The Pan-Eurasian Trend in Turkiye: Ideological Directions, Political Dynamics, and Geopolitical Impacts (Part I)

 Introduction
 Russia's war against Ukraine has exposed the long-existing pan-Eurasianism in Turkiye. Over the past three years, this trend has become clearly visible in Ankara’s official stance and has gained momentum across mainstream media, social media platforms, and academic circles—despite ignoring or sidelining critical voices.

What is particularly noteworthy is that pan-Eurasianism in Turkiye, unlike in its birthplace Russia, is not limited to a single ideological outlook (radical or nationalist); rather, it permeates across all ideological spectrums—right-left, secular-religious, progressive-conservative, Turkish-Kurdish, military-civilian. Another important point is that pan-Eurasianism in Turkiye often manifests more as admiration for Russia and as a component of the Kremlin’s global propaganda machine. Of course, every political and non-political actor has different motivations and imaginations regarding Eurasianism. However, the common denominator among the majority is a loyal attitude toward Russian expansion—the core aim of Eurasianism—and one of its key pillars, Putin’s authoritarianism, along with blatant double standards and hypocrisy toward international law.

Turkish Eurasianism currently does not have the capacity to fully shape foreign and security policy, but its influence cannot be denied. Its role is primarily tied to the Turkish government’s use of Eurasianists in both foreign and domestic politics. Present-day Turkish Eurasianism supports Erdoğan’s “one-man” regime as necessary for state interests, helps broaden the authoritarian coalition by appealing to “secular” voters outside the Islamist and nationalist base, seeks influence in military circles, and attempts to popularize radical nationalist foreign policy theses in the media (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022a). At the same time, the Eurasian thesis remains a blackmailing tool for Ankara to use when it wants to extract concessions from the West or to sabotage relations with it.

In this article, the KHAR Center analyzes the rising Eurasianism in Turkey, its causes, and potential consequences.

Purpose of the Analysis
 The analysis aims to explore why Eurasianism has become so popular in Turkey, what motivates the actors who are promoting this trend, why the Turkish government has increasingly highlighted Eurasianism in recent years, how it uses this ideology in both domestic and foreign policy, and how pan-Eurasianism can influence Turkey’s geopolitical position.

Key Research Questions

• What is pan-Eurasianism in its classical sense?
• What is Turkish Eurasianism?
• Why is Turkish Eurasianism essentially contradictory to Russian Eurasianism, and yet, why does Ankara continue to promote this trend?
• Which actors propagate this ideology in Turkiye?
• How does pan-Eurasianism affect Turkiye’s domestic and foreign policies?
  
  
  

Sources
 The article is based primarily on academic and scholarly sources and, to a lesser extent, on information from news and analytical portals.

Methodological Approach
 The study employs discourse analysis, ideological stream mapping, and comparison of political actors’ positions.

General Framework of Pan-Eurasian Ideology
 In its classical sense, Eurasianism—or pan-Eurasian ideology—is a Great Russian idea that rejects Eurocentrism. It posits the existence of a distinct geographic and historical civilization that differs geopolitically and culturally from both Europe and Asia while containing elements of both. This civilization supposedly blends Mongol-Turkic heritage and Orthodox Christian culture. The roots of this ideological current extend far beyond Alexander Dugin—often incorrectly referred to as the “Kremlin ideologue.”

Slavophilism
 Eurasianism is thought to have its foundations in Slavophilism, a movement that emerged in mid-19th century Russia. Russian philosopher, historian, and poet Aleksey Khomyakov founded this philosophical-ideological current, which was supported by nationalist figures like the Aksakov brothers and Ivan Kireyevsky. It promoted the idea of “Slavic unity against Westernism.”

To distinguish themselves from the “Westernizers” in Saint Petersburg, Slavophiles referred to themselves as “Muscovites,” representing the “Moscow direction” or “Moscow party,” positioning themselves as the “Russian direction resisting the West.” Unlike the Westernizers who emphasized common values with Western Europe, Slavophiles highlighted differences and argued that the Western path was incompatible with Russia (New Philosophical Encyclopedia, 1997–2010).

