Introduction
On April 23, a strategic partnership framework was signed between Turkey and the United Kingdom in London. In a joint official statement, it was noted that this document creates a "strong foundation to strengthen dialogue and cooperation between the two countries, which share a common perspective on international issues and global challenges, including the historic friendship of NATO allies and strategic partners Turkey and the UK, excellent bilateral relations, and a strong desire for security and stability in the Middle East" (Gov.Uk, 2026). The most striking aspect of the statement was the emphasis on security and NATO. In this context, it was emphasized that the accelerating transition toward a multipolar, fragmented international order on a global scale is pushing the UK and Turkey into an era of increasing risks, and that the political and military importance of NATO, the cornerstone of the security and collective defense of both countries, has increased. Another prominent direction in the document was economic relations.
At first glance, this document signed between Turkey and the UK can undoubtedly be evaluated as the deepening of relations between two NATO allies in the fields of security, trade, and the defense industry. However, the emphasis on security in the new international order within the content of the document and the joint statement is particularly noteworthy and brings another nuance to the fore - matters such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights are not priorities in the West's view of Turkey. From this perspective, the signed document should be evaluated as an example showing that authoritarianism in Turkey is accepted by the West as a manageable strategic cost. This is not ideological support for Turkish authoritarianism, but the West's new priorities reduce the costs of this authoritarianization for the Erdoğan government.
Purpose of the analysis
KharCenter in this article examines how Turkish authoritarianism has strengthened in the context of the West prioritizing security and de-emphasizing democracy.
Main question of the analysis
Despite seeing the hardening authoritarianization in Turkey, why is the West further deepening security cooperation with Ankara? Or, how does the West's security priority encourage the strengthening of authoritarianism in Turkey?
SECURITY DISPLACING DEMOCRACY
The democracy-security dilemma has stood out for many years as the greatest point of contradiction in the foreign policy of Western states. While Western states and institutions present human rights, the rule of law, and democracy as core values on the one hand, they cooperate with authoritarian governments by turning a blind eye to democratic backsliding in countries they deem important for security on the other. On the one hand, pressure regarding political problems and democratic regressions creates irritation in the governments of partner countries and risks the security benefits they provide to the West. On the other hand, granting these regimes a de facto right of exception regarding issues like democracy and human rights reduces the credibility of the West's calls for values, strengthening the damaging perception that the West defends democracy only against its rivals or in insignificant countries it considers strategically weak. This has existed as a serious dilemma for the US for many years (Carothers and Press, 2021).
The harshest form of the transition from a system of values to a system of interests began with Donald Trump coming to power for a second time in the US and "ruthlessly" distancing the National Security Strategy from democracy. In Trump's new strategy, authoritarianized and corrupted regimes are no longer seen as a problem; on the contrary, references to universal human rights are ignored (KharCenter, 2026). From this perspective, for Trump's America, the situation is no longer a dilemma; the US president demonstrates through both documentation and practical steps that normative values carry no weight in all matters and toward all countries he deems aligned with his interests. However, the problem does not end just with America.
The value-interest dilemma often faced by Europe, which has traditionally appeared as the representative and defender of normative values like democracy, the rule of law, and human rights, has also shifted in favor of the latter. Undoubtedly, there are objective reasons for this, such as the Russia-Ukraine war, Russia posing a threat to European security, the activation of tension points in the Middle East, the risk of a global energy crisis, and most importantly, the unreliable stance of Europe's permanent ally, the US, which has "erased" democracy to the extent that it is no longer a dilemma topic and shown an unreliable position on common security. But on the other hand, pragmatism based on these reasons carries very serious risks like the "death" of democracy in the world, the irreversible loss of the rule of law, and the disappearance of the concept of human rights.
As early as 2010 - at a time when the state of the world order and democracy was better than it is now - Richard Youngs, criticizing Europe's democracy-security dilemma, wrote that these two concepts are not contradictory. According to Youngs, theoretically, democracy is a multi-purpose tool of diplomacy - a means to soften relations with hostile governments, prevent the radicalization of terrorists, consolidate peace agreements in civil conflicts, and solve "soft security" problems like migration, economic security, and energy transparency. That is, from a theoretical point of view, democracy is not an alternative to security, but its political basis. However, reality is more complex, and one of the main reasons creating this complexity is Europe's failure to comply with its own democratic obligations (Youngs, 2010).
