(This article was prepared within the framework of KHAR Center’s “Security and State Architecture” research project)
Introduction
Turkey's most deep-rooted political organization, the Republican People's Party (CHP), has lost its main opposition status which it held since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002. When the Erdoğan government's efforts to design politics through the hands of the law combined with the division and leadership struggle within the CHP, the collapse of "Atatürk's party" became inevitable. Özgür Özel—whose CHP chairmanship was annulled by a decision of a court subservient to the government at the end of May, who was removed from the party's leadership, and whose demands for a new congress were ignored—announced his new political organization, the New Party (Yeni Parti), at the end of July.
Two-thirds of CHP deputies evaluated the court decision as the usurpation of the party's will and sided with Özel. The New Party gained the status of the main opposition party in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey with 91 members of parliament. The CHP leadership, reshaped by Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu following the "fundamentally invalid" decision, became the fifth party in the parliament with 44 deputies. Thus, although the party founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, preserved its legal existence, it lost the vast majority of its parliamentary and electoral power (Sözcü, 2026 a).
These events are not merely an incident of a party splitting or the creation of a new organization for Turkey. The division of the CHP and the emergence of the New Party must be evaluated in a broader political context.
Unless an extraordinary event occurs or the government makes a surprise decision for snap elections, the next parliamentary and presidential elections will be held in Turkey in 2028. The Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has been in power since 2002 and has strengthened its authoritarian governance in the country especially after 2010, is implementing a strategy of weakening and dividing the opposition to secure its next electoral victory. Breaking the Turkish opposition's long-term losing streak with the 2024 municipal elections, the Republican People's Party has been kept under total pressure for the last two years, also with the power of courts controlled by the government. The division of the CHP and the emergence of the New Party are the results of this strategy. At the same time, although it may seem paradoxical, this outcome created by the government contains a potential threat to itself. Following the opposition's previous unsuccessful attempts against the strengthening authoritarianism of the AKP government, the dissatisfied electorate in the country sees the New Party as the new political address of hope for a change in government.
It is precisely this aspect of the issue that makes the topic relevant: Will the New Party be able to fulfill these hopes and become the new address for the dissatisfied and a real alternative to Erdoğan's authoritarianism? The prevention of Ekrem İmamoğlu's presidential candidacy, the arrest of opposition mayors, the invalidation of the CHP congress through the court, and the dismissal of the elected leadership have further actualized the question of whether a change of government in Turkey is possible through ordinary democratic means. In this respect, the success or failure of the New Party will not only determine the future of a political organization. This process will directly affect the reorganization of the opposition in Turkey, the unification of the dissatisfied electorate around a single center, the protection of an alternative presidential candidate, and the possibility of replacing the authoritarian government through elections.
In this analysis, the KHAR Center examines the political conditions under which the New Party was formed, how much power it holds in parliament, municipalities, and local organizations, and the difficulties it will face in issues such as election participation, financing, cadres, political identity, and candidacy. At the same time, it analyzes the party's potential to become the voice of the dissatisfied electorate, to undermine Erdoğan's advantage regarding security and strong leadership, and to create an alternative for democratic change within the international authoritarian conjuncture; and answers the question: "Will the New Party, having separated from the CHP, be able to cause a qualitative change in Turkish politics and become the political address of the dissatisfied electorate?"
Background
Particularly in 2024, the CHP's significant leap out of the streak of failures to win the municipal elections, defeating Erdoğan's AKP nationwide for the first time in 22 years, added a new nuance to Turkey's authoritarian system. This was the strategy of designing politics through the law, and taking away what the main opposition party had won in the elections via the courts. The AKP had previously used the courts as a mechanism to strengthen authoritarian control. However, the "legal assault" carried out against the CHP after 2024 was new in terms of its scale and character. Discrediting and smear campaigns in the media, which is largely controlled by the government, the arrest of elected mayors on severe charges such as corruption and terrorism, the appointment of trustees to municipalities, and the use of threats and blackmail to force some mayors to leave the CHP and join the ruling party were repressive steps whose main target was the "neutralization" of the CHP and its presidential candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu in the upcoming elections (KHAR Center, 2026). This wave of repression crossed all red lines with actions such as the cancellation of the diploma of Ekrem İmamoğlu, who was preparing to be Erdoğan's rival, his arrest, the conduct of a disproportionate smear, degradation, and discrediting campaign regarding him, his family, and his team, keeping the CHP mayor of Ankara Metropolitan Municipality, Mansur Yavaş, under constant pressure with numerous criminal cases and arrests directed at his team, and the leaking of intimate information regarding CHP mayors to the media through law enforcement agencies to be used for black PR against the main opposition party (Euronews, 2025 a, b, Birgün 2026, Sözcü, 2026 b, c).
