Introduction
Poland is an Eastern European country that has built its security doctrine around the Russian threat and views Moscow’s defeat in Ukraine as the only viable path to sustainable peace. Due to its traumatic historical experience, Soviet occupation, and the collective memory of state terror, both Poland’s political elite and the overwhelming majority of society take a more realist stance toward Moscow’s strategy. In this sense, although certain social groups may be sensitive to the Kremlin’s anti-Ukrainian narratives, Poland as a whole has developed a form of immunity against Russian propaganda, disinformation, and subversive activities.
Despite differences in economic interests and bilateral tensions between Warsaw and Kyiv rooted in historical disputes, these factors do not generate pro-Russian sentiment among Poles. The geopolitical tensions triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have further reinforced Poland’s security strategy. The country has become a critical “frontline” state hosting NATO troops and providing substantial military support to Ukraine, effectively functioning as an “anti-imperial Russian buffer” (Balcer, January 2025a).
However, this very role has turned Poland into a priority target for Russian disinformation and manipulation efforts. In this article, the Khar Center examines the key narratives, actors, and dissemination mechanisms of Kremlin propaganda in Poland.
Key Analytical Questions
What narratives and mechanisms does Russian propaganda employ in Poland?
How strong is the practical impact of these activities?
At what level is Poland’s resistance to Kremlin propaganda mechanisms?
THE KREMLIN’S SHADOW WAR
From the perspective of political influence, Poland is a difficult country for Russia, but this does not alter Moscow’s tactics. Instead of overt political channels, the Kremlin relies on components of a “shadow war.” Russia’s “shadow war” targeting Poland is assessed as a threat network combining espionage, low-level sabotage, internal data leaks, disinformation, and cyberattacks. This model operates as follows:
- Espionage and hostile intelligence: collecting information on military facilities, logistics, and decision-making networks;
- Low-level sabotage: damaging or intimidating “soft targets” such as railway and highway routes, warehouses, production sites, and logistics hubs;
- Internal infiltration: disrupting information flows or extracting sensitive data through individuals embedded in state institutions and critical sectors;
- Information operations: eroding Polish–Ukrainian solidarity, exaggerating “costs,” undermining trust in the state, and fueling radical politics;
- Cyberattacks: targeting critical infrastructure and government networks to create panic and governance crises (Jamestown Foundation, August 2025a).
Between 2010 and 2025, 30 criminal cases related to Russia’s shadow war operations in Poland were completed, resulting in the arrest of 61 individuals. Since 2021 alone, 40 people have been arrested in 19 cases, accounting for 35 percent of all Russia-linked espionage and sabotage arrests in Europe. The cumulative findings of these cases show that the objectives of Russia’s hybrid operations include reducing support for Ukraine, disrupting decision-making mechanisms, eroding societal trust, and fueling radical politics (Jamestown Foundation, August 2025b).
RUSSIAN PROPAGANDA NARRATIVES IN POLAND
The most dangerous aspect of the shadow war lies in its parallel use of hard components—such as espionage, sabotage, and cyberattacks—alongside manipulation of the information space. Through this approach, the Kremlin aims to influence public perception and, ultimately, politics and political decision-making. Therefore, understanding hybrid pressure in Poland requires analyzing not only the operations themselves but also the narratives on which they are built.
The “Failed State” Narrative
As in other European “adversary” states, Russia persistently promotes narratives in Poland claiming that state institutions have collapsed, the government is incompetent, subservient to the West, and that the state lacks sovereignty. From mid-2021 onward, the emails of Polish politicians—most notably those of Michał Dworczyk, former head of the Chancellery of the Prime Minister—began to be leaked. These communications contained politically sensitive information and were used to discredit the Polish government and manipulate public opinion. According to the findings of at least two digital investigations, these leaks were part of a cyber-enabled influence campaign aimed at strengthening anti-NATO sentiment and destabilizing governments in Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia—an operation known as “Ghostwriter” (MFA UA, 2022a).
Ukrainian Refugees Cast as the Enemy
At present, Russia’s most intensive information operations in Poland revolve around Ukraine and Ukrainians. The goal is not only to cut Poland’s strategic support for Ukraine but also to exaggerate the “costs,” question solidarity, and create a legitimacy crisis around this support by portraying Ukrainians as enemies.
