(This article is prepared within KHAR Center’s research line “Authoritarian Regimes and Transregional Influence Mechanisms.”)
In the second article of its series on Russia’s anti-Western propaganda, KHAR Center focuses on the factual and practical dimensions of the problem.
Introduction
This article analyzes Russia’s multi-layered influence mechanisms in the European Union space—political, economic, informational, soft power, and “proxies.” It examines these mechanisms not as separate episodes but as an interconnected influence architecture resembling a spider web.
Within this framework, the article traces both the specific tools and the structural logic that links them. How does the Kremlin simultaneously exploit weaknesses in EU institutions, the rise of populist forces across member states, information gaps created by platform capitalism, and new technological environments such as artificial intelligence—turning them all to its advantage?!
The article suggests reading Russian propaganda not as isolated campaigns but as an adaptive, long-term strategic project that penetrates deeply into Europe’s political, legal, and digital ecosystem.
Why This Topic Matters
Russia’s information and influence operations have already evolved into a strategic instrument of the Putin regime and a structural threat to Western democracies. Within KHAR Center’s research line “Authoritarian Regimes and Transregional Influence Mechanisms,” the topic stands at the critical intersection of the security agendas of both the post-Soviet region and Europe.
Topical Relevance
Although Russia’s information war against the West has its roots in the USSR’s “active measures” operations, the annexation of Crimea (2014), the full-scale invasion of Ukraine (2022), and subsequent EU sanctions have shifted this struggle into a new phase. The rise of populism, the strengthening of far-right and far-left radical forces in Europe, the complete transformation of the information ecosystem by social media, and the role of artificial intelligence in the information space make this topic relevant historically, politically, and socially.
Russian propaganda is no longer merely fighting for public opinion—it has become a strategic threat interfering with electoral processes, sanctions debates, energy security, and even the “memory” of artificial intelligence systems. The resilience of European institutions, the legitimacy of democratic processes, and stability of governance under hybrid warfare depend on understanding and countering this propaganda ecosystem.
Purpose of the Article
The aim is not to provide an abstract description of Russian anti-Western propaganda but to systemically map:
- its concrete tools (politics, energy, media, soft power, and proxy networks),
- its core narrative templates,
- and its new-generation infrastructures such as “Pravda/Portal Kombat,”
—all based on facts, data, and open-source evidence.
The article also seeks to show how these mechanisms infiltrate Europe’s information space, legal-institutional environment, and the AI ecosystem.
Guiding Questions
- Through which primary tools and networks does Russia conduct anti-Western propaganda in Europe?
- To what extent do these mechanisms pose security and governance risks for European democracies, and why are current responses insufficient?
Analytical Framework
The article employs a combined analytical framework drawing on hybrid warfare, information operations, and the “sharp power” concept—interpreting authoritarian influence export not merely as propaganda but as transregional power projection.
It systematically analyzes Russian propaganda mechanisms through the lens of:
- disinformation studies (narrative templates, ecosystem approach, platform logic),
- authoritarian diffusion theory,
- and the tension between media freedom and security dilemmas.
FIVE MAIN INSTRUMENTS
The Russian government pursues multi-layered strategic objectives in Europe through influence operations targeting political, economic, and soft power spheres. These objectives are achieved primarily through five tools: politics, energy, information, soft power, and proxies.
Especially after the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian “infodemic”—created through these mechanisms—continues, normalizing conspiracy theories about the West and reinforcing narratives of “Slavic brotherhood” and Orthodox Christian identity (Stronski & Himes, 2019).
1. Political Influence
Moscow seeks to weaken EU unity by exploiting divisions among member states, supporting populist and nationalist movements that sympathize with Russian narratives, and placing intermediaries or aligned actors within European institutions to legitimize Kremlin positions.
Russia uses broad political networks and lobbying activities to influence EU decision-making. Recent examples include the pro-Russian agent network operating through the website “Voice of Europe,” which was exposed and dismantled.