According to the approach Youngs calls the "single issue syndrome", the West discusses specific issues of security, energy, migration, or defense cooperation by separating them from problems related to the internal political regime of the partner country. As a result, democracy and human rights remain at a rhetorical level, while specific strategic agreements are signed with security interests. From this perspective, European policy is neither fully realpolitik nor fully liberal internationalism; it is between these two approaches. And Europe's policy is not "security through democracy", but rather logic based on "security alongside democracy when conditions are suitable" (Youngs, 2010). In other words, democracy is not a main element of security policy; it is a secondary goal supported when security interests allow.
This framework noted by Youngs has narrowed even further to the detriment of democracy since 2022. Europe's normative map has undergone a serious transformation - energy, transit routes, and security issues have gained dominance in a way that significantly pushes democracy and human rights to the background. Europe's turn toward new authoritarian partners to cut energy dependence on Russia and its selective approach to pressure-criticism lines regarding matters like democracy, the rule of law, and human rights to fit these partnerships has made the picture even more complex (KharCenter, 2026).
This value transformation of the West - the US completely removing democracy from its foreign policy agenda and Europe pushing democracy to the invisible parts of the agenda for the sake of security - has created new opportunities for Turkish authoritarianism. The Turkey-UK strategic partnership document signed on April 23 is also a product of precisely this window of opportunity - within this framework based on provisions like NATO, collective security, defense industry, energy, and the fight against terrorism and organized crime, authoritarianism in Turkey does not carry a restrictive condition function.
THE MAP OF TURKISH AUTHORITARIANISM
The main nuance that makes the document signed between Turkey and the UK the main subject of this analysis is not the emphasis on security, NATO, and the defense industry, but the issue of the framework created by these emphases gaining support for the international legitimacy of Erdoğan's authoritarianism. During the Erdoğan government's era - especially after 2010 - authoritarianism in Turkey has deepened every year. According to international indices, since 2023 authoritarian governance in Turkey has consolidated even further; although elections are held under formal competition conditions, a highly unequal atmosphere has emerged due to the capture and manipulation of state institutions, the restriction of media freedom, and legal-political pressures on the opposition (BTI, 2026). In Turkey, which international organizations evaluate in the "not free" country category, political rights are evaluated at the level of 16 out of 40 points, and civil liberties at 16 out of 60 points. The country's global freedom score is at the level of 32 out of 100, and its internet freedom score is 31 (Freedom House, 2026).
Control over the media
The restriction of media freedom is one of the main pillars of Turkish authoritarianism. Reporters Without Borders (RSF), which evaluates Turkey at 159th place among 180 countries in international rankings, emphasizes that an unprecedented regression was recorded in this area in 2025. The organization's most recent report emphasizes that political control over the courts and internet censorship are just two of the tools used to weaken media outlets critical of the government. This assessment by RSF is also shared by international organizations such as the International Press Institute (IPI), Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), European Centre for Press and Media Freedom (ECPMF), Osservatorio Balcani e Caucaso Transeuropa (OBCT), South East Europe Media Organisation (SEEMO), Amnesty International (AI), and Article 19 (RSF, 2026a).
The overall media pluralism risk for Turkey is evaluated at the level of 78 percent, and this figure is even higher especially in the field of political independence - 85 percent (CMPF, 2025). Along with the public broadcaster status TRT and the state body Anadolu Agency, the vast majority of private channels in the country are pro-government; at the same time, the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK), which carries out oversight of these broadcasts, is also a government supporter and blocks the activities of opposition channels and broadcasting platforms with penalties like fines, broadcast cuts, etc. (HRW 2026, a). Even in 2016, there were reports that 80 percent of the owners of media companies in the country had political and economic ties with the AKP (MOM, 2016); 10 years later - in 2026 - the situation has worsened even more. Reporters Without Borders now emphasizes that 90 percent of the media in Turkey is under the control of the government (RSF, 2026 b). The dominance of investment groups directly linked to the government, such as Demirören, Kalyon-Turkuaz, and Doğuş, has continued in the media sector (Aydınlı, 2025), and the current situation has become more politicized and more closed. Although digitalization has led to the emergence of new platforms and "Youtube" actors, the rapid emergence of mechanisms punishing them has caused self-censorship and content standardization (Aydınlı, 2026).
