The “3+3” platform was introduced by the President of Turkey in 2020 as a new cooperation format for the South Caucasus. It was first mentioned on December 10, 2020, by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during his visit to Baku to attend the Victory Parade upon the invitation of President Ilham Aliyev. According to Caspian News, Erdoğan proposed a regional cooperation platform comprising Russia, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, Georgia, and Armenia. While the initiative aimed to bring together Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, as well as Iran, Russia, and Turkey, Georgia has boycotted the process (Caspian News, 2020): “Georgia has never participated in this meeting and will not participate” (Modern.az, 2023). This analysis explores the emergence conditions of the “3+3” format, its meetings, declared and interpreted objectives, Western reactions, and the platform’s impact on the geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus.
Introduction
South Caucasus countries participate in the EU’s Eastern Partnership Program (European Commission, 2009). Nevertheless, by joining a new cooperation platform dominated by Turkey, Russia, and Iran, they have created a new dynamic in regional politics. Although Georgia has officially refused to participate, this does not necessarily mean that official Tbilisi will remain uninterested in the future. Following the parliamentary elections held in Georgia last autumn, the mass protests and the government’s repressive response—particularly around the “Russian law”—have significantly strained relations with the West. As a result, Georgia’s EU accession process was halted in 2024 (Le Monde, 2024). Time will tell how developments in Georgia unfold. Meanwhile, both Azerbaijan and Armenia actively participate in the format. Given Azerbaijan’s authoritarian regime and poor relations with Western institutions—especially the Council of Europe—its interest in this initiative is understandable (Human Rights Watch, 2024). However, Armenia's involvement, despite its declared transition to democracy and Western integration aspirations, raises questions.
Nevertheless, the central question remains: Will the “3+3” format succeed?
The aim of this analysis is to evaluate, through an analytical and comparative lens, the geopolitical motivations of the actors involved in the “3+3” platform initiated by Turkey in 2020. It assesses the political and strategic objectives of the initiative, its feasibility amid internal and external obstacles, and its implications for regional geopolitical balance and East–West rivalry. It seeks to determine whether the platform is a realistic mechanism or merely a strategic tool, comparing the political regimes, foreign policy priorities, and geopolitical positions of participating countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Iran, Russia, Turkey) while analyzing Georgia’s non-participation.
Limitations
Lack of empirical data:
As the “3+3” platform is still in its early stages, concrete projects, agreements, or institutional mechanisms are limited. Thus, the analysis relies primarily on official statements, rhetoric, and hypothetical geopolitical scenarios.
Changing regional context:
At the time of research, the Russia–Ukraine and Iran–Israel wars are active and significantly affect the future of the “3+3” platform. These high-uncertainty factors complicate stable interpretations of outcomes.
Key Questions
- How does this platform align with Moscow’s post-imperial strategy?
- How realistic is Turkey’s role as a balancing actor in this format?
- What is Iran’s role in this platform in the context of its ties with Armenia?
- How does the platform serve Azerbaijan’s strategy of distancing itself from Western institutions?
- Can this alliance succeed?
Keywords: “3+3”, South Caucasus, Turkey, Russia–Iran, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, the West, Eurointegration
Theoretical Framework: What Do Authoritarian Alliances Serve?
What purpose do blocs formed by authoritarian countries—or rather their leaders—serve? Some scholars argue these alliances are crucial for both domestic and international survival:
“Authoritarian regimes form regional alliances, which help consolidate their domestic power and serve as a defense mechanism against external pressures” (Deneen, 2018).
From this perspective, regional blocs may form the foundation for global ideological polarization. In other words, moving together with Russia, Iran, and Turkey while simultaneously aligning with the West appears difficult and contradictory.
Other scholars see authoritarian bloc formation as a way to mask internal contradictions and restore political legitimacy:
“Authoritarian blocs are constructions designed to hide internal contradictions and justify legitimacy, using external pressure as a pretext” (Levitsky & Way, 2010).
Such alliances are often more about appearing internationally significant to domestic audiences. Given this, there are various theoretical interpretations of authoritarian blocs due to their diverse motivations.