This network actively paid European politicians from Germany, France, Poland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Hungary, and others to disseminate pro-Russian narratives and support Kremlin-aligned agendas ahead of European Parliament elections. Investigations show that some politicians were financially incentivized—sometimes through secret cash payments or cryptocurrency—to push decisions favorable to Russia, effectively acting as “influence agents” within domestic political debates (Brussels Watch, October 2025b).
Experts from Bulgaria’s “Center for Democratic Action” argue that emerging trends in European countries show propaganda messages being shaped by underlying political and economic linkages. The stronger a media outlet’s political and economic ties with Russian circles, the more effective and rapid Kremlin messaging becomes (Civitates, 2020).
This strategy targets multiple political spectrums: it supports Eurosceptic and nationalist parties and simultaneously works to fragment EU common policy and reduce support for Ukraine. Moreover, Russia builds ties with both far-right and far-left parties, disrupting unanimity within the EU and exacerbating internal polarization.
Even when not directly working for Russia, these forces often act as narrative allies, since Russia—an authoritarian, conservative state hostile to liberalism and modernity—serves as a model for many right-wing or racist radicals in the West (ICCT, 2024a).
2. Economic Influence
Economically, Russia uses energy supplies, trade relations, and economic dependence as tools to apply pressure and fragment the EU bloc. Energy is one of Moscow’s core leverage instruments.
“Novatek,” Russia’s largest producer of liquefied natural gas (LNG), has increased LNG exports to Europe despite sanctions and EU efforts to reduce dependence. Russia’s enduring presence in the energy market undermines the EU’s energy independence goals and preserves a vital source of geopolitical leverage and revenue for Moscow (Brussels Watch, October 2025c).
3. Media, Disinformation, and Manipulation
The Kremlin has created a vast disinformation ecosystem operating through alternative and mainstream media channels. The radical right media platform “Voice of Europe,” registered in Prague and exposed as part of a Kremlin-linked network, is a prime example.
The site mixed seemingly neutral news with emotionally charged disinformation tailored to different European political contexts, reaching nearly 180,000 followers on social media. Russia exploits platforms such as X (formerly Twitter), TikTok, Telegram, and Facebook, taking advantage of weak content moderation and the rapid circulation of information.
Intelligence reports have exposed coordinated amplification of false narratives through fake accounts and bot armies. Telegram serves as a direct tribune for Russian special services’ information operations (Brussels Watch, October 2025d).
4. Soft Power
Soft power tactics include disinformation campaigns, ideological messaging countering Brussels’ “rootless cosmopolitanism,” and using intermediary media networks to manipulate public opinion.
Russia has built a wide network of organizations, foundations, and institutes across Europe to subtly advance its geopolitical agenda and undermine the integrity of European institutions. Through cultural diplomacy, diaspora groups, research centers, religious institutions, and even human rights or environmental “GONGO” NGOs (government-organized NGOs), Moscow projects influence under the guise of culture, advocacy, or academic work.
Recent reports indicate that Russia has at least around 80 active soft power organizations in Europe (Brussels Watch, October 2025e).
5. Proxies
Proxies are embedded within all aforementioned tools—but politicians and business circles play a particularly central role.
FIVE CORE NARRATIVES
A key strength of Russian propaganda in Europe is its adaptation to local contexts. The Kremlin narrative can be shaped as:
- “injustices against Catalonia” in Spain,
- “the historic burden of migration from Africa” in Italy,
- “threats to national identity and secularism” in France.
Figures appearing as local journalists, experts, or activists make these narratives more credible; thus Moscow’s message is not perceived as “a Russian idea” but as “part of the domestic debate.” The goal is not always to prove Russia is right, but often to destabilize target countries and divert attention away from Russia (Popov, April 2025a).
The backbone of Kremlin propaganda is not individual lies but consistent narrative templates. The EU East StratCom Task Force’s database of nearly 13,000 episodes collected between 2015 and 2022 shows that the propaganda system can fit nearly any topic into several “frames.” These frames fall into five main categories (SCEEUS, 2022a).
1. Elites vs the People
Russia has used this narrative for more than a century, especially in election campaigns. It is built on claims that “detached elites” are unaware of people’s problems. It relies on conspiratorial information and suspicion, where lack of evidence is sometimes itself presented as evidence (EUvsDisinfo, 2019a).
