(This article was prepared as part of the KHAR Center's "Authoritarian Regimes and Transregional Influence Mechanisms" research.)
Introduction
The parliamentary elections to be held in Hungary on April 12 represent a test not only for Hungary but for the European Union as a whole. In this election, it is not just Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz and Péter Magyar’s Tisza facing off; it is also a contest between liberalism and illiberalism, democracy and authoritarianism, economic transparency and corruption, media pluralism and total political control, and a pro-European line versus a pro-Russian course. If Orbán emerges victorious again, authoritarianism and polarization in Hungary will deepen further, and Budapest will remain Brussels' primary headache. Conversely, an Orbán defeat would open new horizons for both Hungarian society and Europe.
Orbán, who has spent nearly 16 years turning Hungary into Russia’s "Trojan Horse" in Europe, will face a serious challenger for the first time since 2010. According to current opinion polls, Péter Magyar’s party holds a significant lead, sparking hope for the first time in 16 years that Hungary can be saved from Orbán and Europe from "Orbanization." However, the governance system Orbán has built over the years—specifically his "specialization" in electoral manipulation, the inequality of the electoral environment, Russia's role in Budapest’s politics, and the Trump administration's open support for the current government—suggests that Magyar’s path will be far from smooth.
The Core Question of the Analysis
Will Hungary be able to escape "Orbanization" through elections, or will the April 12 vote further consolidate authoritarianism?
The Significance of the Elections
In recent years, elections in the West have ceased to be a mere democratic race and have become a competition between liberal democracy and "illiberal" populism. The rise of populists over the last 15 years was only temporarily slowed by the pandemic. Following Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the surge of populism has accelerated again—driven by the energy crisis, protests against climate policies, renewed migration flows, and Donald Trump’s return to power. This rise is evident across Europe; today, nationalist parties are in power in Belgium, Czechia, Italy, Slovakia, Finland, Sweden, and Hungary. Parties like the National Rally in France, AfD in Germany, PiS in Poland, and Reform UK in Britain are also on the rise, serving as the most loyal allies of Russia’s course to divide European politics (Tocci, March 16, 2026).
Despite being a small country, Hungary is among the largest "contributors" to this European landscape. Once hailed as a success story—the wealthiest and fastest-changing country in Central Europe during the post-communist era—Hungary has now become the poorest, most corrupt, and most authoritarian country in the EU. This is largely the achievement of Orbán, who built a mafia state under the guise of an illiberal system (Iklody, March 20, 2026). Viktor Orbán is not only the architect of liberal-democratic backsliding in his own country but also a "contagious" example of populism, the manipulation of domestic politics through "values," and total control over media and society. He is the symbol of the illiberal movement in Europe, the pioneer of a destructive team of anti-EU leaders including Robert Fico in Slovakia, Andrej Babiš in Czechia, and Janez Janša in Slovenia (Henley, March 18, 2026).
On the other hand, established on pillars such as institutional capture, political discourse engineering, and illiberal internationalism since 2010, "Orbanization" has dramatically altered Hungary's domestic and foreign policy (KHAR Center, 2025a). In Hungary, press freedom has been restricted, a media control system has been established, political discourse has been polarized, the system of checks and balances has been dismantled, and pressure on civil society has increased. Orbán has taken radical steps like altering the judicial system, rewriting the legal code, and drafting a new constitution—changes that have made it harder for new parties to win seats, eased Fidesz's path to a supermajority, legalized clan-based governance, allowed the executive to bypass internal oversight, concentrated media ownership, marginalized the opposition, and weakened civil society (European Commission, 2025).
