(This article was prepared within the framework of KHAR Center’s “Security and State Architecture” research project)
The amendment to the Law “On Defense” adopted by the Milli Majlis of Azerbaijan on July 14, 2025, and approved by the President on August 11, is considered a significant innovation in the country’s defense-related legislation.
Introduction
According to Article 17 of the Law “On Defense,” which has been in force since 1993, “territorial defense is carried out by the Armed Forces in close cooperation with the border troops, internal troops, and other troops provided for by the legislation of the Republic of Azerbaijan.” However, under the new amendment, the scope of participants in territorial defense is expanded.
Thus, according to the draft, territorial defense is considered a nationwide set of military and special measures, and its implementation is to be carried out by the Armed Forces in cooperation with state bodies (institutions), local self-governing bodies, and legal entities.
Nevertheless, this amendment has not been widely discussed at the public or expert level, and available information has been limited to the presentation of the official text. However, the decision of the Milli Majlis on July 14 to update the concept of territorial defense in Article 17 is significant enough to spark deep discussions. The amendment stipulates that not only military institutions, but also civilian institutions and individuals may be involved in territorial defense, pointing to a new approach that lays the legal foundations for renewing the security infrastructure with civilian components.
From this perspective, the purpose of this article is to examine the essence of the amendment to the Law “On Defense” and the new change in the territorial defense system. The article does not cover a deep military-strategic analysis or specific military aspects. Instead, the focus is on the synchrony of this change with similar processes observed in regional countries—including Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine—during the same period, and on the significance and prospects of the amendment at this initial stage. The aim is to review, in general terms, the potential impacts of this emerging model on Azerbaijan’s defense infrastructure.
The key analytical question: The reform in Azerbaijan’s territorial defense model—democratic transformation of the security architecture, or institutional strengthening of authoritarian control?
The concept of “democratic transformation of security architecture” does not apply solely to the military sector; it also requires that all defense and security decisions be implemented in an accountable, transparent manner and placed under public oversight. For example, Germany’s army, the Bundeswehr, operates under strict parliamentary control. The deployment of foreign military units is possible only with Bundestag’s approval (bundeswehr.de). In Norway and Sweden, government decisions on security policy are subject to parliamentary committees’ discussions and broad public debate. In the United States, civilian politicians’ control over the military is considered one of the key reinforcing elements of the democratic security system. Congress must approve the defense budget and oversee the military’s activities through special committees (Feaver 2025).
The New Framework of Territorial Defense and Its Objectives
The amendment to the Law “On Defense” updating the concept of territorial defense shows that Azerbaijan intends to move away from a classical defense model based solely on armed forces, toward a broader, multi-actor approach based on interaction with the country’s civilian administrative and self-governing bodies (Amendment to the Law on Defense, August 2025).
During the parliamentary debate on the bill, the chairman of the Milli Majlis Committee on Defense, Security and Anti-Corruption stated that the analysis of the 44-day Patriotic War and the anti-terrorist operation carried out on September 19–20, 2023, demonstrated the need to further improve the legislative framework ensuring territorial defense:
Thus, the Law “On Defense” adopted on November 26, 1993, defines the basic principles of organizing Azerbaijan’s defense. Although Article 17 of this Law, titled “Territorial Defense,” determined for what purposes territorial defense was to be organized, it did not define the concept of “territorial defense.” In the submitted draft, Article 17 is rewritten to first define the concept of “territorial defense.” In addition, since the constitutional amendments adopted in the referendum of September 26, 2016, established that the Armed Forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan consist of the Army and other armed formations, it is also proposed to improve the wording of Article 17, Section 2 of the Law “On Defense.” According to the amendment, territorial defense is to be carried out by the Armed Forces in cooperation with state and local self-government bodies and legal entities (Nagiyev, June 2025).
Why now—at a time of increasing geopolitical tensions in the region, and domestically when the state is becoming more closed and centralized—does the Azerbaijani government redefine the concept of territorial defense and include non-armed actors, state and municipal bodies, and even legal entities among its participants? Does this change signify a broader involvement of society in defense processes, or is it an attempt to deepen state control in the security sector?