Despite domestic political fluctuations and occasional tensions in relations with Kyiv, Poland remains one of the strongest military and political supporters of Ukraine and one of the key countries within the EU that resists pro-Russian propaganda. At the same time, 22.5 percent of Ukrainian refugees in Europe—approximately 965,000 people—are in Poland, making it the second-largest host country after Germany (Eurostat, October 2025).
As the war drags on, the burden increases, and as the burden grows, narratives shift from the language of “solidarity” to that of “competition and privilege,” creating fertile ground for Russian propaganda. In 2022, support for Ukraine in Poland was at record levels: 80–85 percent of the population strongly supported Kyiv, and 82 percent believed that NATO and European countries should support Ukraine until Russia is defeated (Okopress, 2023). By late 2024, the picture had changed— for the first time since the war began, a majority of Poles stated that ending the conflict was more important than Ukraine’s territorial integrity, even if it required territorial concessions. According to a survey by the Polish Public Opinion Research Center (CBOS), 55 percent of respondents prioritized ending the conflict over Ukraine’s territorial integrity (CBOS, 2024). This figure now stands at 54 percent (Polskie Radio, October 2025a).
A similar trend is observed regarding attitudes toward Ukrainian refugees. In 2022, over 90 percent of Poles supported accepting Ukrainians, but by autumn 2025 this figure had dropped to 48 percent—the lowest level of support since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Polskie Radio, October 2025b). At the same time, data show that the presence of Ukrainian refugees had a positive impact of 2.7 percent on Poland’s GDP in 2024 and increased the employment rate from 61 to 69 percent (UNHCR, June 2025).
Here, the Kremlin operates on two levels: on the one hand, Russian narratives fuel hostility toward Ukrainian refugees and contribute to declining support; on the other hand, the very fact of declining support becomes the foundation for new disinformation and manipulation campaigns. Analyses conducted in Poland show that pro-Russian channels and certain domestic radical actors systematically spread narratives on social media such as “Ukrainians are taking social benefits from Poles,” “they are prioritized in the healthcare system,” “Poles are becoming second-class citizens,” and “Ukrainian refugees are corrupt and ungrateful” (Zadorozna, Butuc, 2024).
Migrant Hostility as Bait for Kremlin Propaganda
More broadly, negative attitudes toward migration in Poland significantly facilitate the Kremlin’s efforts. Surveys show that up to 75 percent of Poles oppose accepting migrants, with 50 percent strongly against it. Anti-immigration narratives in recent years have created favorable conditions for the growth of extremist movements and parties in Poland. These narratives coexist with anti-Ukrainian content, overlap with it, and reinforce it. There is a “mutual reinforcement loop”: hostility toward Ukrainians intensifies hostility toward other migrants, and vice versa (EUDisinfoLab, October 2025a).
In this context, Russia also exploits Belarus’s support. The migrant crisis along the Polish–Belarusian border is the clearest example. Minsk has instrumentalized innocent third-country nationals: by deliberately attracting potential migrants to Belarus with promises of easy access to Europe. After EU–Minsk relations deteriorated due to sanctions in May 2021, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko stated that migrants would no longer be stopped as before. Belarus first applied this tactic against Lithuania in July. Lithuania declared a state of emergency due to the influx of irregular migrants from Belarus and announced plans to build a border barrier, stating that Belarus was flying migrants in from abroad and funneling them to the EU border (Reuters, 2021). Subsequently, Belarus redirected migrants toward the Polish border, and serious tensions were recorded along the border between August and December 2021. Deaths were reported among migrants trapped between the two countries. The Polish government declared a state of emergency, issued multiple diplomatic notes to Belarus, and took steps to strengthen pushback regulations, while reports of migrants being pushed back from Poland were documented (ECRE, 2021).
These events were exploited by pro-government media in Belarus and Russia for narrative production; the content was disseminated and amplified in multiple languages through outlets such as RT, Sputnik Polska, RuBaltic, and BaltNews. The core narratives consisted of disinformation claims such as “Polish soldiers are committing atrocities and genocide against refugees from the Middle East,” “Western countries are responsible for bringing migrants to the Polish–Belarusian border,” “Poland uses migrants as a tool against Belarus,” and “Poland itself transports migrants to the border and creates an artificial crisis” (MFA UA, 2022b).