Orbán’s authoritarian governance and his geopolitical shift away from the EU have gained further confidence following recent moves by the Trump administration, which has cast doubt on U.S. resolve to support democracies and protect the European security order, thereby weakening Ukraine's position and encouraging the Kremlin’s appetite (Hegedüs, 2025). Today, like all radical right-wing forces in Europe, the Orbán government benefits from the support of both Trump’s America and Putin’s Russia, which harbors deep-seated hostility toward Europe. It is no secret that the Orbán administration serves as Russia's primary apparatus in Europe; in recent months, the Hungarian Foreign Minister has acted openly as Putin’s spokesperson (Ukrainskaya Pravda, March 12, 2026). Financial and political ties between the Hungarian government and the MAGA movement in the U.S. have also been among Orbán's most important "cards" in the last two years. U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio traveled to Budapest in February after the Munich Security Conference to reiterate Trump’s support for Orbán. Undoubtedly, this support from Russia and the U.S. cannot be explained by ideological affinity alone; Moscow and Washington are attempting to reshape their spheres of influence. Russia is clearly trying to strengthen its position in Eastern Europe by declaring "victory" in the invasion of Ukraine, viewing Hungary as one of its primary tools of influence. Meanwhile, as stated in the 2025 National Security Strategy, Trump’s America seeks to "gain and expand users in the Western Hemisphere"—and Hungary is a tool in this strategy (Tocci, March 16, 2026).
With this stance, Orbán’s Hungary has become one of the primary threats to the European security order. Hungary is not only a blocker of Ukraine support funds; it also obstructs Ukraine’s membership negotiations, sanctions against Russia, measures against the ruling party in Georgia, and sanctions against violent Israeli settlers in the West Bank (Henley, March 18, 2026). In an era of changing global order, Orbán’s position is the greatest obstacle and the most serious structural problem facing the EU’s ability to act collectively and increase its global significance (Iklody, March 20, 2026).
Hope for Change and the Magyar Phenomenon
Despite widespread dissatisfaction, Viktor Orbán managed to preserve his power easily in 2014 and 2018, and with a bit more difficulty in 2022. However, the situation changed in mid-2024—the right-left paradigm that had defined the country's politics since the early 1990s completely collapsed. Left-liberal parties like the Democratic Coalition and Momentum have weakened significantly (Csaky, January 2026). Particularly after the 2022 elections, the traditional Hungarian opposition, which entered the race with a claim of unity, emerged defeated and fragmented. Parts of it (like MSZP and Dialogue) transitioned into passive parliamentary opposition, while Jobbik lost influence, and the radical right-wing Our Homeland Movement (Mi Hazánk), a Jobbik offshoot, began to rise. LMP tested a "third way" position, while Spark and Momentum shifted toward civil activism, financing government-opposition aid programs following the rise of Tisza (Benedek, March 9, 2026).
All of this could have worked in Orbán’s favor, but the situation on his own front has also deteriorated. The economic prosperity promised by his "illiberal" system has not materialized; instead, a period of stagnation began in 2023, and inflation surged. Orbán increased pensions toward the end of 2025, but this did not curb discontent in a country facing higher food prices and inflation than other EU nations. EU funds have been frozen since 2022, and Orbán’s blackmail policy has brought the country to a point of diplomatic isolation in Europe (Levy, March 17, 2026).
The turning point in Hungary began in February 2024 following a scandal where the President pardoned an individual involved in covering up a pedophilia crime. President Katalin Novák and Judit Varga, the former Justice Minister and then-leader of Fidesz’s European Parliament campaign, were forced to resign. Péter Magyar, Varga’s ex-husband and a former Fidesz member, turned this scandal into an opportunity—quitting the party and releasing audio recordings of his ex-wife regarding corruption, triggering a rapid ascent in Hungarian politics. Gaining the support of dissatisfied Fidesz voters and those who rejected the traditional opposition, Magyar transformed his "Hungarians, Rise Up" movement into the Tisza Party in April 2024, symbolizing the values of Respect (Tisztelet) and Freedom (Szabadság). Magyar’s party prioritized issues absent from both the government and traditional opposition agendas—healthcare, education, and poverty—with corruption being his primary target. Tisza became the first opposition party since 2010 to articulate a systemic, promising vision for regime change and a return to democracy that excited the vast majority of voters. All of this earned Magyar’s party 30% of the vote in the European Parliament elections just months after its founding (Benedek, March 9, 2026).
