(The article was prepared within the framework of the Security and State Architecture research of the KHAR Center)
Introduction
Over the last two-year period, an unstable dynamic has been observed in interstate relations between Azerbaijan and Russia. There is a zigzagging process where sometimes problems arise, then it seems as if everything is settled, and later tension occurs again. However, with the Declaration signed by Presidents Vladimir Putin and Ilham Aliyev in Moscow in February 2022, the establishment of allied relations between the two states was announced (President.az, 2022). This was the peak point of Moscow-Baku relations in the post-Soviet phase, because up until then, the main line, which we could call "geopolitical neutrality," formed the foundation of the Azerbaijani government's foreign policy.
Building pragmatic relations with global and regional power centers, securing their interests in Azerbaijan in one way or another, or at least not posing any threat to the strategic-level interests of these powers, led to the emergence of a balance that satisfied (to a greater or lesser extent) all parties. Russia was satisfied that Azerbaijan, unlike its neighbor Georgia, as well as Ukraine, did not choose the path of Euro-Atlantic integration and thereby did not pose a threat to its regional interests; the West, in turn, was satisfied that Azerbaijan, located in a complex geography surrounded by Russia and Iran, maintained a close partnership with it in the energy sector, and at some stages (for example, operations in Afghanistan) in the security sector, did not join integrative unions like the Eurasian Economic Union or the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and tried to protect its sovereignty. This policy, which became famous as the "balancing policy," protected the regime from external pressures, served its internal stability, and ultimately made a great contribution to Aliyev's legitimacy by paving the way for the military victory in the Second Karabakh War.
The purpose of this analysis by the KHAR Center is to uncover the mechanism of Russia-Azerbaijan tension, substantiate the shift in the global and regional balance, and characterize the true essence of the relations.
The main question of the analysis is as follows: "What geopolitical contradictions lie at the root of the periodically flaring crises between Azerbaijan and Russia, who are allies on paper, and could this tension lead to a strategic rupture between the two countries?"
The new reality that first strengthened, then weakened Russia in the South Caucasus
Azerbaijan's victory and the establishment of its sovereignty over the occupied territories laid the foundation for unpredictable new processes by destroying the previous status quo in the region. As they say, the cards began to be redealt. Expressing it in the terminology of the Russian and Iranian regimes, "extra-regional powers" began to intervene in the phase of forming the new status quo. However, in the initial stage, there was Russian dominance; with the Statement dated November 10, 2020, it deployed its military contingent to Karabakh as "peacekeeping forces" and monopolized the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace and cooperation process through a trilateral format. This format allowed Moscow to regulate all issues within the framework of its own interests. In parallel, the 3+3 format, which was introduced by involving the region's major states, Iran and Turkey (although Georgia did not join), inherently carried the character of an anti-Western coalition, and its goal was to keep the US and the European Union out of the region and to regulate all issues here without Western participation. Thus, although the first stage of building the new status quo caused concern in Iran, it promised Russia more political dividends than the previous stage and strengthened its leading position in regional geopolitics. But the withdrawal of peacekeepers from Azerbaijan in June 2024 and subsequent events ended the "November 10 process" (APA, 2024). Prior to this, in September 2023, the Azerbaijani army took control of Khankendi as a result of a one-day operation, the separatist "NKR" regime was abolished, and the Armenian population left Karabakh. And in October 2022, at the meeting between Aliyev and Pashinyan in Prague with the participation of European leaders, Armenia's official recognition of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity (including Nagorno-Karabakh) eliminated the subject of the conflict, calling into question Russia's role as a mediator and the necessity of its peacekeeping contingent.
All this suddenly turned a picture that seemed like strategic progress for Russia at the beginning of the phase into a strategic regression. Although Moscow agreed to withdraw its military contingent without objection (outwardly), this fact is one of the important events that weakened Russia's positions in the region after the Second Karabakh War. It lost its role as a moderator. It is possible that problems and distrust in Azerbaijan-Russia bilateral relations began at a latent level precisely after this event. As the starting point of the problems on an open plane, one must note the death of 38 people as a result of an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane being shot down in the Russian sky and making an emergency landing in Aktau on December 25, 2024 (BBC, 2024). Moscow's initial reaction to the tragedy—attempting to cover it up by not admitting the fact that the plane was shot down—caused serious dissatisfaction, even anger in Baku. Putin's subsequent apology also did not satisfy Baku (BBC, 2024).
