“We are not a country frozen on the horizon in the frost of the Cold War. We constantly emphasize that it is important not to remain divided between East and West, but to build new bridges.” — With these words, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan explained his country’s vision upon returning from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) meeting in China. (Presidency of Communications, September 2025)
In his statements this time, there was no mention of membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Rather, he focused more on bilateral relations—especially his interest in developing ties with China—and on Ankara’s messages about its peace mission in conflicts.
Looking at the analyses appearing in sources close to the government, Ankara views the SCO as a rising multilateral alternative to the Western-dominated international system and evaluates it as a balancing instrument. (TRT World, August 2025)
Ankara’s SCO Route
Turkiye is among the countries that hold the status of “dialogue partner” within the SCO, along with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Egypt, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Myanmar, the Maldives, and the United Arab Emirates.
Ankara applied for Dialogue Partner status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2011. The application was accepted in June 2012. In 2013, a memorandum on dialogue partnership was signed between Turkiye and the SCO. (MFA Turkiye)
With the democratic backsliding in India during Modi’s rule, the description of the SCO as an “authoritarians’ club” (Libman, Obydenkova, 2018) became even more entrenched. Turkiye’s accession as a dialogue partner coincided with the period when Erdoğan’s government was seeking to strengthen its hegemony in domestic politics—that is, when authoritarian tendencies in governance were on the rise. At that time, Ankara’s main argument for this vectoral shift was the European Union’s failure to open the path for membership negotiations. After obtaining dialogue partnership status, Erdoğan openly expressed Turkiye’s desire to become a full member of the SCO, saying that he had asked Putin about it with these words:
“The EU wants to forget us, but hesitates, cannot forget. If they announced it, we would be relieved. Let them declare it, and we will go on with our own business. We sit and talk, but they cannot say anything convincing. When that happens, as the prime minister of 75 million people, you start looking for other alternatives. For this reason, the other day I told Putin: ‘Take us into Shanghai, and we will bid farewell to the EU and leave. What is the point of delaying this so much?’”
When asked whether the EU and SCO were alternatives to each other, Erdoğan replied with these words: “The Shanghai Five is better, it is stronger.” (AA, 2013)
In 2016, Erdoğan once again put the issue of full SCO membership on the agenda. He said he had conveyed Turkiye’s wish to join the SCO to Putin and Nazarbayev:
“Turkiye should feel comfortable. It should not be as if for me there is only the European Union. For example, why should Turkiye not be inside the Shanghai Five? I told this to Mr. Putin, to Nazarbayev, and to the current members of the Shanghai Five. Mr. Putin also said something like, ‘We are evaluating this.’” (Bianet, 2016)
However, no positive reaction came from China—the de facto leader of the SCO—to Erdoğan’s concrete calls. Beijing’s constant emphasis on dialogue partnership was interpreted as China’s reserved stance toward Turkiye’s SCO membership. (German Marshall Fund, 2017)
The Full Membership Bluff
In 2017, Turkiye assumed the chairmanship of the SCO Energy Club. (AA, 2016) It was after this that the first positive statement came from China regarding the possibility of Turkiye becoming a full SCO member. China’s ambassador to Turkiye said Beijing was ready to discuss Ankara’s SCO membership. (AA, 2017)
However, although Erdoğan said by the end of 2017 that they would make a decision on relations with the EU, during the five years following 2017 Turkiye neither brought up the issue of SCO membership, nor made any official application, nor voiced statements expressing an intention to join.
Five years later, at the SCO summit in Samarkand, Erdoğan once again declared that Turkiye was aiming for full membership and that the matter would be discussed at the 2023 summit in India. Yet at the online SCO summit held in India in 2023, Iran’s membership was approved, an agreement was reached for Belarus to become a member in 2024, but Turkiye’s membership was not even on the agenda.
After the SCO summit held in Astana in 2024, Erdoğan once again complained that he had asked for support from Putin and Tokayev for full membership:
“Our goal is to become a permanent member. Turkiye should be a permanent member, not just an observer. At the Astana summit, I discussed this issue with Mr. Putin and my Kazakh colleague Tokayev, and I asked for their support.” (Presidency of Communications, 2024)
But this statement, too, was not accompanied by any membership application or concrete step at the leaders’ summit held in Islamabad in October 2024. And finally, as it appears, in 2025 Turkiye’s full membership issue once again did not make it onto the agenda.
Strategic Choice or Bargaining Chip?
This picture shows that Turkiye’s “desire” for SCO membership is not a geostrategic choice, but rather a tactical objective aimed at sending the message to the West that “I have an alternative.”
Without a doubt, especially over the past 10–15 years, Erdoğan—with his “one-man” vision—has felt more comfortable among the leaders of countries with authoritarian governance such as Russia, China, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and Belarus. In this club, issues like democratic standards, human rights, and the rule of law are not seen as problems to be discussed. On the contrary, the “Shanghai spirit” is built on principles such as “non-interference in countries’ internal affairs” and “respect for different governance models.” This creates a space where Turkiye—whose authoritarian tendencies have visibly strengthened since the 2010s—feels stronger, in contrast to the Western family where it feels discomfort.
At the same time, by constantly signaling to the West that it has other alternatives, Erdoğan keeps this as a constant bargaining topic in both domestic and foreign policy—this line has formed the main character of Ankara’s policies in recent years. Erdoğan can very easily support NATO allies’ decision to increase defense spending to 5 percent of GDP in the next 10 years due to Russia being a long-term threat (Reuters, June 2025), and then two months later send a message from China saying, “We are not a country frozen in the frost of the Cold War.”