Péter Magyar, a 44-year-old lawyer, is essentially a conservative politician. The primary factor making him more popular than Orbán is his perception as a credible alternative who maintains his conservative identity while remaining free from corruption (Ruy, Snegovaya, March 11, 2026). However, Tisza's voter base cannot be categorized as purely conservative; it is more of a coalition united by opposition to Fidesz, including a portion of the left-leaning electorate (Csaky, January 2026).
Hungary’s Direction, the Ukraine Card, and the Positions of the Parties
The race on April 12 will be Hungary's most foreign-policy-heavy election since 1990. This is driven by Orbán’s foreign policy course—or rather, his normalization of using foreign policy for domestic political manipulation. In Orbán’s Hungary, especially over the last 16 years, foreign policy has moved away from principles and values, veering toward populism, ideological hostility, and blackmail. Hungary’s once-predictable foreign policy has become famous for ideological enmities and vetoes (Vegh, February 2026). Orbán’s "Opening to the East," frequent use of vetoes, threats, and "attack Brussels" rhetoric have turned Hungary’s place in the world into a domestic political issue. While Magyar’s foreign policy promises lack revolutionary character and are often vague (Gizinska, March 11, 2026), the Orbán government has moved so far from the values and norms of an EU and NATO member that the Tisza leader’s proposals for a "return to normal" appear as a distinct approach (Vegh, February 2026).
On the other hand, Magyar leaves the door open for dialogue even on issues where he is radically opposed. For instance, on migration, he holds a tough and uncompromising stance similar to Orbán’s. However, unlike Orbán, who openly ignores EU migration law despite heavy financial sanctions, the Tisza leader signals readiness to discuss exceptions that serve national interests. Magyar opposes using "sovereignty" as a weapon against Brussels; instead, he views the EU as a platform where Hungary’s interests can be protected (Vegh, February 2026). In short, unlike Orbán, Tisza promises to stop being "Europe’s bad boy," to avoid clashing with the EU and NATO, and to return Hungary to Europe (Levy, March 17, 2026). Anita Orbán, Tisza’s candidate for Foreign Minister, puts it this way: "Hungary must stop being a stick stuck in the gears and become part of a working system" (Vegh, February 2026).
These differences in foreign policy are also observed in the Ukraine issue and relations with Russia—among the most sensitive topics of the campaign. The Hungarian Prime Minister has made hostility toward Ukraine the main slogan of the election, and this is not an emotional reaction but a planned electoral strategy. A characteristic feature of the Orbán government’s political strategy over the last decade has been mobilizing its electorate through threat narratives. Previously, these "threats" were George Soros, Brussels’ bureaucratic influence, or migration; as these lost impact, Ukraine was chosen as the new target. This narrative, aimed at creating an alternative reality where Russia is not the aggressor, portrays Ukraine as the primary threat to Hungary—an entity allied with Europe that "seeks to drag Budapest into war," "drives Hungarian youth to death," and "prevents the supply of Russian energy." However illogical or ridiculous it may seem, this narrative has worked for Orbán’s domestic mobilization and activated Fidesz’s electorate (Iklody, March 20, 2026). In the 2022 elections, Orbán’s manipulation in this direction and the "keep Hungary out of war" slogan earned him significant votes (Gizinska, March 11, 2026).
In this campaign, Orbán has taken hostility toward Ukraine even further. The Hungarian government began this campaign late last year by hanging anti-Ukraine and anti-Zelensky posters on the streets of Budapest. After Russia bombed the Druzhba pipeline carrying oil to Hungary in January, the government accused Ukraine of delaying the pipeline's repair and has continued this rhetoric on an upward trajectory. Orbán, as before, vetoed the latest EU aid to Ukraine. He later claimed that Kyiv was threatening his family (Henley, March 18, 2026). The Hungarian government’s hostility toward Ukraine manifested next in an unprecedented, mafia-like behavior: attacking a convoy of neighboring state bank employees in Budapest and seizing $80 million in cash and gold bars (Strauss, March 9, 2026).