The falsity of their claim to “Slavic unity” was evident in their attitudes toward other Slavic peoples. They labeled Ukrainians as “Little Russians” and Belarusians as “White Russians,” denying their distinct cultures and languages, and considered their struggles for language and literature to be Polish conspiracies (Potulnitskiy, 1998). For them, being Slavic meant adhering to Orthodoxy, and Russian language and culture were to be dominant.

Panslavism
 After the Crimean War, Slavophilism evolved into Panslavism in Russia. Hostility toward Western Europe, especially Austria and Poland, and radical ideas such as establishing a Slavic federation with its capital in Istanbul gained traction (Serbest, 2017). The ideological fathers of this movement were Russian nationalists Nikolay Danilevsky and his student Vladimir Lamansky. They argued there was no natural geographic boundary between Europe and Asia, and therefore Russia could not be separated from either but instead represented a unique geographic civilization (Bassin, 2015).

Danilevsky rooted this civilization in Slavic unity and proposed a political unification of Eastern Slavs to counter Europe. Lamansky advocated spreading the Russian language among Slavs and structuring the Slavic worldview around Russia. One promoted political panslavism, the other literary-political panslavism as the foundation of a Russian-centered civilization (Kuprianov, 2017).

Danilevsky’s ideological foundations also included strong hatred toward Turkey. In his 1869 book Russia and Europe, he described Turkey as a barbaric and occupying power that insulted Europe’s most sacred (religious) interests, and he expressed confusion over Western sympathy for “barbaric and despotic Turkey.” He proposed the conquest of Istanbul as the capital of a powerful Slavic state, arguing that this would allow Slavic civilization to replace the declining Romano-Germanic culture and establish a new world civilization (Kaya & İşyar, 2009a).

For both Westernizers and Slavophiles of the time, Turks were regarded as “barbarians,” and freeing Istanbul from Turkish control was a key goal. Just as today, the idea that “Russia is a separate civilization” was often framed against a backdrop of “humiliation by the collective West.” For non-Russian Slavs, this ideology was more Russian nationalism than pan-Slavism—rejected by Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, Croats, and Slovenes. However, Slavic peoples under Ottoman rule viewed Russia as their liberator. The 1877–78 Russo-Turkish War is considered a historical manifestation of Russian expansionist thinking (Kaya & İşyar, 2009b).

Eurasianism
The Eurasianist ideology that emerged in the early 20th century was essentially a slightly modified version of this line of thought. The Eurasianists referred to Danilevsky and Lamansky as their ideological predecessors. Pyotr Savitsky, considered one of the "fathers of Eurasianism," wrote in his 1925 programmatic article titled Eurasianism that the idea of Russia being a unique cultural-geographical civilization was not their own invention, but had been proposed years earlier by Lamansky. However, there was a difference between Danilevsky and Lamansky and the Eurasianists: the former called this civilization the Slavic world, not Russo-Eurasia (Kosharniy, 2007a).

The Eurasianists, on the other hand, added the notion of “Turkic peoples” to the Russia-centered new civilization. By this, they meant the Finno-Ugric peoples, Turks, Mongols, and Manchus (Badmaev, 2015).

They differed from Slavophiles by arguing that Russian identity was not exclusively Slavic and Orthodox but a fusion of Eastern Slavic and Mongol-Tatar elements. On the issue of Slavic identity, they shared views with Slavophiles and panslavists, categorizing Eastern Slavs as “Eurasian” but excluding Czechs, Slovaks, and Poles (Glebov, 2003).

Eurasianists, like their ideological predecessors, opposed Western liberal democracy, the rule of law, parliamentarism, individualism, and human rights.

After the Bolshevik Revolution, a group of Russian intellectuals who fled the country developed Eurasianism ideologically in the early 20th century and transformed it into a political movement in exile during the 1920s. Prince Nikolay Trubetskoy is considered the movement’s primary ideologue. In his 1920 book Europe and Humanity, published in Sofia, he promoted Eurasianism without explicitly using the term.

