(The article was prepared within the framework of the "Authoritarian Regimes and Transregional Influence Mechanisms" research of the KHAR Center)
Viktor Orbán's 16-year era in Hungary has come to an end. The Hungarian people carried out an electoral tsunami despite the trick-filled electoral system built by the Orbán administration, state resources, a weakened civil society, the massive state takeover of the media, and the support of Russia, the US, China, Israel, and the European radical right. In the elections where the highest voter turnout in the country's history was recorded, Péter Magyar, the shining leader of the opposition over the last two years, not only secured victory but also won two-thirds of the parliament, gaining the opportunity to fundamentally change the country and dislodge Orbán's entire system.
Our other analyses on Hungary.
Voter tsunami
On April 12, even in the early hours of voting, the scene observed in Hungary and at the polling stations where Hungarians abroad voted indicated that this election would be different. Videos on the media and social networks showing Hungarians forming queues in front of polling stations demonstrated that the highest turnout in the country's history would be recorded. Just 4 hours after voting began, nearly 38 percent of voters had cast their ballots, a sight unseen in recent years. The trend did not change by the end of the day - 79.56 percent of voters went to the polls and voted (NVI, April 2026).
Coincidence or a pattern, it is hard to say, but so far the elections with the highest turnout in Hungarian history have also been precisely against Orbán. In the previous highest-turnout election - the two electoral rounds of 2002 - voter participation hovered around 70 and 73 percent, and although Orbán's party, in power since 1998, won a high number of votes in that election, it could not form a government (NVI, 2002). The most recent high turnout was recorded in the 2022 elections (around 70 percent), where the left opposition united against Orbán and hope for change arose (NVI, 2022). Along with this, although there were serious differences in the nationwide distribution of turnout in previous elections, in this election, people demonstrated activity across the entire country. The highest turnout was recorded in the western regions of Vas and Győr-Moson-Sopron (83.49 and 83.45 percent), and the lowest in the northeastern Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén (73.73 percent) (NVI, 2026).
Electoral landscape
Discussions on whether this high participation in the elections was an indicator of Orbán's operation to mobilize his voters or the "undercurrent" Magyar created across the country lasted until the end of the voting day. The results showed that both sides worked "to the death" for this election - the fact that Orbán's Fidesz Party won in Vas and Győr-Moson-Sopron, which showed the highest turnout in the voting, also confirms this.
The survey results announced immediately after the polling stations closed (there was no exit poll; the results of the latest surveys conducted in the days prior to the election were announced after the voting) showed that the "Tisza" Party won an overwhelming victory across the whole country (Telex, 2026). The results announced a few hours later also confirmed this - "Tisza" had garnered high votes all over the country. After 98.99 percent of the votes were counted, Magyar's party won 138 seats in the 199-seat Hungarian parliament. This was 5 mandates more than the 133 seats needed for a constitutional majority. Thus, the "Mi Hazánk" (Our Homeland) Party passing the electoral threshold and its possible alliance with "Fidesz" lost any practical significance.
The most critical point in the results was that "Tisza" won a crushing majority precisely in the majoritarian districts where Orbán had repeatedly changed the electoral system and the geography of the constituencies to create a favorable situation for himself. It was this overwhelming advantage that ensured the "winner compensation" (Khar Center, 2026), which had previously earned Orbán an extra 8-10 deputies for years, worked in Magyar's favor this time. "Tisza" secured 93 of the 106 majoritarian districts nationwide, and won 45 MP seats through the party list. "Fidesz", on the other hand, obtained 42 parliamentary seats through the party list while having to settle for 13 mandates in the majoritarian districts. The third party to enter the parliament - Mi Hazánk (Our Homeland) - gained only 6 deputy seats proportionally (NVI, 2026).
Magyar's core base and Orbán's lost fortresses
The results, which Orbán also accepted, show that the Tisza Party's main pillar is Budapest and its surroundings. Tisza candidates won in all electoral districts in Budapest, and in many places, the vote percentage did not fall below 60 (NVI, 2026). Tisza secured the advantage in a large part of the country. Magyar's party also won in and around major cities like Pécs, Győr, Dunaújváros, Nyíregyháza, Kecskemét, and Debrecen. This shows that "Tisza's" election campaign caused a serious awakening and consolidation, especially among urban voters.
Orbán's party, however, was only able to win in Győr-Moson-Sopron and Vas in the west, in three districts on the Tolna-Fejér line in the center, in three districts on the Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg line in the east, in the Nógrád second and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén third districts in the north, and in the Hajdú-Bihar and Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok districts in the southeast. The general picture shows that Orbán was only able to hold on to a portion of the small and conservative districts (NVI, 2026).
