In Turkey’s recent history there is an event known as the “postmodern coup.” Its essence was that, without a military takeover, decisions adopted at the National Security Council meeting on February 28, 1997, and primarily through media campaigns, compelled the Islamist government of Necmettin Erbakan to resign. What is happening in Azerbaijan now can, to a certain extent, be likened to that event: in the media sphere a process of “exposing and neutralizing an attempted coup” is underway. One could conditionally characterize this as the “neutralization of a coup attempt by postmodern means.”
Silent security services, speaking media
On October 14, pro-government media outlets reported that the former head of the Presidential Administration, Ramiz Mehdiyev, had been charged under Articles 274 (High Treason), 278.1 (Actions aimed at seizing power by force), and 193-1.3.2 (Legalization of criminally obtained funds) of the Criminal Code, and that a court had chosen four months of house arrest as a preventive measure against him (Qafqazinfo, October 14, 2025). From that date onward, the media was dominated by exposé and accusatory content about R. Mehdiyev and his coup plan. As per usual practice on outlets funded by the authorities, informational and analytical pieces that give every impression of being sent “from above” are published. The articles, in a manner reminiscent of the practices of 1937–38, extensively discuss the damage traitors have done to the state and people, their betrayal of the leader, and pronounce “judgment” on them. Yet there is still no official statement. (This piece was prepared on October 20.) If there was an attempt to seize power by force, there should be an official statement from the Prosecutor General’s Office or the State Security Service (or both). Most likely, such a statement will be issued in the coming days, but the delay of this announcement and the silence of official bodies over the past week is a non-standard situation. Instead, the vacuum is being filled by the media — or, to put it differently: the vacuum is being filled via the media.
These sites have no freedom to publish independent news and analyses on important topics and everyone in the country knows this. Theses come from the Presidential Administration, and sometimes ready-made articles labeled as analysis are sent to editorial offices. One striking point is that in these pieces it is not only Ramiz Mehdiyev who is being targeted; inadvertently, the regime as a whole is being exposed and its true nature and the real picture of the country are revealed. It appears the media campaign was not well-prepared and the author(s) were simply given instructions and talking points to darken the colors as much as possible.
Why does the regime deny its own past?
In materials sent from the Presidential Administration and in articles prepared in line with the editorial course given to newsrooms, Ramiz Mehdiyev is accused of a very wide range of crimes — being an agent of Russia, heading a “fifth column,” placing saboteurs, spies and provocateurs in various state and private structures, weakening the country’s defense capability, engaging in corruption, bribery and nepotism, interfering in elections, persecuting businessmen and entrepreneurs, dealing blows to Azerbaijan’s economy and science, causing the collapse of the judicial-legal system — in short, of treason, and of being the cause of every problem in the country. An article signed by the “Report Analytical Group” states that Mehdiyev, despite having had no special qualities even during the Soviet era, was appointed to leading positions and that the appointment and clan-building of such people remained important for Moscow even after the Soviet Union dissolved. (Report, October 16, 2025). The logical question arises: if that’s the case, why did the experienced statesman Heydar Aliyev, shortly after assuming leadership of independent Azerbaijan in 1993, appoint his long-known associate Ramiz Mehdiyev to the crucial state position of head of the Presidential Administration? Similarly, why did Ilham Aliyev, after becoming president, keep Mehdiyev in that post for so long? The claim that a person who stood at the political, ideological, and administrative center of the country for 25 years is a “traitor” actually indicates the strategic failure of state governance.
Was it Mehdiyev who was Moscow’s man — or the entire system?
From February 7, 1995, until October 23, 2019, Ramiz Mehdiyev served as head of the Presidential Administration — effectively the country’s second most powerful person. If during that period he truly inflicted the damage to national security and the state that the current pro-government media now describe, he cannot be solely responsible. Responsibility falls directly on the presidents who appointed him to the high post and allowed him to remain there for nearly a quarter of a century: father and son. Talk that Mehdiyev was Moscow’s man — the resident of a Russian spy network in Azerbaijan — circulated for a long time in political, public and media circles, and even ordinary citizens mentioned it. Yet the regime’s media now presents this as new information. On the other hand, the authorities’ media eagerly listing the serious and complex problems caused by Mehdiyev can be seen as an admission that these problems exist. This both undermines the success-story narrative, long propagated domestically and internationally by the regime, and confirms the correctness of criticisms voiced by Azerbaijan’s opposition circles (opposition political parties, non-governmental organizations, and media). Over the years, many independent journalists, activists, NGO representatives and politicians who took an oppositional stance and exposed precisely the negative phenomena that the pro-government press now admits, were persecuted, subjected to police violence, jailed, or forced to leave the country to escape persecution. Some of them are still imprisoned. Responsibility for the unlawful actions inflicted on these individuals, for injustices and for the country’s descent into socioeconomic crisis and dictatorship, cannot be limited to Ramiz Mehdiyev and his close circle alone.
It is also noteworthy that, while a person accused of especially grave crimes has been placed under house arrest (a preventive measure legally permissible under such circumstances), journalists and civic activists accused of lesser offenses remain detained during the investigation — another instance of illegality and injustice.
Who is included in Mehdiyev’s network — or who is being placed there?