Still, common traits exist across these alliances:
“Regional authoritarian alliances often express short-term interests and have weak long-term cooperation prospects, due to a lack of mutual trust and ideological cohesion” (Grigas, 2017).
In short, there are no permanent authoritarian alliances. Each regime tends to prioritize short-term, self-serving strategies to extend its rule.
“3+3”: Between Declarations and Reality
The first meeting under the “3+3” format was held on December 10, 2021, in Moscow at the level of deputy foreign ministers (APA, 2021). The second meeting took place in February 2023 in Tehran (Mehr, 2023), and the third at the foreign ministers’ level in Istanbul on October 17–18, 2024. Each meeting resulted in agreement to continue the dialogue and included specific statements from host countries.
Although a complete peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan has been reportedly finalized, it remains unsigned. This is despite the format’s stated objective of achieving peace and stability:
“A discussion was held on enhancing cooperation in building trust in the region, and on restoring, reconstructing, and expanding economic and transportation links.” (Azerbaijan MFA, 2021).
However, the real situation diverges significantly. The statement itself suggests that trust between parties is an issue. If trust is still under discussion, how would a peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan differ from previous ones? Could this format truly achieve peace?
The British think tank RUSI argues that a peace agreement could reduce Russian influence in the region (RUSI, 2025). In this context, Russia might oppose peace. Thus, it seems the “3+3” platform does not prioritize an Armenia–Azerbaijan peace deal—at least not one Russia supports. In this case, what happens to deeper cooperation, such as the fate of transit corridors that pass through Armenia?
Projects like the “Zangezur Corridor” and “Aras Corridor”—which are posed as alternatives—highlight how communication infrastructure is the second core objective of the bloc:
“Within the 3+3 format, the first regional cooperation meeting was held in December 2021 in Moscow at the level of deputy foreign ministers. The three South Caucasus countries (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia) and three neighboring countries—Russia, Turkey, and Iran—participated.
In another part of the discussions, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian emphasized the historical corridor between Iran and Armenia and noted that this also concerns Azerbaijan.
He stated that President Ilham Aliyev confirmed that Azerbaijan has not blocked the existing routes between Armenia and Iran. The Iranian foreign minister added that Tehran does not want those routes closed.” (Iran Press, 2023).
Another statement came from Iran’s ambassador in Ankara:
“Iran believes that political, security, trade, economic, and transit cooperation among regional countries offers bright prospects. The biggest advantage of this initiative is that no partner is excluded.” Again, the main emphasis is on transit cooperation.
What Do Russia, Turkey, and Iran Expect from the “3+3”?
For Russia, the “3+3” platform is a vital geopolitical tool to preserve post-Soviet influence in the South Caucasus and counter growing Western engagement. Moscow’s goal is to maintain regional power balance in its favor and slow or block integration between Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan and the West (Coffey, 2021).
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s 2024 statements clarify these expectations. Lavrov portrayed the “3+3” initiative as a response to Western “nation-centered models” and called it “a pressure tool directed against regional security” (Anadolu Agency, 2024). This rhetoric highlights Moscow’s intent to neutralize Western (especially NATO and EU) influence.
The format is also a political legitimacy tool for Russia. Amid international isolation over its aggression in Ukraine, Moscow seeks to demonstrate its continued relevance through regional initiatives. This aligns with its ambitions to act as a “regional mediator” and “peacekeeper.” For instance, following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Russia positioned itself as the main mediator and now seeks to institutionalize that role through this platform (Grigas, 2017).
Moreover, Moscow’s interests are not just political but also economic. It views reopening regional trade and transportation routes—especially control over the Yerevan–Baku corridor—as strategically significant. Dominance over the Zangezur corridor would allow Russia to regain transport and logistics influence in the region (Iran Press, 2023).
Moscow’s core argument is this:
“It is more effective for South Caucasus countries to resolve security and development issues through intra-regional dialogue” (Lavrov, 2024).