Finally, on May 21, one of the most "impossible" events in Turkish politics occurred: again by the hands of the court, the team that brought victory to the CHP was declared "fundamentally invalid" (mutlak butlan). The court decision included rendering the CHP congress held on November 4-5, 2023, "fundamentally invalid". However, the court did not merely stop there; it also resorted to a precautionary injunction so as not to wait for the period necessary for the decision to come into force to apply it. Party chairman Özgür Özel and other executives were removed from their positions. Former chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and the party organs prior to the 2023 congress were reinstated to their previous duties (KHAR Center, 2026). A few days after the decision, deputies supporting Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu entered the CHP headquarters in Ankara, which had been evacuated by the police breaking down the doors (Cumhuriyet, 2026a). Özgür Özel and his team, however, left the building and marched to the parliament under a downpour, demonstrating their reliance on public support (Anka Haber, 2026). In addition, Özel stated that they would remain in the party and continue the struggle, and he called on Kılıçdaroğlu to hold a new congress as soon as possible to end the disputes: "We hope that the esteemed Kılıçdaroğlu will not make this mistake, that he will not turn this court decision into a usurpation of will, and that he will not attempt to lead a party to which he was not brought by an election" (T 24, 2026a).
Even in his statement in early June, he said that they considered the new party option only as a precautionary measure against a "disaster scenario" where all other paths were closed (Diken, 2026). This was because the idea of calling an extraordinary congress with the signatures of delegates, appealing the court decision, and reinstating the party's elected organs through legal means prevailed among his supporters. However, the processes showed that Kılıçdaroğlu was far from the idea of calling a congress, but rather, determined to increase the tension within the CHP. To this end, on June 9, he applied to the parliamentary administration with the signatures of 1,100 party members to participate in the first CHP faction meeting following the court decision (to take over the faction). But when Özel, who was the faction leader, also submitted an application to the parliament on behalf of 4,400 people, the TBMM (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) administration banned visitor entry. Özel held a meeting in the parliament, while Kılıçdaroğlu held one at the CHP headquarters. At the meeting in the parliament, Özgür Özel called on Kılıçdaroğlu to hold a congress before July 26, using the signatures previously given by 111 deputies. The reason for mentioning the date of July 26 was simple: since the 2023 congress was deemed fundamentally invalid by court order, and the previous congress was held on July 25-26, 2020, the CHP would have skipped two congress terms, which created the risk of being unable to participate in the elections. Although some argued that there was no obstacle to election participation based on the court not canceling provincial and district congresses, 111 MPs supported Özel's position and demanded a congress be held on July 12 (Yetkin Report, 2026).
However, no step regarding a congress came from the Kılıçdaroğlu front; at the same time, the court did not conclude the appeal regarding the fundamentally invalid decision. The Regional Court of Justice sent the appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals (Yargıtay) a few days before July 20, when the judicial recess began in the country. This means the process will be prolonged even further.
Thus, the ignoring of congress demands and the time constraints to prepare for elections placed Özel face to face with the necessity of implementing the idea of creating a separate party, which he had prepared as a fallback option after İmamoğlu was thrown into prison. On July 21, in his final speech as the CHP faction leader in parliament, Özgür Özel announced that they had created the New Party. On July 24, the party was officially registered.
How New, How Strong?
The New Party did not start politics from point zero; quite the contrary, it stepped onto the political stage as an organization possessing serious parliamentary power. Özgür Özel and 90 members of parliament resigned from the CHP and joined the Founders' Council of the New Party. This turned the New Party into the main opposition party of the parliament.
The CHP lost its 135-seat main opposition status as two-thirds of its deputies crossed over to the New Party, becoming the fifth parliamentary party. Currently, the AK Party has 277, the NEW Party 91, the DEM Party 56, the MHP 46, and the CHP 44 deputies (Bianet, 2026a). The vast majority of the CHP's elected parliamentary faction, the faction leadership, and the overwhelming majority of individuals with experience in party leadership as well as prestige in society sided with Özel. In this respect, the New Party is not a classical new organization. Although its name, legal address, and logo are new, its leadership and parliamentary composition are the continuation of the CHP during Özel's chairmanship.
However, the situation in local administrations is not as unequivocal as in the parliament. The main reason for this is not that the municipalities withhold support from Özel and the New Party, but rather the government's pressure on the municipalities. In the 2024 elections, the CHP had won the mayoralties of 14 metropolitan cities, 21 provinces, and 314 districts. How much support the New Party will garner from this extensive local governance structure will be one of the main indicators determining its organizational power. In his statement on July 27, Özel announced that over 200 municipalities would demonstrate the will to switch to the New Party (T24, 2026 b). The New Party's deputy faction chairman, Gökhan Günaydın, disclosed that 200 mayors have already resigned from the CHP.