According to 2024 figures, a total of 151 media outlets in Turkey had been seized by the state through official means; in 2025, "innovations" were added to this, such as the seizure of several other companies including "Show TV" and "Habertürk", the appointment of a trustee to the "Tele 1" channel, and the rapid closure of "Ekol TV" founded by Azerbaijani businessman Mubariz Mansimov after its opening. Professor Bilge Yeşil, who has followed the processes in the media field since 2021 and wrote a book titled "Media in New Turkey: The Origins of an Authoritarian Neoliberal State", emphasizes that owning the media is politically and ideologically important for the Erdoğan government. According to Yeşil, owning televisions is especially significant politically, because televisions are still one of the main tools of influence to set or change the agenda: "Considering that there is a goal of creating public opinion regarding Bilal Erdoğan especially before the upcoming parliamentary elections, this importance is increasing even more. Even if television programs are not watched as before, we know that they spread piece by piece on social media and affect the agenda" (Aydınlı, 2026). On the other hand, Bilge Yeşil emphasizes that Erdoğan values media ownership from an ideological perspective as well, believing it is necessary for the goal of "local and national" content production and raising a religious generation. According to the expert, monitorings also show that Turkish televisions are passing through a period where right-nationalist and more conservative contents are hegemonic. Pressures on journalists in Turkey have become commonplace. Figures regarding the arrest of journalists vary according to the methodologies of organizations. According to CPJ's narrow-methodology report, which is based on the arrest being purely related to journalism, 8 journalists were in prison in Turkey in 2025 (CPJ, 2026). According to the 2026 report of the "Human Rights Watch" organization, 27 journalists and media workers are in prison in Turkey (HRW 2026, a). According to the latest report of "Expression Interrupted", a project of the P24 organization in Turkey, as of April, at least 26 journalists and media workers are either in prison or their trials are ongoing (Expression Interrupted, 2026). Bianet reports that since 2022, when the "Disinformation law" was passed, at least 83 journalists have been subjected to arrest or investigation with reference to this law (Bianet, 2026a).
Capture of the state via politics and the hand of "justice"
Pressures are not limited only to the media; especially after the defeat of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the 2024 municipal elections, large-scale repressions are being carried out against the main opposition party. The local administration capabilities of the Republican People's Party (CHP), which won 14 of the 30 metropolitan municipalities, including the capital Ankara and the megapolis Istanbul, and emerged as the winner in 21 cities, 337 towns, and 61 village municipalities, have been practically paralyzed (Birgün, 2026). The Mayor of Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, Ekrem İmamoğlu, was arrested shortly after becoming the presidential candidate of the opposition Republican People's Party (CHP), was accused of more than 140 crimes carrying a sentence of more than 2 thousand years, and his trial is still ongoing (Freedom House, 2026).
In the period since the election, 25 elected CHP mayors along with İmamoğlu have been removed from office, and 23 of them have been arrested. Currently, 20 CHP mayors are in prison. Trustees have been appointed to 3 CHP municipalities. Two mayors passed to the AKP. In Istanbul alone, the mayors of 12 out of 26 districts, headed by the metropolitan municipality, have been arrested, trustees have been appointed to 2, and 3 have passed to the AKP. Thus, 5 municipalities won by the opposition party in 2024 have been taken under the government's control (Birgün, 2026). As a result of these repressions that are still ongoing, hundreds of opposition members have been arrested or investigations have been started against them. While arrests continue on the one hand, in the trials that started on March 9, besides İmamoğlu, 406 opposition municipal members, employees, and other persons are also being judged (HRW, 2026b).
This statistic covers only repressions against CHP municipalities. In general, after the 2024 elections, 55 mayors across the country passed to the AKP or its ally Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), and thanks to municipal council members changing parties, the AKP obtained three mayoralties. Although temporary mayoral elections were held in place of mayors against whom investigations were started and who were arrested, since 13 mayors were removed from office with terror accusations, trustees were appointed in their place by the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Thus, the duties of the councils in those municipalities were also abolished - the trustees carry out the administration with the boards they have created themselves. Of the municipalities where trustees were appointed, only three were in the CHP, while in the remaining 10 municipalities (including Mardin and Van metropolitan municipalities), the Kurdish Peoples' Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) had won in 2024 (Bianet, 2026 b). In the 2024 elections, the CHP had won in 412, the AKP in 354, the MHP in 220, and the DEM in 78 municipalities. Two years later, the AKP-MHP alliance took control of another 78 municipalities (Bianet, 2026b).