2. Threatened Values
This narrative is applied broadly to discredit the West’s role in gender equality, minority rights, and LGBT rights—framing them as moral decay or threats to family, religion, and tradition, while emphasizing Russia’s alleged “moral” role (SCEEUS, 2022b).
3. Lost Sovereignty / Threatened National Identity
Russia uses this narrative extensively against both the West and post-Soviet states:
- “Uncle Sam lighting Europe’s gas stove,”
- “Crying Europeans left without gas,”
- “Ukraine governed by foreign powers,”
- “America-controlled Europe,”
- “Baltic states as not fully sovereign,”
- “Germany with no real sovereignty.”
Elements of “Islam and LGBT threats” to national identity are often added. This is one of the most effective manipulation tools among discontented voters—especially when merged with nostalgic myths of national greatness (EUvsDisinfo, 2019b).
4. Imminent Collapse
Another century-old narrative: just like in 1919, claims such as “Europe is collapsing,” “European states are on the brink of civil war,” “NATO is falling apart,” “Germany is disintegrating,” or “the U.S. economy is collapsing” find many buyers—especially among those afraid to confront injustice in their own societies (EUvsDisinfo, 2019c).
5. The Hahaganda Narrative
“Hahaganda”—a term combining “haha” and “propaganda”—refers to mockery, ridicule, and derision used to undermine credibility. Latvian scholar Solvita Denise-Liepnice introduced the concept into political vocabulary (StratCom, 2017).
Its most visible recent example concerns Ukraine. Caricatures, derision, and ridicule of the Ukrainian president have been spread globally—from Western audiences to Turkey—amplified by Kremlin networks (Türkiye gündemi, 2022).
THE SPIDER WEB
Over the three years following the first sanctions imposed by the European Union, Russia’s banned propaganda resources remain active inside Europe. Analysts from the London-based ISD Global mapped the top three internet service providers (ISPs) in six Western and Eastern European countries (Germany, France, Italy, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia), and identified 58 domains belonging to 26 media outlets sanctioned by the EU.
According to this mapping, less than one quarter of attempts to access these sanctioned resources were effectively blocked by the ISPs in question. ISPs in Germany and France were the most effective, blocking between 43% and 57% of domains in Germany and between 24% and 48% in France. In Italy, while one ISP blocked more than two-thirds of sanctioned content, the other two did not prevent access to any of the sites (ISD Global, August 2025a).
The technical reality further complicates the process: due to parameters on user devices, routers, and applications (such as VPNs or alternative DNS settings), DNS queries do not always receive their response from the ISP’s own infrastructure. Users frequently rely on third-party DNS providers such as Google, Cloudflare, or Yandex, which re-enable access to blocked resources. As a result, sanctioned domain names continue to attract online audiences, and a small number of high-traffic websites capture the majority of visits.
In Germany and France—where ISPs are relatively more proactive—just six domains recorded more than 50,000 monthly visitors each; overall, Germany registered the highest average monthly traffic, with several domains reaching hundreds of thousands of visits (ISD Global, August 2025b).
Monitoring conducted on the X (Twitter) platform between 1–31 May 2025 showed that more than 49,000 posts linking to banned Russian media domains were shared by 2,450 accounts. Across the six countries observed, approximately two-thirds of posts were in German and more than one-quarter in French; English and Spanish posts were also significant. Seventy-four percent of these posts were linked to RT content (ISD Global, August 2025c).
A 2024 report by the Alliance for Securing Democracy under the German Marshall Fund (GMF) found that, within a single year, 3,019 distinct redirects to content identical or nearly identical to RT articles were detected on 316 domains across Europe (GMF, 2024a).
According to The Russian Program, the dissemination of content has been strongly supported by a large infrastructure of mirror sites created by “Rossiya Segodnya,” the parent structure of “TV Novosti” and “Sputnik,” after sanctions were imposed. These mirror sites replicate original content but operate under different domain names and can be accessed without a VPN. Last year, 25 such mirror sites created after 2022 were identified across Europe (Audinet; Gerard 2024a).