Currently, only one metropolitan mayor—Besim Dutlulu, Mayor of Manisa Metropolitan Municipality—has officially announced his move to the New Party. In addition, five provincial and 12 district mayors have also openly expressed their stance, stating they will side with Özel (Bianet, 2026b). In some provinces (such as Adana, Izmir, Erzincan, Hatay), mayors have also announced their resignations from the CHP, and along with them, municipal council members and district organizations have made collective resignation decisions (Gazete Oksijen, 2026a). Overall, the number of mayors publicly expressing support for the New Party has surpassed 40, and this number is increasing every day. But uncertainty continues in the metropolitan municipalities, which are critical for the party. One of the main intrigues here surrounds Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Mansur Yavaş. Although Yavaş congratulated the founding of the New Party, he has yet to announce his resignation from the CHP or his transition to the new organization (Dünya Gazetesi, 2026). Özgür Özel stated that they did not send a special invitation to Yavaş and that they do not evaluate his remaining in the CHP as support for Kılıçdaroğlu (T24, 2026 b). The Erdoğan government, which sent a message to Yavaş and Özel by arresting the mayor of Ankara's largest district, Çankaya, in early July—right after the NATO summit ended—is holding criminal cases concerning the Metropolitan Municipality dangling over Mansur Yavaş like a "Sword of Damocles". For this reason, Özel's and the New Party's "we did not invite him" stance regarding Mansur Yavaş in the capital is explained as an attempt to protect the Ankara Metropolitan Municipality Mayor. How much this will protect Yavaş will be shown in the near future.
Although Izmir Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Cemil Tugay resigned from the CHP two months ago—following the court's "fundamentally invalid" decision—he has stated that he will not cross over to the New Party for now and will operate independently for a while (Cumhuriyet, 2026 b). There are allegations that Tugay will join the AKP, but the New Party is acting cautiously on this matter for the time being. On the other hand, Adana Metropolitan Municipality Mayor Zeydan Karalar, who faces criminal charges and an ongoing trial and was removed from office by a decision of the Ministry of Interior, explained his intention to stay in the CHP with the words: "I have been a CHP member for 54 years, I have no business with names; the struggle must be continued within the CHP, which is one of Atatürk's two great works" (T24, 2026 c). Emphasizing that there are no problems with Cemil Tugay and that the decision is a matter of timing, Özel referred to the criminal case against Zeydan Karalar and the impending verdict on him, saying, "No one can come between me and Mayor Zeydan" (T24, 2026 a).
In general, according to the information obtained, the New Party does not plan to issue an open membership call to mayors at this stage in order to protect them and its power in the municipalities. There are two main reasons for this. The first reason is concerns that mayors who openly state they will move to the New Party will face a new wave of legal and administrative pressure. The second reason is the probability that potential divisions in municipal councils could create leadership crises in local administrations. For this reason, only those who wish to come of their own free will will be accepted; there will be no such demand placed in front of others (BBC Türkçe, 2026).
The most important thing right now for Özgür Özel and the New Party will be to form local organizations. On May 21, even before the Erdoğan court's "fundamentally invalid" decision, the elected heads of the CHP's 81 provincial organizations had declared their support for the leadership and Özgür Özel (Medyascope, 2026a). On June 16, CHP organization chairs in 74 provinces gathered the signatures of 833 congress delegates, calling for an extraordinary congress and announcing their support for Özel (Cumhuriyet, 2026 c). Özgür Özel later announced that the number of congress delegates who signed was 1,004 and that they encompassed all 81 provinces. However, instead of fulfilling the demand for a congress, the team under Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu's leadership decided to expel the organization chairs supporting Özel from the party (Sözcü, 2026b). One day before announcing the New Party, Özel met with 74 organization chairs and representatives from the remaining 7 provincial leaderships. In the meeting, organizing the new party in 81 provinces within a month was discussed (Demokrat 32, 2026). It is true that these do not yet mean that the organizations in question will automatically transition from the CHP to the New Party—the government's pressure extends to local organizations, and therefore, there is no guarantee that a new wave of repression will not arrive to block the transition. However, there is sufficient basis to say that Özel hopes for massive support on the ground.
How Ready?
By announcing the new organization, Özgür Özel and his team practically thwarted the government's "fundamentally invalid" court game—not only do they no longer have such a legal threat hanging over their heads, but they will also no longer expend excess energy on fighting Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and his entourage. However, this does not automatically mean that the New Party's political paths will be smoothed out. There are serious technical, organizational, and political difficulties awaiting Özel's party in the coming months.