Orbán’s main rival, Magyar, acts with extreme caution regarding Ukraine. He sees support for Ukraine as part of European solidarity and a condition for regaining Hungary’s credibility within Western structures, but he also operates according to the "rules" of a society deeply polarized by Fidesz—trying to avoid sharp statements to escape the "pro-war" label from Orbán supporters. On the other hand, Tisza promises to maintain the EU position on support, excluding sending soldiers or weapons to Kyiv. However, this party’s representatives in the European Parliament have demonstrated positions similar to Orbán’s deputies in votes regarding financial aid to Kyiv. Regarding Ukraine’s EU membership, Tisza’s position is not unambiguous; the party supports membership in principle but opposes an accelerated process. On the issue of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia—which Orbán uses to increase tension with Ukraine—Tisza supports constructive dialogue and opposes using this issue as a tool to block decisions within the EU (Vegh, February 2026).
The Orbán government, which has turned energy dependence on Russia into a sentence for all of Europe, acts unequivocally in accordance with Moscow’s interests, and no change in this position is expected. On the contrary, his uncooperative and rude behavior at the European Council meeting on March 19-20 shows that Orbán’s loyalty to the Kremlin continues (Iklody, March 20, 2026). Tisza promises to align Hungary’s Kremlin policy with EU and NATO policy, support sanctions, review all agreements with Russia—including nuclear cooperation—reduce energy dependence on Moscow, and completely end this dependence by 2035. Although this last promise contradicts the EU's decision to end dependence on Russian energy by 2027 (Gizinska, March 11, 2026), for Brussels, it is not a more serious threat than Orbán. Opinion polls show that 71% of Tisza’s electorate supports a Western orientation, 66% reject developing ties with Russia at the cost of damaging relations with the EU, and 54% see Russia as a source of foreign threat (Gizinska, March 11, 2026).
The Electoral Environment
The elections held after 16 years of uninterrupted Fidesz rule will take place in a highly polarized environment where institutions have been captured by the government. During this period, the Orbán regime has formed a system that combines three dangerous aspects of political polarization: ideological discrimination, emotional hostility, and elite-driven harmful confrontation. In this system, polarization serves as the primary mechanism for the regime's stability, and opposition actors are portrayed not just as rivals but as illegitimate threats. The greatest challenge for the opposition is to resist this polarizing logic without strengthening it, and to prevent division while rebuilding trust (Benedek, March 9, 2026).
According to international assessments, the last free and fair election in the country was in 2010. Hungarians have been deprived of the opportunity to vote in a fair election for 16 years due to the regime's overwhelming media dominance and Fidesz's misuse of state resources. This assessment is reflected in the election reports of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) for 2014, 2018, and 2022 (Hegedüs, 2025).
Freedom House downgraded Hungary’s status from a semi-consolidated democracy to a hybrid regime in 2020 and has not changed it since (Freedom House, 2024). The V-Dem Institute has categorized Hungary as an "electoral autocracy" since 2018—a multi-party system that is neither free nor fair and is deprived of liberties (V-Dem Institute, 2025). Hungary is the first EU member in the hybrid regime and electoral autocracy categories (Ruy, Snegovaya, March 11, 2026).
The ODIHR report released earlier this year regarding the pre-election situation in Hungary suggests the elections will be extremely tense. Economic difficulties, public discontent, the rise of a new opposition political force, and discussions about the country's international direction are the main factors shaping the pre-election environment. Civil society, independent media, and opposition representatives emphasize that freedoms are being stifled, the rule of law is weakening, and pressure is increasing. Most previous recommendations regarding the blurring of state and party roles, the use of administrative resources, campaign finance, and citizen observation have not been implemented. While the election administration is technically ready, there are serious concerns regarding its bias and lack of independence. Factors such as the pre-election announcement of social benefits, pressure on voters, vote-buying, intimidation of candidates, the public broadcaster favoring the government, lack of media pluralism, online disinformation, AI-generated smear materials, and the risk of foreign interference continue to raise serious concerns about the fate of the elections (ODIHR, January 2026).
Consequently, the OSCE ODIHR will monitor the elections in Hungary with a large observation mission. Fifteen international experts have already been in Hungary for two months, and 18 long-term observers began monitoring in early March. On election day, 200 short-term observers will monitor the vote (ODIHR, February 2026).
