(The article was prepared by the analytical group of the "Khar Center" within the framework of studies on Azerbaijani authoritarianism)
Introduction
In the traditional system of international relations, the status and weight of states are measured not by the propaganda speeches of leaders or the euphoric claims created by temporary geopolitical conditions, but by the country's political-economic, human resources, scientific-technological potential, military-industrial complex, institutional resilience, as well as its capabilities to influence global and regional politics.
Ilham Aliyev, who currently holds the status of the world's showcase dictator, in one of his speeches took Azerbaijan, which he rules with a harsh authoritarian regime, out of the regional framework and presented it as a "middle power" on a global scale (Radio Liberty, 2026). However, when passed through the filter of classical geopolitical theories, it becomes clear that this claim is hollow and primarily intended for the domestic audience.
In this analysis, based on political theories, the "Khar Center" will classify the concepts of "Great Power" and "Middle Power," explain why Aliyev's Azerbaijan cannot possess "Middle Power" status in a real sense, and answer the question: What is the purpose of the "Middle Power" claim?
The Conceptual Difference Between Great and Middle Power
In the realism and neorealism schools of international relations theory, states' capabilities to influence global politics are measured based on the "state resources" they possess (military power, economy, demography, technology) (University of Washington).
"Great Powers" are states that have systematic influence capabilities on a global scale, shape the international security architecture, and can control power beyond their regions (e.g., USA, China, Russia). Their power capabilities carry a global character. They can act as the creators/protectors or destroyers of international rules (Robert Gilpin, 1981).
"Middle Powers" are states possessing a strong economy, high human capital, and diplomatic prestige. Even though they do not have decisive power in global politics, they play a significant role. The most obvious characteristic of "Middle Powers" is their ability to conduct "niche diplomacy," that is, their capacity to build coalitions and their mediation skills on international platforms (UN, regional organizations). Canada, Australia, South Korea, Japan, Germany, Brazil (Gareth Evans, 2026), and in our region, with some reservations, Turkey and Iran are included in this category.
From the perspective of political theories, possessing modern weapons bought here and there or raw material revenues is not sufficient to be a "Middle Power"; there must also be strong instruments ensuring regional stability and domestic political legitimacy accepted at the international level.
Why is Aliyev's Azerbaijan Not a "Middle Power"?
Ilham Aliyev's declaration of Azerbaijan as a "Middle Power" is a claim far from reality, somewhat euphoric, and somewhat manipulative. There are objective and subjective reasons why Azerbaijan is far from this status.
Genuine "Middle Power" states possess a diversified economy, vast human resources, and advanced technologies. This also grants them the opportunity to use their geostrategic advantages as a means of political influence (Bernard Wood, 1987). For example, the economy of Turkey, with its 85 million population, is based on a strong industrial and service sector. Automobile production, textiles, machinery, agricultural products, and the chemical sector form the basis of the country's exports. By advancing in the defense and aerospace sectors in recent times, it has joined the ranks of developed countries. Tourism and international logistics, for instance, Turkish Airlines, create a large inflow of foreign currency into the country (WTO, 2022). Located at the intersection of three continents, Turkey manages to turn its advantage of being an important regional production and transit hub in the global supply chain into a diplomatic tool as well.
On the other hand, the economy of Azerbaijan, with its 10 million population, is a rentier (raw material exporter) state model entirely dependent on oil and gas exports (Kharcenter, 2026). The fact that GDP and exports are mainly tied to hydrocarbon resources makes the country directly dependent on global market conditions and price fluctuations. This reality dictates the absence of the country's capabilities to be a "Middle Power."
1. "Soft Power" and the Deficit of International Legitimacy
The majority of "Middle Power" states (Canada, Australia, South Korea, etc.) are also recognized in international public opinion by values such as progressive governance models, democracy, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. Azerbaijan, however, is characterized in international reports by systemic human rights violations, the destruction of civil society, the elimination of independent media, and harsh authoritarian rule (RSF, 2026). Grand claims such as a regime experiencing a crisis of legitimacy domestically and being intolerant towards elementary human rights taking on the mission of "moral leadership" or diplomatic mediation abroad are, undoubtedly, impossible.