In the minutes when the AZAL plane was shot down, Ilham Aliyev was flying to St. Petersburg to participate in an informal summit of CIS heads of state. Immediately after the incident, Aliyev's plane turned back to Baku without landing in Russia. According to some claims, Aliyev returned to Baku not purely because of the shooting down of the passenger plane, but because of the radiotechnical interference his own plane was subjected to. The "Turan" agency published information on this on January 4, 2025, titled "Azerbaijani President's plane faced GPS problems over Russia, investigation confirms," but official institutions denied this news. The agency itself also issued a denial a day later and ceased its operations a month later (Modern.az, 2025).
There is no doubt that the AZAL plane was shot down by mistake, which is why the assumptions that Azerbaijan's sharp and angry reaction continuing for months might be related precisely to the interference with the presidential plane, and that deep distrust towards Russia has emerged in Baku, may not be unfounded.
Tension – lull – tension spiral
While the echoes of the plane tragedy continued, the operation carried out by the special purpose police (OMON) against Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg, Russia on June 27, 2025, caused the next crisis. As a result of police raids on the residences and workplaces of local Azerbaijanis and physical violence against them, 2 people died and 6 people were arrested (Modern.az, 2025). Baku expressed its strong protest to this (Report.az, 2025). As a retaliatory step, on June 30, the Azerbaijani police conducted an operation in the office of the "Sputnik-Azerbaijan" news agency, the director of the agency Igor Kartavykh and the editor-in-chief Yevgeny Belousov were detained, and a 4-month arrest decision was issued for them (Qafqazinfo, 2025).
On October 9, 2025, for the first time since the deterioration of relations, a face-to-face meeting between Putin and Aliyev took place in the capital of Tajikistan. Putin explained the shooting down of the Azerbaijani plane 10 months earlier by the presence of Ukrainian drones in the sky at that moment and a technical malfunction in the Russian air defense system. He said they would pay compensation to the families of the victims and the wounded (President.az, 2025). After this meeting, the Russian citizens Kartavykh and Belousov, who were arrested in Baku, were released (Modern.az, 2025).
However, assumptions that the tension had ended and relations had returned to their previous course, including the statements made by the leadership of the two countries in this regard, did not justify themselves. For example, in response to a question from a Russian journalist at the IV Shusha Global Media Forum (July 13, 2026), Ilham Aliyev stated that the problems between the two countries were already left behind. "Relations have completely normalized, contacts have taken place at various levels: at the government level, members of the government, co-chairs of intergovernmental commissions, ministries of foreign affairs, and presidential administrations. So, I think everything is going well in this direction and we are glad for it," Aliyev said (President.az, 2025). The positive dynamic he spoke of lasted only a month. The day after Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov's official visit to Russia, on August 18, Russian Ambassador Mikhail Yevdokimov was summoned to the Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry. The official statement issued by the Ministry stated that "the Azerbaijani side's serious concern and resolute protest regarding the provocative, insulting, and threatening statements made in the Russian media and information space against the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Azerbaijani people, and the country's leadership have been brought to the attention of the Russian side" (AzerTAC, 2026).
On the same day, the Prosecutor General's Office of Azerbaijan announced that a criminal case had been opened against 3 Russian citizens and a search was declared for them. These are "Moscow 24" TV channel host Ivan Knyazev, political consultant and media expert Semyon Uralov, and the advisor to the Russian Minister of Transport, journalist Alexey Chadayev. According to the statement of the Prosecutor General's Office, these individuals made calls in a program on the "YouTube" platform directed at applying violent methods against the Republic of Azerbaijan, forcibly changing the country's Constitutional structure and dividing its territorial integrity, as well as inciting national hatred and enmity (Qafqazinfo, 2026). These individuals expressed their dissatisfaction with I. Aliyev's statements supporting Ukraine's territorial integrity and Azerbaijan-Ukraine relations (Zelensky visited Azerbaijan in April), evaluating Baku's foreign policy overall as an unfriendly policy. For example, A. Chadayev stated in the broadcast that the Ilham Aliyev regime must either be tamed or destroyed. He also noted causing a civil war in Azerbaijan and violating the country's territorial integrity as possible measures (Telekanal Pryamiy, 2026).