Farmers’ Protests at the Center of Kremlin Narratives
In 2023–2024, the crisis surrounding Ukrainian grain access to the European market, transit routes, and sanctions generated discontent within Poland’s agricultural sector. In September 2023, then–Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki stated that Poland would no longer provide military support due to grain imports. In February 2024, during the “Farmers’ Protests,” border crossings were blocked, and import bans were imposed on certain agricultural products under the pretext of grain imports (Balcer, January 2025b). Ukraine challenged these measures at the WTO, and subsequently the EU–Ukraine trade agreement entered into force; however, Poland’s Ministry of Agriculture announced that it would continue the import ban on Ukrainian products (Polskie Radio, October 2025b).
Unsurprisingly, this environment was not left unused by Kremlin propaganda. Narratives such as “Ukrainian grain is destroying Polish farmers,” “Brussels and Kyiv are jointly dismantling Polish agriculture,” “sanctions impoverish Poles by removing Russian and Belarusian products from the market,” “Poland has opened a second front against Ukraine,” and “Ukraine will be defeated without allies” were amplified both by pro-Russian online networks and by Polish populist politicians. During the peak of the protests between February and April, thousands of propaganda items on this topic were disseminated. This propaganda, aimed at deepening mutual distrust among both Poles and Ukrainians, escalated to such an extent that Polish authorities themselves stated that the influence of Russian agents was visible in these protests (DFRLab, 2024a).
A report by the Henry Jackson Society emphasizes that farmers’ protests across Central and Eastern Europe—particularly in Poland—have been instrumentalized by forces hostile to Ukraine. According to the report, Russian propaganda “latched onto” existing grievances in countries most likely to support Ukraine and used them as Trojan horses (Henry Jackson Society, October 2025).
The Volhynia Tragedy as Propaganda Content
The Volhynia tragedy is an extremely sensitive issue in Poland. The Polish side considers the events that took place in 1943–1945 in the southeastern regions of the country—then under German occupation—to constitute genocide committed by Ukrainian nationalists of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA). Ukraine does not accept this position; as a result, the issue regularly generates tensions around exhumation decisions and is exploited both by extremist circles and by Russian propaganda. Since 2014, the Volhynia tragedy has been part of anti-Ukrainian disinformation in Poland.
In June of this year, a “document” claiming that Ukraine had halted exhumations related to the Volhynia tragedy circulated online, along with a video in which Andrzej Ossowski, the head of the exhumation work, allegedly confirmed this decision. It was later revealed that the document was forged and that the video had been produced using artificial intelligence and disseminated from a fake account. Despite these revelations and official denials, this wave of disinformation—supported by nationalist and pro-Kremlin accounts on social media—reinforced anti-Ukrainian narratives (DFRLab, October 2025).
Energy Disinformation at the Core of Propaganda
As a result of diversification efforts launched by Warsaw in 2014, Russia’s share in Poland’s energy supply stood at approximately 35 percent by 2020. In 2022, Poland became one of the first European Union countries to begin severing energy ties with Russia—first halting coal imports and transit, and then completely stopping oil and gas imports in 2023 (Maj, 2023).
However, Russia did not miss opportunities arising from rising energy prices, inflation, and social discontent. Kremlin disinformation particularly targeted projects such as the LNG terminal in Świnoujście and the Baltic Pipe pipeline. False claims were spread within Polish society alleging that the LNG terminal—the cornerstone of Poland’s LNG import strategy—was inefficient and excessively costly, that the Baltic Pipe importing gas from Norway faced technical problems and delays, and even that construction had been halted. Repeated in more than half a million posts, these narratives sought to generate doubts about Poland’s ability to end its dependence on Russian gas. Nevertheless, Poland managed to resist this disinformation campaign thanks to strong political and public support for these projects (Warsaw Institute, 2024).
In 2024–2025, waves of Russian disinformation portrayed the EU’s Green Deal through assertive narratives such as “a plan to destroy Polish industry” and “a project deliberately killing coal culture.” Kremlin propaganda also sought to frame the EU as an “aggressor” forcing solutions harmful to the Polish economy in the realm of climate policy, specifically targeting the “Fit for 55” package (EUDisinfoLab, October 2025b).