The picture on digital platforms is similar. Although RT’s main official links on YouTube and Reddit are blocked, both platforms still function as carriers of Russian propaganda content: Reddit users link to RT articles via mirror sites and content-copying tools, while on YouTube, RT articles circulate in text-to-speech format.
Additionally, original or reposted RT content circulates on Gab, Telegram, Facebook, X, LinkedIn, Substack, VKontakte, Instagram, Pinterest, 8kun, Rumble, and other platforms. According to GMF observations, many of the sites that systematically republish RT content are not news or analytical platforms; they include sports and automotive sites (typically followed by men) that feature RT content in their “world news” sections, as well as “health” and “spirituality”-themed platforms that combine New Age religiosity with pro-Kremlin geopolitics—thus becoming a major component of the propaganda “laundering” mechanism (GMF, 2024b).
THE REPACKAGING NETWORK — “PRAVDA”
The most prominent underground content-repackaging network used by Russian propaganda in recent years is “Pravda.” This network is not legally connected to the Russian media outlet of the same name; the label refers to the overall mechanism. It was uncovered in 2023 by VIGINUM, France’s governmental monitoring authority.
The Atlantic Council’s DFRLab, the Finland-based CheckFirst, and VIGINUM later conducted a deeper investigation. They found that the network includes a massive and coordinated sub-structure known as “Portal Kombat” (Portal Kombat, 2024a).
This new system, created after the 2022 sanctions, mainly disseminates content related to the war in Ukraine and has expanded significantly since 2024. The network—composed of hundreds of sites designed to imitate legitimate news portals in Europe, the United States, and Asia—initially focused on Poland, Germany, and France in 2023, before expanding to target Ukraine, Moldova, and Serbia. In 2025, the network added new domains and grew further (Châtelet & Lesplingart, February 2025a). The continuously monitored network currently contains more than 6.3 million articles (Portal Kombat, 2024b).
Research shows that the network was created by an IT company called “Tiger Web,” registered in Russian-occupied Crimea (Châtelet & Lesplingart, February 2025b). The company has been linked to Arkady Rotenberg, an oligarch close to Vladimir Putin (Intellinews, April 2025a).
The network operates through a system of copying, pasting, and amplifying pro-Kremlin narratives. Content from official and unofficial propaganda entities, government statements, social media posts by Russian politicians, and messages from Kremlin agents is automatically translated into local languages, with artificial intelligence and bot networks used to multiply the volume of content (Asslani, May 2025a).
According to ISD’s study covering July 2024–July 2025, more than 900 websites worldwide—from major news outlets to academic platforms and radical blogs—linked to Pravda network articles. More than 80% of these links cited Pravda content as a reliable source, fewer than 5% identified it as part of a Russian propaganda operation, and nearly 15% expressed no concern about its ties to Russia (ISD Global, 18 November 2025).
The five primary sources for Pravda network articles are TASS, RIA Novosti, Lenta, Komsomolskaya Pravda, and RT. Other sources include TV channels Ren TV and Tsargrad (Asslani, May 2025b).
The main distributors of Pravda content are Russian media outlets and pro-Russian Telegram channels. Among the key actors disseminating Pravda material are the 50 Telegram channels belonging to the “Info Defence–SurfNoise” disinformation network uncovered by DFRLab in 2023, which primarily spread anti-Ukraine disinformation and manipulation. These channels are organized into three clusters: “Surface Noise,” “Info Defence,” and “Node of Time” (Aleksejeva & Mammadova, 2023).
Studies show that in 28 countries and regions, channels belonging to the InfoDefence network rank among the ten most cited sources and constitute one of the main vectors of Russia-supported disinformation within the Pravda ecosystem. This network covers the Balkans, Baltic states, Eastern and Southern Europe, Scandinavia, East Asia, the South Caucasus, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and Turkey (Châtelet & Lesplingart, April 2025).
Research conducted between 2023 and 2025 shows that X’s community-notes system—introduced for transparency and external analysis—has itself cited sites belonging to the Pravda network.
As of 2025, the Pravda network has filled the internet with millions of articles produced across 182 domains in 12 languages, largely designed for ingestion by artificial intelligence systems. Its aim is to embed Russian narratives into AI training data (Intellinews, 2025b).