In general, the situation in the regions considered "Fidesz's" main fortresses is by no means encouraging for Orbán. One of the most symbolic examples of this is Debrecen. Debrecen has been under the control of "Fidesz" for many years. The city's mayor, László Papp, had been one of Orbán's most loyal party members since 2002, and was elected head of the Debrecen municipality in 2014. Debrecen was considered Orbán's old fortress for many of its features, but in recent years, plans to build Chinese-origin battery plants in this region, Orbán—who constantly turned anti-migration rhetoric into a main element of election campaigns—allowing thousands of workers from Asia to come for the Chinese plants, corruption facts, the widening social gap, economic problems, and "Fidesz's" inability to find candidates as substantial as in previous years (Le Monde, 2026) fundamentally changed the situation. Magyar held the final rally of his election campaign precisely in this city and signaled that he would win with a large demonstration attended not only by youth but also by a large number of middle-aged people and pensioners (Telex, 2026). The result was just as he expected - "Tisza" won in all 3 single-mandate districts in Debrecen (NVI, 2026).
There are also many losses in Orbán's other "fortresses" - Bicske, one of "Fidesz's" important strongholds in the central-west, where it received 57.3% of the votes in 2022, passed to "Tisza" with 53.48% in this election, while Orbán's party garnered only 39.21%. Similarly, in Kecskemét, which gave Orbán's party 59.02% of the vote in 2022, the winner of this election was Tisza with 51.29 percent. A similar situation arose in regions like Zalaegerszeg and Hajdúszoboszló. In places where "Fidesz" maintained a formal advantage - regions such as Sárbogárd, Berettyóújfalu, Dombóvár, and Paks - the vote percentages are not above 60 percent like in 2022, but are around 43-46%, and the gap with "Tisza" is very close (444.hu, 2026). Even in its loyal districts where "Fidesz" won by a relatively large margin - like Vásárosnamény and Mátészalka - a serious loss of votes is observed compared to previous elections. Felcsút, considered Orbán's "personal fortress," is no exception in this regard - against "Fidesz's" 49.64 percent, "Tisza" received 43.93% of the votes (444.hu, 2026). Until now, Felcsút and the Fejér county it is part of have been directly associated with Orbán and his corruption partner, close friend, billionaire Lőrinc Mészáros (Reuters, 2018). But in this election, although Orbán managed to protect Felcsút by a narrow margin, "Tisza" won in four out of five electoral districts in Fejér, and "Fidesz" only won in one (444.hu, 2026). Likewise, even in traditionally right-wing regions like Zala, "Tisza" melted away "Fidesz's" votes and won.
Main factors ensuring Magyar's victory
When analyzing the pre-election situation in Hungary, we noted that Magyar's main advantage was precisely coming to the fore with his conservative identity in a country ideologically polarized by Orbán (Khar Center, 2026). The portrait of a candidate who opposes the system from within, conforms to conservative Hungarian identity, and at the same time is free from corruption and trusted, were the main factors that kept Magyar at the peak of the country's politics for two years and ensured his victory in yesterday's election. Alongside this, the results also showed that it is incorrect to evaluate the Tisza Party's electorate solely in these categories - without right-left, old-young, or rich-poor distinctions, Magyar became the hope of a large electorate wanting to be rid of Orbán.
Unlike Orbán, who built his entire election campaign on foreign policy manipulations, hostility toward Ukraine, and anti-EU sentiment, Magyar brought daily economic life to the forefront. He traveled the entire country inch by inch, primarily the regions where "Fidesz" traditionally gained an advantage, and highlighted issues directly affecting people's lives, such as economic stagnation, healthcare, living costs, and corruption problems. Unlike Orbán, who seriously distanced himself from the language of the people with his anti-EU, anti-Ukraine, anti-liberalism, and "foreign enemy" rhetoric, and even conversely, created horror stories with this tense, polarizing style, Magyar's promises were very simple, convincing, and close to the people's language - like fighting corruption, ensuring the unfreezing of EU funds, reviving the economy, implementing healthcare reforms, etc. Magyar's election language was also nationalist and conservative, he too brought patriotism to the forefront, but unlike Orbán, he did not do this in parallel with European Union hostility; on the contrary, he promised a Hungary preserving its nationalist and conservative identity within the European family - which won him the sympathy of the voter tired of Orbán.
