(This article was prepared within the framework of the "Authoritarian Regimes and Transregional Mechanisms of Influence" research by the "KHAR Center")
Introduction
Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban was a significant political figure on the global political stage. His recent electoral defeat could lead to important consequences for all of European politics. This article examines the potential impacts of Orban's defeat on democracy, authoritarianism, and the role of civil society as a democratic defender. Returning to power in 2010 after an eight-year hiatus, gradually shifting towards a more authoritarian style of governance, restricting the press, suppressing individual freedoms, and weakening the institutions of checks and balances, Orban's defeat should be perceived as a victory for democracy. His defeat will likely not pass without effect, not only in Hungary but also in other European countries where democratic values and institutions are increasingly challenged. We hope that this will inspire millions of Europeans to take action and make similar changes possible in their own countries. Orban's departure is also a positive development for civil society in Europe. During his rule, a number of civil society groups in Hungary were targeted and persecuted. Now, with the return to democracy, these groups will be stronger and more vocal in defending human rights, freedom of association and expression, and the democratic rule of law. It is also possible that Orban's defeat will inspire democracy across the continent and even encourage the European Union to take a more principled stance against authoritarianism within its own borders. "Khar Center's purpose in preparing this article is to demonstrate that the results of the recent parliamentary elections in Hungary mark an important moment in recent European politics, that populist authoritarian politicians can be defeated, and that hope for democracy is not yet exhausted. As a result of Orban's defeat, democratic movements everywhere in Europe will be encouraged to continue the struggle for democracy. In this regard, investigating the possible impacts of the change in Hungary on the continent possesses strategic importance.
The article will attempt to answer the questions "What do the changes in Hungary mean for democracy?" and "What new challenges and risks will arise?"
The Impacts of Viktor Orban's Defeat on Authoritarianism and Populism in Europe
Viktor Orban, whose departure from power was doubted until the very last moment, losing by a wide margin after 16 years, created excitement in all countries suffering from authoritarian regimes. Pessimism regarding very serious factors—such as resources, external support, control over state institutions, and experience in political manipulation—granting longevity (even permanence) to authoritarian regimes has given way to the hope that change is possible. This is unlike the "all is not lost" sentiment that emerged after the overthrow of the populist-conservative "Law and Justice Party" in Poland in 2023, and the victory of pro-Western supporters in Moldova and Romania despite all of Russia's interventions; it is fundamentally a larger event. Of course, it would not be accurate to make far-reaching predictions that this will lead to an automatic wave of change or a "domino effect" in countries with authoritarian governments, but it is clear that Orban's departure constitutes a blow to populist, authoritarian, pro-Russian, and radical forces in Europe. Viktor Orban did not merely represent liberal-democratic regression, authoritarianism, and the function of a Russian apparatus in Hungary; he was also a symbol of radical right-wing populist politics on this continent, both within Europe and even beyond Europe's borders (Khar Center, 2026). By remaining in power for a long period and successfully embedding both himself and his ideology into the state, he served as a paradigm, because although the radical right is generally on the rise in Europe, most of the parties representing it have not thus far been able to achieve continuity and full integration with the state like Orban. A significant portion of Orban's influence was associated precisely with this—he managed to spread his populist "illiberal" ideology not only in his own country but also beyond Hungary's borders (Reuters, 2026). Furthermore, there is a serious financial aspect to the issue—many individuals, institutions, and parties have benefited from the generosity of Orban's "illiberal democracy." Every year, Budapest poured millions of dollars into think-tanks, media projects, and individuals associated with the populist right from the United Kingdom to France, and from Germany to Italy. Orban's defeat will cause a sudden halt to this financing poured into the populist-right network in Europe (The Guardian, 2026). Orban's influence is not limited only to the radical right in Europe. The dividing line in European politics no longer passes between the right and the left, but between leaders who accept the limitations of power and those who target the boundlessness of authority, and all populist parties, right and left alike, replicate Budapest's methods when confronted with legal challenges (Strauss, 2026). The alliance formed by the Vox Party in Spain with Orban's network and its receipt of a 9.2 million euro loan from a bank associated with Orban's inner circle; the AfD Party in Germany collecting illegal donations and linking its investigation to political pressure; Marine Le Pen in France, who has ties to Russia, accusing the courts following her conviction for embezzlement and receiving support from Orban; and Fico in Slovakia abolishing the anti-corruption office and subsequently presenting corruption as the result of malfunctioning institutions, along with other similar facts, demonstrate how extensively European politics has been influenced by the Hungarian model (Strauss, 2026). In this respect, Orban's defeat is also a serious signal for governments (and forces aspiring to power) that utilize "Orbanization" as a fundamental framework. On the other hand, in terms of the Trump administration and the MAGA movement in the US explicitly opposing liberal democracy and supporting