The Issue of Election Participation
The first of these is the party gaining the right to participate in elections. The New Party, possessing 91 deputies, is enough for it to form a group in parliament, and even turns it into the main opposition party. However, it is not sufficient to participate in elections—this rule was changed in 2022. According to current election legislation, for a party to be able to participate in an election, it must be organized in at least half of the provinces and have held its grand congress at least six months prior to voting day. And to be organized in a province, it must establish a branch in at least one-third of the province's districts and towns, including the central district. In other words, the most urgent task facing the New Party will be to organize in at least 41 provinces and hold a congress. If elections are held at their normal time, this may not pose a problem for Özel and his team, but the government could also suddenly decide on a snap election, attempting to catch the New Party offside. Against this possibility, Özel and his team are keeping another political party that has the right to participate in elections in reserve (BBC Türkçe, 2026).
The Financial Problem
The second difficulty awaiting Özel and his team is the financial issue. Since the New Party did not participate in the 2023 parliamentary elections, it will not be able to receive the financial aid given to political parties from the state budget. Because according to the legislation, the aid given to parties from the treasury is granted not based on the number of deputies in parliament, but based on the votes received in the last election—on the condition of receiving at least 3 percent of the vote. For this reason, the CHP will continue to receive the 1.8 billion liras granted from the state treasury. Although Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) Chairman Devlet Bahçeli stated it would be ethical for the CHP to give a share of this aid to the New Party in proportion to the number of deputies, the realization of this is not expected (Gazete Oksijen, 2026 b). For this reason, in the initial stage, the New Party will have to secure its financing through membership fees collected from members and deputies, donations, and the limited avenues provided by law.
On the other hand, since the CHP's buildings, real estate, vehicles, technical infrastructure, and financial resources legally remain with Kılıçdaroğlu's team, Özel and his team will also need to solve these problems both locally and centrally. Another obstacle is that the government keeps municipalities, businessmen, and politicians close to Özel—all channels that could bring finance to the party—under pressure. Özgür Özel, who remarked "the money stayed in the 'nullity'," noted that there have been numerous applications for donations to the party (Medyascope, 2026 b). And on July 29, Özel announced that they had officially launched a donation campaign (Cumhuriyet, 2026 ç).
Personnel-Team Difficulty
The third difficulty awaiting the New Party is the issue of personnel (cadres). This is because mere opposition to Erdoğan alone is not enough for the system to change in Turkey—the right structure and right cadres are crucial factors, especially for the Turkish voter. Many analysts in Turkey report that Özel acted correctly, especially in the recent process, and gained public support, but nevertheless, his cadres are not very successful (Khar Center, 2026). On the other hand, if a newly established organization lacks financial freedom in particular, it falls into a state of dependence on the resources of many people during party building. And these people want to receive the return for their money and labor by being represented in the party leadership. This often hinders the establishment of a strong personnel system—the Good Party (İYİ Party) is one of the examples of this (T24, 2026 ç). Another issue is that the government pressure factor we mentioned above could restrict open personnel support to the New Party, as seen in the Mansur Yavaş example, which carries the risk of causing disappointment among the electorate. Özgür Özel and his team are currently acting cautiously to minimize these risks, but it is hard to say what conditions will force them to do. The most promising fact is that the game played by the authorities over the CHP has generated serious protests among the party's own fairly conservative members and voters. Following the "fundamentally invalid" decision, all reputable public opinion polls conducted in the country show that the CHP voter now supports the pursued political line and struggle, rather than the party name or the old conservative "no matter what, the CHP is ours" mindset.
The Issue of New Political Identity
Another task facing the New Party is forming a new political identity. The party's 41-page program largely consists of a shortened version of the 130-page CHP program renewed during Özel's chairmanship. Traditional principles and approaches of the CHP, such as the Six Arrows, Atatürk's values, contemporary social democracy, the social state, a return to the parliamentary system, equal citizenship, and statist economic policy, have been largely preserved in the New Party's program. In other words, Özel and his team promise not to break away from the core principles of the CHP, but to continue them with a new political understanding (T24, 2026 ç). When considering that the main part of the New Party electorate will be comprised of CHP voters, this is understandable. However, simultaneously considering that the New Party does not have the luxury of settling for just a segment of the CHP electorate (even if it is the overwhelming majority), Özel and his team must also fulfill the demands of a broader voter base that expects a new identity and a new approach from it. This base expects Özel to get rid of the CHP's baggage, which lacks correspondence or even has an adverse effect in a part of society, and the CHP conservatism. The New Party has a chance to shed this negative baggage encoded in a part of society over the CHP's 107-year history—to mobilize anti-CHP voters, voters leaning center-right, and undecided voters, and unite them around itself.