2. The Boundaries of Strategic Independence
The military-political successes achieved by official Baku after the 2020 Karabakh war should be evaluated within a regional framework, without succumbing to euphoria. In international relations theory, the power of a state is also measured in relation to its immediate neighborhood environment and regional rivals. The South Caucasus and the surrounding geography where Azerbaijan is located have historically been an arena of clash for great empires and ambitious powers. On such a complex map, it is out of the realm of possibility for Azerbaijan to be a "Middle Power" not only on a global scale but even in a regional sense. Because official Baku's effective foreign policy capabilities are largely possible within the balance of interests of regional giants, Turkey and Russia (whose relationship system has historically possessed an up-and-down character). It is precisely the form of Ankara-Moscow relations that dictates the increase or decrease of Baku's influence capabilities even in the South Caucasus. This demonstrates a regional dependency model of the country's status. That is, without Turkey's military-political support, Azerbaijan's claim to power is not only zeroed out, but even its capabilities to conduct an independent policy in the region are called into question (TVP WORLD, 2026). Two historical examples of this show the picture more clearly: 1920s Azerbaijan collapsed as soon as it was deprived of the Ottoman Empire's support. And in 2001, it was precisely Turkey's resolute support that rendered Iran's threats to Azerbaijan insignificant (Hurriyet, 2001).
Thus, there are two large states deeply rooted militarily, demographically, and historically in this region—Turkey and Iran—which fit the criteria for a "Middle Power." Turkey also possesses one of the largest armies in NATO and holds a significant place in the global defense industry. Iran, despite domestic economic and ideological difficulties, can single-handedly change the regional balance of power with its asymmetrical military forces, proxy networks, and the nuclear ambitions it still maintains despite the conflict with the US. Azerbaijan's military and economic potential, however, is significantly smaller in comparison to these two countries. And in the north, there is the revanchist shadow of Russia, which still possesses nuclear weapons and vast military-strategic capabilities. This country perceives the post-Soviet space as its "natural sphere of influence."
In such a tense geopolitical environment, in a region where the interests of three major states collide, Ilham Aliyev's presentation of himself as a dominant regional player making independent decisions, that is, a "Middle Power," is inconsistent not only with scientific but also with political realities.
The Source of the Euphoria: Transit Share, European Union Contracts, and the Ankara Umbrella
Aliyev's resort to such ambitious rhetoric is, of course, not without reason. It is the deep euphoria created by some temporary geopolitical and economic opportunities obtained by Baku in recent years. Intoxicated by this regional conjuncture, the regime sees itself as much larger than it actually is.
1. The Energy Turmoil of the European Union
For the European Union (EU), which has been trying to reduce its gas dependence on Russia after the Ukraine war, Azerbaijan became an alternative choice as an urgent energy provider (European Commission, 2022). Under the circumstances where the West turns a blind eye to domestic repressions, the energy agreements signed between Baku and Brussels have created such an illusion within the regime that Ilham Aliyev has become eager to present the country's raw material status as "global political weight."
2. The Transit "Key" of Central Asia
The role of a logistical hub on the "Middle Corridor" route starting from China and extending to Europe via Central Asia grants Azerbaijan the opportunity for a regional transit monopoly (The World Bank, 2023). Ilham Aliyev assumes that simply this geographical position will allow him to behave as a spoiled actor of the international system.
3. The "Shusha Declaration" and the Turkish Insurance
The biggest pillar of this euphoria is, without a doubt, the military-strategic alliance established with Turkey. The direct technological-tactical support received from Ankara in the Second Karabakh War (TRT World, 2021) has created such complacency in Ilham Aliyev that he perceives this umbrella of Turkey as his own internal and independent power. However, behind this euphoria of Aliyev hides a terrible strategic void in terms of ensuring the country's security. Genuine Middle Powers possess the capabilities to ensure their national security with their own domestic resources in moments of crisis, or to be protected by integrating into international collective security systems (such as NATO). Azerbaijan, on the other hand, lacks such an institutional security guarantee. The country is not a member of NATO, nor of any other collective defense system. It does not even strive for it. The US or other Western powers have no legal defense obligations towards Azerbaijan. Today, Azerbaijan's only security insurance is the resolute security guarantee of Turkey, which Ilham Aliyev sometimes tries to downplay because it casts a shadow over his charismatic victorious leader image.
