The meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on April 1 was marked by highly notable dialogues. From the EU-Eurasian Union contradiction to tense relations within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and from the elections in Armenia to energy bargaining, the negotiations raised many questions about how a new balance would be established. While the optics were "polite," the essence was an ultimatum. Considering Armenia’s preparation for the parliamentary elections on June 7 and Pashinyan’s warnings in recent weeks about the activation of pro-war (pro-Russian) forces within the country, the Moscow meeting was of critical importance. However, the messages delivered to the public show that the talks took the form of a reckoning rather than any real outcome. The closest clue as to what this reckoning will result in will likely be seen in the Armenian elections.
Between the Search for Balance and the Russian Threat
One of the most striking headlines of the Putin-Pashinyan meeting was the issue of Armenia continuing its membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) while deepening ties with the European Union. Putin explicitly stated the impossibility of belonging to both customs unions simultaneously. He then deepened the veiled threat by noting that while the price of 1,000 cubic meters of gas in Europe exceeds $600, they sell it to Armenia for $177.50, and simultaneously mentioned that Armenia’s exports to the EAEU have increased tenfold. He concluded by saying, "The decision is yours; see where, with whom, and on what basis you will work" (Official website of the Prime Minister of Armenia, April 1, 2026).
Pashinyan stated that, in principle, they are aware of the incompatibility of being a member of both the EU and EAEU at the same time, but they will continue to align agendas with both sides until a decision point is reached. He emphasized that the decision would be made "as citizens of Armenia." On the energy issue, he pointed toward new technologies and solar energy, noting that while continuing close cooperation with Russia, they are also seeking the most beneficial offer for Armenia by conducting discussions with other partners regarding the construction of a new nuclear power plant (Official website of the Prime Minister of Armenia, April 1, 2026).
Undoubtedly, Putin’s warning to Pashinyan regarding the EU and the reminder of energy prices in this context were entirely political. Although Putin claimed this was an economic-technical issue, by pointing to the example of Ukraine, he essentially shook his finger at Pashinyan and made a call for a choice.
Particularly after the defeat in the Second Karabakh War, Armenia has not hidden its disappointment in relations with Moscow and is trying to create a new balancing framework by deepening ties with the EU, strengthening U.S. patronage, and establishing relations with Turkey. This framework encompasses issues such as open borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey, economic diversification, political balance, reducing dependence on Russia, and creating strong ties between Europe and the U.S. for an Armenia whose two longest borders have been closed for over 30 years and whose economy has depended on narrow trade corridors passing through Russia, Georgia, and Iran (Wall, Kochinyan, Shiriyev, April 1, 2026). Implementing all of this at once—especially creating a balance between various parties and their diverse interests outside of Russia while the Russian threat persists—is certainly not easy.
After the Second Karabakh War, the central mission of negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia moved from Moscow to Brussels. Although Russia offered mediation several times to change this situation, the parties did not seem very enthusiastic. Factors such as the tension in relations between Azerbaijan and Russia, Turkey’s activation as a regional actor, and Armenia’s approach to Europe played a role. However, Trump’s ascent to power in the U.S. and his emergence with the claim of "peace missioning" worldwide radically changed the picture. Trump’s claim to the role of sole mediator in Azerbaijan-Armenia negotiations and the TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) idea completely distanced Moscow from the process (Harutyunyan, February 2026). This was not contrary to Armenia’s balancing framework; on the contrary, Yerevan calculates that the TRIPP route will provide an opportunity to establish and strengthen ties with Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Europe. The only problem there is Russia, though Yerevan believes Moscow will not want to confront the U.S. in the South Caucasus.
Trump’s primary mediator role also reduced the European Union's function in the Azerbaijan-Armenia negotiations, but unlike Russia, Brussels remains one of the beneficiaries of this change in the region and is even increasing its role. Indeed, the Russia-Ukraine war led the European Union to become even closer to Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus. For Armenia, 2025 was of historical importance in terms of strengthening ties with the EU—last year, the Armenian parliament passed a bill to initiate the process of Armenia's membership in the European Union, signing a decision of high symbolic importance (Khar Center, 2025). Furthermore, the Armenia-EU Partnership Strategy Agenda was signed, discussions in security and defense began, a document organizing the framework for Armenia's participation in EU crisis management operations was signed and entered into force, the duration of the EU mission was extended, and the visa liberalization dialogue conducted only with Armenia was activated. In January of this year, the EU Council allocated 20 million euros to Armenia within the framework of the European Peace Facility. Alongside this, Brussels is evaluating infrastructure and investment opportunities. Currently, the EU's participation in the construction and renovation of the Nakhchivan railway is being discussed. The EU and Azerbaijan have reached an agreement on the preliminary preparation for this project. Armenia, meanwhile, is conducting discussions regarding the sustainability of TRIPP and participation in various infrastructure projects (Harutyunyan, February 2026).