Azerbaijan’s Military Defense Infrastructure
Azerbaijan’s strong presidential system of governance and authoritarian political structure play a decisive role in shaping the country’s security infrastructure. The Constitution, national legislation, and the prevailing political situation allow the president to hold tightly controlled elections, to form a parliament entirely dependent on the executive branch, and, in an environment where independent media and civil society activity is entirely prohibited, to unilaterally establish, manage, and direct the country’s security system with virtually unlimited powers.
Against this public and political backdrop, the organization of the military and security system nevertheless operates within the institutional and legal frameworks established by the Constitution and legislation.
Azerbaijan’s defense system consists of a complex of legal, political, military, and social measures aimed at protecting the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the state. This system is carried out under the leadership of the President and regulated by the laws “On Defense,” “On Martial Law,” “On the Armed Forces,” Azerbaijan’s Military Doctrine, and other acts. The Milli Majlis is responsible for legislative activity in the field of defense and for approving the budget, while the Ministry of Defense, under the leadership of the President, is responsible for implementation.
According to the Constitution, the main participant in the defense system is the Armed Forces (Article 9). The Armed Forces include the Army and other armed formations such as border troops, internal troops, and other relevant armed units of state institutions. The functions of the Armed Forces cover combat and mobilization readiness, the organization of civil defense and territorial defense, protection of borders and strategic facilities, ensuring public order, and responding to emergencies.
According to Azerbaijan’s military legislation, territorial defense is organized for the protection of state borders, key facilities, and communication lines, as well as to combat enemy landing and reconnaissance-sabotage groups (Law “On Defense,” Article 17).
An examination of the Law “On Defense” from 1993 to the present shows that although territorial defense was recognized as an element of defense infrastructure, its systemic and institutional linkage with civilian components—local self-governing bodies, legal entities, and other non-military actors—was neither provided for in legislation nor ensured in practice.
The original version of the Law “On Defense” defined territorial defense primarily as a function of the armed forces and other militarized structures, without accounting for civilian participation. This resulted in a narrower, military-centered model of defense concentrated in the hands of the armed forces, inconsistent with the “total defense” or “whole-of-society mobilization” approaches emphasized in modern security challenges and international defense concepts. Consequently, the territorial defense system over decades did not develop into a flexible, multi-actor, and resilient structure responsive to security and defense needs.
It should also be noted that, according to Article 5 of the 1993 Law “On Defense,” the approval of the Charter on Territorial Defense was assigned to the President. Yet, more than 30 years later, no such document has been drafted or adopted. However, the Law “On Martial Law” (Article 10.1.27) extensively regulates the mobilization of all resources (material and labor) of institutions, enterprises, and organizations regardless of their ownership or organizational-legal form for defense needs. The new amendment, by expanding participants in territorial defense during peacetime, indicates a new defense approach.
A Regional Wave of Similar Defense Models: Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Armenia
Azerbaijan’s attempt to broaden the circle of defense actors also attracts attention because it coincides with similar legislative amendments introduced almost simultaneously in neighboring regional states such as Armenia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. These countries likewise enacted changes to ensure broader participation in organizing territorial defense during 2023–2025.
For example, on June 30, 2025, Kazakhstan’s parliament adopted the Law “On Territorial Defense of the Republic of Kazakhstan” (Orda.kz, June 2025). The law was approved by the Prime Minister’s decree on July 21, 2025, and entered into force on August 31.
According to Article 17 of this law, territorial defense forces consist not only of military structures but also include the forces and means of law enforcement agencies, territorial troops, special and self-defense units. The Armed Forces and other troop types allocate special resources for this purpose and are involved in implementing territorial defense tasks. The main function of territorial defense forces is the implementation of security and defense measures within the country, and their operating principles and mechanisms are regulated by the rules for the preparation and conduct of territorial defense. This approach points to a comprehensive defense model combining civilian and military components. Articles 17 and 18 of the law also provide definitions for “territorial troops” and “self-defense units.”