If an acute, large-scale, and multi-vector military confrontation breaks out in the region and for whatever reason (due to Turkey's domestic crises, or being on a different front in the race with global powers) the Ankara umbrella or its military support weakens, Azerbaijan's chances of defending its sovereignty and national security completely alone are zero. Instead of understanding the seriousness of this, Ilham Aliyev brings the country's future face to face with various threats through hollow claims and unrealistic hubris. If the military confrontation touched upon above engulfs the region, this claim of his could drag the country into disaster. Neither economic resources, nor human capital, nor the bureaucratic resources' distance from meritocracy, nor the ever-widening gap between society and the state allow for emerging successfully from any asymmetric war. It is necessary to understand that there is no real "Middle Power" present. Instead, there is a fragile security balance resting on someone else's military might and a temporary raw material conjuncture.
Behind the Scenes of the "Middle Power" Narrative
So, when the reality is so blatantly clear, why does Aliyev toss out the "Middle Power" thesis? The answer is directly hidden in his survival strategy in domestic politics. The most dangerous purpose of this ambitious fairy tale and the created "Middle Power" illusion is to systematically militarize Azerbaijani society and to keep the people perpetually in a "semi-military regime" psychology.
After the end of the 2020 Karabakh war, expectations for democratic development, comprehensive economic reforms, increasing social welfare, and effective fighting against systemic corruption were naturally bound to rise in society. The majority has been able to observe this trend. Classical authoritarian regimes, however, consider the coming to the forefront of domestic socio-economic and legal demands with the end of war excitement as the most serious danger. Ilham Aliyev exploits the statist thinking of society by circulating the idea that "we have turned into a Middle Power with global goals, taking a seat at the main tables," in order to suppress this quiet but destructive-for-the-regime alarm coming from within and to distract the masses from internal woes.
The concrete tools of the narrative are these: "We are now a middle power going head-to-head with large global powers (for example, France, the European Parliament, the US Congress, etc.), and challenging them. There are global conspiracies against us" (President.az, 2025). Therefore, forget your social demands, tighten your belts, and be quiet! This is a mechanism to keep society in a constant psychology of fear.
The "middle power" myth is also an ideal cover for stifling independent voices. The regime claims that in order to independently stay on one's feet in this complex regional and global battle, an absolute monolithic unity (i.e., zero opposition, zero criticism) and "iron fist" governance internally are essential (Freedom House - Azerbaijan Report, 2026). Every domestic criticism is branded by the regime as "sabotage by foreign intelligence against Azerbaijan, which is a Middle Power."
Sectors that would ensure the country's long-term development, quality education, medical insurance, social welfare programs, and human capital are continuously cut from the budget and redirected to the non-transparent military-security sector, and society is continuously kept in a state of mobilization and covert war (STOCKHOLM INTERNATIONAL PEACE RESEARCH INSTITUTE).
All of this serves only one purpose: to protect the harsh authoritarian dynastic rule from delegitimization under the conditions of society's silence.
Conclusion
Ilham Aliyev's "Middle Power" claim contradicts both the scientific principles of international relations theory and geopolitical realities. To claim that a country whose economy is based on raw materials, whose governance is based on a dynastic principle, and whose human capital is exploited is a "Middle Power" is nothing but an arrogant ambition. In reality, this narrative is addressed to the country's domestic political environment and aims to keep society in a police state regime, under fear, and to prolong the life of the authoritarian government.
Azerbaijan's strategic goal, however, should be domestic democratization, the rule of law, the free development of human potential, building a welfare state, and, far from artificial status claims, taking shelter under the umbrella of a collective security organization like NATO in order to further strengthen Turkey's guarantee.
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