This applies especially to the manipulation of Wikipedia content. Studies reveal that the network used the Wikipedia API to alter content at scale, and Wikipedia contributors—relying on Pravda news sites to justify claims—unintentionally facilitated the “washing” of manipulated content.
Analyses also show that Pravda sources are used to contaminate Wikipedia content in ways that influence generative AI algorithms. DFRLab and CheckFirst demonstrated via ChatGPT and Gemini that content published by Pravda portals appears in AI-generated responses. More importantly, even when the chatbots cited news sources proving the network’s ties to Russia, they did not disclose these connections to users. A March 2025 report by NewsGuard Technologies similarly found that popular AI tools contain millions of articles from sites linked to the Pravda network (Châtelet & Lesplingart, March 2025a).
Experts identified 1,907 link connections to Pravda-network sites embedded in Wikipedia across 1,672 pages in 44 languages. While Pravda citations initially appeared mainly on Russian- and Ukrainian-language pages, since 2022 the same pattern has been observed on English, French, and German pages as well (Châtelet & Lesplingart, March 2025b).
The inclusion of Pravda-network sites on Wikipedia is particularly concerning because the platform serves as a primary data source for large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT, Gemini, and Copilot. LLMs rely on information repositories to develop their language-understanding capabilities, and Wikipedia is one of their main repositories.
Experts conducted tests to assess the network’s influence on these technologies and found that—even when AI software acknowledged the existence of reports identifying the Pravda network as an information operation—it still did not warn users about it (Châtelet & Lesplingart, March 2025c).
According to the American Sunlight Project, Pravda is intentionally “designed” to overwhelm large language models with Kremlin-aligned content (ASP, February 2025). In other words, the network serves as an infrastructure that “teaches” AI tools false truths—thus shaping not only the current information environment but also the knowledge absorbed by millions of future users.
THREAT ACTORS — THE FANCY BEAR, THE SANDWORMS, AND OTHERS
As noted in the first article, some of the main actors used by Russia in its propaganda operations in Europe are operational and influence groups linked to Russian military and foreign intelligence agencies.
Since 2022, Russia has implemented various reforms to organize and expand its active propaganda-sabotage activities. Sergey Kiriyenko—First Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration and overseer of occupied Ukrainian territories—has created committees responsible for appointing special-service operatives in target countries. Provocations are coordinated by a committee led by Sergey Shoigu. The operational component of this front is managed by Russian Military Intelligence (GRU). GRU Deputy Chief Andrei Averyanov oversees these activities, controlling a special operations service consisting of three main departments (Jones, March 2025a).
GRU Unit 29155 (also referred to as Center 161), known as the training hub for elite GRU operatives, is active across Europe and beyond. This unit is believed to be responsible for the poisoning of GRU defector Sergey Skripal, opposition politician Alexei Navalny, Bulgarian arms dealer Emilian Gebrev and his son, material assistance to the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the attempted coup in Montenegro (Jones, March 2025b).
GRU Unit 54654 is tasked with creating illegal agent networks; it recruits foreign students studying in Russian universities, individuals with a military background, and places them into target institutions via shell companies. Cyber-espionage, cyberattacks, and cybersabotage operations are conducted by GRU Units 26165 and 74455—known in cybersecurity literature as “APT28/Fancy Bear” and “Sandworm/APT44” respectively (Jones, March 2025c).
Fancy Bear (APT28)—also called “Pawn Storm,” “Sofacy Group,” “Sednit,” “Tsar Team,” and “STRONTIUM”—is known for its long-term infiltration operations, stealthy and coordinated attacks, and the difficulty specialists face in uncovering its tactics, techniques, and procedures. Active since at least 2008, the group targets sectors ranging from aviation and defense to energy, government, media, and opposition networks, using tactics such as credential phishing through fake websites (Radware 2024a).