Orbán acting openly as a vassal of Russia, especially in the last few years, becoming the central figure of problems within Europe, authoritarianizing the country under the name of an "illiberal system," bringing the media and civil society under control, turning laws and the constitution into elements conforming to his wishes, and finally, the pre-election Trump administration openly supporting Orbán, created an opposite effect on the Hungarian people. As a result, this became a national resistance election, and despite all the internal, external, and resource mobilization around Orbán, the people won.
It would not be right to present the election results in Hungary as a victory for liberalism, and it would be very ambitious to say it will create a "domino effect" in Europe (or the world), but it is possible to say with certainty that the authoritarian, anti-liberalism, pro-occupation trend represented by Orbán and supported by Putin and Trump has received a serious blow.
Orbán is gone, will it be possible to end Orbanism?
Until yesterday, the biggest intrigue of the election was whether "Tisza" would achieve a constitutional majority. Because while designing Hungary in a way that he, his family, and his close circle could rule, Orbán did not settle for using the constitutional majority as a main tool, but also tied the possibility of changing many important issues precisely to this two-thirds majority. There is a special category in the Hungarian legal system called "Fundamental laws" (Sarkalatos Törvények), for which a constitutional majority is a precondition to be adopted or changed. These laws, which form the basis of the country's constitutional structure, include the following:
- The structure, powers, and judge appointments of the Constitutional Court;
- The organization of courts and the status of judges;
- The authority of the Media Council and control over the public broadcaster;
- The independence and function of the Central Bank;
- Election law;
- Law on Political Parties;
- Citizenship law;
- Family protection law;
- Public finance and national assets;
- Tax and pension, etc.
In short, due to Orbán's changes, laws regarding all important areas from public administration to the judicial system, from the media to the economy, from elections to taxes are passed with a two-thirds majority. If "Tisza" had won a simple majority in the election, it would not have been able to change these laws, and this essentially meant its government would be paralyzed from its starting position. However, 138 mandates removed this obstacle before Magyar. This majority gives "Tisza" the opportunity to change the constitution and fundamental laws - that is, Orbanism. This is exactly what the Hungarian society expects from him - to re-normalize the country with cardinal, not cosmetic, changes. The strengthening of Hungary's currency immediately after the election (Reuters, 2026) is also an indicator of this expectation.
Starting today, Magyar's status changes - he is no longer expected to be just the leader of the anti-Orbán tsunami, but the prime minister who rebuilds the state. The factors that mobilized the voters and won Magyar the victory, such as eliminating economic stagnation, increasing welfare levels, reducing living costs, and normalizing relations with the EU, now stand before him as conditions that must be fulfilled. In particular, the unblocking of European Union funds is not a matter tied to Magyar's words and promises - implementing concrete reforms stands ahead as the main condition for this (Reuters, 2026).
One day after the magnificent atmosphere of election day, the real picture facing Magyar is this - an empty treasury, frozen funds, the lowest-paid people in Europe, a corrupted judiciary and state system in general, a polarized society, lost trust in Europe, a capital that has become a major headache regarding Ukraine's EU membership and the war in general, continued energy dependence on Russia, cities turned into Chinese battery factories, etc. Whether Hungary's young leader will be able to cope with all this is quite difficult to predict at this point. First of all, because the victory is big, the expectation will also be big - but the economic problems facing the country will be the biggest obstacle to fulfilling the promises or fulfilling them quickly. On the other hand, before starting the changes, a serious "cleanup" phase awaits Magyar - it will be necessary to clear the state administration system, media, and judiciary of individuals loyal to Orbán. According to analysts, "Fidesz's" control over business, media, administration, and the judiciary in Hungary is very broad and very deep. It might not be so easy for Magyar to carry out this cleanup without creating serious cataclysms domestically (The Guardian, 2026).
On the other hand, after Magyar was declared an "undesirable leader" by Russia and the US before the election, and after the open efforts of the leadership of these two countries for him to lose, the new prime minister's maneuvering areas in foreign policy will also be significantly narrowed. Magyar stated that energy dependence on Russia continues, that it is impossible to end it soon, and that for this reason they will hold discussions with Putin, but he also emphasized that he will not be Putin's man. Moscow will most likely take this second emphasis into account and will try to squeeze Magyar on the energy issue. On the other hand, the Trump administration, despite the open show of force, will try to take out the anger of losing Orbán on Magyar. Of course, all this will open new maneuvering opportunities for Magyar within the European Union and will stimulate Brussels' policy of supporting Budapest. But whether Brussels' support can protect Magyar from the wrath of Putin and Trump, and from the support they will give for Orbán to recover again, is hard to say. Here, how fast the EU acts, and Magyar taking courageous steps to turn his victory from a temporary relief into a real turning point, will also be determinative.
REFERENCES
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