The Erdoğan government has completely destroyed judicial independence, one of the areas Turkey once boasted of. The AKP has created partisan control over the court and police system. In recent years, it has aggressively used these state tools for the goals of weakening political opponents, drawing them to its own ranks, reducing the electorate support of the opposition, and preventing it from coming to power through elections (Freedom House, 2026). The process of appointing trustees to the municipalities we noted above is exactly a clear example of the aggressive intervention of law enforcement agencies into politics. The appointment of Akın Gürlek, who directly led the political persecution campaign against the CHP during his period as Istanbul chief prosecutor, as the country's minister of justice is evaluated as his being rewarded by Erdoğan exactly for his role in the capture of the state apparatus (Reuters, 2026). Considering that the minister of justice in Turkey also heads the main body where judges and prosecutors are appointed - the Council of Judges and Prosecutors, with this appointment Gürlek also seized control over the court system that will look at the cases he himself prepared, starting with the İmamoğlu case.
President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan practically controls all administrative functions in the country, usually manages the country with decrees, and makes all political decisions directly himself. Especially after the 2016 coup attempt of the Fethullah Gülen group, he has re-formed all state bodies and ministries of Turkey (Freedom House, 2026). In place of the Gülenists, who were Erdoğan's previous ally, his new allies - MHP members, circles close to them, Eurasianists, and new religious groups (like Menzil, İsmailağa, İskenderpaşa-Hakyol) have passed. The Menzil cult is stronger mostly in healthcare, bureaucracy, security, and the justice system, the İsmailağa group in the field of education, in and around the Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) (Medyascope, 2024), and Hak Yol-İskenderpaşa again in the court and justice system (Duvar, 2021). In 2025, a new contact and bargaining with the radical wing of the Kurds - the PKK was also added to this complex power composition. The Erdoğan government announced the goal of ending the armed conflict that has been ongoing for 40 years by conducting negotiations with the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan in 2025. In May 2025, the PKK announced that it would comply with Öcalan's call to disarm, and in August, a parliamentary commission was created regarding this issue. It is not yet known what the commission's activity will result in, but while the AKP government signs an agreement with the armed Kurds, it has been keeping Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ, who wage a political struggle, in prison for close to 10 years (HRW, 2026a).
Corruption continues to remain as one of the country's most serious problems, including the highest levels of the government. The politicization of the courts, contradictions and selectivity in the application of laws have created a serious environment of impunity regarding corruption in the country. Courts and law enforcement bodies are corrupted and subjected to political interference. The media being under control further deepens this impunity environment (Freedom House, 2026). The clearest example of this was recorded in March of this year - CHP leader Özgür Özel held a press conference he named "The small of the radish" and demonstrated the registration documents of the apartments and land plots in the name of Justice Minister Akın Gürlek. Özel announced that the price of the real estate in Gürlek's property and that he sold was 452 million liras and stated that this was an amount too large to be obtained with a 19-year prosecutor's salary (CHP, 2026). Later, Gürlek rejected Özel's claims and announced that he had only 4 real estates (TRT Haber, 2026), but did not give an explanation regarding the documents Özel announced on social media. The main point attracting attention here was the fact that even some opposition journalists did not push the claims regarding Gürlek's real estates too much - this topic was discussed for days on social media. And later, the government made the topic of Gürlek's real estates forgotten with another topic regarding the CHP - images of the opposition party's Uşak mayor taken with a woman in a hotel in Ankara were serviced to the country's media. The mayor was removed from his position with a corruption accusation and was arrested, CHP leader Özgür Özel apologized to the nation regarding the spreading of the mayor's private images and cursed the government media (Diken, 2026). However, the images of the CHP mayor with various women are still broadcast in the government media and on social media, and this is widely used against the CHP leadership.