Moscow's Energy and Infrastructure Levers
Moscow is using all its levers to prevent these projects from being implemented without its participation. One of these is the railway routes. Within the framework of the TRIPP project, Armenia wants to open the currently closed 238-kilometer Nakhchivan-Central Armenia-Kars railway line. Aside from Azerbaijan's opposition to this, since 2008, Armenia's railway network has been operated on a concession basis by the South Caucasus Railway Company, a subsidiary of the Russian State Railway Company, which is under Western sanctions. Because this company has not fulfilled the bulk of its obligations, the activities of many lines have stopped. Pashinyan, arguing that this situation kills regional competition, proposed that Russia give this concession to another country friendly to both Yerevan and Moscow. However, a day before his visit, Moscow announced that it has no intention of giving up the concession (JAMNEWS, April 1, 2026). Simultaneously, tension continues between the two sides regarding the nuclear power plant. Armenia wants to replace the existing NPP with modular-type plants. Russia, however, views this as Armenia’s intention to diversify its energy system and move away from cooperation with Rosatom toward the U.S. The participation of the heads of the Russian Railways Company and Rosatom in the inter-delegation meeting in Moscow shows that these issues have entered the "urgent" agenda (JAMNEWS, April 1, 2026).
Putin’s “Requests” and the Armenian Elections
Another notable headline of the Putin-Pashinyan meeting disclosed to the public was the tension within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Putin stated that they know Armenia has complaints regarding the CSTO, but with his characteristic manipulative phrasing, he justified the CSTO’s non-intervention by citing Yerevan’s 2022 recognition of Karabakh as Azerbaijani territory in Prague. Pashinyan stated that they have already finished the Karabakh issue and that a healthy ground for peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been created, but he did not leave Putin’s manipulation unanswered: “True, we recognized Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. However, before that, the Russian leadership had twice publicly announced that it recognized Karabakh as Azerbaijani land; we announced it after that. And we did not hide our problem with the CSTO then either, because a special situation arose for us in 2022, and while CSTO mechanisms should have worked, they did not. For a very simple reason, we are not participating in the CSTO—we still cannot explain to our people why the CSTO did not fulfill its obligations or react.” (Kremlin.ru, April 1, 2026).
Two years after the Second Karabakh War, following Russia's silence as Azerbaijan restored sovereignty over all its territories, Armenia rejected participation in CSTO exercises and meetings, and in 2024, announced it was leaving the CSTO (Khar Center, 2025). Although this decision has not yet been formalized, it remains a topic of tension between the two countries. Russia is concerned that Pashinyan keeps this topic on the agenda; Putin's warning to the Armenian Prime Minister to end this matter and not bring it up in the election campaign was an indication of this.
This warning should also be evaluated together with Putin's other election "request." The Russian President stated that there are many friends of Russia and pro-Russian forces in Armenia and asked for these parties to participate in the elections. He noted that some of them were arrested despite having Russian passports and said, "We are not interfering in your business, but we would like them to participate in the election." Pashinyan responded to Putin with a challenge of democratic elections. He stated that there is democracy in Armenia, emphasized social media freedom, and said that only Armenian citizens could participate in the elections. Although no names were mentioned, it was clear who the conversation was about—billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, who was arrested on charges of an attempted coup d'état in Armenia. Karapetyan, arrested last June, is a citizen of Russia and Cyprus in addition to Armenia. Karapetyan was a real estate billionaire in Armenia and the owner of Tashir Holding, which operates the Electric Networks of Armenia (AP, 2025).