The movement’s main manifesto was the 1921 collection Return to the East, featuring essays by Trubetskoy, geographer Pyotr Savitsky, historian and philologist Georgi Florovsky, and literary critic Pyotr Suvchinsky. The movement grew to include other Russian intellectuals and remained active in cities like Sofia, Prague, Belgrade, Berlin, Brussels, and Paris until the 1930s (Kosharniy, 2007b).

Eurasianists included Eastern Europe, Western Siberia, and Turkestan in their definition of “Eurasia.” They believed that similarities among Slavic and Turanic peoples—in culture, psychology, religion, and language—made their union necessary. They traced the roots of Eurasian unity not to Kievan Rus but to the Mongol Empire.

They saw the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution as a return to Russia’s true historical roots, breaking away from the alien “Romano-Germanic” civilization. Although not overtly nationalist at first glance, Eurasianism ultimately demanded submission to “high Russian culture.” While Orthodox Christianity played a unifying religious role, “minor” cultures were expected to harmonize with the “higher culture,” which was unequivocally Russian (Kosharniy 2007c).

Eurasianists of the 20th century believed that the West was anti-humanity and that Russia, in all its forms—imperial, Orthodox-monarchical, or Soviet—was the stronghold resisting Western hegemony. They supported the creation of the USSR based on this justification. Although they didn’t favor atheism or materialism, they believed communism’s external facade masked deep national characteristics, and they considered the Soviet Union the geopolitical legacy of the Russian mission.

However, the doctrine’s elitism eventually triggered harsh criticism among Russian émigrés. The first major split came in 1923 with Georgi Florovsky’s departure and strong critique of the movement. In his 1928 article The Eurasian Temptation, Florovsky wrote:

“The fate of Eurasianism is the history of a moral failure. You cannot silence the truth of Eurasia. But it must be said immediately and directly—this is the truth of the questions, not of the answers; the truth of the problems, not the solutions. Eurasianists saw the urgent questions of the day before anyone else but failed to offer answers…”

In 1927, the Eurasianists declared themselves a political organization. However, internal divisions could no longer be prevented. That same year, a left-wing faction emerged, openly sympathetic to Stalin’s regime. Prominent left-wing Eurasianists—Karsavin, Efron, Svyatopolk-Mirsky—formed around the Eurasia newspaper. Unlike the right-wing Eurasianists, who saw the USSR as a transitional phase toward a “Greater Russia,” the leftists believed the USSR already embodied their dreams (Kosharniy 2007b).

Founders like Trubetskoy and Savitsky led the creation of the Eurasian Party. However, by the mid-1930s, the movement had lost momentum and collapsed.

Neo-Eurasianism
 One of the early proponents of neo-Eurasianism—or more precisely, neo-Slavophilism—was Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn. In the final years of the USSR, he proposed creating a Russo-Slavic state composed of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Solzhenitsyn also advocated for including the Russian-populated regions of Kazakhstan in this union. Boris Yeltsin, then leader of the RSFSR, supported this idea (Elma, 2009).

In February 1991, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine signed an agreement to form a new union, which was presented as a long-anticipated Slavic unity. However, this idea soon lost traction in Russia, as limiting hegemony to just Eastern Slavic lands seemed too small for Russia’s ambitions of greatness (Kaya & İşyar, 2009c). Thus, history repeated itself, and Russia transitioned from neo-Slavophilism to neo-Eurasianism.

The first major representative of neo-Eurasianism in Russia was historian and ethnographer Lev Gumilev. As a young man, he had met Savitsky, one of the leading classical Eurasianists. Like the classical Eurasianists, Gumilev was opposed to Catholicism, democracy, and individualism, and he argued that the Eurasian (i.e., Russian) super-ethnos was superior to the Romano-Germanic civilization (Paradowski, 1999).