INDISPENSABLE AUTHORITARIAN PARTNER
Of course, the West also sees the picture we described above and which shows only a part of Turkish authoritarianism. This situation is reflected especially in the reports of European institutions. In the 2025 report of the European Commission, it is emphasized that serious concerns related to the deterioration of democratic standards, the rule of law, the independence of the courts, and respect for fundamental rights have not disappeared, on the contrary, new ones have been added to them (European Commission, 2025). In the resolution adopted by the European Parliament in February of this year, the value-interest contradiction in the EU's attitude towards Ankara attracts attention. It is emphasized that on the one hand, negotiations regarding Turkey's membership in the EU have virtually stopped due to the backsliding of the rule of law and democracy, and on the other hand, Ankara is a main partner as a NATO ally, in trade, economic relations, security, the fight against terrorism, and migration fields. The European Parliament states on the one hand that democratic standards in Turkey have worsened, that the country has gone towards an authoritarian model in the last ten years, and that this accelerated with the politically motivated arrest of İmamoğlu. On the other hand, it accepts Turkey's strategic and geopolitical importance, its role in critical regions in terms of international security like the Black Sea, Ukraine, and the Middle East; repeats that Turkey is a strategic partner and a NATO ally (European Parliament, 2026) This reveals the West's paradox in its attitude towards Turkey - the authoritarianization diagnosis is made, it is emphasized in official documents that this is deepening, but such a situation does not turn into any political condition in practice, on the contrary, the security topic becomes the main factor protecting the line of cooperation. This is a fundamental paradox especially for the European Union - Turkey is a candidate for EU membership, but negotiations have virtually stopped, political disagreements continue, no concrete long-term vision exists regarding the future of the membership process, but alongside these, strategic cooperation with Turkey in critical areas is mentioned. It seems that Brussels is focused on short-term and targeted results in relations with Ankara. After the 2015 refugee wave that started with the war in Syria, relations between the EU and Turkey have carried more of a commercial character (Seyrek, 2026). Rapid geopolitical changes and the increase of security competition have once again created bargaining opportunities with Europe for Turkey. It is clear that for the countries that are members of the EU, a necessity has arisen to prepare new security doctrines against both the Russian threat and Trump's threats regarding NATO and collective defense. In this context, discussions are held towards deepening cooperation with non-EU NATO allies, especially the UK, Turkey, and Norway. The geopolitical importance of Turkey, which has NATO's second-largest army and a strategically important geography, has increased manifold. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz expressed this openly during his visit to Ankara in October 2025 and justified it with the new stage of great power politics: "As Germans and Europeans, we must expand our strategic partnerships, and there is no other way than a deepened partnership with Turkey". Merz's abstaining from constructing a concrete sentence regarding İmamoğlu's arrest and sufficing only with the general sentence "Decisions have been adopted in Turkey that do not yet answer the requirements of the rule of law and democracy in the sense we understand from a European perspective" was also an open demonstration of Europe turning a blind eye to authoritarianism for the sake of security (AP, 2025). In the same context, Germany withdrawing its previous objection related to the export of the "Eurofighter Typhoon" aircraft to Turkey and the discussions held around Turkey joining Europe's SAFE defense initiative are also manifestations of how much security priorities have come to the fore in the West (Euractiv, 2025).
The line of deepening security, trade, and defense-based cooperation, where democracy is almost not remembered, shows itself more clearly in Ankara's relations with Italy and Spain. In Italy, the Meloni government sees Turkey as a main partner in regional stability and migration management, the family company of Erdoğan's son-in-law "Baykar" partners with Italy's "Leonardo" company on a joint drone project, while the defense industry and trade relations stand out as priority areas between the two countries. Italy recently evaluates its defense partnership with Turkey within the framework of NATO and European security, and sees Turkey as a main actor for the southern part of NATO (Chiriatti, 2026) A similar focus is valid for Spain as well. Spain also sees Turkey as an important NATO ally, presenting it as a strategic partner especially in the field of trade and investments. Thanks to the "stable and pragmatic" course of relations, Turkey's tensions with other Western allies have not spread to the Spain-Turkey line (CATS Network, 2025). The Strategic Partnership Framework signed between Turkey and the UK on April 23 is also one of the examples of this general European tendency. The document is very, very far from the line of criticism-conditionality related to democracy and the rule of law, it confirms Turkey's strategic partner function in the fields of NATO, defense industry, energy, trade, and security cooperation. From this point of view, it must be read as the next interest-security cooperation that reduces the international costs of the Erdoğan government's authoritarianism.