Fancy Bear attacked France’s TV5 Monde in 2015, breached the U.S. Democratic National Committee’s emails during the 2016 elections, conducted cyberattacks against the German Bundestag, and has been linked to the 2017 “NotPetya” malware attack. In 2018, the group carried out a hack-and-leak operation against the World Anti-Doping Agency in retaliation for Russia’s suspension from Olympic competitions. U.S. and UK officials have warned that Fancy Bear used Kubernetes clusters in a global password-spraying campaign targeting hundreds of government and private-sector entities (Radware 2024b).
In 2019, the group drew attention for targeting 104 think tanks in Belgium, France, Germany, Poland, Romania, and Serbia (Cyberscoop, 2019). In 2022, its primary targets were Ukrainians.
Sandworm (APT44), another Russian cyber-influence actor observed in Europe, is notorious for attacks on electric grids and critical infrastructure, especially in Ukraine—and increasingly on Europe’s energy and transportation sectors. It is considered one of the most aggressive instruments of the Russia-Europe “gray-zone” conflict.
Moscow also employs groups such as Gamaredon, Callisto, hacktivist-labeled outfits like Killnet and NoName057(16) (responsible for DDoS and website defacement campaigns used to deliver political messages), as well as the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), the Main Directorate for Deep-Sea Research (GUGI), and the FSB in its propaganda operations across Europe (Jones, March 2025d).
CONCLUSION
The general framework and information base presented in our first article, together with the concrete facts and figures in this one, show that Russian propaganda is able to exploit every gap and penetrate every fault line in Europe. Sanctions, licensing restrictions, and similar measures create certain technical obstacles for the Kremlin, but the stability and complexity of its system allow it to find new pathways and techniques, ensuring that the propaganda assault continues uninterrupted. RT and Sputnik are blocked; in their place appear hundreds of mirror sites, alternative platforms, and proxy networks. ISPs block some sites, but DNS settings and VPNs prevent them from stopping the leakage of content. On X, YouTube, Reddit, and other platforms, “washed” content is reintroduced in new packaging, fragmented and difficult to trace.
Networks such as “Pravda” (Portal Kombat) demonstrate that Russia is now also targeting the ecosystem of artificial intelligence. The bombardment of open-information platforms like Wikipedia with fabricated content, and the transfer of this material into the “memory” of large language models, shows how easily the poison of Russian propaganda seeps into the information infrastructure of a new generation.
The activities of GRU-linked groups like Fancy Bear, Sandworm, and others reveal how the Kremlin’s information warfare merges with the cyber domain. Interference in electoral processes, attacks on energy and infrastructure systems, leak-and-smear operations—all of these transform Kremlin propaganda from an abstract discourse issue into a concrete threat to security and governance in Europe.
For now, Europe’s responses to this long-term, systemic, strategic propaganda machine are insufficient and lack coordination. There are several objective reasons for this. First, the free media market of Western Europe simply does not have the financial and human resources to compete with a propaganda system that is one of the core components of the Russian state apparatus and is lavishly supported by the state (Popov, April 2025b). Second, liberal principles surrounding freedom of expression and media freedom allow—even for hostile foreign media—the dissemination of ideas as long as there are no clear and severe violations; this also allows such outlets to circumvent sanctions by using different methods precisely because the system protects these freedoms. For example, when the EU imposed sanctions on Russian media in 2022, Switzerland and Norway did not join them. Their argument was that despite these channels being instruments of Russia-centered propaganda and disinformation, combating harmful content would be more effective than outright bans. At the same time, in many countries from France to the Netherlands, sanctions against Russian propaganda were criticized on the grounds of press freedom (DiderotComity, 2024).
Finally, democratic regimes are systems in which discontent can surface and be expressed loudly; this makes it easy for Moscow to inflame grievances that groups or citizens in target countries may have toward their own governments or toward overall European policies. Russian propaganda exploits these “weaknesses” of democratic societies to create political polarization with ease.
Unless Europe develops a coordinated, multidimensional response that addresses transparency, enforcement mechanisms, societal resilience, and international coordination, Russian propaganda operations will continue to weaken European governance and security. Protecting the integrity of European institutions and democratic processes in the face of evolving hybrid threats requires sustained commitment, resources, and adaptive capacity. The scale and depth of the problem demand that Europeans treat Russian propaganda as a strategic security issue—one that directly concerns the question of survival.
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