Gumilev placed greater emphasis on ethnic identity and asserted that Eurasia constituted a civilization with a unique super-ethnos. According to his "passionary theory of ethnogenesis," the “Great Russian” super-ethnos included Eastern and Western Slavs, Baltic peoples, Finns, Turks, and to some extent, Mongols. Yet Gumilev maintained that, although Russians carried traces of Turanian culture, they were the primary formative element of the Eurasian super-ethnos—in essence, Russian people were the foundation of Eurasianism (Amirbek, 2015).

Unlike classical Eurasianists, Gumilev acknowledged the existence of the Kievan Rus state and believed that both Russian and Turkic influences were essential in its formation.

Another pillar of the new Eurasianist current was Aleksandr Panarin. He believed that after the collapse of the USSR, Eurasianism was Russia’s only viable path. He emphasized that the Slavic and Turkic peoples living in the Russian Federation, along with Orthodox Christianity and Islam, could serve as unifying elements of Eurasia (Laruelle, 2004a). However, Panarin also regarded regional projects like the “Silk Road” and “Turkic Unity” as ideologies that denied Russian culture and posed a threat to Eurasianism, claiming they aimed to dismantle the Slavic-Turkic unity.

Although he promoted an abstract Slavic-Turkic unity within Russia, Panarin emphasized the importance of reducing Turkey’s influence over the region. He argued that for the Turkic world to attain universal value, it must unite with the Russian world (Laruelle, 2004).

The most popular figure of modern neo-Eurasianism in Russia is Aleksandr Dugin, who is ideologically closer to the left wing that split from classical Eurasianists in the late 1920s. Unlike the classical Eurasianists, Dugin does not see Tsarist Russia as the model for Eurasia but instead considers the former USSR territory as the foundation of Eurasianism. He stresses the importance of Russian control over the post-Soviet space and sees it as the groundwork for a future state resembling the USSR. From this perspective, he views the Eurasian Union as a positive development (Bassin, 2011).

At the same time, Dugin believes that the scope of Eurasian ideology extends beyond the borders of the former USSR. He advocates for creating a new empire that would unify the region and be led by Russians. Moreover, this empire should be larger and more powerful than the USSR (Dugin, 2005a).

When it comes to anti-Westernism, Dugin aligns with classical Eurasianists but with a key distinction—while the classical enemy was the “Romano-Germanic” civilization, Dugin’s Eurasianism targets the United States and the United Kingdom.

The idea of a Russian-Turkish synthesis, promoted by classical Eurasianists and Gumilev, has no place in Dugin’s worldview. In fact, he views it negatively. For Dugin, Eurasianism is not a cultural but a geopolitical concept, and a Russian-Turkish synthesis carries no significance.

On the contrary, like Panarin, Dugin sees all projects under the name of “Turkic unity” as harmful and believes Turkish influence in the region must be curbed. Although Dugin played along with the Turkish government in a show of “goodwill” after the failed 2016 “FETÖ coup” attempt, at his core, he sees Turkey as an Atlanticist country and a major threat to Eurasia. He proposes that Russia should ally with Iran to counter Turkey.

Dugin believes that Iran’s access to the Indian Ocean would solve one of Russia’s longstanding geopolitical dilemmas. Additionally, he views continued Turkish support for Azerbaijan as a harmful factor and argues that in such a case, Russia, Armenia, and Iran should act together to divide Azerbaijan (Dugin, 2005b).

Dugin’s Eurasianism can be described as the radicalized form of classical Eurasianism—a doctrine of political and geopolitical expansion, aiming to ensure Russian nationalist dominance over Eurasia. In this sense, Dugin’s Eurasianism provides the ideological foundation for Russia’s current and planned occupation policies in the post-Soviet space.

Who is Dugin – the Kremlin’s Ideologue or an Adventurist Russian Fascist?
 It is difficult to determine who holds the dominant role here — does Putin use Dugin’s ideas to reinforce his authoritarianism and imperialism, or is Dugin using Putin, who is equally afflicted with the illness of imperialism, for his own goals?