All international assessments show that the pre-election environment is not fair, and some emphasize that the freedom of the elections is also at risk. Until now, Orbán has been able to ensure victory through tactics applied before election day without resorting to specific fraud on the day of the vote. Now, receiving support and courage from Washington, there are concerns that he may go further and commit serious fraud on election day (Hegedüs, 2025).
Another risk for the elections is Russian interference. The Hungarian Helsinki Committee has documented information regarding Russian interference in the elections since March. According to this, Sergey Kiriyenko, First Deputy Chief of Staff of Vladimir Putin’s administration, oversees the influence operation on the Hungarian elections. Sources also claimed that three political operators associated with the GRU are operating under diplomatic or service cover at the Russian embassy in Budapest. Additionally, the Financial Times, citing documents, wrote that the Kremlin-linked Social Design Agency, which is under Western sanctions, has prepared a detailed plan to bolster support for Fidesz-KDNP. At a meeting of the Central Election Commission on March 7, a proposal to include the issue of possible foreign interference on the agenda was rejected by a 5-5 tie vote, with the commission chairman’s deciding vote (Hungarian Helsinki Committee, March 13, 2026). Given Russia's experience in election interference and hybrid operations, no one doubts that Putin will use every means to extend a helping hand to Orbán (Iklody, March 20, 2026).
The Electoral System
Currently, in elections for the Hungarian Parliament (Országgűlés), 106 of the 199 mandates are determined by a majoritarian (single-mandate) method, while 93 are elected through a proportional (party list) system. Thus, the fate of the election depends not only on the party's total vote percentage but more on its performance in majoritarian districts. However, the problem is not just this; the unimaginable changes Orbán made to the electoral system have created a mechanism he uses as he pleases. Hungary’s electoral system has long since become one of the primary elements of electoral autocracy.
In fact, the architect of this system, which always works for the party in power, is not Orbán. Since 1990, Hungary has had an electoral system where the distribution of mandates in parliament is not proportional to the parties' votes, often leading to results that even voters find difficult to understand (Scheppele, 2022). Nevertheless, voters were able to change the majority party in every election until Orbán came to power in 2010. Orbán’s party won 53% of the vote in 2010 but obtained 68% of the mandates thanks to the electoral system. Orbán utilized both this and the constitutional provision allowing for changes with a two-thirds majority to strengthen his regime and ensure its longevity (KHAR Center, 2025a).
Effectively gaining a position above the laws, Orbán made 12 changes to the Constitution within a year of coming to power in 2010—including the abolition of the four-fifths majority requirement for rewriting the Constitution. Just one year after abolishing this barrier, Orbán had a new Constitution, written in secret, approved, passed hundreds of new laws accordingly, and filled the "gaps" in the electoral system for his own benefit (Scheppele, 2022).
Under the 2011 Constitution, the number of seats in parliament was cut in half, which was generally welcomed, but the intention behind it emerged later. The new change required redrawing the electoral district map, which Orbán handled in his own way behind closed doors. Fidesz’s parliamentary majority defined districts ranging in size from 60,000 to 90,000 voters—large districts "fell" where the left opposition was strongest, and small districts where Fidesz was strong. This became one of the most important factors ensuring Fidesz’s easier victory. According to the new map, even if the left opposition and Fidesz won equal percentages of the vote, the system ensured Fidesz would be at least 10 mandates ahead. This system led to Fidesz winning parliamentary majorities in the 2014, 2018, and 2022 elections. Despite the OSCE ODIHR standard that the geography of electoral districts should not change by more than 10%, this threshold had already been exceeded in 25 of the 106 majoritarian districts by the 2022 elections (Scheppele, 2022).
In 2024, the Orbán government changed the geography of electoral districts once again. The boundaries of 39 single-mandate districts were redefined. While part of these changes is explained by demographic shifts, no one doubts it was a step taken in favor of the ruling party. Notably, seats decreased in Budapest while increasing in the surrounding Pest region (ODIHR, January 2026).
