(This article was prepared as part of the KHAR Center's "Post-Soviet Authoritarianism Studies" series.)
The results of the parliamentary elections in Armenia on June 7, 2026, are very important in terms of preserving and institutionalizing the new status quo forming in this country and the South Caucasus as a whole. The failure of political revenge and Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan receiving another 5-year mandate from the people will allow him to continue the reforms and changes he has begun implementing domestically, as well as the construction of a new regional security and cooperation architecture.
These elections, which were the scene of an uncompromising competition between two antagonistic political poles, also carried the essence of a referendum, and Armenian citizens had to make a strategic choice regarding the country's foreign policy and development vector. With its choice, the Armenian people said continue to European integration.
Results
According to the Central Election Commission, 58.97% of voters, or 1 million 476 thousand out of 2 million 503 thousand citizens with the right to vote, participated in the voting. This is a 10% increase in percentage compared to the snap elections held in 2021. According to the preliminary results announced by the CEC after counting the ballots in 2005 polling stations, only 3 political parties and blocs gained representation in the parliament: (Armenpress, 2026)
- Civil Contract Party — 49.82% (728 thousand votes);
- "Strong Armenia" Bloc — 23.28% (340 thousand votes);
- "Armenia" Bloc — 9.93% (145 thousand votes).
The minimum vote threshold to be represented in the legislative body is 4% for political parties and 8% for electoral blocs consisting of a maximum of 3 parties. Although the "Prosperous Armenia" Party came very close to crossing the barrier with 3.996% of the votes, it remained outside the parliament because it could not surpass 4%. After the recount of votes in some polling stations, the CEC will announce the final official results on June 14. If the current picture does not change, the seats in the parliament will be distributed as follows:
- Civil Contract Party — 64 mandates,
- "Strong Armenia" Bloc — 29 mandates,
- "Armenia" Bloc — 12 mandates.
Although there was a percentage decrease in the results of the ruling party, which collected 53.92% of the votes in the 2021 elections, in terms of voter numbers, it increased its votes from 687 thousand to 728 thousand. Along with this, it should be noted that the revanchist and pro-Russian opposition also increased its votes. Thus, in 2021, the "Armenia" bloc was the locomotive of this political camp, and the alliance founded under the leadership of Robert Kocharyan received 21.04% of the votes, while the party of former National Security Service Director Artur Vanetsyan collected 5.23% of the votes. As a result, the parliamentary opposition won a total of 36 mandates with 26% of the votes. In the new parliament, there will be a pro-Russian bloc that is stronger than before, owning 41 mandates by collecting 33% of the votes.
Thus, according to the election results, the Civil Contract Party has once again obtained the right to form the government on its own without the need for any coalition.
Armenia is turning into the democratic center of the region
Armenia's continuation on its path towards democratization by holding another competitive election after the 2018 "Velvet Revolution" is one of the important political results of the elections. Achieving this at a stage when liberal democracy is declining globally and the autocracy trend is strengthening, is remarkable. A deep crisis of democracy is also observed in the region where Armenia is located. While the authoritarian regime in Azerbaijan is transforming into a dictatorship in the post-conflict period, a serious regression has also occurred in Georgia, which, until recent years, was the regional leader in the field of democracy and human rights. While a theocratic dictatorship rules in the other 2 neighboring countries — Iran; in Turkey, President Erdoğan's personalist regime is in a transition stage from competitive authoritarianism to hegemonic authoritarianism.
Under such complex regional realities, it is a very difficult task for Armenia to choose the course of European integration and try to institutionalize its democracy with all its flaws — moreover, at a time when Russian pressure is increasingly growing. For this reason, it should be noted that the Pashinyan government carries out fundamental changes not through radical reforms, but gradually and sometimes by deviating from the principles of the rule of law. Although the final results reflect the will of the voters, it is impossible to speak of the full compliance of neither the latest nor the previous electoral processes with European standards in general. For example, international observers (OSCE ODIHR, OSCE PA, PACE) noted that during the June 7 elections, there were criminal prosecutions against opposition candidates and activists, for which reason many opposition supporters refrained from actively participating in the campaign, public sector employees were forced to participate in the ruling party's events, and other flaws stemming from government policy (OSCEPA, 2026). Along with this, European observers also emphasized that voters were provided with a real opportunity to choose among political alternatives. In their preliminary assessments, referring to Russia, they also stated that there were "direct pressures from abroad in the form of trade restrictions and security threats aimed at influencing the will of the voters in favor of the opposition."