anti-liberal parties in Europe, Orban's departure is a profoundly psychological point. The fact that Trump's overt support for Orban in the election, and his dispatching of his former secretary of state and pre-election vice-presidential candidate to Budapest, backfired has led to a dispute over the effectiveness of Washington's support for radical right, authoritarian, and pro-Russian actors in Europe. Although they differ from one another in their histories, forms of emergence, strategies, and contradictions in internal interests, there are several crucial nuances uniting radical forces in Europe. Primarily, despite their differences, all of these parties are opponents of EU and NATO integration. Secondly, although all of them emphasize national interests, they do not hesitate to make decisions regarding international alliances and partnerships that form a paradox with this emphasis. Thirdly, while many are traditionally anti-US, they intend to benefit from the Trump wave and do not wish to choose between these two positions. Fourthly, a majority of the radical forces in Europe are close to, or inclined towards, the regimes of Russia and China. This perspective, which entails both an ideological and practical challenge, constitutes their common line with Trump (ECFR, 2025). Orban and his political allies spent massive sums over the years to secure support from their ideological allies in the US, who are considered supporters of the nationalist rise in Europe. However, the investment could not save Orban and "Fidesz" from defeat either. Europe's radicals observed that support originating from Trump and his team transformed into more of a burden than a benefit (Atlantic Council, 2026). In this context, the loss of power by the most serious representative of the "challenging" forces in Europe—united by authoritarianism, proximity to Russia and China, and populism—despite immense support from Trump, can be considered a defeat for this grand coalition. Finally, Orban served the function of the main "brake" on solidarity against Russia in Europe. Moscow lost this "brake" with his departure, because the Hungarian government is compelled to repair relations with Europe - at the very least, to allow over 30 billion dollars of frozen funds to flow into the country. This, in itself, is a factor that will increase Brussels' effectiveness in the Russia-Ukraine war. Because, due to deep polarization in the country and energy dependence on Russia, even if not more generous than Orban on the issue of supporting Ukraine, the new Hungarian leadership will not enter into a confrontation with Europe, and the veto blackmail will have been eliminated. Yet, alongside all these promising nuances, it is necessary to emphasize that Orban's departure is not a wave of liberal return. The impact of illiberalism is more substantial than it appears. According to a report released in March of this year by the V-Dem Institute in Sweden, countries such as Hungary and Serbia, which were already included in the list of autocratizing countries, have been joined in 2025 by the United Kingdom, Croatia, Italy, Slovakia, and Slovenia (V Dem Institute, 2026).
Slovakia
The role played by Orbanism in this trend, especially in Central Europe, is evident, and one of its most important examples is Slovakia. The Prime Minister of Slovakia, Robert Fico, one of the most controversial figures of post-communist Europe, has in recent years formed one pillar of the European Union's most pro-Kremlin and authoritarian-leaning "club" alongside Orban (Khar Center, 2025a). His critics state that Fico's autocratic governance is inspired by Orban, and in this regard, Slovakia's populist prime minister is considered Orban's greatest "successor." Protest rallies held in the Slovak capital, Bratislava, and other major cities two days after Orban's defeat also demonstrate that Slovak society draws this parallel as well. The protest rally was connected to the proposal to abolish the rule allowing voters abroad to vote by mail, which has come onto the agenda multiple times since last year and has turned into one of the main discussion topics of the Slovak political agenda. Although Fico and his representatives repeatedly claimed that this issue was merely a topic of discussion, on March 30, Smer-SD deputies officially submitted this proposal to parliament (TASR, 2026). Voters outside Slovakia traditionally vote against the Fico government; in the 2023 elections, approximately 80 percent of the nearly 60 thousand Slovak voters living abroad voted for the opposition, and only 6.1 percent voted for Fico's Smer Party (AP, 2026). According to the opposition, Fico's "electoral reform" aims to prevent Slovaks living abroad from voting in the 2027 elections and to reduce opposition votes. At the rally held in Bratislava on April 14, Michal Šimečka, leader of the opposition Progressive Slovakia Party, stated that democracy is under threat, exactly as it has been in Hungary until now. The opposition at this rally welcomed Orban's electoral overthrow with applause (AP, 2026). Magyar's overwhelming victory in Hungary and his decisive termination of the 16-year rule of Orban, who was deemed "invincible," will undoubtedly be a source of inspiration and experience for the Slovak opposition. At the same time, the comfort of being the secondary actor in Orban's line of blackmail in Brussels has now ended for Fico. Now, he will face Brussels more openly, without Orban's shadow, which will seriously narrow the maneuvering capabilities of the Slovak leader, who had not previously entered into as sharp a confrontation with the EU leadership as Orban had. As Martin Poliačik, one of Slovakia's former MPs, said, the greatest threat to Fico will be a pro-European Hungary, because Slovaks will then see that the Fico government is also not permanent (Jandourek, 2026) Overall, the impact of Orban's departure on Slovak politics and the elections to be held in 2027 will be significantly dependent on the changes in Hungary. If the Hungarian government succeeds in rapidly and effectively changing the system built by Orban, its effect on the Slovak elections will be inevitable; otherwise, Fico will gain yet another excuse to deepen autocracy.