Territorial troops are special military structures created within the Armed Forces of Kazakhstan to carry out defense and security measures in the country’s territory. They are responsible for protecting settlements and border areas, conducting evacuation measures, and engaging in armed combat against the enemy. Within the framework of legislation, these troops are authorized to use weapons and special means.
Self-defense units, meanwhile, consist mainly of civilians and are formed under the leadership of local executive authorities or law enforcement bodies. They support territorial troops and law enforcement, take part in evacuation, protection, and armed resistance in occupied areas. When necessary, they may be incorporated into the Armed Forces. Members of such units are granted the status of military servicemen.
In February 2025, Armenia’s parliament, in its second and final reading, approved legislative changes renaming the existing “People’s Self-Defense Units” (Ashkharazor) into “Territorial Defense Forces.” The main tasks of the new structure are as follows: to support the regular army in preventing enemy aggression, to carry out certain combat missions together with the armed forces, to prevent sabotage, to participate in fighting against enemy units, and to help protect critical facilities. The Territorial Defense Forces will be formed on a voluntary basis from reservists, and their leadership will be exercised by corps commanders of the army. In the previous system, this function was performed by community leaders or their appointees. Participation in service requires the signing of a special contract that is not considered a military service contract (Faktor.am, February 2025).
In Ukraine’s defense system, the concept of territorial defense is defined by the 2021 Law “On the Fundamentals of National Resistance.” According to this act, territorial defense is a system of nationwide, military, and special measures carried out in peacetime and special periods to counter military threats, as well as to assist in protecting the population, territories, environment, and property from emergencies. In the amendment made to Article 3, Clause 2, on November 11, 2024, it is stated: “Civil-military cooperation is an effective element in achieving the goal of national resistance.”
The implementation of legislative measures on territorial defense and the transition to new systems almost simultaneously in several neighboring countries can be regarded as a result of growing security risks in the region and changing war doctrines. Against the backdrop of increasingly complex internal and external threats, post-Soviet states in recent years have sought to strengthen their defense systems with more structured, flexible mechanisms that have local response capabilities.
The Concept of Territorial Defense
According to military and security researchers and the shared understandings in security policy documents, territorial defense is described primarily as a defensive concept that is not suited for offensive action beyond national borders and does not pose a threat to other states; it relies more on mobilization potential and citizen participation than on standing forces, employs different weapons and technologies, and directs military resources directly to the defense of the country’s territory and institutions (Mendershausen, 1980).
However, with the end of the Cold War, attitudes toward the concept of territorial defense changed in many European countries as new security approaches were adopted. Previously, models based on territorial or total defense were gradually aligned with the principle of collective defense in the process of integration into NATO. The experience of the Baltic states shows that although a total defense concept was established in the 1990s with the support of Sweden and other partners, once they were invited to join NATO this approach was replaced by collective defense. These changes also brought the abolition of compulsory military service, because in the new security environment the priority shifted from mobilization to reliance on alliance mechanisms. Some countries, such as Finland and Switzerland, retained elements of total defense for a time due to long borders and neutral status; however, over time they too moved toward international cooperation and multifunctional security systems (Berzina, 2020a).
The security environment of the 21st century was shaped by events such as the September 11 terrorist attacks, interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, the color revolutions, the Arab Spring, Russia’s attack on Georgia and annexation of Crimea. During this period, most conflicts were asymmetric rather than symmetric. In 2014, the annexation of Crimea showed that the collective defense approach in Europe alone was not sufficient and brought the strengthening of national self-defense capabilities to the fore. At the Warsaw Summit (2016), NATO declared civil preparedness and the support of military power with civilian elements to be a central pillar of collective defense. In this context, the concept of “total” or “comprehensive defense” gained an important place not only in the policies of neutral countries but also of NATO members. Finland advanced a comprehensive security model through the concept of the “vital functions of society,” integrating all government structures, while Sweden, from 2015 onward, returned to a total defense concept enriched with modern elements. Thus, in the 21st century, collective defense is complemented by principles of national resistance and resilience, forming a broader security approach against hybrid threats (Berzina 2020b).