KREMLIN POLITICAL INFLUENCE ACTORS IN POLAND – A RADICAL “BOUQUET”
For Russia, Poland is a difficult country in which to find an open ally with a large electorate. Poland’s 123 years under Russian occupation, Soviet influence and sabotage operations between the two world wars, its forced inclusion in the Eastern Bloc after World War II, and 45 years of governance by a Moscow-oriented communist party form the foundation of Poland’s anti-Russian stance. As a result, the emergence of an openly pro-Kremlin party with broad electoral support has been practically impossible. All major political parties in the country directly support Ukraine and sanctions against Russia.
However, Russian disinformation is “hyper-local”: it exploits every social fault line it can find. Some of these fault lines were identified by Russia long ago, and systematic resources have been invested to widen and deepen them. Through these resources, Russia has cultivated a complex “bouquet” of political supporters in Poland. This “bouquet” consists of the most radical, anti-democratic wings of both the right and the left; they enter into various hybrid alliances and sprout in the form of dozens of micro-parties from a mutually expanding “mycelium” (fungal network). These organizations encompass a broad spectrum, including former Soviet-aligned communists, nationalists, religious fanatics, national-Bolsheviks, monarchists, neo-Eurasianists, self-appointed officers of “civil militias,” anti-scientific conspiracy theorists, and antisemites (ICCT, 2024a).
The activation of Russian influence agents in Poland dates back to and follows the annexation of Crimea in 2014 (Witkowski, 2023). In 2015, the political initiative “Zmiana,” founded by Mateusz Piskorski, was considered the main political showcase of a Kremlin-adjacent “influence environment” in Poland. Although Zmiana had limited electoral strength, it occupied a role as a political-organizational vector within Russia’s soft power and disinformation ecosystem. The party’s leader, Mateusz Piskorski, also used the “analytical center” ECAG, which he founded in Warsaw in 2007, to introduce Kremlin-aligned positions into international discussions. Open-source materials confirm that this structure was involved in activities aimed at legitimizing the annexation of Crimea (OCCRP, 2017). Piskorski was arrested in 2016 on charges of espionage in favor of Russia and China (The Guardian, 2016) and released on bail in 2019. He continues to operate in Russia’s interests and actively disseminates Kremlin narratives as a “Polish political analyst,” particularly via the Belarusian propaganda outlet Biełta (Belsat, June 2025).
From 2015–2016 onward, Russia intensified its search for allies within Polish politics, and numerous small organizations representing the radical right and radical left became the primary “battlefield” for Russian security services. Within this pro-Russian environment in Poland, two currents stand out in particular: the monarchist, nationalist, ultra-religious, and antisemitic politicians of the far-right Confederation party, and the national-Bolshevik milieu.
In the first group, Grzegorz Braun—former member of the Polish Sejm and current Member of the European Parliament—stands out for disseminating Russian narratives, his intensive participation in pro-Russian political networks, and his anti-Ukrainian rhetoric. Braun leads the Confederation of the Polish Crown, the most pro-Russian faction of the Confederation party, which later became a separate political party (ICCT, 2024b).
The Confederation party’s 2025 presidential candidate, Sławomir Mentzen, has also recently ceased to conceal his Kremlin-leaning positions. His attacks on Ukraine and Ukrainians and his accusations against the European Union during the election campaign fully align with Kremlin narratives (Mierzynska, March 2025a). A Member of the European Parliament, Ewa Zajączkowska-Hernik—whom Mentzen calls a close friend—is also among Russia’s most fervent defenders. Overall, Confederation MPs currently represent the most organized group fueling hatred toward Ukraine and supporting Russian narratives in this direction (Mierzynska, March 2025b).
The second pro-Kremlin group is led by national-Bolshevik organizations such as Falanga. Falanga’s leaders emerged from Polish nationalist circles and underwent rapid radicalization in the early 2000s and early 2010s, while simultaneously becoming adherents of the neo-Eurasianist concept developed by Aleksandr Dugin. Their activities combine extensive propaganda—such as publishing Dugin’s books, operating pro-Russian websites, and organizing journalistic trips to Russia, occupied territories of Ukraine, Syria, and Lebanon—with paramilitary operations. This group has also established numerous links with Donbas separatists and terrorist groups from the Middle East and has carried out political violence and even overt terrorist acts on Ukrainian territory. Bartosz Bekier, the leader of Falanga and a former associate of Zmiana leader Piskorski, has repeatedly traveled to Russia, occupied Crimea, and Donbas, met with the most aggressive figures of Russian propaganda—from Dugin to Ramzan Kadyrov—and actively participated in disseminating Kremlin narratives. Only after 2022 did Bekier’s activity somewhat decline (ICCT, 2024c).