Interestingly, the CIS observation mission assessed the Armenian elections as an open, competitive process fully complying with democratic standards. The head of the mission, Deputy Secretary General of the CIS, Kazakh diplomat Nurlan Seytimov stated that the elections were held in conditions of healthy political competition, the voting was organized in accordance with the Constitution and legislation, and the vote counting was maximally transparent with the participation of various political party representatives (Verelq, 2026). The mission consisted of nearly 120 observers, half of whom were representatives of Russia, and the others from Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan (RTVI, 2026). Practice so far has shown that CIS observation missions usually make assessments that align with Russia's position and interests, and Russia in turn refers to their opinion. However, it was different this time. Putting forth a position completely contrary to the preliminary opinion of the CIS observers, Russia announced that the elections in Armenia were accompanied by unprecedented pressure against the opposition and Western interference (TASS, 2026). Russian President Putin has not yet congratulated Pashinyan.
Russia's strategic defeat
The claim of the Russian Foreign Ministry about Western interference in the elections is partially true, in the sense that the organization of the European Political Community summit and the 1st Armenia-EU summit in Armenia on the eve of the elections, as well as the visits of the US Vice President and Secretary of State, were a demonstration of political support for Pashinyan. However, Russia resorted to more open and blatant interference by imposing trade restrictions on Armenia. "Kharcenter" discussed this extensively in its article dedicated to the analysis of the pre-election situation (Kharcenter, 2026). Let us remind you that Russia has imposed a temporary ban on the import of flower products, fruits and vegetables (apricots, cherries, sour cherries, plums, grapes, cucumbers, tomatoes, greens, peppers, strawberries), fish, mineral water, cognac, and wines from Armenia, and also warned that the agreement on the duty-free supply of natural gas and petroleum products will be unilaterally suspended. In addition, before the election, Moscow tried to get Armenian citizens living and working in Russia to return to their homeland and participate in the voting. Overall, there was information that 100 thousand Armenian migrants would be sent to Armenia (Meduza, 2026). In the end, there is no exact information on how many people returned to their homeland and voted.
Unambiguously calling this election Russia's last chance to keep Armenia in its orbit might be a controversial assessment, but no one would object to the opinion that it was one of the last chances. It can be said that in the next five years, Armenia's distancing from Russia could take on an irreversible character and that this process has begun. The first step in the institutional break between Armenia and Russia will be Yerevan's complete withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). It is known that Armenia has frozen its participation in this military bloc, known as the "Russian NATO," since February 2024 and has not paid membership dues since then. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov announced that for this reason, sanctions stipulated in the charter will be applied against Armenia (Die Welt, 2026).
It is obvious that Armenia's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union is also approaching its end. It is simply that while the Pashinyan government tries to make this process happen as painlessly and with minimal losses as possible, Moscow demands that Yerevan immediately choose between the European Union and the Eurasian Union. Armenia's choice is known, it accepts the impossibility of staying in two mutually exclusive integrative unions at the same time. However, the Pashinyan government intends to leave the Eurasian Economic Union after submitting an official membership application to this organization with the consent of the European Union. Since there is no mechanism for expelling a member country from the Eurasian Union, Russia wants Yerevan to make this decision soon.
In the near future, it is expected that Armenia will receive the status of an official candidate for the EU and the country's citizens will gain the right of visa-free entry into the Schengen zone. The development of relations both with the EU at an institutional level and with individual European states on a bilateral plane will have a positive impact on social stability and the welfare of the population in Armenia. Following Russia's pre-election sanction-like decisions, the EU's allocation of 50 million euros to compensate the losses of producers in Armenia, finding a very quick market for flower products not accepted by Russia and organizing urgent exports to Latvia, as well as the announcement that Armenian agricultural products will be brought to the European market without customs duties, show that the European Union's view of the region is not conjectural, but of a long-term and strategic nature (Armenpress, 2026). The implementation of the TRIPP project will lay the groundwork for US investments coming to Armenia and the permanent presence of the superpower in the region (News.am, 2026).