With a change before the 2014 elections, Orbán also altered the way proportional votes are calculated. Previously, votes for losing candidates in districts were added to party list votes to balance the seat share in parliament with the number of votes for certain parties. This was the "loser compensation" typical of mixed electoral systems. Orbán added "winner compensation." According to Orbán’s rule, for a candidate to win in a majoritarian district, every extra vote they receive beyond what is necessary is added to their party's tally. For example, if two candidates compete in a district, and the first receives 20,000 votes while the second receives 15,000, and if their parties passed the proportional electoral threshold, the 4,999 extra votes the winner obtained to secure the seat are added to the party’s proportional votes (Political Capital, March 13, 2026). The votes of losing candidates also go to their parties for compensation by law, but for this, those parties must pass the 5% threshold in the proportional vote; otherwise, those votes are not considered at all. Thus, even if a second-place candidate in a majoritarian race collected many votes, if their party failed the threshold, those votes have no significance. This results in parties that win by a large margin having even higher percentages. Orbán gained 6 extra mandates in 2014, 5 in 2018, and another six in 2022 thanks to this "winner compensation" (Scheppele, 2022).
The only way for the opposition to resist this system was to unite, but the Orbán government created a new legal obstacle: while a single party needs a 5% threshold to enter parliament, a two-party alliance needs 10%, and an alliance of three or more parties needs 15%. This rule worked in favor of the ruling party, especially in elections where the opposition was fragmented. While the old system required a second round in any district where the winning candidate received less than 50% of the vote, the new system eliminated the second round, allowing for victory by a simple plurality. Parallel to this, the government initially set a rule requiring national parties to compete in at least 27 single-mandate districts. As a result, opposition parties wanting to protect their party lists were effectively forced to split anti-Fidesz votes in many districts, allowing the Prime Minister’s candidates to win with relatively small pluralities (KHAR Center, 2025b). A 2020 change increased the mandatory number of majoritarian candidates for all parties participating in the proportional vote from 27 to 71 districts. According to this rule, to participate in the election, a political party must nominate candidates in 71 of the 106 districts, have at least one candidate in Budapest, and have candidates covering at least 14 counties (Political Capital, March 13, 2026).
The opposition attempted to field lists of the most promising candidates across the country, but these efforts were insufficient to topple Orbán’s electoral autocracy. This is because Orbán never competed with a "single weapon." The 2014 law granting citizenship and voting rights to Hungarians who have never lived in Hungary served as an additional base for Fidesz in all elections. This law provides for non-resident Hungarians to vote only in the proportional system, and in a country of 8 million voters, approximately 450,000 foreign votes—sent by mail, often with secret lists that observers and commissions cannot control—make a significant difference. Furthermore, in 2022, Orbán changed the voters without changing the districts: a 2021 law legalizing "voter tourism" allowed voters to vote in any district, regardless of where they live. This enabled the transport of Fidesz voters to districts where competition was neck-and-neck or where the opposition was ahead, ensuring results in favor of the government. Officially, 157,551 voters voted outside their legal place of residence in 2022. If we also consider the use of "near-abroad voters" in this voter tourism, the picture becomes clearer (Scheppele, 2022).
As a result of all these changes, Orbán had no need for specific fraud on election day, as the electoral system made an opposition victory functionally impossible anyway. In 2014, although Fidesz won 45% of the vote as a party, it took 91% of the districts; in 2018, it won 49% of the vote but took 86% of the seats; and in 2022, it won 54% of the vote but obtained 68% of the mandates (Scheppele, 2022).
The Electoral Struggle—Can Magyar Save Hungary from Orbán?
Péter Magyar entered Hungary's most critical election race against Orbán under the difficult conditions mentioned above. While this does not cast doubt on the opposition candidate's popularity, it adds a shade of caution to predictions of his victory.
The Tisza Party has led in all independent opinion polls since October 2024. After the European Parliament elections, it became the second strongest party after Fidesz. Since April 2025, there has been no change in the clear advantage of Magyar’s party in the polls. Currently, most polls show Magyar as the favorite. Polls released in mid-March show support for Tisza among decided voters at 49-53%, while among all voters, this figure is around 38%. Support for Fidesz among decided voters appears at 37-39%, and among all voters at 29-30% (Reuters, March 11; IDEA, March 12, 2026). Although government-affiliated pollsters show Fidesz at 50% and Tisza at 40% (Nézőpont, March 19, 2026), independent experts and centers believe Magyar holds support that could ensure an advantage in the election.