Although A. Chadayev resigned from his position as ministerial advisor after Azerbaijan's demarche, it would not be correct to evaluate what he said on air merely as his personal thoughts. Chadayev expresses the mood existing in some official corridors in Moscow, and this is the true reason for the Azerbaijani government's reaction, which at first glance seems inadequate, to what was said on an unofficial media platform. Azerbaijan's Ambassador to Russia Rahman Mustafayev emphasized that the alliance is difficult under the conditions of a negative informational background purposefully created by Russian experts, journalists, and bloggers (RTVI, 2026). According to him, currently 96 news portals, "Telegram" and YouTube channels with multimillion audiences, and other media outlets in Russia are spreading the "unfriendly country" thesis about Azerbaijan, and this number is growing day by day. The ambassador said that although they brought Azerbaijan's concern to the attention of the Russian side at various political levels and called for the prevention of such activities, these types of broadcasts and positions in the Russian information and media space not only continue, but have even taken on a dangerous character: "The matter has already reached the discussion of interference in Azerbaijan's internal political processes, up to calls for physical violence against the Azerbaijani people and leadership." Baku wants Moscow to give a political assessment to the atmosphere formed against Azerbaijan in the Russian media space and to take concrete measures for the sanitation of this environment. Apparently, because Aliyev has not yet received a response to his expectations, he limited himself to a stand-up conversation when encountering Putin only in the corridor within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's Bishkek summit on September 1, which cannot be considered a bilateral meeting (Report.az, 2026).
Global geopolitical context
The negative trend in Azerbaijan-Russia relations coincides with the period following Donald Trump's re-election as US President. For many years, the Azerbaijani government has avoided making an unequivocal strategic choice among global powers and has considered such a choice an unnecessary risk from the perspective of its interests. It simply temporarily inclined towards one side or another depending on the global-regional conjuncture. For example, in February 2022, two days prior to the invasion of Ukraine, a Declaration on Allied Interaction was signed with Russia. At a moment when the Russian army stood ready for military intervention on the Ukrainian borders, the factor that prompted the Azerbaijani side to sign this document was undoubtedly related to the belief that Russia would achieve success in Ukraine and thus restore its hegemony in the post-Soviet geography. However, after the Russian army failed to occupy Kyiv in the first assault, the Azerbaijani government agilely adapted its policy to the new situation and decided to send humanitarian aid to Ukraine. In the subsequent phase, in accordance with the changing global geopolitical conditions, it became clearly evident that this alliance was also in fact conjunctural and did not mean a strategic choice.
The meeting held between Trump, Aliyev, and Pashinyan in Washington on August 8, 2025, and the signed Joint Declaration can be considered the start of a new phase in the South Caucasus (President.az, 2025). The Washington agreements mean Azerbaijan and Armenia effectively exiting the trilateral Statement dated November 10, 2020, and the establishment of a new regional configuration. Six months later, the US Vice President's visit to the region, the signing in Yerevan of documents envisaging the development of strategic partnership with Armenia, and the signing of the Charter on Strategic Partnership in Baku, entails elevating these countries' bilateral relations with the United States to a qualitatively new level (President.az, 2026).
There is a positive communication between Aliyev and Trump stemming from mutual sympathy at a personal level. In the current period, the Azerbaijan-US convergence can be more so explained by this factor. The Trump administration's refusal to bring democracy and human rights issues to the agenda and its foreign policy based on political realism satisfies Baku. However, at the current stage, the convergence policy with the US, just like the alliance document signed with Russia, is not Baku's long-term strategic choice. This stems from the existing international conjuncture and, depending on a political change that could occur in Washington in the near future, it may carry a temporary, even short-term character.
