exclusion designed to filter and manage mobility based on perceived threat rather than vulnerability or legality.
In the public discourse and populist narrative of the Albanian and Italian PMs, the agreement is a sign of the loyalty and fraternal love that exists between the two nations. Albanian PM Edi Rama noted that, “This is an exclusive agreement with Italy, because we love everyone, but with Italy we have unconditional love.” (Top Chanel 2024). A sign of loyalty that does not care about justice or rights (Rorty 1997). Meloni, on the other hand, has duly noted that they will go on with implementation no matter what (Reuters 2025). However, for the time being, Italian judges have overturned the sending of migrants to Albania three times now, showing that a strong judiciary institution can be a safeguard against an abuse of legal power (Giordano & Ford 2024). But where does this leave the EU and its neglecting to the point of denial of a crisis that has been spanning now for almost two decades?
The audacious United in Diversity project seems to have hit a deadlock for quite some time now. When Deleuze and Guattari termed “territorialization,” they also referred to it as a two-sided coin, where territorialization occurs; so does “deterritorialization.” (Günzel 1998). This goes the same for nationalization and denationalization, humanization under the pretext of human rights, and dehumanization. None of these can happen by themselves because of the power structures that shape spaces, identities, languages, moralities, legalities, etc. Territory and identity are closely interlinked with one another, as to territorialize means to assign identities and different traits of it to each individual by categorizing, nationalizing, or, in the case of nowadays political agendas of migrants, in being “subjects” of peaceful or violent removal, deportation, deprivation of freedom, and human rights.
Offshoring Asylum: Lessons from the UK-Rwanda and EU-Turkey Agreements for Italy-Albania
Critical lessons for the Italy-Albania agreement can also be learned from the UK-Rwanda asylum agreement (2022) and EU-Turkey migration deal (2016), which reveal a disturbing pattern where developed nations exploit legal gray areas to avoid refugee obligations, often justifying these measures as emergency responses to migration pressures (Erjon & Giola 2024). The UK and EU experiences show how outsourcing asylum processing can systematically undermine protection systems when adequate oversight mechanisms are lacking. Some key issues to be taken into consideration include:
- Judicial oversight gaps: Both the UK and EU cases demonstrate how externalization schemes often operate with insufficient accountability (as seen in the UK Supreme Court's intervention) (Human Rights Watch 2023);
- Questionable "safe country" designations: The Turkiye precedent shows how such classifications may not reflect actual conditions for asylum seekers (ECRE 2016);
- Erosion of protection standards: These policies risk creating a domino effect, encouraging more states to circumvent their legal obligations.
As Italy moves forward with its Albania plan, the failures of previous externalization attempts highlight the need for stronger safeguards to prevent rights violations. Without proper protections, such agreements risk normalizing the dilution of refugee rights under the guise of migration management — a dangerous precedent for global asylum systems.
Conclusion
The Italy-Albania agreement epitomizes a dangerous shift in European migration control policies, where the legal rights of refugees are undermined by political expediency. By outsourcing asylum procedures to Albania, Italy risks violating international obligations. Italian courts have proven so far to be the first safeguards, halting the implementation of the protocol whilst awaiting a unified decision of the European Court of Justice. All of the 73 migrants transferred to Albania have been taken back to Italy by order of the Court of Rome, heralding a clamorous failure of the agreement and a big win of justice over power politics (Deutsche Welle 2025). Nevertheless, our essay has underscored the alarming point, as a huge contingency has been identified regarding the protection of migrant rights.
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