The Duty of Carrying Hope to the Elections
The crisis created by the government had inevitably turned Özel and those close to him into one of the parties of the internal CHP conflict. The New Party creates an opportunity for Özgür Özel and his partners to become, on the one hand, a political figure and organization that is not a party to the internal CHP quarrel, and has ideas, a program, and a plan regarding the change of the authoritarian order in the country. On the other hand, if this opportunity cannot be used successfully, it carries the risk of the wave of hope dying out and the loss of political energy. The New Party is now the hope not only of CHP members angry at the "fundamentally invalid" decision, dissatisfied with those who occupied the CHP, and fed up with government pressure, but also of a broader electorate wishing for the end of Erdoğan's authoritarianism. Public opinion polls conducted by companies like KONDA, MetroPOLL, and AREA show that Kılıçdaroğlu's appointment to the leadership of the CHP by the court created a serious breaking point both among the internal party electorate and the general voter base. At the same time, these polls (conducted before the New Party was announced) reveal another serious result: a forecast that the new party will receive at least 33-37 percent of the votes. The election result of a party that includes Özel and İmamoğlu, meanwhile, is projected at 46 percent (Gazete Oksijen, 2026 c).
The task of structuring this hope and carrying it to the election stands before the New Party. To this end, Özel and his team propose a "Turkey Alliance" approach that will "change the dark order" and includes "social democrats, conservative democrats, nationalist democrats, Kurdish democrats, socialist democrats, and liberal democrats" (T24, 2026 ç). However, this proposal alone is not enough to translate dissatisfaction into electoral energy and victory. The New Party must also manage to reconcile the interests of these voter groups, which hold contradictory positions to one another. Opinion polls show that aside from 69 percent of CHP voters, the new party could also receive support from 39 percent of İYİ Party voters, 20 percent of DEM Party voters, 18 percent of MHP voters, and 9 percent of AKP voters (T24 d, 2026). This means an extremely fragile coalition from a political standpoint. However, the New Party has no other way than to take this risk to win the struggle against the Erdoğan regime. On the other hand, there are almost two years left until the elections, and for Turkey's rapidly changing politics, this is not a short time; the New Party cannot remain in the position of a "nullity victim" for long. Even if society supports Özel and his supporters against injustice, as the election approaches, they will expect more concrete action from them. Because the voter's dissatisfaction in Turkey is not solely related to authoritarianism, the courts designing politics, or the arrest of İmamoğlu and other opposition figures. A large part of the dissatisfaction is tied to daily livelihood concerns—such as economic difficulties, sharp decreases in incomes and purchasing power, unemployment, poverty, lack of trust in the education system, and numerous problems in the healthcare system that the government has boasted about until now. For this, the New Party must put forward convincing solutions regarding the economy, poverty, the labor market, education, housing, migration, security, and state administration, and present a team to implement this—in other words, it must do what the CHP has not been able to do up to now (Medyascope, 2026 c).
At the same time, it should be taken into account that all predictions regarding the New Party's possible electoral success are calculated based on the Özgür Özel–Ekrem İmamoğlu–Mansur Yavaş combination. Currently, the party's presidential candidate Ekrem İmamoğlu is in prison, Mansur Yavaş cannot risk separating from the CHP, and Özel states that he will not be a presidential candidate—that he will not repeat the mistake Kılıçdaroğlu made: "We will not nominate someone who will lose, even if he is the party chairman. If Ekrem İmamoğlu or Mansur Yavaş had been the candidate in the 2023 elections, we would not be in this situation right now." Özel stated that their current candidate is İmamoğlu, who received the votes of more than 15 million citizens, but added that if his candidacy is prevented, they have plans to have the new candidate chosen again by the people (Medyascope, 2026a). Regardless of who the candidate is, one of the main issues that will determine the future of the New Party will be preserving the Özel-İmamoğlu-Yavaş alliance. Because currently, the voter sees the New Party not as a leader's party, but as an alliance of three strong political actors, and the high probability of victory is tied precisely to this factor. For now, this unity is not institutional, but carries a political and symbolic character. It is obvious that in the coming months, one of the government's main targets will be the breaking of this unity precisely through the hands of the courts and the media—because it is exactly this image that could disappoint the dissatisfied and angry electorate pinning their hopes on the New Party.
Erdoğan's Security Agenda and the International Conjuncture
The New Party does not only await the resolution of issues such as organization, finance, cadres, political identity, and the identity of the candidate. Özel and his team must also fight against Erdoğan's image of a "strong leader who protects security," which has formed over many years, and manage to convince the people that they can perform this duty. Although the economic crisis, poverty, injustice, and authoritarian governance increase the people's anger against the AKP government, there still exists a conviction regarding Erdoğan's superiority in matters such as foreign policy, security, the defense industry, and crisis management. According to a study conducted by MetroPOLL in March of this year, in a scenario where Turkey is likely to be caught in the middle of a regional war, 45 percent of voters consider it safer for Erdoğan to manage the crisis. The percentage of those who choose Özgür Özel is 29. In the same study, those who consider Erdoğan's leadership in foreign policy as an opportunity for Turkey constituted 51 percent, while those who see it as a risk constituted 40 percent. The fact that nearly one-third of İYİ Party and DEM Party voters are among those who consider Erdoğan's foreign policy an opportunity shows that this advantage is not limited solely to the ruling bloc (T24, 2026e).