Serbia
It is possible to state the same sentences for other countries in Europe inspired by "Orbanization." For instance, the "Balkan Insight" website writes that an uneasy future awaits Serbia's pro-Kremlin, Trumpist, and Orbanist prime minister, Aleksandar Vučić, without the architect of "illiberal democracy" (Balkan Insight, 2026). Although Serbia is not an EU member, it is one of the main examples of Orban illiberalism in Europe. Vučić's management methods are very close to the methods of Hungary's former leader—state capture, pressure on the media, weakening of civil society, and nationalist-populist rhetoric (Khar Center, 2025 b). Without Orban, the "legitimacy" of this model within the EU will be shaken, and this creates serious risks for Vučić. Concurrently, Viktor Orban was one of the few leaders in the EU who supported Vučić and hindered the operation of Brussels' pressure mechanisms against Belgrade. With his departure, Vučić lost a crucial ally in the EU and an "internal voice" within the union. In all likelihood, the new Hungarian government will remain committed to the common policy of the EU, which will narrow Serbia's room for maneuver. It will become more difficult for Belgrade to evade Brussels' pressure on matters such as dependence on Moscow, sanctions against Russia, the rule of law, and normalization with Kosovo. In this regard, the Hungarian elections serve as a lesson for Vučić: "you should not enter into a confrontation with the EU from which you wish to receive money" (Vasilev, 2026). On the other hand, Russia's loss of one of its Trojan horses in the EU will not only narrow Vučić's capabilities but will also exert an indirect effect in terms of reducing Moscow's influence throughout the Balkans. The new government in Hungary choosing a line of closer cooperation with NATO alongside the EU will lead to a narrowing of Russia's geopolitical playing field in the Western Balkans. For example, the comfort of the leaders of nationalist, pro-Kremlin regions like Republika Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina will also be disturbed.
Poland
Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk demonstrated his satisfaction with Orban's defeat by calling Péter Magyar and saying, "I am happier than you." This was the joy of a Polish leader—who overcame PiS authoritarianism in 2023 and, despite this, struggles to implement expected changes due to the resistance of a populist president and the objective difficulties of a society polarized by PiS—gaining a new regional ally. Tusk openly expressed this by citing the elections in Poland, Romania, Moldova, and Hungary as examples, with the words, "I feel satisfaction that this part of Europe has shown we are not condemned to corrupt and authoritarian governments" (NFP, 2026). Orban was a very serious exemplar for the right wing in Poland, because the system he built was proof for PiS that it is possible for a nationalist-conservative, populist-autocratic force to seize the state and maintain power. While in power in Poland between 2015 and 2023, PiS applied exactly Orban's methods (Khar Center, 2025 c). In recent years, the Polish right pointed to the US and Hungary as the main paradigms of the broader right-wing populism wave. Orban's defeat despite Trump's support, and Trump demonstrating that he could also attack the foundations the right leans on (such as the confrontation with the Pope), was a blow to the Polish right. On the other hand, although PiS claimed to be against Russia for many years, the radical right-wing international circles from which it drew its main strength had very close ties with Putin, and Orban was the primary bridge of these ties. Simultaneously, similar to the Serbia example, for the PiS government, Orban played the role of the main patron in Brussels and the principal ally against the EU (Dowell, 2026). The fact that former Minister of Justice Zbigniew Ziobro, a PiS representative, and MP Marcin Romanowski fled prosecution in Poland and sought refuge in Hungary is also proof of how much the Polish right relied on Orban. However, Péter Magyar now declares that he will extradite these individuals to Poland (Dowell, 2026). If Orban had won the election once again, it would have been substantial political support for PiS in the parliamentary elections to be held in Poland in 2027. But with Orban's loss, PiS lost its main patron, its main ally, and its main paradigm. This does not mean that PiS will completely weaken; every country has different dynamics, and theoretically, PiS is currently still capable of forming a parliamentary majority together with radical right forces in 2027. However, Orban's departure from power deprived the Polish right of external support, whilst simultaneously providing Tusk and his allies with arguments against PiS and Nawrocki.