The renewed rise of interest in the concept of territorial defense is explained mainly by the Russian threat, the need to respond to hybrid military intervention strategies, and the desire to form a less costly mass force to compensate for the reduction in military personnel (Underwood, Emery, Haynsworth, and Barnes 2022).
According to security specialists, territorial defense is, as a rule, a defense-in-depth system; it is the defense organized by the state and carried out on the state’s own territory. Typically, a territorial defense system is based on weapons systems, strategies, and methods of military organization that are more suited to a defensive role (Adam Roberts, 1976). In a certain sense, territorial defense lies between the main combat forces and the civil defense system, and its resources and functions relate to both systems (Paul Latawski, 2017).
According to Dr. Paul Latawski, a military researcher at the Department of War Studies of the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in the United Kingdom, a territorial defense strategy consists of several key components. He explains this strategy as a defense-oriented system that is unsuitable for external attack and does not pose a danger to other states; as total defense, which expresses the “whole-of-society” reaction of the population to war with the participation of a broad mass of citizens; as a defense system oriented only toward defense; and as a nationally oriented defense in which military resources are closely linked to the protection of the society’s own territory and institutions.
This classification brings to the fore, in particular, the importance of the concept of total defense. Total defense envisages the involvement in ensuring national security not only of the army but of society as a whole—state bodies, municipalities, legal entities, and citizens. This approach forms a resilient defense mechanism against modern challenges such as hybrid wars, sudden attacks, and acts of sabotage, increases rapid response capabilities at the local level, and turns nationwide resistance into a strategic resource.
In the next section, we will focus on the main features of this model, its purposes of application, and the geopolitical and governance logic behind it.
NATO and Scandinavian Practice: The “Total Defense” Model
Most NATO countries are guided by the concept of total defense, which ensures the preparedness of both the army and society as a whole against military aggression. For example, Finland applies a comprehensive security model called Kokonaisturvallisuus.
Although the concepts of territorial defense and total defense are related, they originate from different military and security traditions. In recent years, the legislative changes adopted in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have brought these two approaches closer: state institutions, civil defense structures, volunteers, and local self-government bodies are now being involved in territorial defense, which previously relied only on the army and border forces. Thus, the expansion of territorial defense with civilian elements appears to be a step toward the total defense model.
However, the difference is that in Western and Northern European countries (for example, Sweden and Finland), the total defense concept was from the outset formed as a national security strategy that integrates all state and societal structures into a single system, whereas in the post-Soviet space this process is still being conducted in a fragmented and more militarily oriented framework.
Finland’s defense and security concept is based on the “total defense” model, which envisages the joint preparedness and activity of the state, business, civil society, and individuals. This system unites seven core areas—leadership; international and EU activities; defense capability; internal security; the economy; infrastructure and security of supply; the functional capacities of the population and services; and psychological resilience. Preparedness measures are integrated not only for emergencies but also during normal times across all fields, from legislation to infrastructure policies. Security of supply is particularly vital for the economy and defense during crises.
The total defense model aims to ensure the country’s defense in all security situations through all national and international civilian and military resources. With NATO membership, Finland’s defense plans now address not only the armed forces but also allied forces operating on its territory. This model is based on the joint resistance of all sectors of society—not only the army—against the most serious threats such as war, and serves as a main pillar of Finland’s security (Publications of the Ministry of Defence 2024).
Other Scandinavian countries like Sweden have also formed a “total people’s defense” system dating back to the Second World War and the Cold War. In 2024, the Swedish Government adopted a new Total Defense Decision, introducing a broad package of measures to further strengthen the country’s military and civil defense. The decision is aimed at increasing Sweden’s defense capability and ensuring the joint preparedness of all sectors of society—state bodies, the private sector, municipalities, and citizens—against armed attack and other threats. The government emphasized that the total defense approach will also enhance Sweden’s contribution to the collective security system within the framework of NATO membership (Government Offices of Sweden, 2024). Under the new decision, Sweden will strengthen the security of its supply chains, resilience against information warfare and cyberattacks, the preparedness of reserve forces, and the robustness of civil infrastructure. The government has also made public awareness and the updating of regional and local plans for civil defense a priority. The aim is to provide a rapid, flexible, and coordinated response to potential threats.