This strategic contradiction became even more apparent after Erdoğan was forced to rely on MHP’s support, merging with a nationalist foreign policy discourse. The widespread anti-Western sentiment dominating the base of almost all political parties in the country, and the tendency not to view the Russia–China-centered alternative as a risk for the country’s future, also emerges as one of Erdoğan’s most important cards strengthening his hand in tightrope walking between the West and the East.
But these are entirely the ideological and propagandistic aspects that serve to strengthen authoritarian governance. Practically speaking, although the SCO is claimed to be a dialogue platform that, unlike NATO and the EU, does not impose concrete obligations and makes decisions by consensus, its foundation is highly slippery: Russia and China’s global power ambitions, the presence of countries like India and Pakistan with domestic and mutual problems, Iran’s ambitions, the reverence of Azerbaijan and Armenia between Moscow, the West, and Ankara, and Central Asian countries’ balancing between Russia, China, and Ankara. In this form, the SCO cannot be an alternative to the European Union or NATO, and Ankara is aware of this.
On the other hand, the principle in the SCO charter that member states should determine their foreign policy “in accordance with the Shanghai spirit” (CIS, 2002), as well as the provision in the Istanbul Declaration adopted in 2012 that “No member state will participate in any alliance or group of countries targeting other member states” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 2012), in fact make Ankara’s full membership impossible. Membership under such conditions would require Turkiye to make a choice, which would mean the elimination of Ankara’s bargaining opportunities in relations with the West. Ankara does not want to narrow its maneuvering space with such membership. In Turkish foreign policy circles, it is openly emphasized that cooperation with the SCO must be carried out in a way that does not hinder the fulfillment of obligations and responsibilities to NATO and does not sever relations with the West. (Demir, 2022)
Conclusion
No matter how close the relations may become, the probability of Turkiye becoming a full member of the SCO in the near future is quite low. This conclusion arises not only from Ankara’s foreign policy tightrope walking, but also from the reserved stance of China, India, and Russia regarding Turkiye’s place in this organization.
Just as Turkiye is aware that full membership in the SCO would narrow the country’s maneuvering space and bargaining opportunities, the countries that hold sway in the SCO—especially China—are also aware that Ankara’s SCO membership messages are bargaining cards against the West. For this reason, they do not see Ankara as a reliable potential ally. (German Marshall Foundation, 2017) For China, Ankara is more of a partner from which it can benefit within the framework of a “win-win” understanding.
Although Ankara strives to normalize the balancing acts between rival blocs and claims that these relations are not directed against one another, the rhetoric of Erdoğan and his government shows the opposite. This situation, while providing Turkiye with short-term advantages and gains when bargaining with both sides, carries the risk of making it an unreliable partner for both in the long run. The foreign policy course, likened to walking on a tightrope, for now ensures Turkiye some immediate advantages, but in the distant perspective may lead to a crisis of trust.
References:
İletişim Başkanlığı, eylül 2025. Cumhurbaşkanı Erdoğan, Çin ziyareti dönüşü gazetecilerin sorularını yanıtladı
TRT Word, avqust, 2025. Erdogan is attending SCO Summit in China. How significant is that?
https://www.trtworld.com/world/article/2798e36b834a
MFA Turkiye. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/shanghai-cooperation-organization.en.mfa
Libman Alexander, Obydenkova Anastassia, 2018. Understanding Authoritarian Regionalism. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/understanding-authoritarian-regionalism/
AA, 2013. Putin’ Şangay Beşlisi teklifi. https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/politika/putine-sangay-beslisi-teklifi/281518?
Bianet, 2016. Erdoğan'dan "AB Değil, Şanghay 5’lisi" Mesajı https://bianet.org/haber/erdogan-dan-ab-degil-sanghay-5-lisi-mesaji-180903
GMF US, 2017a. Turkey’s SCO ambitions challenge EU and United States. https://www.gmfus.org/news/turkeys-sco-ambitions-challenge-eu-and-united-states
AA, 2016. ŞİÖ Enerji Kulübünün 2017 dönem başkanı Türkiye oldu.
https://www.aa.com.tr/tr/ekonomi/sio-enerji-kulubunun-2017-donem-baskani-turkiye-oldu/691763
AA, 2017. China agrees to discuss Turkey joining Shanghai Group. https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/china-agrees-to-discuss-turkey-joining-shanghai-group/817051
Al Jazeera, 2022. Can the SCO be Turkey’s alternative to the West?
İletişim Başkanlğı, 2024. Erdoğan: “Türkiyə ŞİÖ-ye üye olmayı hedefliyor”
Reuters, iyun 2025. Turkey backs NATO's 5% defence spending goal, plans nationwide air shield, source says
CİS, 2002. Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=3851&
Ministry of Foreign Affairs People’s Republic of China, 2012. Declaration of the Heads of State of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Building a Region of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity.
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zy/gb/202405/t20240531_11367264.html
Demir Sertif, 2022. Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütünün Evrimleşmesinin Analizi ve Türkiye Açısından Değerlendirilmesi. Strasam. https://strasam.org/ua-iliskiler/uluslararasi-orgutler/sanghay-isbirligi-orgutunun-evrimlesmesinin-analizi-ve-turkiye-acisindan-degerlendirilmesi-1176
Al Monitor, avqust 2025. Turkey’s Erdogan visit China first time five years for SCO summit.
GMF US, 2017b. Turkey’s SCO ambitions challenge EU and United States.
https://www.gmfus.org/news/turkeys-sco-ambitions-challenge-eu-and-united-states