To prevent the splitting of critical votes, several small parties withdrawing from the election also positively impacts Magyar’s support. In many electoral districts, this has allowed the Tisza candidate to run unopposed against the Fidesz candidate. However, both the long-standing opposition Democratic Coalition and the "Mi Hazánk" Party still have a chance to pass the 5% threshold, which, if it happens, could affect both Tisza and Fidesz votes (Ruy, Snegovaya, March 11, 2026).
Fidesz undoubtedly wants more parties to pass the 5% threshold to split the votes, which could increase its chances against Tisza. Furthermore, if "Mi Hazánk" passes the threshold, it is highly likely to enter an alliance with Fidesz, which could complicate Magyar’s task if the vote difference is small. Tisza still has the chance to gather government opponents who fear their supported party won't pass the threshold.
On the other hand, the targeted changes in the redrawing of majoritarian district boundaries remain one of Tisza’s primary problems. According to many analysts, the gaps between district sizes represent a significant source of risk (Gizinska, February 2026). However, another approach suggests that if the voter base unites around a single main challenger, the winner compensation in majoritarian districts could work in Tisza’s favor.
Calculations show that the Tisza Party must be at least 3-6% ahead of Fidesz nationwide to obtain a majority in parliament (Gizinska, February 2026; Henley, March 18, 2026). Conversely, Orbán’s party could ensure a majority even with a neck-and-neck result or if it takes slightly fewer votes than Tisza (Gizinska, February 2026). Here, the uncontrolled votes of Hungarians living in neighboring countries and the quota for national minorities established during the Orbán era could play a decisive role. These two elements of the Hungarian electoral system could support Fidesz even if Tisza wins by a small margin (Techet, Schaffer, March 2026).
Although Orbán claims not to trust any opinion poll and says he knows his own numbers, leaked internal polls from Fidesz suggest that this claim serves voter mobilization and that Tisza’s victory is viewed within the ruling party as the most plausible scenario (Tada, Szalay, March 24, 2026). However, this should not be interpreted as the party losing hope; rather, the immense risk of defeat increases their motivation to stay in power at any cost. There are claims that the government is considering various scenarios to avoid defeat, including the possibility of postponing the elections at the last minute. According to this scenario, the Hungarian government could declare a state of emergency and halt elections through a false flag operation such as a "critical infrastructure attack coming from Ukraine" (Iklody, March 20, 2026). The Vsquare Research Center reports that Russian agents have been sent to Hungary for the election, and a plan similar to the 2025 election interference in Moldova is being prepared, but this time with the Orbán government as a partner. According to the center's analysts, Orbán’s shift from rhetoric about Ukraine to open provocations, accusing Ukraine of attacking "TurkStream" in the same tone as Russia, and steps like deploying army units to protect key facilities increase concerns that he will carry out a pre-election false flag operation (Panyi, March 6, 2026). Additionally, Orbán is "pushing all buttons" to discredit Magyar, including threats to release kompromat and intimate videos from his rival's private life (Reuters, February 2026).
Another detail showing how ugly and aggressive the campaign has become is the kompromat line regarding Magyar. In February, Magyar stated that individuals associated with the government were preparing to release intimate images from his private life ahead of the election, characterizing this as a "Russian-style kompromat" attempt. This claim itself shows that the election race in Hungary is already accompanied by black campaign elements aimed at destroying the rival's moral, personal, and public reputation rather than programs and political promises.
At the same time, the deep polarization in Hungary, where rivals do not recognize each other’s legitimacy, raises concerns that even if there is a change in the election, authoritarian resistance will continue and democratic consolidation will be blocked. Beyond this lies the possibility of even deeper autocracy—since the beginning of 2024, the government's reactions suggest that as it weakens, it turns toward deepening authoritarianism rather than liberalization. Steps such as the discrediting of the opposition and investigation cases regarding Magyar and Tisza resemble the trajectory in Russia since 2012 and in Turkey after the last local elections (Benedek, March 9, 2026). While considered the least likely scenario, there is even a risk of Fidesz obtaining a constitutional majority again through U.S. and Russian interference, electoral manipulation, and even direct fraud on election day. This would be a disaster not just for Hungary, but for all of Europe.