Such a “whole-of-society approach” is currently highly valued in NATO as well. Article 3 of the NATO Treaty specifically emphasizes that each allied country must continuously develop its capacity to resist armed attack both individually and collectively (Annelies van Vark, June 2025). In NATO and European countries, the concept of total defense has come back to the forefront, especially after the occupation of Crimea and the large-scale war against Ukraine. This strategy envisages the joint participation of the whole society—from the army to government institutions, the private sector, and citizens—in national defense. The goal is to deter a potential aggressor by demonstrating that an attack will be costly and prevent it from achieving its objectives.
However, after the Cold War many European countries relegated such collective defense practices to the background. Only in recent years, against the backdrop of the Russian threat, has attention to defense resilience and the concept of territorial defense increased again. NATO members such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and the Czech Republic are taking new steps in areas like civil preparedness, training of reserve forces, and defense exercises aimed at youth and the private sector (Józef Witold Jordan, 2024).
For example, Poland drew lessons from the war in Ukraine’s Donbas region and the occupation of Crimea in 2015 and, in 2017, created a new military branch called the Territorial Defense Forces (Wojska Obrony Terytorialnej – WOT). Organized as the fifth service of the Polish Armed Forces, its purpose was to provide resistance in local areas in the initial phase of any attack and to respond flexibly to “hybrid warfare” threats (Ministry of National Defence of Poland, 2024).
The Baltic states have similarly strengthened their defense forces—for instance, the Estonian Defence League (Kaitseliit) and Lithuania’s National Defence Volunteer Forces operate—and these countries distribute special booklets to educate a wide segment of the population, conduct defense classes in schools, and carry out other activities. All these experiences show that, in the modern era, small countries prefer to prepare for strong external aggression not only with systematic armed formations (the army) but with the participation of the entire society.
The Importance of the Total Defense Concept for Countries Bordering Neighbors with Histories of Occupation and Irredentism
The model of territorial defense and nationwide resistance is of vital importance especially for countries surrounded by large neighbors that advance territorial claims, pursue revisionist policies, or have historical expansionist tendencies.
Such countries are usually the weaker side in terms of military power, and under a traditional war doctrine it is difficult or impossible to stop large invasion forces. However, a model in which the entire population is involved in defense provides the small state with an asymmetric advantage. That is, the potential aggressor knows in advance that if it attacks, it will face not only the regular army of the other side, but also hundreds of thousands of civilians ready to take up arms. In such a scenario, even in occupied areas, every city, village, and even every home can turn into a point of resistance. This makes the consequences of occupation exceedingly costly for the invader.
For example, the defense strategy of countries like Finland is designed so that, despite being outnumbered by the adversary, a possible attack would result in maximum severe consequences for the aggressor, making a military adventure unattractive.
This concept proved effective in the last century—when the USSR attacked Finland in 1939, the general mobilization of the Finnish people caused the invader to suffer heavy losses and encounter great difficulties advancing (the experience of the “Winter War”) (Thomas Franke, 2024). In the modern era, each of the Baltic states has such plans as well: if they are subjected to occupation by Russia, surviving forces and the local population will conduct partisan warfare together and keep the enemy under constant pressure. NATO specialists have even developed a special Resistance Operating Concept (ROC) for this purpose—the objective is to organize an internal resistance network in advance of war so that, in the event of occupation, sabotage and guerrilla activities can begin immediately (John Friberg, 2019).
The Effect of Concentrating the Security System in the Hands of a Single Leader in Authoritarian Regimes and the Risks for Total Defense
Alongside its importance for security, the total defense concept also creates risks for democracy. In non-democratic countries lacking accountability and the rule of law, the application of such defense concepts can lead to heavy burdens placed on citizens, the restriction of public debate and access to information under the pretext of security risk, and the militarization of the civilian population (Kristin Ljungkvist, August 2025).