This aims to reduce Western dependency and weaken Western mediation. It reflects Russia’s “limited sovereignty” doctrine, which opposes independent foreign policy choices by post-Soviet states (Mankoff, 2009).
Additionally, the “3+3” platform allows Moscow to manage and balance the ambitions of other regional powers—Iran and Turkey—by keeping them within its orbit. It reinforces Russia’s dominance while keeping Ankara’s growing influence in check.
Finally, the “3+3” format is part of Russia’s hybrid geopolitical strategy: it is neither overt confrontation nor a classical alliance. Rather, it serves as a “minimum institutional commitment, maximum geopolitical impact” model (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Thus, for Russia, the “3+3” initiative is both a rhetorical framework and a low-cost tool to push Western actors out of the region.
Turkey
For Turkey, the “3+3” platform is primarily seen as a favorable opportunity to strengthen its political and economic influence in the South Caucasus. While official Ankara presented the initiative in 2020 as a “format for peace and cooperation in the region,” the format carries deeper strategic subtexts (Anadolu Agency, 2020). Most importantly, the initiative functions as a structured platform allowing Turkey to act as a competitive yet dialog-based power actor alongside Russia and Iran in the Caucasus.
Turkey’s policy toward the South Caucasus entered a new phase particularly after its active role in the Second Karabakh War in 2020. During that period, Turkey positioned itself as Azerbaijan’s main military-political supporter, and in the post-war period, it began to present itself as one of the region’s key geopolitical players. Within this context, the “3+3” format provides Ankara with an opportunity to deepen its political, economic, and logistical ties in the region via Azerbaijan.
One of Turkey’s main expectations is to promote regional economic integration. Through the Zangezur Corridor and other transportation-communication projects, Turkey seeks direct access to Central Asia and aims to strengthen the Middle Corridor in trade with China. Thus, the “3+3” platform is not only a political format but also a tool of “logistical strategic expansion.” In parallel with the Organization of Turkic States, Turkey intends to transform the corridors crossing the South Caucasus into its own geo-economic arteries.
Another key goal for Turkey is to be recognized as a mediator and balancing actor. While Ankara emphasizes dialogue and cooperation within the “3+3” format, it also seeks to elevate its diplomatic standing in the eyes of both Russia and the West. Turkey, as a NATO member and simultaneously a partner of Russia and Iran, attempts to appear as a neutral party in regional conflicts. This reflects Ankara’s “strategic balancing act.”
For Ankara, “3+3” is also a tool to boost domestic political and symbolic capital. President Erdoğan utilizes Turkey’s regional power status as a source of internal legitimacy. This aligns with Turkey’s strategy of positioning itself as a “protector power” in the region. This is clearly expressed in official statements: “The 3+3 format is a constructive platform that promotes regional dialogue and trust” (Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2023).
However, Turkey does not shape this platform alone, and the necessity of joint action with Iran and Russia compels it to engage in geopolitical maneuvering. This trilateral relationship is asymmetric and presents a dilemma for Turkey: on the one hand, the necessity of cooperation with Iran and Russia; on the other, competition with their attempts to expand regional influence. Particularly, Russia’s dominance claims may limit Turkey’s capacity to act as an “equal partner.”
Additionally, normalization of relations with Armenia is an important objective for Ankara within the platform. Turkey seeks to use the format as a means to open borders with Armenia and establish economic ties (International Crisis Group, 2022). However, this process is accompanied by uncertainties due to Armenia’s internal political dynamics and its relations with the West.
In conclusion, for Turkey, the “3+3” format serves as a mechanism both to expand geopolitical influence and to implement logistical and economic projects. Ankara aims to act as both a “provider of stability” and a “logistical bridge” in this initiative. However, strategic misalignments with Moscow and Tehran make these ambitions harder to realize. Nevertheless, “3+3” remains a useful platform for Turkey to continuously test and refine its influence in the South Caucasus.