If there was indeed preparation for the forcible seizure of power, Ramiz Mehdiyev could not have done this alone. Both carrying out the plan and governing the state afterwards require a team. Thus, the composition of Mehdiyev’s team is of interest. According to pieces that appeared on APA, Qafqazinfo and similar outlets close to official circles (October 18, 2025), Mehdiyev’s inner circle allegedly includes: former Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov; former departmental head of the Presidential Administration Ali Hasanov; former Culture Minister Abulfas Garayev; the president’s former press secretary Azer Gasimov; former Minister of National Security Eldar Mahmudov and his relative-in-law; former head of the International Bank of Azerbaijan Jahangir Hajiyev; former Transport Minister Ziya Mammadov and his brother Elton Mammadov. Also mentioned are Zahid Oruj, head of the Social Studies Center (a public legal entity), MP Malahat Ibrahimqizi, and other deputies, with the warning that ingratitude and treason end badly... (When discussing the Russian network in Azerbaijan, one should certainly add the name of Najmaddin Sadigov, who was long the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.) It is not yet known whether the named persons are part of the criminal case and whether they will face legal prosecution. If these persons are or will be involved in the investigation, the “coup dossier” will swell considerably.
It is known that the slogan “anti-national regime” has long been a staple of opposition rhetoric and independent media’s propaganda against the authorities. If it turns out that so many people who once held high posts and were part of Ilham Aliyev’s political team acted together with Russia’s man Ramiz Mehdiyev (if the allegations are true), this is a major political scandal and confirms the opposition’s long-voiced charge that the regime was anti-national. Entrusting high offices to these individuals should create moral and legal responsibility; at the very least, Ilham Aliyev should acknowledge the inadequacy of both his and his father’s political judgment.
Did Russia betray its own man?
It did not take long to learn how Mehdiyev’s coup plan was exposed. According to loyal media (which do not publish news without permission), on October 9, during the meeting in Dushanbe, Putin informed Ilham Aliyev about it (APA, October 16, 2025). Reportedly, Mehdiyev sought to exploit tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia to prepare a coup and offered the plan to Russia through his channels. He had allegedly proposed creating a provisional State Council for the transition period and shared the list of those to be represented there with Russia. Moscow reportedly rejected the proposal of the 87-year-old man, who offered nothing promising, and decided to inform official Baku about him and his network.
The collapse of the security discourse: who protects Azerbaijan — the State Security Service or the Kremlin?
The situation is paradoxical: Azerbaijan does not trust Russia and sees it as a threat; the exposed Ramiz Mehdiyev is Russia’s man; and yet the final picture is that Russia “saves” Azerbaijan (i.e., the Aliyev regime). This political equation is difficult to comprehend by pure arithmetic or political intelligence. It is also unclear for what purpose information that Putin informed Aliyev of Mehdiyev’s plans was leaked to the press. Such information primarily discredits the country’s security structures because it implies they were unaware of what was happening in their own backyard and that it was Russia that alerted the president to the expected danger. It is worth recalling that after the sudden dismissal of National Security Minister Eldar Mahmudov in October 2015, rumors circulated in Azerbaijan’s political and media circles that Aliyev had acted following a secret dossier provided to him by Putin about Mahmudov’s actions.
The Russian factor: a new form of post-Soviet dependence
What has occurred clearly demonstrates that although Russia may have lost some of its influence, it still remains an important actor in Azerbaijan’s domestic politics. For years, Moscow has preserved this influence not only through military and energy means but also by shaping political elites, influencing the internal balance of security institutions, and managing information flows. The “Ramiz Mehdiyev case” shows that this influence is not just an inertia leftover from the past but continues to operate via functioning mechanisms.
In fact, the incident exposes that Azerbaijan’s notion of a “sovereign security architecture” is formal in nature and that the country’s internal centers of power remain politically dependent on foreign capitals.
References:
APA. 2025. “Ramiz Mehdiyevin dövlət çevrilişi planı necə ifşa olunub? Mehdiyev işinin detalları.” APA.az, October 16, 2025. https://apa.az/hadise/ramiz-mehdiyevin-dovlet-cevrilisi-plani-nece-ifsa-olunub-mehdiyev-isinin-detallari-921791
APA. 2025. “Ramiz Mehdiyev – nankorluq və xəyanət anatomiyası: onun planında kimlər olub?” APA.az, October 18, 2025. https://apa.az/daxili-siyaset/ramiz-mehdiyev-nankorluq-ve-xeyanet-anatomiyasi-onun-planinda-kimler-olub-922152
Qafqazinfo. 2025. “Ramiz Mehdiyev dövlətə xəyanətdə ittiham olunur: maddələr məlum oldu.” Qafqazinfo.az, October 14, 2025. https://qafqazinfo.az/news/detail/ramiz-mehdiyev-dovlete-xeyanetde-ittiham-olunur-maddeler-melum-oldu-485569
Report.az. 2025. “Dövlətin içində dövlətə qarşı: ‘Boz kardinal’ın ifşası finiş xəttində.” Report.az, October 16, 2025. https://report.az/analitika/dovletin-icinde-dovlete-qarsi-boz-kardinal-in-ifsasi-finis-xettinde-serh