Following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, several pro-Russian groups emerged in Poland, among which “Safe Poland” and “Front” became relatively popular. In the summer of 2025, a new pro-Russian political group appeared in Poland. The National Federation of Non-Aligned Municipalities (OF BS), led by Marek Woź—one of the least successful candidates in the most recent presidential elections—openly allied itself with the nationalist, pro-Russian Association of the Great Poland Camp (Obóz Wielkiej Polski – OWP) (Okopress, August 2025a). The Great Poland Camp has maintained links with oligarch Konstantin Malofeev, who plays a role in organizing Russian propaganda activities in Europe, as well as with Belarusian Russian agent Aleksandr Usovsky, who since 2014 has used Malofeev’s funds to organize rallies across Eastern Europe. It was precisely this organization that organized pro-Russian rallies in Poland between 2013 and 2015 under Usovsky’s sponsorship. Other organizations, such as the Slavic Union and the Polish National Sovereignty Movement—founded in 2006 as openly pro-Kremlin parties—also supported these efforts (Okopress, August 2025b).
Polish propaganda analyst Anna Mierzyńska emphasizes that among the 37 candidates who participated in the most recent presidential elections in Poland, 16 were anti-Ukrainian, anti-EU, and Russia-leaning (Mierzynska, March 2025c).
From the perspective of strengthening Kremlin narratives, an even greater risk than all of the above is the emergence of authoritarian tendencies in Poland. The example of the PiS government demonstrated that democratic resilience in Poland has significantly declined (KHAR Center, September 2025), making the country more vulnerable to external influence—first and foremost to Kremlin narratives. At the same time, the new president Karol Nawrocki’s skepticism toward Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership, his blocking of the extension of social benefits for refugees, and his instrumentalization of historical traumas in day-to-day politics resemble a repetition of Kremlin theses (Reuters, May 2025). While it would be inaccurate to label Nawrocki as a pro-Russian politician, his hard national-populist line on Ukraine may at times function as a convenient informational “transmitter” for the Kremlin.
THE THREE PILLARS OF THE ONLINE PROPAGANDA MACHINE
Poland was among the first countries to take steps to ban Russian propaganda broadcasts following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Just a few days after the war began, Poland’s National Broadcasting Council removed five Kremlin propaganda television channels—Russia Today (RT), RT Documentary, RTR Planeta, Soyuz TV, and Rossiya 24—from broadcast frequencies (Niezalezna, 2022). Later, Sputnik was also banned; nevertheless, Sputnik Polska continued broadcasting until September 2023, after which it ceased operations and was completely removed in April 2024. With its open channels blocked, Russia shifted to covert tactics to continue its propaganda activities in Poland, prioritizing both old and newly established proxy broadcasters (Benzoni, Doroshenko and Sikora, Krystyna, May 2025a).
Since 2022, Russian-oriented propaganda in Poland’s information space has been built around three main pillars: the Pravda–Portal Kombat network, social media platforms, and the conspiracy media ecosystem.
A study conducted by the Google Threat Intelligence Group in late 2025 illustrates how Russian propaganda operates in Poland through these pillars. The group analyzed several information operations against the backdrop of Russian drones entering Polish airspace (the “drone incident”). According to the analysis, the operation followed this pattern: Portal Kombat / the Pravda Network disseminated narratives such as “the drones may not actually have come from Russia,” and “Polish and Baltic politicians are exaggerating the incident, creating hysteria against Russia, and attempting to disrupt U.S.–Russia negotiations.” A pro-Russian network of fake private media brands known as “Doppelganger” expanded the reach of these narratives through articles claiming that the reaction to the drone incidents was exaggerated in order to drag Europeans into a war with Russia. Meanwhile, local websites that present themselves as independent media—but have been proven to disseminate Russian narratives, such as Niezależny Dziennik Polityczny (NDP)—served to give these narratives an “insider perspective” tone (Google Threat Intelligence Group, October 2025).
The Pravda / Portal Kombat Network
One of the five Western countries targeted by Russia’s “underground” propaganda network—Portal Kombat (Pravda)—after 2022 was Poland, and it continues to rank among the top five targets worldwide out of nearly 100 countries. Between 2023 and 2024, 11–12 percent of propaganda content produced for France, Germany, Poland, Spain, and the United Kingdom/United States was directed at Poland. In terms of the volume of propaganda disseminated through the Pravda network, Poland ranks fourth, after Spain, the United Kingdom, and Germany (VIGINUM, 2024).