Thus, the separate penetration of the two main centers of the West — the US and the European Union — into Armenia will further limit Russia's influence in this country and in the South Caucasus in general. The signing of a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan and the opening of the Turkey-Armenia borders will also give additional impetus to pushing Russia out of the region. Moscow is worried because it sees this prospect, and for this reason, the emotional tone in its reaction has significantly increased.
The elections in Armenia were also a geopolitical clash between the West and Russia and a referendum on which of these two power centers the Armenians would choose, and Moscow suffered an electoral defeat once again.
How will Pashinyan, who does not have a constitutional majority, change the Constitution?
As is known, Azerbaijan puts forward an amendment to the preamble part of the Armenian Constitution as a condition for officially signing the initialed peace treaty. In that part, there is a reference to the Declaration of Independence, which reflects a territorial claim against Azerbaijan. Immediately after the preliminary results of the elections became known, Prime Minister Pashinyan's emphasis on the importance of signing a peace treaty with Azerbaijan and opening the borders with Turkey shows that this issue is at the top of his agenda (News.am, 2026). However, there are questions regarding the mechanism for implementing the Constitutional amendment.
On the eve of the election, there were opinion polls showing that the Civil Contract Party would receive 65% of the votes and achieve a constitutional (two-thirds) majority. The ruling party itself hoped for such a high result. But these forecasts and expectations did not justify themselves. The party, which won 64 mandates, is short of 6 mandates to achieve a constitutional majority. According to Armenia's "Constitutional Law on Referendum," a new Draft Constitution can be put to a referendum after being adopted in parliament with a two-thirds vote (Arlis.am, 2026). A constitutional law on amending certain articles of the Constitution can be approved in parliament without being put to a referendum, but a two-thirds majority is also required for this. On the other hand, the preamble amendment must be carried out not in parliament, but only by popular vote. But the Pashinyan government plans to adopt a completely new Constitution, not an amendment to the existing Constitution, and this promise was also reflected in the election program of the Civil Contract Party (TASS, 2026). It is a very weak, even impossible probability that the "Strong Armenia" and "Armenia" blocs, which we can conditionally call the "Russian bloc" in parliament, will support the new Constitution initiative.
In lieu of a Conclusion
Although the Civil Contract Party did not achieve a 2/3 majority in parliament, it obtained a 3/5 majority. A three-fifths majority also has political-procedural significance. Thus, a 3/5 majority gives the right to adopt Constitutional laws. Using this right, it might be possible to change and soften the relevant requirements of the "Constitutional Law on Referendum." But there is still legal uncertainty around this issue. Undoubtedly, the government will try to find ways to put the new Draft Constitution to a referendum.
References:
Armenpress, 2026(a). ЦИК опубликовал обновленные данные: «Процветающая Армения» не преодолевает избирательный порог. https://armenpress.am/ru/article/1252350
OSCEPA, 2026. Избирателям Армении был предоставлен реальный выбор на фоне прямого иностранного давления и неравных возможностей для проведения предвыборной кампании. https://www.oscepa.org/ru/novosti-i-multimedia/press-relizy/2026/izbiratelyam-armenii-byl-predostavlen-realnyj-vybor-na-fone-pryamogo-inostrannogo-davleniya-i-neravnykh-vozmozhnostej-dlya-provedeniya-predvybornoj-kampanii
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Meduza, 2026. Кремль хочет отправить 100 тысяч проживающих в России армян голосовать против Пашиняна. https://meduza.io/news/2026/05/29/reuters-kreml-hochet-otpravit-100-tysyach-prozhivayuschih-v-rossii-armyan-golosovat-protiv-pashinyana
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News.am, 2026(a). Пашинян: TRIPP – это миллиардная программа, которая повлечет за собой приток новых миллиардов, у нас нет проблем с деньгами. https://news.am/ru/news/1042294
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