Iran
For Iran, the “3+3” platform is strategically significant in terms of maintaining geopolitical balance in the South Caucasus, limiting Western influence, and increasing participation in regional communications. Tehran’s interest in the format primarily stems from a desire to preserve the regional status quo, counter the growing activity of Turkey and Azerbaijan, and strengthen ties with Armenia (Kaleji and Baev 2022).
Iran’s approach to “3+3” is built more on a defensive strategic posture. For years, Tehran has perceived projects like the Zangezur Corridor as threats to its national security. In 2023, Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian openly expressed this concern, stating: “We do not want existing routes between Azerbaijan and Armenia to be closed” (Iran Press, 2023). Iran’s main priority is to preserve its border with Armenia and maintain land access to Russia and Europe through Armenian territory.
Another expectation of Iran is to reduce Western military and political influence in the region. For Tehran, the “3+3” format can serve as an alternative regional security framework to constrain U.S. and Israeli presence. Iran’s ideology that “regional security must be ensured by regional countries” forms the conceptual basis for this stance. This is also an extension of Iran’s rhetoric around “respect for national sovereignty” applied to the South Caucasus.
Simultaneously, Iran views the platform as a new opportunity for transregional transport and trade logistics. Since 2021, Tehran has emphasized the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), which gains particular relevance here. Iran wants to synchronize the “3+3” with this corridor to create an integrated communication map with Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia. Being part of these networks grants Iran both economic dividends and strategic leverage.
Iran’s expectations are also linked to internal legitimacy. Diplomatic activity in the South Caucasus is used domestically to show that Tehran is not internationally isolated. This is especially visible in Iran’s high-level meetings with Armenia, where Tehran presents itself as a “proponent of peace and dialogue” (Mehr News, 2024).
Nevertheless, Iran approaches “3+3” with caution and attempts to balance the dominance of Turkey and Russia. One major risk Tehran perceives is the potential for the format to be used against its interests by the Turkey–Azerbaijan tandem. Thus, Iran participates conditionally, using a model of corrective engagement (Shiriyev, 2023).
Additionally, Iran’s confrontation with Israel and Azerbaijan’s close relations with Israel further heighten Tehran’s uncertainty regarding the platform. Iran fears that if “3+3” is manipulated in a way that serves Western or Israeli interests, it could become a regional security threat for Tehran (Financial Times, 2025).
In this sense, the “3+3” format is both an opportunity and a risk for Iran. Through this initiative, Tehran seeks to maintain its geopolitical influence, safeguard overland routes via Armenia, and resist Western encroachment. However, Turkey and Azerbaijan’s active engagement, asymmetric relations with Russia, and broader regional conflicts constrain Iran’s ambitions. Hence, Iran approaches “3+3” with cautious optimism — it neither fully rejects it nor embraces it as a strategic alliance. For Tehran, the format functions as a flexible diplomatic tool for protecting its interests.
Azerbaijan’s Expectations: A West-Free Caucasus and Geo-Economic Corridors
For Azerbaijan, the “3+3” format represents an opportunity to consolidate its post-war geopolitical superiority and to build a regional security architecture independent of the West. Although official Baku presents the format as a diplomatic instrument for opening the Zangezur Corridor and other communications, its deeper intention is to avoid the influence of Western institutions (Council of Europe, European Union, OSCE) and to conduct intra-regional negotiations under Russian mediation (HRW, 2024). President Ilham Aliyev has repeatedly stated that “regional issues must be resolved by regional countries” — an indication that the “West-Free South Caucasus” thesis is Baku’s strategic priority.
Moreover, Azerbaijan seeks to strengthen the Middle Corridor initiative in tandem with Turkey while maintaining limited cooperation with Iran and Russia. Through the platform, Baku also gains additional leverage over Armenia, especially during the peace agreement process, thus expanding its geopolitical maneuvering capacity.
Armenia’s Dual Approach: Between European Integration and Regional Pressures
Armenia’s participation in the “3+3” format is accompanied by serious contradictions. On the one hand, Armenia is openly committed to deepening ties with the European Union, pursuing democratic reforms, and potentially joining the EU in the future. On the other hand, it participates in the format to avoid regional isolation and maintain minimal relations with Iran, Russia, and Turkey. This dual approach is both a security necessity and a strategy of diplomatic flexibility for Yerevan (International Crisis Group, 2022).