The German Marshall Fund (GMF) analyzed more than 3,500 articles published on the Pravda network between 28 August 2024 and 28 March 2025 and identified proxy websites disseminating Kremlin propaganda. The analysis uncovered a large volume of content translated directly from Russian state media and pro-Russian Telegram channels. This propaganda surge—particularly intense in the pre-election period—also served as a content source for the Polish-language versions of Crimea-based NewsFront, linked to Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), and Aleksandr Dugin’s Geopolitika website. During the analysis period, the Polish-language output of both sites doubled (Benzoni, Doroshenko and Sikora, Krystyna, May 2025b).
Local Polish websites also contributed to the dissemination of Russian narratives. Sites such as nacjonalista.pl, kresy.pl, myslpolska.info, and legaartis.pl published articles that were almost identical to content circulating within the Pravda network. At the same time, by producing original content that was subsequently picked up and republished by NewsFront and Pravda, these sites also created a “reverse pathway” from Polish sources to Russian platforms (Benzoni, Doroshenko and Sikora, Krystyna, May 2025c).
The “Grey Zone” and the Conspiracy Ecosystem
Poland’s far-right, populist, and conspiracy-oriented media are among the most active “consumers” of Kremlin narratives. Formally operating under the labels of “alternative” or “independent” media while systematically reproducing pro-Kremlin narratives, these outlets are classified by EU DisinfoLab as “grey zone” actors. According to the organization’s research, the same accounts that disseminated disinformation related to the COVID-19 pandemic play a major role in spreading conspiracy theories and false information about Ukraine, with both narrative streams closely linked to Kremlin influence centers. Although the impact of these circles was limited in the early months of the war, anti-Ukrainian narratives are now resurging and are being amplified by Russian influence hubs and far-right groups (EUDisinfoLab, October 2025c).
The most overtly conspiratorial narratives question the very intensity of the war and even portray the entire invasion as a “fabricated setup.” Another highly operative Kremlin narrative claims the existence of laboratories producing biological weapons in Ukraine, directly justifying Russia’s aggression (EUDisinfoLab, October 2025d).
Another study conducted in 2025 examined a network of Polish-language websites disseminating Kremlin narratives and targeting Ukraine, the EU, and the West. The top ten included bumerangmedia.com, magnapolonia.org, marucha.wordpress.com, myslpolska.info, neon24.net, ocenzurowane.pl, pravda-pl.com, voltairenet.org, wolnemedia.net, and zaprasza.net. These sites cite sanctioned Russian state media, while Russian outlets, in turn, quote them as “pro-Russian voices in Europe” (Insight News Media, March 2025).
Telegram, X, Bluesky, and the “Doppelganger” and “Matryoshka” Operations
Research shows that Telegram channels, fake X (Twitter) accounts, and “alternative media” profiles play a significant role in Poland’s disinformation environment. Aleksy Szymkiewicz, an expert from the Polish fact-checking organization Demagog, notes that since 2022 Russian disinformation and manipulation operations have become a persistent component of Poland’s digital space, with Telegram functioning as an initial distribution hub: “False and manipulative claims appear here first, then spread to major platforms such as X, and from there enter discussions in Facebook groups” (BBC, June 2025a).
Numerous Telegram channels affiliated with sanctioned Russian media outlets such as RT, Sputnik, and RIA Novosti remain fully or partially accessible from Polish IP addresses, with content delivered to Polish audiences through mirror and alternative channels. A 2025 study by CEDEM (Centre for Democracy and Rule of Law) found that while access from Poland to the official Telegram channels of 16 out of 27 sanctioned Russian propaganda outlets was blocked, nine remained accessible without issue. For two outlets, the research team was unable to locate an active official Telegram channel (CEDEM, October 2025a).
Moreover, restrictions apply only to official Telegram channels. Russia circumvents these limits by operating multiple channels in different languages and on different topics—sometimes without official branding, sometimes through cloned channels. Research indicates that accounts fully or partially copying RT and Sputnik content are most prevalent on Telegram (GMF, June 2025). Telegram channels, personal accounts, and accounts of Russian diplomatic missions—key instruments of Russia’s soft power—also play a significant role in enabling Kremlin propaganda to bypass sanctions and penetrate Poland. In this model, propaganda flows into the country via the chain “Kremlin → banned media → embassy Telegram accounts.” Telegram’s free and anonymous publishing service Telegra.ph further facilitates the distribution of propaganda content beyond sanctions and additional scrutiny—a tool Russia actively exploits (CEDEM, October 2025b).