For a long time in Turkey, Dugin was presented as “Putin’s top advisor” or “Putin’s consultant.” Even today, some media and political circles continue to refer to him with this title. The Western press has also made comments referring to Dugin as “Putin’s brain.”

However, there are diverse opinions about this in Russia. Some claim that Dugin is a pseudo-intellectual, not an important figure for the Kremlin, and is far from being a “grey cardinal.” According to this view, the Russian government has no ideology at all (Volkov, Telegram, 2022).

Others argue that while Dugin’s importance as the “leader of the Russian world” is exaggerated, his teaching role at the Russian Ministry of Defense Academy and his connections with the FSB should not be ignored. According to this view, Dugin is one of the 10–15 ideologues used by the Putin regime in domestic and foreign propaganda (Radio Svoboda, 2022).

There are also claims that Putin did not show any particular interest in Dugin in earlier years, and that Dugin was only included among the nationalist ideologues met by the Russian Presidential Administration leadership after the death of his daughter Darya. According to these claims, the Presidential Administration is in close contact with Dugin, Aleksandr Prokhanov, Vardan Baghdasaryan, and oligarch Konstantin Malofeyev (owner of “Tsargrad” TV), with the aim of developing a “new ideological concept” (Meduza, 2022).

Dugin’s appointment in 2024 as director of the Higher School of Politics under the Russian State University for the Humanities — an institution named after Ivan Ilyin, the ideologue of Russian fascism — also reinforces this claim (VOA, 2024a).

A point many experts agree on is this: Russian state policy has become so radically nationalist and imperialist that Dugin is no longer a marginal figure but has moved to the center. In other words, Dugin is still the same Dugin — but ideas once considered marginal and radical now coincide with the mainline political thinking of the Russian state (VOA, 2024b).

What is Turkish Eurasianism?
 The idea of Eurasianism has been discussed in various forms in the Turkic world and, unlike in Russia, has not always been rooted in nationalism. In recent times, however, it has increasingly aligned with the version promoted by Russia — one in which Russian identity dominates.

In the early 20th century, Yusuf Akçura, a prominent figure in the Turkic world, proposed a concept of unity between the Russian and Turkic peoples against European and Chinese hegemony. However, when the Russians rejected this proposal, Akçura turned toward the Turkic nationalist current in the newly established Republic of Turkey (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022b).

One of the most fervent advocates of Eurasianism in Turkey was the leftist Marxist poet and writer Attila İlhan. He argued that the centuries-long Russian-Ottoman rivalry was a Western conspiracy and emphasized the importance of maintaining the close ties between the Bolsheviks and Kemalists that existed between 1919 and 1938 (Aktürk, 2004).

The ideas of Turkic Eurasianists like Yusuf Akçura and Ismail Gasprinski — and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s policies of establishing relations with the Soviet Union in the early republican years — were fundamentally at odds with the Marxist Eurasianists who later sought to shield themselves under the popularity of these historical figures. The former advocated Pan-Turkism, based on Turkic cultural superiority from China to the Adriatic; the latter favored a type of cooperation more akin to Dugin’s Eurasianism today.

In the early years of World War II, Pan-Turkists in Turkey sympathized with Nazi Germany. This group included figures like Nihal Atsız, Alparslan Türkeş, and Zeki Velidi Togan. Their main motivation for supporting Germany was the hope that the war would lead to the liberation of Turkic peoples under Soviet control. However, when Germany lost the war, Turkish politics shifted accordingly. Türkeş, Atsız, and other Turkic nationalists were arrested, and Pan-Turkism began to be labeled a radical ideology in Turkey (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022c).

Contrary to expectations, however, this did not lead to a rise in Marxist Eurasianist influence in Turkey. After WWII, the Soviet Union — which emerged as a victorious power — made demands for Kars and Ardahan and sought military bases in the straits. This increased Turkish resistance to Soviet and Russian hegemony, and Ankara was compelled to align with the Western bloc, especially the United States, to defend itself against Moscow’s threats (Çelik, 2023). By joining NATO in 1952, Turkey essentially made opposition to Russian Eurasianism a matter of state policy.