Turkey is one of those countries where, even if economic dissatisfaction is very high, the security agenda can change voter behavior. Because the Turkish voter views the state as a sacred entity, and a threat to this entity can come before all other issues for them (KHAR Center, 2026). The country's geography also ensures the relevance of such threats, as well as manipulations related to such threats. Under these conditions, the AKP government can quite easily present domestic demands for change as a security risk. In this regard, one of the main tasks of the New Party is not to convince the voter that Erdoğan is authoritarian (there is enough consolidation on this issue); the main issue is to convince a large part of society that Turkey without Erdoğan will not be weaker, more powerless, or in more danger. This will be precisely one of the objective difficulties of the election for the New Party. This difficulty is not solely tied to Erdoğan's strong leader image. The fact that the political conjuncture in the world right now is not at all in the direction of democratization is a particularly serious obstacle for the Turkish opposition. Because, unlike in previous years, Turkey's authoritarianization almost no longer bothers the European Union or the USA. The EU's certain influence mechanisms regarding membership and Western sanctions created a limited but tangible effect on the Turkish government in previous years. In recent years, this effect has almost been reduced to zero. Quite the opposite, according to the conviction forming in the West, it is not important for Turkey to be a democratic country; what is important is for Turkey to continue its functionality under the leadership of a strongman whom system actors know well and can easily bargain with. And this strongman, for them, is Erdoğan (Khar Center, 2026). This approach was also openly demonstrated at the recent NATO summit held in Turkey. US President Donald Trump generously gave Erdoğan the "closest friend" images he needed most. EU leaders, on the other hand, contented themselves with praising Turkey's position as a security, migration, counter-terrorism, trade, and energy partner without ever touching upon issues like democratic backsliding, authoritarian governance, arrests, pressure on the opposition, and the capture of the media. Even the mass arrests carried out on the eve of the NATO summit did not affect this rhetoric; conversely, NATO showed support for Turkey's authoritarian regime by not accrediting media organs "undesirable" to the Erdoğan government.
The Turkish opposition, in the current case the New Party, is forced to struggle with this serious global obstacle as well. In this situation, only one path remains for Özel and his team: to convince the people, the Turkish voter, that they are the right alternative.
CONCLUSION
Currently, the opposition electorate in Turkey is angry at the government, but for this anger to turn into a mobilization factor as in the example of Hungary, there is a need for a strong political actor. Turkey's dissatisfied electorate knows who they will not vote for, but their search regarding who they will vote for has not yet ended. So far, the politics pursued and efforts shown by the opposition (many of which later turned out to be the government's plan) have not fulfilled the hopes of the dissatisfied electorate. For this reason, the people are already in search of a strong structure that has the probability of winning. How ideologically close this structure is to the voter no longer plays as great a role as in previous elections. Whichever organization has the probability of defeating Erdoğan, the voter will gravitate toward it. In this respect, the New Party's path will be very long, its burden very heavy, and its struggle very difficult.
The New Party is not an organization starting from scratch in Turkish politics. It is a strong structure that begins its activities with the advance support of the main opposition faction of the parliament, the local organizations of the CHP, municipalities, the CHP voter base, and a portion of the dissatisfied electorate outside the CHP. Undoubtedly, these advantages create an opportunity for it to become the strongest political address for the electorate desiring a change of government in Turkey.
However, the existence of this opportunity is not a direct guarantee of success. On the contrary, a test awaits the New Party to turn this support behind it into a stable political force and to repay the advance it received from the people as a victim of repression by organizing and creating an alternative with a serious program and personnel policy. To create a qualitative change in Turkish politics, Özel and his team must transcend the traditional borders of the CHP, they must not divide, but on the contrary, unite the dissatisfied electorate, convince conservatives moving away from the government, nationalists, Kurdish voters, youth disillusioned with politics, and the broad masses suffering from the economic crisis that they can be an alternative, give hope that they can steer the ship of Turkey to port in security and crisis situations, and also find foreign allies for themselves in a highly complex international conjuncture.
Despite all difficulties, the emergence of the New Party should be accepted as a qualitative change phase for the Turkish opposition and society. The breaking away of both a large army of cadres and electorate from a conservative left party like the CHP can turn into a driving force for society's hope for change. The New Party is undoubtedly one of the most real hopes for the electorate wanting change in Turkey right now; however, whether it will turn into a true alternative will be determined by the political vigilance, capability, and performance it demonstrates in the coming months.