A major mechanism for amplifying Telegram content is Russia’s propaganda networks such as Pravda, UkrLeaks, and InfoDefense. For example, outlets like RIA Novosti and Lenta.ru—which do not have Polish-language websites—can still reach Polish audiences via translations and reposts on Polish-language Telegram channels affiliated with the Pravda network. UkrLeaks, a multilingual Telegram-based platform created by former Russian intelligence officer Vasily Prozorov, devotes special attention to Poland; one of its nine language versions is in Polish (DFRLab, 2023).
The InfoDefense group, operating in more than 30 languages, includes InfoDefensePoland, which is currently controlled by Moscow-based Kremlin influence agent Yuri Podolyaka, a Ukrainian national by origin (BBC, June 2025b).
Russian propaganda content is also widely disseminated by pro-Kremlin Telegram channels and local actors within Poland. According to a BBC investigation conducted in June 2025, Russian narratives circulate across 22 Polish-language Telegram channels with a combined audience exceeding 150,000 followers. These channels, which present themselves as independent, neutral, and unbiased news sources, either copy RT and Sputnik content, cite them directly, or manipulate audiences using entirely fabricated videos and news. They also cross-promote and reference one another (BBC, June 2025c).
Russia’s “Doppelganger” operations—activated after 2022 and relying on clones of real media outlets, particularly well-known Western news organizations, to distribute fake articles, videos, and polls—remain highly relevant for Poland. The Social Design Agency (SDA), which conducts Doppelganger operations, was sanctioned by the European Union in 2014. Nevertheless, ahead of Poland’s 2025 presidential elections, Russia carried out a renewed Doppelganger campaign by creating websites and social media accounts imitating Western media outlets (Ukrinform, May 2025).
Alliance4Europe documented attempts by the Doppelganger operation to interfere in Poland’s presidential elections. According to its findings, Russia coordinated the dissemination of anti-EU, anti-Ukrainian, and anti-“Warsaw elite” narratives during the election campaign via cloned accounts on the X platform. To reinforce these narratives and present them as domestic Polish discourse, the operation also leveraged 43 articles published across 13 Polish media outlets. The X platform failed to comply with EU sanctions—it neither removed nor labeled these posts. Doppelganger content operates through reposting strategies aligned with Kremlin narratives and headlines; during the Polish elections, this approach amplified the impact of so-called “amplification media” such as Bankier, wPolityce, Fronda, NCzas, PAP, RP, and RMF24 (Alliance4Europe, April 2025; May 2025).
According to a report by ISD, Doppelganger—alongside the Pravda Network—was one of the two main foreign propaganda operations used during Poland’s presidential elections. While the overall impact of these operations was limited, the report stresses that their existence and activity should not be dismissed (ISD, August 2025).
Another Russian operation conducted ahead of Poland’s 2025 presidential elections was “Matryoshka” (Operation Overload). This operation followed a specific line in Poland—portraying Ukrainian refugees as a terrorist threat to the elections. ISD’s investigation found that between 22 April and 14 May, several videos shared by anonymous X accounts and reposted on Bluesky falsely claimed that Ukrainian refugees were planning terrorist attacks in Poland on 18 May, the day of the first round of voting. A parallel “overload operation” advanced false claims that Ukrainians were planning attacks against leading politicians in neighboring countries. These posts garnered hundreds of thousands of views and thousands of interactions (ISD, May 2025a).
Amplification once again relied on reinforcing networks. ISD found that ChatGPT reproduced misleading claims originating from Russian website networks known as Pravda or Portal Kombat (ISD, May 2025b). The novelty here lies not merely in the falsehood of the content, but in its ability—through imitation, artificial intelligence, and coordinated dissemination—to appear credible and poison the information agenda.
ACTORS OF RESISTANCE
Poland is among the countries that have responded adequately to Russia’s propaganda war and, in this regard, has developed one of the most institutionalized counter-disinformation mechanisms in the region. This mechanism is built on a “defensive architecture” encompassing intelligence, cybersecurity, diplomacy, and public awareness components.