THE DECREASING INTERNATIONAL COSTS OF AUTHORITARIANISM
This security-centric approach of the West regarding Turkey constitutes one of the indirect sources of nourishment for the authoritarian desire of the Erdoğan government. This approach brings international legitimacy, and even further - strategic importance to Turkey's authoritarian government. Close association with the West - NATO membership and a customs union with the European Union, close relations with Washington play the role of a strategic asset for Turkey, ensuring Ankara remains in a strong position in the regional and global game. At the same time, these ties create opportunities for maneuvers with Russia and China as well (CSIS, 2025). That is, despite internal authoritarianism, the Erdoğan government is not isolated, on the contrary, its acceptance as a strategic partner by the West opens diplomatic maneuver and legitimacy fields for it.
This maneuver field did not emerge only with the security perspective after 2022. Even earlier, different topics - for example, migration and refugee pressure - caused decisions related to Turkey in Europe to be transactional, and weakened the focus regarding democracy and the rule of law (European Parliament, 2021). In the world where security competition has become increasingly ruthless after 2022, the increase of Ankara's strategic importance has started to play the role of a stronger shield to protect it from questions, criticisms, and pressures regarding democracy. The line of both not ruining relations with the Trump administration and deepening partnership with Europe is necessary for Ankara exactly for this.
On the other hand, foreign policy in Turkey has long since turned into a tool of domestic political consolidation, and from this perspective, security partnerships with the West mean geopolitical success narratives for it in domestic politics. The AKP and Erdoğan have used the foreign policy and security agenda strategically in the last ten years to strengthen domestic political support. The government benefits from the security agenda, achievements in the defense industry, and international maneuver opportunities in the presentation of Erdoğan as the only leader who protects national interests and can ensure Turkey's security. Defense industry achievements are used in election campaigns as an indicator of national power, technological development, and global prestige. This topic has almost turned into one of the main pillars of Turkey's national identity and geopolitical strategy. Especially the Israel-Gaza war, tensions in the Middle East, and "Third World War" warnings have served the presentation of Turkey as a country under threat. Erdoğan further strengthened this existential threat narrative by saying "Israel's aggression also targets Turkey" in October 2024. At the same time, Turkey's Syria policy has been presented to the domestic audience as a strategic victory, behind which stood Erdoğan's narrative of turning the country into a rising regional power (Korkmaz, 2025). Because of this reason, security and defense documents signed with the West are not only a foreign policy issue, but also and more so, materials that feed Erdoğan's image as "leader of the century" domestically.
At the same time, the institutional gains of these security agreements for authoritarian regimes must also not be missed from consideration. These gains are also used to further deepen authoritarianism. As Youngs, whom we referred to in the theoretical part of this article, said, the policy of the West in relation to allied regimes is built on equipping and training governments rather than forcing them into democratic reforms. In other words, the West does not demand democratic reforms very seriously from authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes it considers an ally in the security field (or any other field), does not set any compulsory condition, on the contrary, it strengthens the security apparatus of those countries with training and equipment. That is, independence of the courts, parliamentary control, media freedom, or human rights mechanisms do not become the priority, but rather issues like border control, surveillance technologies, police cooperation, arms sales, and training of security forces. And the strengthening of the security apparatus means that one of the main pillars for authoritarian and semi-authoritarian regimes becomes even more resilient. This context is highly relevant for Turkey, because cooperation with the West in the security field covers exactly fields like the defense industry, the fight against terrorism, migration management, border security, police, and intelligence cooperation, rather than democratic institutions - the document signed with Britain is also no exception from this perspective.