By joining the platform, Prime Minister Pashinyan’s government also seeks to create alternative mediation centers in peace talks and balance Western involvement. However, this dual game makes Armenia’s strategic direction ambiguous and risky. There is significant public skepticism within Armenia toward “3+3” and distrust in Russian mediation (Shiriyev, 2023).
Georgia’s Refusal
Georgia is the only South Caucasus country that openly boycotts the “3+3” platform. Official Tbilisi links its refusal to the status of territories occupied by Russia since 2008 (Abkhazia and South Ossetia). Georgia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that “participating in a format alongside an occupying power would grant it political legitimacy” (Kaleji, 2022).
For Georgia, the format represents a direct geopolitical threat. This position was supported by U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin during his 2021 visit to Tbilisi: “Instead of inventing new formats, Russia should fulfill the commitments it made after the 2008 war” (Austin, 2021). However, amid the 2024 “Russian Law” protests and tensions with the EU, a future shift in Georgia’s stance cannot be ruled out. For now, though, “3+3” is seen as ideologically and strategically unacceptable.
These diverging positions show that the “3+3” format affects not only the interests of major regional powers but also the strategic choices of smaller states. Azerbaijan views it as a tool for regional dominance; Armenia uses it for hedging; Georgia rejects it entirely. These contrasts undermine the platform’s potential to evolve into a structured, long-term bloc and instead render it a fluid and unstable regional dialogue framework.
How Is the West Responding to “3+3”?
Unsurprisingly, such a bloc has not been warmly welcomed by Western institutions and governments. The U.S., EU, and NATO have shown skepticism toward the “3+3” initiative. On October 18, 2021, during a visit to Georgia, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin responded to a question about the format by saying: “Russia is occupying 20% of Georgia’s territory and has failed to meet its post-2008 commitments. Instead of inventing new formats, this should be the focus.” His reply was both diplomatic and clear — the U.S. considers the format unnecessary.
Luke Coffey, a leading analyst at the Hudson Institute’s Center for European and Eurasian Studies, stated that the initiative is designed to freeze Euro-Atlantic influence and increase that of Russia and Iran:
“The latest proposal will strengthen Russian and Iranian influence while gradually eliminating Euro-Atlantic presence” (Coffey, 2021).
It is likely that Russia, facing Western pressure, realizes it cannot manage alone and therefore tolerates the interests of Turkey and Iran to protect the South Caucasus from Western penetration.
“The 3+3 initiative can be seen as a tool used by Turkey, Russia, and Iran to limit Western actors' influence” (Legieć, 2021).
Some argue the platform aims not just to halt Western expansion, but to actively expel it from the region:
“The platform is considered an attempt to restore the role of regional authoritarian powers” (Kuzio & Chkhaidze, 2021).
In this view, Russia aims to restore its dominance with the help of Turkey and Iran.
What Are the Main Obstacles to “3+3”?
There are several serious obstacles to the formation of this bloc:
- Georgia’s non-participation: “By refusing to participate in the 3+3 format, Georgia signals distrust toward Russia’s regional initiatives. This questions the platform’s legitimacy and effectiveness” (Kaleji, 2022). In essence, the format is flawed from the start and its very name may soon come under revision.
- Russia–Ukraine war: “In the context of the Russia–Ukraine war, Russia is no longer seen as a reliable partner, which reduces confidence in the 3+3 initiative” (Shiriyev, 2023). The bloc’s leading anti-Western actor is weakened, raising doubts about the platform’s coherence.
- Western exclusion: “The exclusion of key Western actors — especially the U.S. and France — makes the platform unbalanced and lacking objectivity” (Shapiro, 2021).
Additionally, the ongoing Iran–Israel conflict distracts Tehran from regional cooperation and may render the platform irrelevant:
“As Iran’s foreign policy collides with the West, regional initiatives lose relevance or stall. Tehran will prioritize defense against Israel, sidelining other efforts” (Financial Times, 2025).