Along with this, it is also evident that the process initiated by the agreements dated August 8, 2025, carries a strategic essence. The sudden replacement of the trilateral format under Russian patronage with a US-led format, and the agreement on the TRIPP project within this framework, are decisions that could have long-term strategic consequences. While Russia was planning to control the important land corridor that will pass through Zangezur, the corridor suddenly being handed over to Washington's control for 49 years and the US turning into an important actor in the South Caucasus is a shock-effect surprise for Moscow.
Azerbaijan and Russia: even if separated, we are together
Despite the current problems and misunderstandings, the transition of Azerbaijan-Russia relations to a confrontation plane is a low-probability prospect. Although the dose of tension sometimes rises, the parties pay attention to preventing this tension from getting out of control. It would be more accurate to speak of manageable, controlled tension.
Feeling the negative consequences in the South Caucasus of directing all its power and resources to the Ukraine invasion and the hybrid confrontation with Europe, the Putin regime is having difficulty preserving its positions in this region. Moscow, unable to achieve what it wanted in the latest elections in Armenia, is forced to act more cautiously and patiently with Azerbaijan during a period when it sees the horizon danger of completely losing its former loyal ally that has chosen a course of Euro-integration. Putin's recent phone call to Aliyev also shows that Moscow is not interested in escalating the tension (Report.az, 2026). Alongside bilateral relations, the North-South international transport corridor project, which passes through Azerbaijan and will connect Russia with Iran and India, is very important for Moscow, especially in conditions where the Zangezur corridor was lost and under Western sanctions.
In fact, Baku is also not interested in experiencing a strategic rupture. It would be wrong to say that the Azerbaijani government's relations with the West currently proceed without problems and are based on mutual trust. Tension with institutions such as the Council of Europe and the European Parliament continues. Relations with the European Union rely on current pragmatic interests where energy partnership is a priority. There is no confidence in Baku that the strategic partnership with the US will be sustainable or will continue in the same way during a democratic administration. For this reason, the regime does not want relations with Russia to reach a breaking point. On the other hand, the Azerbaijani government also knows very well Russia's destructive potential, its possibilities of creating chaos and turmoil within the former Soviet republics. What was experienced in the first years after the declaration of independence, when Russia was weaker than it is now, such as the terrorist acts in the Baku metro, political assassinations, and coup attempts, have not been forgotten. If relations pass into a confrontational paradigm, as the Russian journalists and the ministerial advisor said in the broadcast on "YouTube," Russian special services could commit various sabotages and create chaos within Azerbaijan. The explosion that recently occurred at a military ammunition depot in Azerbaijan's Goranboy district gives grounds for suspicion (APA, 2026). The NEXTA resource claimed that the incident could precisely be Russian sabotage. Although Azerbaijan categorically denied this, the concern in Baku did not escape attention. Especially at a moment when Russia has started hybrid attacks against Europe and misunderstandings and tension are being experienced between Azerbaijan and Russia, is the explosion in Goranboy a coincidence? This could also be a warning signal to Azerbaijan.
Conclusion
Analyses show that the Azerbaijan-Russia "alliance" formalized in 2022 is a pragmatic compromise stemming from the need to adapt to the changing global and regional situation. The restoration of sovereignty in Karabakh, the early withdrawal of Russian military forces from the region, and the agreement on communication lines on Western platforms have seriously damaged Moscow's traditional mediation and pressure mechanisms in the South Caucasus.
The increase in open threats and calls of a sabotage nature directed at Azerbaijan in the Russian media is Moscow's reaction stemming from its concern over lost opportunities for influence. Along with this, it does not seem possible in the near future for the existing zigzagging tension to turn into a full strategic rupture between the parties. Both sides want to keep the crisis under control. For Moscow, due to the swamp it is stuck in on the Ukrainian front and in a period when Armenia has taken the path of Euro-integration, it is important not to escalate relations with Baku. For Baku, the volatility of relations with the West, especially with European institutions, and Russia's potential for regional provocation/hybrid threat requires not escalating the tension of relations with its northern neighbor.
Consequently, Azerbaijan-Russia relations will continue in the form of "even if separated, we are together" in the near future. The parties, while maintaining mutual distrust, will not refuse minimum cooperation regarding the formal alliance in order to insure military-economic risks.
Note: The article you have read was originally written in the Azerbaijani language. Artificial intelligence tools were used only in the translation.
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