CONCLUSION
The strategic partnership document signed between Turkey and the United Kingdom is not only a diplomatic rapprochement between two countries, but one of the examples of the West's changing approach to Turkey. In this approach, Turkey is no longer a candidate country for EU membership whose democratization is demanded, but an authoritarian partner carrying importance with its security function. The West sees that authoritarianism has deepened in Turkey, that Erdoğan's personal power strengthens from year to year, and that normative values like human rights, the rule of law, and democracy are being destroyed. Because the scale of authoritarianism in the country - total control over the media, harsh pressures on the few critics, the politicization of the courts and their passing entirely into the government's control, the opposition being subjected to mass repressions, election results later being changed by the hand of the state apparatus, pressures on civil society, etc. - is not at an unnoticeable extent, on the contrary, it is at a level where hiding it is impossible. This finds its reflection in the reports of European institutions and international human rights and media organizations as well. But the main problem also emerges here - the West's diagnoses regarding Turkish authoritarianism exist merely on paper, these determinations do not turn into a subject of any political condition, on the contrary, they are sacrificed to security interests. Because Turkey is an indispensable actor for the West despite its problematic political regime, and events happening in the world recently have further increased its importance. Ankara, whose importance for the West increased in fields like migration after the start of the Syrian war, and energy after the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, has also come to the fore as an important security actor in the new reality that arose after Trump came to power for the second time. This role of Turkey is emphasized in all discussions related to the re-formation of the European security architecture. Due to this reason, the West does not approach democracy problems very painfully in relations with Turkey, it thinks this is a problem that can be managed in the face of Ankara's weight as a security actor. Undoubtedly, the Erdoğan government uses such a favorable international situation for its own authoritarian interests. Turkey not being isolated abroad due to the deepening of authoritarianism, on the contrary, being invited to prestigious international partner chairs, reduces the international costs of the Erdoğan regime. At the same time, this demonstration of trust abroad ensures the continuity of Erdoğan's "strong leader" cult domestically. This is exactly the greatest gain for the Erdoğan government.
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BirGün, 2026. CHP’ye çok boyutlu saldırı: 2 yılda 23 seçilmiş belediye başkanı tutuklandı, 25 başkan görevden uzaklaştırıldı. https://www.birgun.net/haber/chp-ye-cok-boyutlu-saldiri-2-yilda-23-secilmis-belediye-baskani-tutuklandi-25-baskan-gorevden-uzaklastirildi-707542
Bianet, 2026 b. 31 belediye başkanı görevden alındı, 13’üne kayyım atandı.
https://bianet.org/haber/31-belediye-baskani-gorevden-alindi-13-une-kayyim-atandi-318228
Human Rights Watch, 2026 b. Türkiye: Impeded Access to Mayor’s Trial,
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Reuters, 2026. Erdogan names prosecutor who led opposition crackdown as Turkey justice minister.
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Medyascope, 2024. 15 Temmuz’dan günümüze Türkiye’de cemaatlerin devletle ilişkisi. https://medyascope.tv/2024/10/21/cemaat-ve-tarikatlarla-turkiye-fethullahcilarin-yerini-kim-aldi/
Duvar English, 2021. Turkish judiciary under control of Islamist sects: Top court member.https://www.duvarenglish.com/turkish-judiciary-under-control-of-islamist-sects-top-court-member-news-59236
CHP, 2026. CHP Lideri Özgür Özel: “Akın Gürlek’in Elindeki ve Satılan Gayrimenkullerinin Toplam Değeri 452 Milyon Lira.
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Diken, 2026. Yalım’ın gözaltı görüntüsü: Özel’den ‘millet’e özür, iktidar medyasına lanet.
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Seyrek, Demir Murat, 2026, Could defence cooperation generate a spillover effect for Türkiye–EU relations?,
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Associated Press, 2025. German chancellor calls for stronger Europe-Turkey ties during Ankara visit.
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Euractiv, 2025. Britain allows Ankara to buy Eurofighter jets.
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Chiriatti, Alessia, 2026. Unlocking Strategic Potential Outside the EU: Italy-Turkey Bilateral Partnership in Defence.
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Cats Network, 2025. Despite the EU: Spain’s Security and Defence Cooperation with Turkey.
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CSİS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) 2025. Strategic Ambiguity: Erdoğan’s Turkey in a Multipolar World. https://www.csis.org/analysis/strategic-ambiguity-erdogans-turkey-multipolar-world
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Korkmaz, Seren Selvin, 2025. Beyond Diplomacy: The Political Utility of Foreign Policy in Türkiye. https://ipc.sabanciuniv.edu/Content/Images/CKeditorImages/20250407-14042166.pdf