Ultimately, the fact that two of the three major “anti-Western” states (Iran and Russia) are engaged in unresolved conflicts further undermines the credibility of the platform.
Conclusion and Recommendations
Although nominally framed as a platform for regional cooperation, economic integration, and peace, the “3+3” initiative is in practice politically complex and multidimensional. Initiated by authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes — Turkey, Russia, and Iran — the platform primarily functions as a geopolitical resistance mechanism against Western influence.
Findings:
- Russia uses it to protect its post-imperial influence zones, isolate the West, and promote a “national security” model.
- Turkey sees it as a tool for economic gain (via Zangezur and the Middle Corridor) and geopolitical balancing.
- Iran views it as a defensive instrument for countering the West and preserving strategic ties with Armenia.
Smaller actors approach it differently:
- Azerbaijan uses it to strengthen post-war dominance and build a West-free security architecture.
- Armenia participates despite contradictions, balancing EU integration with avoiding regional isolation.
- Georgia rejects it entirely as a threat to its pro-Western path and national sovereignty.
These conflicting approaches and geopolitical contradictions diminish the likelihood of “3+3” evolving into a structured institutional bloc. While it may offer some value for transit or technical issues, it cannot be considered a stable geopolitical model.
Recommendations:
For the West:
- Western actors — especially the EU and U.S. — should not limit their response to “3+3” to mere criticism. They must propose alternative institutional frameworks and initiatives for the South Caucasus, or risk ceding the vacuum to Russia and Iran.
For South Caucasus countries:
- Long-term security and economic stability require more than balancing acts — they demand democratic transformation and strengthened legal institutions.
For Georgia:
- Instead of a complete rejection, Georgia could explore a conditional observer status that aligns with its national interests without compromising Western alignment.
For Armenia:
- Armenia must develop a clear strategy balancing ideological and security considerations to engage tactically without harming its EU integration trajectory.
For Azerbaijan:
- The platform will only yield geopolitical dividends for Baku if it advances civilian communication projects and genuine peace. Otherwise, it remains a rhetorical tool.
General Assessment:
At its current stage, the “3+3” format is more of a geopolitical narrative and symbolic diplomacy tool. Its actual impact will depend on the internal stability of participating actors, the trajectory of regional conflicts, and the evolution of the West–Russia confrontation. In this sense, the “3+3” platform is less a determinant of the South Caucasus future than a reflection of its ongoing geopolitical uncertainty.
References:
Anadolu Agency. 2024. “South Caucasus Regional Cooperation Platform Calls for Cease-Fire in Middle East.” https://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/south-caucasus-regional-cooperation-platform-calls-for-cease-fire-in-middle-east/3366830.
APA. 2021. “Moskvada ‘3+3’ formatında ilk iclas başa çatıb.” https://apa.az/xarici-siyaset/moskvada-33-formatinda-ilk-iclas-basa-catib-yenilenib-675352.
Austin, Lloyd J. 2021. “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III During a Joint Press Briefing With Minister Burchuladze of the Republic of Georgia” U.S. Department of Defense. https://www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript/Article/2813126/remarks-by-secretary-of-defense-lloyd-j-austin-iii-during-a-joint-press-briefin/.
Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2021. “No:506/21, Azərbaycan Respublikası xarici işlər nazirinin müavini Xələf Xələfov KİV-in Moskva şəhərində keçirilmiş “3+3” fomatında görüş ilə bağlı sualını cavablandırır” https://www.mfa.gov.az/az/news/no50621.
Caspian News. 2021. “President Erdogan Calls for Cooperation to Achieve Lasting Peace in South Caucasus.” https://caspiannews.com/news-detail/president-erdogan-calls-for-cooperation-to-achieve-lasting-peace-in-south-caucasus-2021-11-1-0/.
Coffey, Luke. 2021. “The 3+3 Format in the South Caucasus Doesn’t Add Up.” Middle East Institute. https://www.mei.edu/publications/33-format-south-caucasus-doesnt-add.