In democratic countries, however, the total defense system in peacetime is ensured not through mass mobilization and conscription, but through a system where citizens’ rights and responsibilities are clearly defined, democratic principles are preserved, and participation is conscious and voluntary. Otherwise, the power promised by the total defense concept can become the state’s weakest point.
The concept of nationwide defense can be important not only against external threats but also in terms of forming a healthy political environment domestically. In countries governed democratically, civilian control of the military, transparent decision-making, and public awareness take precedence. In such conditions, the integration of various participants in social life into the armed defense system (for example, training citizens in reserve, developing mechanisms for establishing volunteer defense units in the event of occupation, public oversight of the army) is seen by the authorities not as a threat but as a key factor of national strength.
Concentrating all powers of the security structures in the hands of one person—an authoritarian leader—reduces the resilience of the defense system and increases the risk of it being used as an instrument of personal ambition. In such regimes, the army and special services typically protect the interests of the ruling elite first and foremost, rather than those of the people. As a result, the broad involvement of society in defense processes is considered undesirable by the authorities, and public trust in the army and the security infrastructure weakens.
Against this background of experiences, the amendment to the Law “On Defense” is very important for Azerbaijan, which from time to time hears threats against itself from neighbors like Iran and Russia. It is also important because coordinating the country’s defense with civilian life in a democratic and accountable manner is vital not only from the perspective of effective administration but also political governance. This approach runs counter to arguments that justify the protection of the state’s territorial integrity solely by the existence of a strong, authoritarian leader and therefore deem it necessary to restrict civil liberties and further centralize and expand the state apparatus.
All these legal changes and regional trends indicate an intention by countries in the region, including Azerbaijan, to enter a new stage in their defense concepts, and demonstrate the need for deeper and more systematic measures for the real effectiveness of this approach. For such a defense concept to be truly effective, democratic institutions that ensure parliamentary and civil oversight of the army must exist in the country, and public oversight mechanisms must be strengthened. Otherwise, in authoritarian regimes this model may become a tool that strengthens political control, restricts civil liberties, and even puts the state’s own security at risk. The resilience of Azerbaijan’s future defense architecture will be formed precisely around this choice.
Conclusion
Azerbaijan’s amendment to the Law “On Defense” shows that the territorial defense model, the main element of the defense system, is being directed away from a limited circle consisting of the armed forces toward a participatory model involving state institutions, municipalities, and legal entities. Although this change represents a distinct concept, it also draws attention to the “total defense” model in which civilian and military resources are better coordinated in defense.
Observations show that this step overlaps with similar trends observed in the same period in the region—in Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Ukraine—and appears to be an attempt to adapt to a changing security environment (hybrid threats, the need for rapid local response). If properly established, the new system can create practical advantages in areas such as better coordination of civilian and military resources rather than greater reliance on conscription, security of supply, and the increasing role of preparedness at the local level.
Nevertheless, this model is more successful in a democratic governance environment where trustful relations between the state and citizens are established. Under a democratic system of governance, civilian control over the army increases. The decision-making process becomes more transparent and accountable. Different participants—such as civil society, parliament, and the media—exert influence, either directly or indirectly, on decisions regarding the army’s activities. This strengthens the army’s position within society and ensures its operation independently of politics. This relationship is built on several key principles: civilian administration within the constitutional framework—in accordance with the principles of democracy, the army is under the control of the government, and the final decisions are made by the civilian leader.
Conversely, if parliamentary and civil oversight, transparent decision-making, public debate, and openness of information are not ensured, the “total defense” approach may result in the militarization of the civilian sphere, the centralization of broad powers, and, due to weak public trust, a lack of effectiveness. That is, the same model can both strengthen defense resilience and, institutionally, reinforce authoritarian control. In short, in governance where democratic institutions do not function and parliament and society have no oversight capabilities over the state, it is questionable whether this model can carry a robust security and deterrence function.
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