At the core of the state’s “resistance actors” are the Internal Security Agency (ABW), the Government Security Centre (RCB), which serves as the government’s crisis management body, and the national cybersecurity institute, NASK. In 2022, a dedicated unit to counter international disinformation was established within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; in 2023–2024, it was elevated to department level, with both staffing and mandate expanded. Poland treats information manipulation of Russian origin as a distinct threat category under the concept of “foreign information manipulation and interference” (FIMI) (Info Ops Poland, 2024a).
NASK and its Disinformation Analysis Centre perform both a “radar” function and a public awareness role within Poland’s defensive architecture against propaganda. The Centre’s “Defend Yourself Against Disinformation” platform explains common manipulation techniques as well as examples of visual- and text-based fake content, while also enabling users to report suspicious material directly online (NASK, 2025).
It was NASK that identified political Facebook advertisements during the 2025 presidential election that were suspected of being financed from abroad, raising the issue with both Meta and the Internal Security Agency (ABW). It emerged that more funds had been spent on some of these advertisements than by official election committees (Reuters, May 2025).
Poland also plays an active role in regional initiatives aimed at countering propaganda. Warsaw is an active member of the Lublin Triangle (Poland–Lithuania–Ukraine), established in 2020 to counter Russian disinformation. Poland’s state-level counter-disinformation experience—comprising institutions such as the Government Communication Centre in Kraków, ABW, RCB, and NASK—is regarded as a model within the Lublin Triangle framework (MFA UA, 2022c).
The second major pillar of resistance to Russian propaganda in Poland consists of fact-checking organizations and investigative media. A central role in this ecosystem is played by Demagog, one of the leading actors in systematic fact-checking. The organization not only debunks daily examples of disinformation but also conducts expert discussions, podcasts, and public education projects on Russian propaganda, conspiracy theories, and election manipulation (Demagog, official website). Materials produced by Demagog exposing hundreds of pro-Russian narratives related to the war in Ukraine are also collected separately at the European level (EDMO, official website).
Investigative platforms such as OKO.press, Frontstory, and Info Ops Poland also form part of the defensive line against Russian propaganda. They map Russian-origin information operations, expose coordinated networks on Telegram and X, and reveal links between political parties, radical groups, and Kremlin narratives (Info Ops Poland, 2024b). In 2025, these organizations established a joint mechanism to identify and counter Russian propaganda during elections (Gulbenkian, March 2025).
At the academic level, Poland is also among the countries actively countering Russian propaganda. The SWPS University in Warsaw is one of the partners of the Central European Digital Media Observatory (CEDMO), operating along the Prague–Warsaw–Bratislava axis (AFP, 2022).
CONCLUSION
In Poland, Russian propaganda primarily operates along several lines: deepening fatigue related to the war in Ukraine; portraying Ukrainian refugees as a burden and a threat; inflating general fears surrounding migration; inflaming farmers’ protests through the narrative that “Ukrainian grain is destroying Polish agriculture”; presenting Ukrainians as historical enemies through traumatic topics such as the Volhynia tragedy; and amplifying the thesis that “Brussels and Kyiv are destroying Polish industry” through energy and climate policy narratives.
These narratives are disseminated via the Pravda–Portal Kombat network, local conspiracy websites, Telegram channels and mirror domains, fake Western media clones (Doppelganger), coordinated campaigns such as “Matryoshka,” and radical political actors. Poland engages in an institutional struggle against Russian propaganda—at the state, media and civil society, and academic levels. For now, Kremlin propaganda has not been able to alter Poland’s strategic course: the country remains NATO’s frontline state, one of Ukraine’s key military and political supporters, has effectively severed its dependence on Russian energy, and has not seen the emergence of a mass, openly pro-Moscow political party.
At the same time, however, as a result of these activities, public support in Polish society—previously among the strongest in backing Ukraine—has shifted downward. The stance of “supporting Ukraine until Russia is defeated” has increasingly been replaced by a position favoring “peace even at the cost of territorial concessions.” A sharp decline in sympathy toward refugees, the agenda-setting role of radical populist candidates, and the normalization of conspiratorial thinking all indicate that Kremlin narratives have gained some traction within society. The growth of domestic authoritarian tendencies and populism, combined with deepening war fatigue amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, further increases the risks facing Poland.
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