Deneen, Patrick J. 2018. Why Liberalism Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
European Commission. n.d. “Eastern Partnership.” https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/european-neighbourhood-policy/eastern-partnership_en.
Financial Times. 2025. “Israel 1967, Iran 2025: two countries on the threshold of a nuclear bomb” https://www.ft.com/content/f6a7f1b1-870c-4f0f-88fc-994796b04a3d.
Financial Times. 2025. “Iran’s Grand Strategy — imagining a world without American hegemony” https://www.ft.com/content/ecafd5c4-3832-43ad-b7e0-482c45b44477.
Grigas, Agnia. 2017. The New Geopolitics of Natural Gas. Harvard University Press.
HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2024. “Azerbaijan: Events of 2023.” https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2024/country-chapters/azerbaijan.
Iran Press. 2023. “Iran supports 3+3 format in South Caucasus: FM” https://iranpress.com/content/227604/iran-supports-33-format-south-caucasus.
Iran Press. 2022. “Iran supports 3+3 format in South Caucasus: FM” https://iranpress.com/content/55651/opening-tehran-yerevan-transit-route-maintains-neighborly-relations.
Kaleji, Vali, and Pavel K., Baev. 2022. “The impact of the war in Ukraine on regional cooperation in the South Caucasus” https://www.mei.edu/publications/impact-war-ukraine-regional-cooperation-south-caucasus.
Kirişçi, Kemal. 2011. “An ambiguous partnership: The serpentine trajectory of Turkish-Russian relations in the era of Erdoğan and Putin”. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/pavel-and-kirisci-turkey-and-russia.pdf.
Kuzio, Taras, and Nicholas Chkhaidze. 2021. “A Weaker Russia and the West’s Opportunity in the South Caucasus.” Henry Jackson Society. https://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/33-taras-SA.pdf.
Legieć, Arkadiusz. 2021. “Prospects for the Development of the ‘3+3’ Format in the South Caucasus.” Polish Institute of International Affairs. https://pism.pl/publications/prospects-for-the-development-of-the-33-format-on-the-south-caucasus.
Le Monde. 2024. “Georgia’s EU Accession Process Frozen in Wake of ‘Foreign Influence’ Law.” https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2024/07/12/georgia-s-eu-accession-process-frozen-in-wake-of-foreign-influence-law_6682413_4.html.
Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 2010. Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mankoff, Jeffrey. 2009. Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Mehr News Agency. 2023. “Tehran Ready to Host Meeting of 3+3 South Caucasus Format.” https://en.mehrnews.com/news/197611/Tehran-ready-to-host-meeting-of-3-3-south-Caucasus-format.
Mehr News Agency. 2024. “Iran seeking ‘real’ peace in Caucasus region: Envoy” https://en.mehrnews.com/news/211804/Iran-seeking-real-peace-in-Caucasus-region-Envoy.
Modern.az. 2023. “Gürcüstan ‘3+3’ə yox dedi.” https://modern.az/dunya/437045/gurcustan-33e-yox-dedi.
RUSI (Royal United Services Institute). 2025. “Peace Prospects in the South Caucasus.” https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/peace-prospects-south-caucasus.
Shapiro, Daniel. 2021. “The West Should Re-Engage in the South Caucasus.” European Leadership Network. https://europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/the-west-should-re-engage-in-the-south-caucasus-heres-where-and-how/.
Shiriyev, Zaur. 2023. “Azerbaijan Gets Bolder: How It Won Back Its Lands, The Lessons For Others, And What Comes Next For The South Caucasus,” Rondeli Foundation. https://gfsis.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/03/228-expert-opinion-eng.pdf.
Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2023. “Sayın Bakanımızın Güney Kafkasya Bölgesel İşbirliği Platformu Toplantısı’na Katılması, 23 Ekim 2023, Tahran” https://www.mfa.gov.tr/sayin-bakanimizin-guney-kafkasya-bolgesel-isbirligi-platformu-toplantisi-na-katilmasi-23-10-2023-tahran.tr.mfa.