According to another scenario, even if Magyar is elected, Orbán could obstruct his activities through the system he built over 16 years—people he appointed everywhere from the media to the courts, state institutions to banks. For example, if the budget of the new government is not approved by these institutions and individuals, Tisza could face early elections within a year. This concern is not unfounded; even in Poland, with its stronger democratic traditions, the difficulties faced by the Tusk government in reversing the situation created by 8 years of the Law and Justice Party (PiS) make it possible to imagine what awaits Magyar after 16 years of Orbán’s rule (Henley, March 18, 2026).
Another scenario suggests that if Orbán loses the election by a small margin, he could refuse to resign, which would present the European Union with another impasse—an illegal and illegitimate government. Eric Maurice, an analyst at the European Policy Centre who raises this possibility, states that Orbán has the potential to carry out new constitutional changes and block a change of power, relying on captured courts and the outgoing parliament (Henley, March 18, 2026).
According to experts, the most dramatic situation will arise if the votes are close. In this case, the risk of the pessimistic forecasts mentioned above coming true will increase; if Tisza wins by a large margin, Orbán will be forced to hand over power, even if he complains about the results (Tada, Szalay, March 24, 2026).
The only risk-free variant for Hungary to escape Orbán and for Magyar to begin changing the country is a constitutional majority. This is because the current constitutional system requires a two-thirds majority not only for constitutional changes but also for changing or repealing many laws regarding the media, civil society, and courts. In other words, for the legal dismantling of the current illiberal system, a constitutional majority, not just a simple majority, is necessary (Techet, Schaffer, March 2026). In all other scenarios, Fidesz can maintain its position in power in some way. For a constitutional majority, Tisza needs at least 17% more votes than Fidesz (Gizinska, March 11, 2026). The Independent Partisan Platform’s election barometer, based on various polls, shows Tisza’s chance of winning a constitutional majority is currently 11.3%. In early February, this figure was 21.6% (Tada, Szalay, March 24, 2026).
Conclusion
On April 12, Orbán’s closely intertwined electoral autocracy and state authoritarianism will be put to the test. The parliamentary elections in Hungary will be a test of the resilience of the illiberal system Orbán built over 16 years and a consolidation test for the Hungarian society reflecting a desire for change with Magyar. Moreover, the boundaries of this election are not limited to Hungary; Europe, which has faced serious problems resulting from Orbán’s veto-blackmail policy in the interests of Russia and China, also has its eyes on Budapest. This is not just a race for democracy and "who will win" in itself; it is a larger and more global issue.
The rise of Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party has created a real possibility of a change of government for the first time in 16 years. Most independent polls show the Tisza Party as the favorite, but the system Orbán has built makes optimistic forecasts for an automatic victory difficult. This is because it is an election where many important factors—the managed electoral system, the unequal electoral environment, the capture of state institutions, Russian interference, and U.S. support—are combined with Orbán’s "at any cost" motivation driven by the fear of losing power. These factors have created a situation where even a narrow election result in favor of change is not enough to dismantle the system as a whole.
An election where Orbán wins would create a dramatic landscape not only for Hungary but for all of Europe. Similarly, if Magyar wins by a small margin or only achieves a simple majority, it will not lead to a fundamental solution to the problem. In this case, the system created by Orbán will have the potential to paralyze the new government’s activities, and the current Prime Minister will undoubtedly use this potential. The most likely variant for the fall of "Orbanization" and the start of radical changes in Hungary is for Tisza to obtain a constitutional majority in parliament, which is very difficult to predict with certainty.
In any case, the April 12 elections will be one of the most important turning points in Hungary's post-communist history. After this point, Hungary and Europe will either face the even more radicalized, darker face of Orbán’s 16-year illiberal mafia system—the consequences of which will be felt far beyond the small Central European country—or Hungarian society will dismantle this system and take a very serious step for its own future and the future of Europe.
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