Note: The article you have read was originally written in the Azerbaijani language. Artificial intelligence tools were used only in the translation.
REFERENCES
Sözcü, 2026a. “Yeni Parti Meclis kayıtlarına girdi; 91 vekille ana muhalefet oldu.” https://www.sozcu.com.tr/yeni-parti-resmen-tbmm-de-p339513
KHAR Center, 2026. “Ana müxalifət partiyasına qarşı çevriliş qərarı Türkiyəni sivil itaətsizliyə sürükləyərmi?” https://kharcenter.com/arasdirmalar/ana-muxalifet-partiyasina-qarsi-cevrilis-qerari-turkiyeni-sivil-itaetsizliye-surukleyermi
Euronews, 2025 a. İstanbul Üniversitesi duyurdu: Ekrem İmamoğlu'nun üniversite diploması iptal edildi
https://tr.euronews.com/2025/03/18/ekrem-imamoglunun-universite-diplomasi-iptal-edildi.
Euronews, 2025 b. Tutuklanan Ekrem İmamoğlu cumhurbaşkanı olabilir mi?
https://tr.euronews.com/2025/03/24/tutuklanan-ekrem-imamoglu-cumhurbaskani-olabilir-mi.
Birgün, 2026. Kardeşi gözaltına alınan Dilek İmamoğlu'ndan ilk açıklama.
https://www.birgun.net/haber/kardesi-gozaltina-alinan-dilek-imamoglu-ndan-ilk-aciklama-689962
Sözcü, 2026 b. Bakana şu soru soruldu: Mansur Yavaş’a niçin dokunulmuyor?
https://www.sozcu.com.tr/bakana-su-soru-soruldu-mansur-yavas-a-nicin-dokunulmuyor-p305668
Sözcü, 2026 c. Çok ‘Özel’ ifade için başkan aranıyor.https://www.sozcu.com.tr/amp/cok-ozel-ifade-icin-baskan-araniyor-p305251.
Cumhuriyet, 2026a. “‘Görüntüler üzüyor’ demişti: Kılıçdaroğlu ekibinin ilk işi afiş indirmek oldu.” https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/turkiye/goruntuler-bizi-uzuyor-demisti-kilicdaroglu-ekibinin-ilk-isi-afis-indirmek-oldu-2506648
ANKA Haber, 2026. “CHP Genel Başkanı Özgür Özel, CHP Genel Merkezi’nden TBMM’ye yürüdü.” https://ankahaber.net/haber/detay/chp_genel_baskani_ozgur_ozel_chp_genel_merkezinden_tbmmye_yurudu_313440.
T24, 2026a. “Özel ‘Yeni parti kurmayacağız, kimse istifa etmesin’ dedi, Kılıçdaroğlu’na seçim çağrısını yineledi: Butlanı irade gaspına döndürmeyeceğini umuyoruz!” https://t24.com.tr/gundem/ozgur-ozel-yeni-bir-parti-kurma-gibi-bir-durumumuz-yok%2C1324421.
Diken, 2026. “Özel: Yeni bir parti var ama felaket senaryosu için.” https://www.diken.com.tr/ozel-yeni-bir-parti-var-ama-felaket-senaryosu-icin/.
Yetkin Report, 2026. “Özel: O kurultayı yapacaksınız! Yoksa CHP seçime giremeyecek.” https://yetkinreport.com/2026/06/09/ozel-o-kurultayi-yapacaksiniz-yoksa-chp-secime-giremeyecek/.
Bianet, 2026a. CHP ana muhalefet konumunu kaybetti, Meclis’te beşinci sıraya geriledi.
https://bianet.org/haber/chp-ana-muhalefet-konumunu-kaybetti-mecliste-besinci-siraya-geriledi-321838.
T24, 2026b. “Özel, 200’den fazla belediyenin Yeni Parti’ye geçeceğini açıkladı; iktidara seslendi: Biri dayaktan yılmıyorsa ondan korkun, ben dayaktan yılmam!” https://t24.com.tr/gundem/yeni-parti-lideri-ozgur-ozel-aciklamalarda-bulunuyor%2C1338793.
Bianet, 2026a. “Yeni Parti’ye geçen CHP’li belediye başkanları.” https://bianet.org/haber/yeni-parti-ye-gecen-chp-li-belediye-baskanlari-321925.
Gazete Oksijen, 2026a. “Özgür Özel ‘200’ün üzerinde belediye katılacak’ demişti: CHP’li belediyelerde istifalar peş peşe geldi.” https://gazeteoksijen.com/turkiye/ozgur-ozel-200un-uzerinde-belediye-katilacak-demisti-chpli-belediyelerde-istifalar-pes-pese-geldi-283812.