In the early 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Eurasianist thought in Turkey was again oriented against Russia. This version of Eurasianism, supported by the West, aimed to make Turkey a dominant actor in the post-Soviet space — particularly in Central Asia and the South Caucasus (Dalay, 2021a).

The West's desire to present Turkey — rather than Iran — as a model for the newly independent Muslim and Turkic states enhanced Ankara’s influence. The term “Eurasia” reentered Turkish political discourse during this period. Leaders like Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel supported the idea of a Turkic world “stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China” (CS Monitor, 1993).

Despite this initial enthusiasm, Turkey ultimately failed to achieve its desired level of influence in the post-Soviet space (Dalay, 2021b).

Toward the late 1990s, with the rise to power of the Democratic Left Party led by Bülent Ecevit, Turkey began to deviate from its fully Western-oriented policies. Ismail Cem, the most prominent center-left figure of the Ecevit era and the foreign minister who implemented the “Region-Centered Foreign Policy” concept (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022d), reintroduced Turkish Eurasianism in a new form. According to Cem,

“Thanks to its historical and cultural qualities and its unique European and Asian identity, Turkey is in a strong position to become the strategic center of Eurasia” (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022e).

Unlike classical Eurasianists, Cem’s version was not anti-Western. Unlike Turkish nationalist Eurasianists, it was not anti-Russian either. On the contrary, Cem believed the end of the Cold War would facilitate integration between Western Europe and Asia (Dalay, 2021c).

The “Blue Stream” project signed in 1997 and the “From Bilateral Cooperation to Multilateral Partnership” action plan of 2001 can be seen as expressions of Cem’s Eurasianism.

Cem’s Eurasianist thinking also influenced the early years of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Ahmet Davutoğlu, one of the architects of AKP’s foreign policy, introduced the term “Afro-Eurasia” in his book Strategic Depth, arguing that Turkey is not at the edge of Europe but rather at the center of multiple regions, and therefore must play a broader role. Following Turkey’s refusal to support the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Putin’s visit to Ankara in December 2004 was described by Turkish Eurasianists as the start of a “Turkic-Slavic brotherhood” (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022f).

Still, it would be inaccurate to interpret Turkey’s rapprochement with Russia during this period as a product of Eurasianist influence on foreign policy. These moves were more likely pragmatic (as in Cem’s case) or idealistic (as in Davutoğlu’s case). However, there are claims that the AKP’s Western-oriented foreign policy in its early years — including its pursuit of EU membership and political/legal reforms — triggered the rise of ideological neo-Eurasianism in Turkey (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022g).

The AKP government’s promises to launch EU membership talks, implement democratic reforms, reduce the role of the military, and initiate the Kurdish opening — all of which garnered support from liberals and the business elite — worried military leadership. At this point, they saw Eurasianism as a solution. Because in essence, Eurasianism is not only anti-Western; it also rejects democracy and the rule of law.

The currently dominant form of ideological Eurasianism in Turkey emerged in the early 2000s. The First and Second Eurasia Conferences organized by Doğu Perinçek’s Workers’ Party in 1996 and 2000, along with his 2000 book The Eurasian Alternative, are considered the starting point of Turkish neo-Eurasianism. After establishing ties with Russian neo-Eurasianist Aleksandr Dugin, Perinçek’s efforts became more systematic. In 2003, Perinçek participated in the founding of the International Eurasian Movement in Moscow and became a member of its Supreme Council under Dugin’s leadership (Kınıklıoğlu, 2022h).

The version of Eurasianism promoted in the 2000s by Perinçek’s group and high-ranking military figures like Tuncer Kılınç was unequivocally anti-Western and advocated closer ties with China and Russia. Its most prominent contemporary expression is the Blue Homeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine (Dalay, 2021d).

Supported by retired military officers, the Perinçek group, and their media network, the Blue Homeland doctrine envisions the redefinition of Turkey’s maritime power and sea borders in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean. It also positions Turkey geopolitically within a Russia-China alliance…

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