Putin's ultimatum also shows that the upcoming parliamentary elections in Armenia will be a significant turning point in determining the boundaries of Yerevan's new geopolitical maneuverability. The June 7 elections will be the first normal (non-extraordinary) elections held since 2017 and will constitute a serious test for a political system shaped by crises over the last eight years. Votes for Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party, which has been in power since 2018, have decreased compared to previous years, but he still appears to be the favorite for the elections. One of his main rivals is Samvel Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia Party, for whom Putin made his request. After being arrested last year, Karapetyan was released to house arrest at the end of December after paying $10.6 million. The actual leadership of the party is carried out by his nephew, Narek Karapetyan. According to Armenian law, Karapetyan cannot be a candidate for prime minister because he is a citizen of Russia and Cyprus. If his party wins the election, it plans to change the relevant article of the constitution (Nazaretyan, March 2026).
The other pro-Russian party Putin had in mind is the Armenia Alliance, led by former President Robert Kocharyan. Currently the largest opposition faction in parliament, this alliance includes Kocharyan’s independent deputies, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, and a small party called Forward (Araj). The bloc has announced Kocharyan as its prime ministerial candidate.
Former President Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s Armenian National Congress (ANC) will also participate in the election. The party’s candidate, Levon Zurabyan, called Samvel Karapetyan the favorite of the race and stated that they are conducting potential coalition discussions with him. Edmon Marukyan, leader of the Bright Armenia Party and a former ally of Pashinyan, also seems inclined toward cooperation with Karapetyan (Nazaretyan, March 2026).
Nikol Pashinyan states that the election race is running along a war-peace line and asserts that if the opposition wins on June 7, Armenia will face a new war. The Armenian Prime Minister promises the preservation of peace with Azerbaijan, normalization with Turkey, strengthening of relations with the U.S. and EU, and a balanced relationship with Russia (Azatutyun, March 2026). Kocharyan and his party participate in the election race as traditional, revanchist rivals with strong ties to Moscow (Thornton, February 2026). The electorate of Karapetyan’s party is also considered pro-Russian; while the oligarch leader does not completely reject the peace process with Azerbaijan, he states he will continue it under different conditions. The Armenian Church, which interferes in Armenian politics with the help of the Kremlin, also openly defends Karapetyan. Simultaneously, observations show that Russia’s hybrid interference campaign in Armenia has reached unprecedented levels. According to the opinion of the McCain Institute’s election observation mission, Russian television channels, Telegram, online spaces, the church, youth networks, and financial flows are considered the main channels of this influence. The report notes that more than a third of Armenians watch Russian television every day, and Russia's narratives work through lines of fear such as "If Armenia breaks away from Russia, it will collapse" and "Only Russia can return Karabakh." Observers state that Russia is preparing a scenario in Armenia similar to its intervention in the Moldovan elections (Thornton, February 2026).
All this shows that the June 7 elections are not just a matter of a change of government in Armenia, but will bear the character of a referendum on determining course, strategy, and direction. Undoubtedly, Pashinyan will try to avoid tension in relations with Moscow until the elections, and the April 1 meeting should be evaluated in this context. However, both the course of events and Putin’s ultimatums to Pashinyan show that the Kremlin does not share the same intention. Moscow will try to use these elections as an opportunity to change Pashinyan's pro-Western policy and his efforts to normalize relations with Ankara and Baku.
References:
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Wall de Thomas, Kochinyan Areg, Shiriyev Zaur, mart 2026. Rewiring the South Caucasus: TRIPP and the New Geopolitics of Connectivity. https://carnegieendowment.org/middle-east/research/2026/03/rewiring-the-south-caucasus-tripp-and-the-new-geopolitics-of-connectivity
Harutyunyan, Varduhi, 2026. Analysis: EU Engagement in the South Caucasus in 2026 in the Context of Armenia-Azerbaijan Normalization. https://www.commonspace.eu/analysis/analysis-eu-engagement-south-caucasus-2026-context-armenia-azerbaijan-normalization
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AP News, 2025. Armenian billionaire appears in court accused of calling for regime change as church feud spirals. https://apnews.com/article/nikol-pashinyan-samvel-karapetyan-armenian-church-b7ca840df75bda50c48bb91fa6e68218
Nazaretyan, Hovhannes, mart 2026. Election Primer: Understanding Armenia’s Parliamentary Vote. https://evnreport.com/elections/election-primer-understanding-armenias-parliamentary-vote/
Azatutyun, mart 2026. Pashinian Warns Of ‘Imminent’ War If Opposition Wins June Elections. https://www.azatutyun.am/a/33710624.html
Thornton, Laura, fevral 2026. Assessment Pre-Election Mission to Armenia. https://www.mccaininstitute.org/resources/reports/assessment-pre-election-mission-to-armenia/