Dünya, 2026. “Mansur Yavaş Yeni Parti’ye geçti mi, geçecek mi?” https://www.dunya.com/gundem/mansur-yavas-yeni-partiye-gecti-mi-gececek-mi-haberi-833912.
Cumhuriyet, 2026b. “Cemil Tugay: ‘Bir süre daha bağımsız kalacağım.’” https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/siyaset/cemil-tugay-bir-sure-daha-bagimsiz-kalacagim-2522977.
T24, 2026 c. Zeydan Karalar'dan "Yeni Parti'ye geçecek misiniz?" sorusuna yanıt: CHP'de kalacağım, benim isimlerle işim yok.
BBC News Türkçe, 2026. “Yedi soruda Özgür Özel’in liderliğindeki ‘Yeni Parti’ hakkında bilinenler.” https://www.bbc.com/turkce/articles/c14103pz2y1o
Medyascope, 2026a. “CHP’nin 81 il başkanından Özgür Özel’e destek açıklaması.” https://medyascope.tv/2026/05/21/chpnin-81-il-baskanindan-ozgur-ozele-destek-aciklamasi/
Cumhuriyet, 2026c. “CHP’de 74 il başkanı, olağanüstü kurultay imzalarını genel merkeze teslim etti: ‘Saray oyununu kurultay bozar.’” https://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/turkiye/chp-de-74-il-baskani-olaganustu-kurultay-imzalarini-genel-merkeze-teslim-etti-saray-oyununu-kurultay-bozar-2513078.
Sözcü, 2026b. “CHP Lideri Özgür Özel CHP’lileri görevden alınan il başkanlıklarına çağırdı.” https://www.sozcu.com.tr/ihrac-kararlari-sonrasi-ozgur-ozel-den-ilk-aciklama-p328838.
Demokrat 32, 2026. “Sayılar netleşti.” https://www.demokrat32.com/foto-galeri/sayilar-netlesti.
Gazete Oksijen, 2026b. “Devlet Bahçeli: Yeni partiye, CHP’den geçen milletvekili oranında Hazine yardımı yapılmalı.” https://gazeteoksijen.com/turkiye/devlet-bahceli-yeni-partiye-chpden-gecen-milletvekili-oraninda-hazine-yardimi-yapilmali-283391.
Medyascope, 2026b. “Özgür Özel: ‘200’ün üstünde belediye başkanı YENİ Parti’ye katılıyor.’” https://medyascope.tv/2026/07/27/ozgur-ozel-yeni-partiye-200un-ustunde-belediye-baskani-katilacagini-acikladi/.
Cumhuriyet, 2026 ç. Özgür Özel videoyla duyurdu: YENİ Parti bağış kampanyası başlattı
T24, 2026ç. “İşte Yeni Parti Programı’nın tam metni: ‘Bu kara düzeni değiştireceğiz’ vurgusuyla, milliyetçi ve muhafazakâr sağa da ‘Türkiye İttifakı’ çağrısı yapıldı.” https://t24.com.tr/politika/iste-yeni-parti-programinin-tam-metni-bu-kara-duzeni-degistirecegiz%2C1338158.
Gazete Oksijen, 2026c. “MetroPOLL, Türkiye’nin Nabzı araştırması: Özgür Özel yeni parti kurarsa en yakın rakibinden 5 puan önde.” https://gazeteoksijen.com/turkiye/metropoll-turkiyenin-nabzi-arastirmasi-ozgur-ozel-yeni-parti-kurarsa-en-yakin-rakibinden-5-puan-onde-281864.
T24, 2026 d. “Çarpıcı butlan anketi: CHP seçmeni parti logosunu bırakmayı göze alıyor mu; yeni parti oy oranlarını nasıl etkiler; AKP ve MHP’de süreci hukuki bulmayanların oranları ne?” https://t24.com.tr/foto-haber/carpici-butlan-anketi-chp-secmeni-parti-logosunu-birakmayi-goze-aliyor-mu-yeni-parti-oy-oranlarini-nasil-etkiler-akp-ve-mhpde-sureci-hukuki-bulmayanlarin-oranlari-ne%2C42198.
Medyascope, 2026c. “Ruşen Çakır yorumluyor: ‘Yeni Parti’ yeni olabilecek mi?” https://medyascope.tv/2026/07/17/yeni-parti-yeni-olabilecek-mi/
T24, 2026 e. “Anket: Mansur Yavaş, Hakan Fidan, İmamoğlu ve Erdoğan arasında öne çıkan isim kim oldu?” https://t24.com.tr/politika/anket-mansur-yavas-hakan-fidan-imamoglu-ve-erdogan-arasinda-one-cikan-isim-kim-oldu%2C1310845