Czech Republic
For the Eurosceptic government of the Czech Republic, Orban's defeat is also not a pleasant signal. Exactly as in Poland, in the Czech Republic, the president and the government operate in an environment of confrontation, but the positions of the figures are different—in Poland, the president is Euroskeptic, while in the Czech Republic, the government is Euroskeptic; moreover, the conservative president of Poland is not pro-Kremlin, whereas the right-wing government of the Czech Republic is closer to Kremlin narratives (Jandourek, 2026). The coalition in government in the Czech Republic, consisting of ANO, SPD, and Motorists (MS), was formed precisely on sympathy for Orban's "illiberal democracy." The leaders of this coalition made no secret of the fact that their most loyal European allies were Orban and Fico. According to Ivan Krastev, one of Europe's renowned intellectuals, what Fidel Castro was for the left in the 1970s, Orban was for the radical right in the West, and in the Czech Republic, Andrej Babiš, Tomio Okamura, and Petr Macinka supported Hungary's authoritarian leader with this mindset. Prior to the election, Macinka had announced that Orban had become an inspiration not only for his neighbors but for everyone fighting for conservative traditions and Christian values (Tabery, 2026). Even though Babiš stated last autumn that the Czech Republic would not follow the path of Hungary and Slovakia, observations indicate that the country is heading precisely in that direction. In this regard, Orban's departure is disappointing for Babiš and his coalition partners as well. In this context, Orban's defeat and the decline in Trump's popularity could soften the rhetoric of the Czech government. Babiš lost one of his two closest allies (Orban and Fico), the other's economy is going through difficult times, and corruption is spreading rapidly. Furthermore, he is bound to his coalition allies solely by personal political interests, and this alliance carries the risk of collapsing at any sign of weakness. Nevertheless, the Czech prime minister is pragmatic; in all likelihood, he will try to find common ground with Péter Magyar and revive the Visegrád Group. His coalition partners, the radical right-wingers, however, do not conceal their sorrow over Orban's departure (Jelinek, 2026). The center-right opposition in the Czech Republic, however, is, of course, pleased with Magyar coming to power.
In lieu of Conclusion
The change in Hungary is undoubtedly a turning point for all of Europe and holds immense significance. From this perspective, the wave of excitement it has generated is also quite normal and understandable. However, how processes will unfold from now on, and how durable and strong the current effect of hope will be, will primarily depend on the policies pursued by the new Hungarian government. Because experience demonstrates that elections are not the primary way to truly weaken populist authoritarian regimes, but rather the first step: the main issue is to create a new system of governance without resembling them and without resorting to their methods. In societies highly polarized by populism, this is not so easy; there is also the risk that the sharp tip of the scalpel may be turned toward those who won the election. The message "One Orban left, another Orban arrived," which has come to the forefront in the campaign against Péter Magyar within pro-Russian and radical right propaganda ecosystems in recent days, also indicates that the new government will primarily have to combat precisely this "nothing will change" narrative. And this struggle must manifest itself not with promises and words as in an election campaign, but with tangible actions, because the issue does not solely lie in propaganda; the expectations of the voter who voted for change are high, and their patience is brief. Magyar has obtained a serious mandate for systemic changes by winning a constitutional majority in parliament, but how he will utilize this mandate will be consequential not only for his own country but also for regional and continental countries that have been subjected to Hungarian influence thus far. On the other hand, how flexibly and strategically Brussels will act will also play a crucial role. The release of frozen funds to Hungary would be a highly significant advance for the Hungarian government in both economic and political terms, but for this to happen, Brussels' reform demands must first be fulfilled. Otherwise, this step will provoke new populist reactions within the union. It is necessary to consider that even though Orban has departed and the illiberal system has suffered a severe blow, Orbanism as a system still survives—both within Hungary and Europe... In this respect, it is of utmost importance that the new Hungarian government, as well as Brussels and European capitals, implement changes very rapidly and very carefully.
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